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SELECTIONS

FROM THE

LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND OTHER STATE PAPERS

PRESERVED IN THE

BOMBAY SECRETARIAT.

MARÁTHA SERIES,

VOL. I., PART II.

EDITED BY
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DECCAN COLLEGE,
FELLOW OF THE BOMBAY UNIVERSITY.

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CONTENTS.

PAGE.

THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR ... ... 209—482

I. Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's Campaign 211

II. Papers relating to the intrigues of the French at the Marátha Court 288

III. Diary and Proceedings of Messrs. Carnac, Egerton, and Mostyn, appointed by the Hon'be the President and Select Committee of Bombay to conduct Raghunáthráv to Poona 338

IV. Brigadier General Goddard's Campaign 387

V. Index ... ... i—ii

THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

Bombay Castle, Friday, 17th March 1775.

Under the 17th ultimo our forces under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, set out from hence for Surat, to proceed from thence to the assistance of Raghunáthráv Peshwa, commonly called Rághoba. Previous to their arrival at Surat, Rághoba with his army had an engagement with the army of his enemies, the Ministerial Party. When finding, in the heat of battle, that a considerable part of his forces, consisting mostly of Arabs, who were posted near his person, neglected to do their duty, he apprehended a general disaffection, and therefore immediately fled from the army towards Cambay, and from thence to Bhávnagar. He there embarked on one of our gallivats, and arrived at Surat the 23rd ultimo, where he was received by the Chief as a friend and ally to the Company. Some time after his arrival he executed the treaty with the Company exactly agreeable to the terms that had been transmitted by us (as a Select Committee) from hence; the Chief, agreeable to the power given him having at the same time executed one to Rághoba in behalf of the Company until the same could be ratified by us. Intelligence of this event having been received from the Chief on the 12th instant, as entered on the Diary of the Select Committee, the treaty ratified by us was this day signed in order to its being transmitted to Surat by the vessels now proceeding for being delivered; or if Rághoba and our forces have left Surat in consequence of the instructions we sent to the Chief and Council in our letter of the 8th instant, that it then be transmitted to him. The treaty with the ratification of it is as follows:—

Seal
of the
Company.

Articles of agreement between the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esquire, the President and Governor and Council of Bombay and of all its dependencies, on part and behalf of the Hon'ble United East India Company on the one part, and Raghunáthráv Báláji Peshwa on the other part.—Dated the 6th day of March in the year of our Lord 1775, on the third day of the month Moharram and year 1189 (Hijira), Mahomedan style.

ARTICLE I.

The treaty concluded between the Government of Bombay and Bájiráv Pandit Pradhán or first Minister of His Serene Highness the Sháhu Rájá, dated July 1739, or 1140 of the Gentoo style, and that concluded on the part of this Government with Báláji Bájiráv Pradhán, dated 12th October 1756, or of the Mahomedan style 17th of Moharram 1170, are hereby ratified and confirmed in their fullest extent according to the true intent and meaning of them in the same full and ample manner and in the same light in which they have hitherto been ever understood.

ARTICLE II.

All other agreements subsisting between the Government of Bombay and that of the Maráthás are hereby ratified and confirmed, and after the re-establishment of Rághoba in the

Government of the Marátha dominions peace and tranquillity shall subsist between this Government in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and the Marátha Government.

Article III.

Rághoba on his part and on the part of the Marátha Government engages from this day forward never on any pretence or in any manner to assist the enemies of the Hon'ble Company in any part whatever of their dominions in India, and the Hon'ble the Governor in Council of Bombay do in the like manner engage never to assist the enemies of Rághoba.

Article IV.

The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and in consideration of the undermentioned grants and cessions made by Rághoba to the Company do hereby engage and agree, so soon as possible after these articles of agreement and treaty are fully ratified, executed and confirmed on the part of Rághoba, to assist him with a strong body of forces with proper guns and warlike stores as a field train of artillery which are to join his army and act in conjunction with his forces against his enemies, the Ministerial Party. In the said body of forces shall be included no less than seven hundred (700) Europeans and the whole shall not be less in number than two thousand five hundred men: but at present only five hundred (500) Europeans and one thousand (1,000) sepoys and lascars, with a proper and effectual number of guns, will be sent, and the rest, if wanted, afterwards.

Article V.

In consideration of such effectual assistance on the part of the Hon'ble Company, Rághoba, as Peshwa and as Supreme Governor in the whole Marátha Empire, doth hereby engage on his part to cede and make over to the Hon'ble Company, for ever, the undermentioned places and territories; and he doth accordingly by these presents make over the same to them in the most full, ample and effectual manner: and he doth with these presents deliver the necessary sanads granting in the fullest manner all the present and future full right and title of the Marátha Government to them; and, in case of loss at any time of the sanads now delivered, these presents are at all times to be considered as such and of full equal validity with any sanad whatever.

Bassein and the whole of its dependencies in its fullest extent, and all rents and revenues thereunto belonging, together with the forts or fort and everything belonging to the Poona Government in them.

Sálsette, the whole and entire island, with all the revenues of the different places annexed to it as collected by Anantráv and Rámáji Pant.

Jambusar and Olpád with the whole of their dependencies in their full extent, together with everything belonging to the Poona Government in those parganás.

The four following islands adjacent to Bombay, with everything belonging to the Poona Government therein, *viz.*, Karanja, Kaneri, Elephanta and Hog Island.

Article VI.

Rághoba also engages immediately to procure from the Gáikawárs a grant to the Company for ever, with all the necessary sanads, of their share in the revenues collected by the Gáikawárs in the town and parganas of Broach.

Article VII.

The Hon'ble Company are to be considered as the sole lords and proprietors, from the day of the signing of this treaty, of all and every of the places ceded by the two last articles,

in the like manner as the Poona Government or the Gáikawár Government were before considered; and are accordingly from this day forward to exercise every right and authority in those places, and to receive every revenue which the Poona Government or the Gáikawár Government before exercised or received.

Article VIII.

Rághoba also engages faithfully to make good to the Company for ever the sum of seventy-five thousand (75,000) rupees annually from his share of the revenues of Occlaseer (Anklesvar), which sum is to be paid by his Pandit in two different payments at stated periods.

Article IX.

Rághoba engages to pay in full for the charges and expenses of the body of forces with which he is to be assisted, consisting of two thousand five hundred men, the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand rupees monthly, and every month which the Hon'ble the Governor and Council agree to accept without further account, and is to commence the day the forces leave Bombay; but as the whole number of forces will not at first proceed, he is only to pay a proportionable monthly sum till the whole force, if necessary, may be sent to join him. He engages to pay this stipend monthly and security for the same till his affairs will enable him to furnish money which he promises to do as soon as possible; he assigns by these presents the revenues of the following places, *viz*:

Occlaseer (Anklesvar) his remaining share after deducting what is before by these presents ceded to the Hon'ble Company.

Ahmood and all its districts.

Hansoot and all its districts.

Versaul and all its districts.

But it is hereby declared that the revenues of these places belong to the Hon'ble Company no longer than till the amount of the monthly stipend that may be due for the expenses of the Company's forces is fully discharged, when all further demands on these four places are to be relinquished; and in this light the Hon'ble the Governor and Council declare they accept those four parganás.

Article X.

As it has been mutually agreed, during the course of this negotiation, that the sum of six lákhs of rupees should be deposited by Rághoba with the Agents of the Hon'ble Company, to be accounted for at the expiration of the service intended to be performed against his enemies, the Ministerial Party, and Rághoba finding it at this time totally impossible for him to raise the sum to be deposited, though still equally willing to do it, was it in his power, the contracting parties have mutually agreed to settle this point as follows:—That Rághoba shall immediately deposit with the Company's Agents at Surat the full value of six lákhs of rupees in jewels to remain in the Hon'ble Company's possession till redeemed, which must be done as soon as Rághoba's affairs will possibly admit. All this Rághoba faithfully and firmly engages to perform and the Hon'ble Company to accept.

Article XI.

In case of opposition from any person or persons whatever to the Company's taking possession of all or any of the places hereby firmly and effectually ceded to them, Rághoba doth engage to pay the expense that will be incurred by their gaining possession; to use

effectual means to put them in possession; as well as to secure for them for ever the quiet possession of all the revenues and places now ceded to the Hon'ble Company.

ARTICLE XII.

Should Rághoba make peace with his enemies, the Ministers, he firmly and faithfully engages that the English East India Company shall be included in it to their satisfaction.

ARTICLE XIII.

Rághoba doth also engage never to molest the dominions of the Hon'ble Company in Bengal. He further engages not to make war or commit any depredations in the Karnátak so long as the last treaty subsisting between the two Governments is adhered to by the Nabob.

ARTICLE XIV.

In case it should happen (which God forbid) that any of the Company's ships or vessels, or the ships, vessels, or boats of any persons trading under their protection, should be shipwrecked on any part of the Marátha coast, every assistance shall be given by the Government and inhabitants to save as much as possible; and the whole that may be saved shall be returned, all reasonable expenses being paid by the owners.

ARTICLE XV.

All the places ceded for ever to the Company by this treaty are to be considered as their sole right and property from the day this treaty is signed; and this treaty from that day is to be considered in full force, just as if the expected services were fully accomplished, whether Rághoba shall make peace with his enemies or not.

ARTICLE XVI.

Immediately after the ratification of the aforegoing articles, and after the jewels to the full amount of six lákhs of rupees are deposited, and the security above mentioned given for the payment of the monthly expenses of the forces so long as they continue with Rághoba and till they return, all in the manner above mentioned, the Governor and the Council engage that the Company's forces, agreeable to what is mentioned in the body of this treaty, shall proceed from Bombay to join the army of Rághoba, and they trust by the blessing of the Almighty that they will quickly overcome his enemies, the Ministerial Party, and establish him at Poona in the Government of the Marátha Empire.

The foregoing articles having been agreed to by the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, who have empowered me to accept the same in their behalf, I do, in confirmation thereof, affix the seal of the said Hon'ble Company and sign my own proper name thereto, in Surat, the day and year above written, and I do engage to procure a ratification of this treaty under the seals of the Hon'ble Company, and under the hands and seals of the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, within thirty days after this date.

(Signed) ROBERT GAMBIER.

We, the President and Council of Bombay aforesaid, having empowered Mr. Robert Gambier to execute a treaty with Raghunáthrav Báláji Peshwa in our behalf, on account of the Hon'ble Company, of the foregoing tenor, which he has accordingly done of the date above mentioned, and the same having been signed to, ratified, and confirmed by Raghunáthráv Báláji Peshwa; and whereas by the last article it is covenanted and agreed that a ratification of the said Treaty shall be transmitted by us under the seal of the Hon'ble Company and under our proper hands and seals within one month from the above date; these, therefore, are to

certify that we hereby ratify and confirm the foregoing treaty in all and every part. In testimony whereof we have caused the seal of the aforesaid Hon'ble Company to be hereunto affixed, and do now sign the same with our hands, and affix our proper seals thereunto, this 16th day of March in the year of our Lord 1775.

(Signed) WILLIAM HORNBY, (L.S.)
„ DANIEL DRAPER, (L.S.)
„ THOMAS MOSTYN, (L.S.)
„ BRICE FLETCHFR, (L.S.)
„ WILLIAM TAYLOR, (L.S.)

By order of the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esquire, President and Governor of Her Majesty's Castle and Island of Bombay, and of all forts, factories, territories, forces, and affairs of the Hon'ble English East India Company on the west side of India and on the coast of Persia and Arabia.

(Signed) GEORGE SKIPP (L.S.),
Secretary.

Instructions to Colonel KEATING *on his proceeding to join* RÁGHOBA.

SIR,—Having appointed you to the command of a body of the Hon'ble Company's forces intended to proceed to the assistance of Rághoba for re-establishing him in the supreme Government of the Marátha Empire, which his enemies—the Ministerial Party—are and have been for some time past attempting to deprive him of; we direct you to take upon you the command and that you proceed to Surat on the ship "Calcutta," with such part of the force which is to compose this detachment as is sent from hence, the returns of which have already been delivered.

The force intended for this service is to consist of 80 Artillery, 350 European Infantry, 800 sepoys and 160 lascars, which with their officers and non-commissioned officers will amount to upwards of 1,500 men, which is the number with which we have at present agreed to assist him. Whatever the force now sent from hence is deficient in point of numbers will be made up from the garrisons of Surat and Broach.

Though the treaty with Rághoba is not absolutely concluded by any advices we have received from Surat, yet we have every reason to suppose from the directions we have lately sent to the Chief, that it must be executed before you arrive at the bar. Of this Mr. Gambier will advise you. In case it is not finished you are to proceed no further than Surat, but should it be executed as we must believe it will, you are to proceed to such port or place as the Chief may direct you to do, in consequence of what may have been agreed upon between him and the Agent of Rághoba for most easily effecting a junction with Rághoba and with his army; taking under your command such part of the force now at Surat as the Chief and Factors may order, and pursuing the most eligible means with the advice of the Chief for joining the detachment that will be sent from the garrison of Broach.

A proper field train and the necessary stores are sent from hence, the accounts of which the Commissary is furnished with.

Uncertain as we at present are, not only with respect to the exact situation of Rághoba's affairs, but with his precise designs, we therefore can give you no positive directions for your conduct. You are sent to his assistance against his enemies—the Ministerial Party and their adherents—and of course you are to move with his army, and to do everything for bringing this

war to a speedy and happy issue, that he may desire of you, and that you may think the force under your command will be able to effect.

We rely upon you to take every opportunity of conciliating the good opinion of Rághoba and of those persons who may be most in his confidence and esteem, and then we do not doubt, but that he will readily hearken to your advice in respect to his military operations, from the just confidence which the country powers in general place in the skill and abilities of Europeans in the art of war, which by experience they well know is much superior to their own.

It is our wish, and we believe it is Rághoba's intention, to proceed to Poona so soon as he is joined by our forces; you are therefore to urge him to this step if from circumstances you find it consistent; and could he gain any material advantage over the adverse army by our assistance, it will tend most effectually to depress his adversaries, and bring over to his party many who we have reason to believe at present are afraid to declare in his favour.

Sensible as you must be of the bigotry of the Gentoos in general, especially of those of the higher castes to their particular notions and customs, and as it may be attended with very ill consequences to give any just cause of offence in these points, we therefore direct that you prevent any under your command from doing so, and we particularly enjoin and direct that no bullocks be ever killed for the Europeans or others, unless you are perfectly satisfied that it may be done without any umbrage being taken at it.

Keep strict discipline among the forces; and we strongly and earnestly recommend to you, and direct, that as far as in your power this service may be brought to a speedy issue, for you will know how much these forces are wanted here, and that nothing but the absolute necessity of the measure and to gain the great advantages that are to issue to the Company from it, would have induced us to enter the measures we have now adopted.

You are constantly to advise us of your proceeding and situation, and of the state of Rághoba's army, and of his affairs, his proceedings, designs and expectations, together with your sentiments thereon. You are not to correspond with either of the other Presidencies; they will be acquainted of the needful through us.

Mr. John Tarlesse is appointed Commissary of Stores and Provisions to the forces under your command; Mr. James Forbes to act as Chaplain, Mr. George Lovebond, Judge Advocate, and Mr. Thomas Holmes, Paymaster and Secretary.

A commission empowering you to appoint general courts-martial is enclosed with a warrant empowering Mr. Lovebond to officiate as Judge Advocate, which is to be delivered to him.

Mr. Samuel Richardson, one of the principal Surgeons of the Presidency, proceeds as Surgeon-Major and is to be considered and obeyed as such by the other Surgeons who are employed on this occasion; and they must accordingly follow his directions respecting the hospital and the sick.

Should you meet with any conveyance coming from Surat on board of which there should be any officers who are to proceed on this service, you are to order them to return with you to Surat.

We direct that you keep an exact and regular diary of all your proceedings to commence from this day. In this diary all letters and papers that you send and receive must be inserted, and the motions of Rághoba and of his army must be noticed in it. Two copies of this diary must be delivered on your return.

As it is improper to permit of a table being kept at the expense of the Hon'ble Company, we therefore forbid it, but you will be paid such allowances as the practice of the service and your rank may entitle you to expect.

As Rághoba will be under engagements to the Company when the treaty is signed, to pay monthly a considerable stipend for the expense of our forces under your command, you are therefore, as money may be wanted, to endeavour to procure from him sufficient sums for defraying the expenses in the departments of the Commissary and Paymaster, which sums are to be delivered to those officers, who will account for them, and you are to assure Rághoba that all sums of money so advanced shall be carried to his account and considered as part of the sum which he has engaged monthly to pay to the Company: should it at any time be out of Rághoba's power thus to furnish you with such sums of money as may be wanted, those officers must pass their drafts on us, or on Surat Factory, for the money that shall be required for the indispensable occasions of the army.

We heartily wish you success, and are,

Your loving friends,

Bombay Castle,
17th February 1775.

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COUNCIL.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel KEATING *to the* PRESIDENT.

HON'BLE SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, that the troops and stores under my command arrived in the road of Surat at eleven o'clock the night of the 27th ultimo, without any accident except the loss of a fishing boat but no people. The morning of the 28th I proceeded to town, when I was informed by Mr. Gambier of the defeat and retreat of the Peshwa Rághoba, and yesterday I was introduced to him. He appears a man of sound judgment and of quick and clear conceptions. The best to enable me to lay before your Honour a true state of his present situation and my opinion thereof, I have enquired of him and also the most intelligent of his people respecting the late engagements and its subsequent consequences. The information received is as follows:

On the 17th instant the army under the Ministers Haripant Fadkia, Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar crossed the Máhi at Sanwali Pargana about 35 kos from Cambay, and did attack the army of Rághoba, which then consisted of about 35,000 horse and foot. The army commanded by Haripant Fadkia consisted of about 42,000 horse. The engagement commenced about noon, and ended about 8 in the evening. The loss of the action to Rághoba was occasioned by the disaffection of a body of 12,000 Arabs, who refused to engage on account of large arrears of pay being due to them, so that he was left to withstand the whole ministerial force with a very inferior one. After sustaining the loss of about three or four hundred men, Rághoba was obliged to retreat towards Cambay, which place he reached at 3 o'clock next day, and proceeded immediately for Bhávnagar, where he arrived the same night with about seven hundred horsemen, seven elephants and a few camels: so great was his haste to proceed to Surat to take the protection of the Company, that he embarked without making any esteem of the horses, &c. They were turned loose, and he, his adopted son, and about nine hundred of his followers proceeded to this place. The chief officers of Rághoba's army are Appáji Mahádev, Sadáshiv Rámchandra, Sakhárám Hari, Govindráv Gáikawár and Khanderáv Gáikawár from whom he had heard to the following purport:—

"We are much surprised to find that after our having fought so well with the army of Haripant Fadkia that you are 'missing'; nor do we know where to send to you, this going as chance may direct. However we have now collected all our forces amounting to about 16,000, mostly

horse, also our ammunition at the fort of Coppergunge, which is about 50 kos from Cambay, and there shall remain until we receive your orders." Rághoba has returned answers to these advices to this purport. "The reason" says he "of my being obliged to retreat was owing to Haripant Fadkia having made the attack with 25,000 men on the centre, where I was with little more than 4,000 men, being deserted by the Arabs who drew off and refused to fight. Thus situated and finding the whole force of Haripant's troops was against my person, I went to Cambay, from thence to Bhávnagar, and there took shipping to Surat, where I arrived safe after many troubles which have been made up for in a great degree by the kind reception I met with from my good friends the English. The Governor in Council of Bombay has sent me a good force, and all kinds of guns and ammunition, so that I only wait to hear from you what place you think most proper to join my forces to the English; and when that is once accomplished my affairs will soon be in a proper condition. I wait to have your speedy answer to this great business and very much wish it may come soon."

The above, Hon'ble Sir, I believe, is a genuine account, since which he (Rághoba) has received many advices, that serve to confirm his army being collected to the number of twenty thousand under the command of the abovementioned officers; also that all his baggage, &c., supposed to be lost are actually safe. From the above circumstances, together with the many conversations I have had with his people, I draw the following conclusions:—That the Ministers, finding the treaty between the Hon'ble Company and Rághoba upon the eve of ratification, determined if possible to strike a grand stroke, and demolish Rághoba before a junction of our force could take place. Thus resolved they sent emissaries among the Arabs on whom Rághoba placed his greatest dependence, and by some bribes and large promises they were prevailed upon to stand neutral. The Ministerial Party assured of this, crossed the river, and made their grand attack on that part where Rághoba's quarters were, and where the Arabs were posted. As soon as the Arabs refused to engage, Rághoba concluded himself betrayed, and was confirmed therein by the Ministerial army pushing particularly for the part he was posted in; filled with these sentiments he retired. Some people there are who say that Rághoba suspected a general defection of his officers, but I do not believe a word of it. Since his being here he expressed the fullest confidence in Govindráv and Khanderáv, also in his Ministers; and the result proves he was not deceived. They are staunch to him, nor do I doubt of their pursuing every measure to effect a speedy junction with us; but I think it will be absolutely necessary for our forces to proceed to Cambay. I do not think the danger attending this measure great. It very frequently happens, as I am well informed, that fifty boats have proceeded to Cambay without sustaining any damage: if then so large a number of merchants' boats who have no respect to a general safety can do so, it is very reasonable to suppose it may be done by us who can procure pilots and be assisted by a regular plan of proceeding. Should we ever land at Jambusar, the river Máhi must be crossed before we join Rághoba's forces. This measure, I am assured, will be attended with equal, if not more danger, than landing at Cambay and ten times the trouble. As to the collected force now at Kapadvanj, I think they cannot move towards Broach. Indeed I am of opinion it would be greatest imprudence to attempt it. Their present post is a good one, their numbers much inferior, and thus situated it is not for them to risk anything before we join them. All matters considered I am clearly of opinion, granting we receive a full confirmation of the situation of the army of Rághoba under Govindráv and Khanderáv, we should re-embark our force, and sail from hence for Cambay on the 13th day of this present moon which is the most proper time as I am informed. Mr. Gambier has this instant received a letter from Mr. Malet, dated the 2nd instant, which confirms me in the propriety of landing at Cambay.

I have nothing more to add saving that Rághoba has sent every assurance of the great sense he has of your friendly intention towards him, and says he shall always esteem himself bound by every tie to render the Hon'ble Company every advantage in his power. I believe he writes to you to this effect.

Surat, 4th March 1775.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating to the Governor and Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I did myself the honour under the 15th instant to inform you of my having left Surat road on my way hither. On the afternoon of the 7th we arrived, and by the 20th in the morning all our boats in port, without sustaining any damage. Since being here Rághoba has received frequent accounts from his army under conduct of Govindráv. Yesterdey he had letters from them, dated 14th instant, in which they tell him "that they are now in the Bisnagar country at a place called Pálanpur, about 29 kos from Ahmedabad, a strong defile. Their army consists of 15,000 chosen horse besides tattoo horse and foot—the total amount twenty-five thousand. They wait to hear from him what port the English mean to come to, and particularly mention their wishing it to be Cambay or Broach, but prefer the former for a junction and are impatient to have certain intelligence." At two yesterday afternoon a party of one hundred horse and foot, part of the troops that dispersed after Rághoba's flight, arrived here from Ahmedabad. They left it the morning of the 10th, and there were stale accounts arrived on the 8th, that our troops and Rághoba's would arrive here on the 16th instant, that upon the strength of said news they had come here, as would numbers now very shortly. That the inhabitants round Ahmedabad and on their way here appeared much pleased with the intelligence. That Gunáji, Governor of Ahmedabad, was with the Ministerial army; and his son commanded during his absence not more than two thousand horse and foot in the town and neighbourhood.

I visited the Naváb last night. He gave me the strongest assurance of his attachment to our interest and declared himself ready to render us every assistance in his power. I am not without hope that some stroke of importance may be struck with his and Jallum's assistance in this neighbourhood. The Naváb wrote for him and he is expected here this afternoon. While I was with the Naváb one of his harkárás arrived from the Ministerial army. The morning of the 19th it was five *kos* from the side of Kapadvanj and forty-five from Cambay. On the 17th accounts were received from Jambusar of our force being on their passage to Cambay, that a body of 5,000 horse, commanded by whom he did not know, had marched about the 17th with great numbers of cattle, women, &c., towards the Deccan. Sakhárám Bápu, from an assurance that Rághoba and his party were totally demolished after the late battle, wrote to Haripant Fadkia to send Mahádji Sindia to Poona to settle accounts with the Sarkár. On this coming to the knowledge of Mahádji Sindia he was greatly disgusted, and having received orders from the king, resolved to quit the Ministerial army and was actually preparing for that purpose before he left the army. That Tukoji Holkar did not appear warm in the ministerial cause. Fatte Sing's army was encamped five or six kos distant. That Haripant Fadkia gave out he intended to march his army to Neriad to meet us and give us battle if we chose. From all these circumstances it is very natural to deduce that Khanderáv and Govindráv, with their army, are staunch and zealous friends to Rághoba, and will most readily embrace the first opportunity and

prudent moment of forming a junction with us. That the heads of the Ministerial auxiliaries are most of them heartily tired of supporting the pretensions of they know not whom that the usage of Mahádji Sindia has not only drawn him from the party, but must also open the eyes of others who cannot expect better treatment in the end. These matters, added to our having so warmly espoused Rághoba and his interest, must in my opinion in a short time effectually loosen the Ministerial combination.

I hope for and anxiously wait your Honour and Council's answer to my address of the 15th instant which from every subsequent circumstance I the more earnestly hope will be agreeable to my desire; should it be so, I am almost convinced the wished-for success will crown the event.

I have the honour to be,
with most profound respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
THOMAS KEATING.

Narrancer Camp near Cambay, the 21st March 1775.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I have the honour to acquaint you that this morning about 8 o'clock we formed a junction with the whole of the Peshwa army under the command of Sadáshiv Rámchandra, Appáji Mahádev, Sakhárám Hari and Mánáji Fadkia at this village, which is about 10 miles distant from Cambay and about six from the present Camp of the Ministerial army. Most sincerely do I congratulate your Honour and Council on this event. It most certainly will insure very considerable advantages to the Hon'ble Company who really stand in need of such assistance on this side of India.

I wrote so very fully on the necessity of an immediate supply of cash-amount five lákhs as a loan to Dáda Sáheb under yesterday, that I cannot say more on that head, excepting that it now becomes more necessary than before, his force being at this time near forty thousand horse and foot, and no cash in his possession for their support.

That the spirits of such an army may not be damped I am come to resolution to give him every assistance our small military chest will allow of, until your Honour and Council are able to furnish him, which I cannot doubt of your doing without the least loss of time, and further to enable me to do this, I now write to the Chief and Council of Surat for a supply of cash. The duplicate of your Hon'ble and Council's letter of the 23rd ultimo arrived this moment, also Captain Mophin's; but as yet I have not received any answer to my address under the 31st of March.

I have the honour to remain,
with great respect,
Your most, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING.

Camp at Darra, 19 miles from Cambay, 19th April 1775, at 11 A.M.

Hon'ble Sir.—Yesterday night I wrote to the Board acquainting them of our having joined Govindráv at a village about four or five miles west of this Camp. He has brought as they are called 11,000 fighting men and by Indian enumeration our whole force is near 50,000 strong. However by minute enquiries I find we have 11,000 real good horse and 4,000 good foot, a body in every respect full enough to accomplish all we wish. The treaty with Fattesing is now signed by Dáda Sáheb. I was under an absolute necessity of making the Company a party in it,

as by that means Fattesing cedes to them the parganas depending upon the Navábship of Broach and customs of the town, and their agents are to take immediate possession thereof, and receive all and every part of its rents, revenues, &c., from this day. In order to enable Mr. Shaw to avail himself of this treaty for the advantage of the Hon'ble Company, I shall, as soon as possible, send him a copy thereof and also one to the Hon'ble Board, the original I shall not choose to risk by any conveyance at this season. I was led to this measure from two motives: first to save a kind of trouble to the Company by fighting for what could be obtained without bloodshed, and also to gain a formidable ally to Dáda Sáheb, who until very lately stood in great need of it. To-morrow morning we march to Terapur, 6 kos near the Ministerial army. Bullock carts, &c., are exceedingly scarce in this country.

I remain with sincere esteem and great respect,

THOMAS KEATING.

Darra Camp, 28th April 1775.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had the pleasure of writing you to the 21st instant, acquainting you of the junction between the Peshwa's army and Govindráv near Darra; at the same time advising your Honour and Council of my intentions of marching from Darra so soon as Mr. Tarlesse, with the treasure, stores, &c., arrives from Cambay. A duplicate of that letter I transmitted the next day *viâ* Surat.

On the 23rd instant I left Darra with Rághoba and the whole of the Peshwa's army, being joined by Govindráv and his forces on our entering the plain. We halted that day about noon at a village called Versora abounding with wells and a large tank, where I proposed encamping until Mr. Tarlesse should join us from Cambay, but the next morning finding our numerous army had exhausted all the water, I renewed our march towards the river Sábarmati. At noon we arrived on the banks and crossed the river with all our guns, stores, &c., without any difficulty or opposition from the enemy, who however were posted very near but were not in a disposition of mind to attack us.

Yesterday morning Mr. Tarlesse arriving at Angela (where I encamped on crossing with the treasure, &c.) from Cambay, I decamped this morning, and marching along the banks of the Sábarmati remained unmolested until we arrived at the village of Hasamli, when I perceived the confederate army on the opposite bank coming down towards us. After performing a few manœuvres, they drew up in order of battle and advanced. I immediately gave the necessary orders for an attack and marched down towards them. The cannonading began a little before 10 and lasted till past 12 o'clock; but the river or a branch of it being between the two armies and as our people were much fatigued with a long hot march, I could not pursue the advantage we should otherwise have reaped, particularly in taking their ordnance, &c., which however I flatter myself will fall into our hands the next engagement.

I must say I am highly pleased with the very spirited behaviour of our officers and men, who, though greatly tired with a march of nine miles, advanced briskly and most spiritedly against the enemy who were at least twenty-five times our number, for Rághoba's people never

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[1] The encampment at Darra, on an arid plain bare of trees, and exposed to the blasts of the hot winds, was intolerable: we looked back with regret to the lovely lake and shady groves of Narransur. * * * The depredation of shade and water at Darra, and our early encampments, was a serious risk to the English soldiers, who suffered very materially from the intense heat.—(Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 32.)

engaged. I have the pleasure to acquaint your Honour and Council that during this action we had only eight men wounded, and none killed. The enemy's loss, I am well informed, and have every reason to suppose, is pretty considerable. Two of their principal officers are said to be killed, with about four hundred men killed and wounded, and a number of horses and elephants. I hope in my next to give your Honour and Council a more particular account of their loss. Their guns were not badly served, and I suppose were about twelve in number; our accounts say they retired five kos before they halted, and are now encamped there.

In respect to your not being able to furnish Rághoba with a loan for his present very great necessity, I must honestly confess, I am afraid to communicate to him in the most distant terms you having declined it, as I very much fear the consequences would be despair on his part, and very near a general defection of his troops. Sensible as I am of these dreadful consequences, I cannot avoid once more in the strongest manner urging your Honour and Council to take this so very consequential business into your most serious consideration, when I am certain you will fall on some way or means of granting him a loan, sufficient at least to support his army for one month, by which time I do not in the least doubt but his affairs will admit of his providing amply for his army, and shortly after paying off the loan.

As to Rághoba's present plan and designs, his first great wish was to bring the Ministerial army to a close engagement, in hopes of being able to give them a severe blow, by which means the confederacy would be greatly disjoined and probably many chiefs would come over to him; then bend his course to Ahmedabad where we shall be able to supply ourselves with provisions, bullock carts, camels, &c., of which articles we now stand greatly in need. This is Rághoba's present intention, and which in my opinion the best plan he can pursue.

I have just received an undoubted intelligence that Khanderáv, with the remainder of his and Govindráv's army, is now but a few kos from hence, and will I hope arrive here to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING.

Camp near Hasamli, 28th April 1775, 9 P.M.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had the honour to address you from Hasamli on the 28th ultimo, a triplicate of which letter now accompanies this. On the 30th at nine in the evening I marched from Hasamli, in hopes of being able to reach our present ground by morning; but crossing the river and want of knowledge in our guides prevented us from accomplishing our intention, and obliged us to encamp at Chanwar.

Yesterday morning we marched from Chanwar, near five miles from hence, and arrived on the west banks of the river Watrie[1] about nine o'clock, and crossed after our advanced guard of horse had skirmished with the enemy and obliged them to retreat. After our army was in motion towards Kaira the whole of the Ministerial army appeared upon our right flank, and rode on at full gallop, as if resolved to charge; upon which I ordered the line to halt, wheel up, and receive them. Our fire soon checked their progress and turned their attention to the rear of the Peshwa's army which they attacked with great vigor, but there they found themselves mistaken, as I had to prevent bad consequence posted two six-pounders, fifty Europeans, and

[1] "We encamped in a large mango grove on the banks of the Wartruc or Batruc, a small river which joins the Sabermatty at a little distance."—(Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 74.)

the same number of sepoys in their rear. About this time a large body attempted an attack upon our left but were received so warmly that they could make nothing of it. Our line advanced upon them as far as possible, but the ground between us and them was rough, and divided with deep hollow ways, and the number of lascars to move our guns so small as made it impossible to pursue them. In something less than two hours they all retreated in very great confusion, since which we have not seen them. The ground as I said being broken and full of hollow ways, made our shot, case and round, fall heavy mostly on their men, who must have suffered severely. It is said by our harkárás twelve hundred are killed and wounded, but I think not so many; not a man of the English army is hurt; about fifty or sixty of the Peshwa's army are killed and wounded. An elephant-keeper was dangerously wounded, by which accident the elephant got loose, ran away, and suppose has since got into the enemy's possession.

We are now fighting the enemy to a great disadvantage by being encumbered with a large bázár and baggage, whereas theirs is always at a distance; they move lightly, we heavily; nor can we move without this and all our stores; if we did, all must become a prey to the enemy. For these reasons I intended this evening to endeavour to prevail on the Peshwa to change his route and take the road towards Poona. This will oblige the Ministerial army to follow us, consequently they must march with bázár, baggage, &c., with them, and equally embarrass them as ours now do us.

I am, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING.

Mátar Camp, 2 English miles from Kaira, 3rd May 1775.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—Accompanying is triplicate of a letter I had the honour of addressing you the 3rd instant from Mátar camp, a duplicate of which has been already forwarded *viâ* Cambay, since when I have not had the pleasure of hearing from your Hon'ble Board.

On the 5th instant in the morning we marched from Mátar, and after a short progress encamped that day at Coomlah,[1] a village on the banks of the river Sheune (Sharayu ?) which place we left early the next morning, and, after marching a few miles were suddenly interrupted by the whole of the confederate army near the village of Hyderabad. They had posted themselves on an advantageous situation behind a rising ground on the opposite side of the river Sheune from whence they began a very smart cannonading, which they kept up with spirit more than an hour, as I since found, with twelve guns. They did not however make a full use of the advantage their situation afforded them by bringing their guns to the top of the hill, otherwise they might have done considerable mischief in our army; but keeping them behind the eminence, which must alone have proceeded from fear, they were obliged to elevate them so much that their shot did but little execution. Our shot and shells silenced their guns, which must undoubtedly have fallen into our hands had not the river parted us in a place which it was utterly impossible to ford. I have received repeated intelligence that in this action the enemy met with a considerable loss; among the killed was an officer of rank in their army. I have the further satisfaction to add that in our detachment only one sepoy was killed and one wounded.

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[1] Leaving Kairah unmolested we marched to Coomlah and pitched our tents in a delightful spot near the village on the banks of the Serry, a small deep river abounding with fish; the surrounding country was covered with wild fruit trees and berries of a beautiful hue and pleasant flavour, which we found refreshing during a sultry march; these indigenous fruits and some tasteless figs were all that remained, the enemy having robbed of all the ripening mangoes, tamarind and other valuable productions.—(Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 77.)

Rághoba's loss was more considerable, near thirty killed and wounded, as the greatest part of the enemy's shot seemed directed to that quarter where the Peshwa was in person on his elephant.

We left Hyderabad the 7th in the morning, directing our march for Nariad. On our approaching the village of Dahánu, two kos from hence in a woody country, the greatest part of the Ministerial army suddenly appeared within three hundred yards of the head of our line of march. Seeing them come up to the charge at full speed, I immediately halted, formed the line and got the guns unlimbered. And as they then thought proper to approach very near us, with an intent to charge the head of our line, fired a few rounds of case shot and some shells, which fell into the thickest of them, and immediately threw them into disorder. They then wheeled to the right and then to the left, and attempted to attack us on our left flank, but were so warmly received with musketry, case and round shot and shells, as obliged them to retreat in the utmost confusion. Their loss must have been great, though they did not give us time to expend much ammunition from the hurry they were in to get away. They have not since then chosen to show themselves to us.

We encamped at Dahánu for the remainder of that day, and on the 8th in the morning renewed our march to Nariad, and encamped under the walls about ten o'clock. Nariad is the principal town belonging to Khanderáv Gáikawár and indeed one of the greatest in the Gujarát province. It has a mud wall, which is very weak and flanked by towers; there are ten gates, nine of which are lately built; from every appearance a new wall is intended. On this town the Peshwa intends levying a tax to help him in his present very distressing situation respecting money matters. The late behaviour of Khanderáv who has joined the Ministerial party warrants this act, and was he not to receive a supply of cash at this juncture I really believe the greatest part of his army would leave him in a few days; six hundred have quitted him within these last five days, and was it not for the great discredit occasioned by such defections, it would matter little if some thousands of the present set were to follow the above-mentioned, but the reason of their going away hinders better troops from joining us.

Since our crossing the Sábarmati we drove the enemy thirty-three English miles before us, and defeated them in four different engagements; by our halts here which are indispensable, we have in a manner lost them, not having any certain accounts of their present place of encampment; the most reports say their intention is to cross the river Máhi, the banks of which they mean to defend, the passage twenty-one miles from hence, very broad and difficult to cross with such a heavy train of horses and baggage as must necessarily move with us, but I very much fear we shall not be able to cross it before the rains except we very speedily receive a supply of cash.

In my address of the 23rd ultimo to the Hon'ble the President, I mentioned a treaty being entered into with Fattesing in which it was absolutely necessary to include the Hon'ble Company. Two reasons made this step necessary; first, Fattesing would not touch on the business without it, but the most essential was the cession of the Broach parganas. Fattesing's Vakil was furnished with full powers, and he wrote to his master the full contents of the treaty and had his ample approbation. In this state were matters for three or four days, the Vakil pressing in the warmest terms for the treaty being signed by us; it was so on the 22nd ultimo, and sent next day to him under charge of Mr. George Lovebond, our Judge Advocate. For the subsequent proceedings and consequences I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed copy of Mr. Lovebond's letter delivered to me on his return; I must remark that I am extremely sorry this business did not take place. Had it been, the Ministerial interest would thereby be totally destroyed in the Gujarát province. Fattesing is the life and soul of their party in this country.

I said before I much feared we should not be able to cross the Máhi before the rains set in. I much wish to cross the Máhi and push towards Poona without the loss of a moment, and have made use of every argument in my power to persuade the Peshwa to pursue this measure, but must confess that his reasons against it are strong and carry much conviction. "I am," says he, "destitute of money to pay my people any part of their long arrears, or even to furnish them with provision for themselves and horses. Should I cross the Máhi in this situation my army will be in a country they know and much nearer their homes, and finding themselves without pay or support will fly from me to their families as fast as possible. This will be doing what the Ministerial party want, who wish much to go to the southward, and it is thought must at all events be obliged to do it." "On the other hand," says he, "if we take up our quarters in the Petlád District, and reduce the fort of Bowsit, our army can levy contributions and get plenty of provisions, replace from Cambay the stores we have used since our leaving it, and if the Ministerial army march to the southward send for our heavy artillery and early in the fair season reduce Baroda in our way to Poona."

After our first engagement with the Ministerial army the Peshwa was so well pleased with the behaviour of the English forces that he sent me his Phirmaund, promising that as soon as he was in possession of Poona he would pay a donation of thirty lákhs of rupees to be divided among the officers, soldiers, &c., now employed on this service.

Since writing the above I am favoured with your Honour and Council's letter of the 3rd instant, and am exceedingly sorry to have incurred your displeasure by making an advance to the Peshwa to help to support his army and keep them together, and now I assure your Honour that had I not done as I have or had I waited for your orders respecting that measure, I most firmly believe there would not have been a Peshwa army now existing. And as you now declared your utter inability to supply his wants, I must think it will be totally impossible to pass the river Máhi before the rains set in, and very difficult to keep any large body of his troops together during the monsoon, except we are more fortunate in money matters than we have hitherto been. The whole of the tax laid upon Nariad only amounts to sixty-one thousand rupees, and which will be a long time collecting if it ever is; two days have elapsed and only Rs. 5,000 are recovered.

The sum I have advanced the Peshwa from our cash is Rs. 40,000, for which amount I have received a deposit of jewels; they are in our military chest. This caution will I hope serve to convince your Honour and Council that my hon'ble employers' interest is ever uppermost in my thoughts, nothing but an attention to their interest could ever induce me to part with their cash, and I must hope that in future your Honour and Council will be pleased to put a little confidence in me, and take off that severe restriction of never applying any part of your cash but for our own particular use, as I do assure you there may be a moment when an advance of 10,000 rupees may be the absolute means of saving the Peshwa's army from a total separation; nothing that is not similar to this could urge me to use the Hon'ble Company's cash but for their immediate use, and if your Honour and Council choose to place this trust in me, no advances shall be made without valuable deposits nor ever immediately to distress ourselves. Our balance of cash is now about Rs. 23,000, but we are largely in arrears, so that we shall want a supply in a few days. I shall therefore write to the Chief Council at Surat for one lákh.

I am, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING.

English Encampment under the Walls of Nariad, 10th May 1775.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had the honour of addressing you from Neriád Camp the 10th instant, acknowledging the receipt of your commands of the 3rd, and advising you very fully of all transactions from my preceding address to that period, duplicate of my letter from Nariád, I have since forwarded *viâ* Surat and have since been favoured with a duplicate of your Honour and Council's command of the 3rd instant.

On the 14th in the morning we marched from Nariád and encamped at a village called Fattepur three miles distant. That place we left next morning, and towards evening encamped at the village called Boroni, nine miles distant. On the 16th we marched from thence and about 10 o'clock arrived at the village Anantmogri four miles and a half from Boroni, where we encamped the remainder of the day. We renewed our march on the 17th, and before noon arrived at the town of Nappar, five miles from Anantmogri.

Yesterday morning at half past six o'clock we marched from Nappar toward Bettai. Marching with the Peshwa's army is both dangerous and troublesome to a great degree, without dividing our force to protect their army, they would very soon totally desert. To accomplish this I have, at the repeated request of the Peshwa, hitherto formed two guards, one in the rear, one on the flank, opposite to which our main body marches for protection of our ammunition, stores, &c. Each guard consists of two guns with one hundred Europeans and sepoys, the defiles at the entrance of the villages not allowing more than one cart abreast always makes it necessary to halt about a mile from the village we have left, to form the whole, and get in a regular line of march. We had just finished such a halt yesterday within a mile and a half of Nappar and the line in motion, when a large body of the enemy appeared in our rear, and a small distance from its left fired from six guns, with a small thick wood between them and us; to guard against a chance of the enemy availing themselves of an attack on the rear, or flanking guard alone, I had ordered that supposing the enemy should attack the flank, then the rear was to move to their assistance and Captain Myers' division take up their ground; also if the rear was attacked, Captain Myers' should reinforce them.[1] As soon as the enemy's guns began firing,

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1 This battle, the first great engagement we had with the Maráthás, is called by historians "the battle of Arras." Forbes in his Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 95, writes :—"On the 18th we reached the plains of Arras, the spot which had been so fatal to Rághoba in his last battle with the ministerial army, before the English junction; there in conformity to the Hindu superstition of omens, astrological calculations, and Bráhmanical predictions, the enemy resolved once more to try their fortunes in a general action. On entering the plain of Arras we perceived the enemy advancing in two divisions, who soon commenced a cannonade on the rear, where Rághoba was seated on his state elephant: his body-guard, at his particular request, had been this day strongly reinforced from the English detachment. Our line immediately formed, and a further reinforcement of infantry was ordered to Rághoba's assistance, but no artillery; the field pieces remained with the line, and kept up a heavy fire till the enemy's cannon were silenced, and their cavalry dispersed with considerable loss. The Colonel having frequently told Rághoba that he would attack the enemy's guns whenever they brought them on a plain without the separation of a river, now gave orders for a strong party to advance and take them. The detachment was immediately formed, and advanced with Captains Myers and Serle at the head of their companies of European infantry and a strong party of sepoys. The enemy, on observing our intention, returned at full speed with their artillery, and threw in a large body of cavalry between our advanced party and their guns, who twice charged the British detachment with great impetuosity: they were repulsed and fled. At this time another large body of cavalry with several war elephants penetrated between our advanced party and the British line, who, declaring themselves Rághoba's partisans, were permitted to approach unmolested; especially as their assertions were confirmed by Hurra Pant, an officer of rank in his army. Here we were fatally deceived, and Hurra Pant proved a traitor! Several among our allies overheard this infamous man calling on the enemy to seize the opportunity of striking a decisive blow by cutting off the advanced division. In consequence, they commenced a vigorous attack, and nearly surrounded them by their elephants and cavalry. Our brave fellows repulsed them gallantly in front and rear; many were cut to pieces, among them Captains Myers and Serle : when by some unaccountable mistake of the officer who then took the command, the grenadiers facing to the

I rode to the rear, and found Captain Myers' moving agreeable to order. When near enough our guns and howitzers fired on their army, and at their cannon, until the former fled and the latter were silenced. Captain Myers, and several other officers then reported to me, that two guns belonging to the enemy were but a little way from the right of the division engaged, and the enemy cutting down hedges to make way for carrying them off. On this information I ordered the second company of European Grenadiers from the head of the line of march to join Captain Myer's Division, and directed Captain Myers to endeavor to possess himself of the two guns, ordering him to avail himself of the strong milk-bush enclosures and wood, and move with the utmost regularity. To cover them, I remained with the guns, two 12-pounders, and one eight-inch howitzer; soon after the division with Captain Myers quitted their ground I observed them move much too quick, I called to them to slack their pace, which they then did, but I since found they were soon after ordered to move on rapidly; however they got well formed near the guns when the enemy charged them from their left with a very large body, which I reached with round and case shot, and with the musketry they were soon repulsed. They then charged a second time and were again repulsed. At this time Captains Myers and Serle were killed. Just at this moment a very large body of the enemy with two war elephants got into a lane, immediately in the rear of the division, but declared they were Rághoba's army, and this was affirmed by one of his officers named Haripant[2] and who was heard by many of our people, also some of our Scindian horse, calling to the enemy to advance; adding now is your time; here are the English without their guns. These circumstances added to the endeavours of the horse and elephants to break in on the division obliged them to face to the rightabout and give them a general fire, which totally routed them. Thus were the enemy repulsed in front and rear with great loss to them, and very little to us. When the first Company of European Grenadiers were observed by the rest of the division to go to the rightabout, and make a running march or retreat from their ground, this occasioned the sepoys and Madras Infantry to follow their example, but not further than to join the Grenadiers, though they all retreated very quick; it was something regular until they came to the milk-bush hedges in their now run away front, where the openings

rightabout, to change their ground, co mmenced a retreat; the other Europeans and sepoys followed their example. Unfortunately at this time a tumbril of shells belonging to the howitzer, pierced by a rocket, blew up, and added to the general confusion. Although our men retired with precipitation, they preserved some order until they reached an impenetrable hedge of the thorny milk-bush. Here they entirely broke their ranks, and leaving a field-piece in the hands of the enemy, endeavoured to push through the formidable barrier, though repeatedly ordered by the surviving officers to form. Another body now advanced against this devoted detachment; their officers in vain endeavoured to rally them, and fell a sacrifice. The enemy pursued the fugitives to the advancing British line, which now recommenced a brisk fire. Our grape-shot and shells at length drove off the whole confederate army, and we remained masters of the field. The Brigade-Major, with a company of grenadiers, had previously retaken the field-piece; the tumbril of ammunition was lost in the explosion. The engagement lasted near four hours. Situated as we were in respect to Europeans, the victory was dearly purchased: out of fifteen British officers in the advanced division, seven were killed and four wounded, besides a great many native officers and two hundred sepoys; we also had to lament eighty Europeans killed and missing, mostly grenadiers. The officers at that unfortunate crisis separated from the line, and, deserted by their soldiers, bravely fell in the bed of honour. I had been conversing with most of them during the morning march, and in the evening was called to bury them in a large pit with their unfortunate comrades. A field of battle is indeed a scene of horror!"

2 "The traitor Hurra Pant (Haripant) who betrayed our unfortunate detachment into the enemy's hands was punished as his infamous conduct deserved. A grenadier sepoy of the British line pulled him from his horse, and Rághoba's Arabs, who had suffered severely by his treachery, cut him to pieces."—(Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 99.)

were very small, there commenced their destruction, every man pushed where he could without observing the least order, though repeatedly called upon by most of their officers; the enemy observing their confusion, rode among them sword in hand, and cut great numbers to pieces. As soon as I observed our men in this disorder I pointed all our fire to cover their retreat and went to rally them; the first I met were the Grenadiers as rabble flying before about fifty horsemen, cutting them down without opposition; with great difficulty I got them to the rightabout and ordered them to fire, instead of which they answered; "these are our friends." "Your friends," said I, "see them cutting down our sepoys." This was the case; they were not fifteen yards distant; the moment I assured them it was the enemy, in place of firing they fled shamefully without firing a single musket, though our cannon was scarce forty yards from them, nor did they halt for some time. Then it was our Artillery that made amazing slaughter. In a few minutes our case shot covered the field with their dead bodies; but it is a business I cannot account for that in spite of every annoyance these people always carry off the dead.[1] On this occassion they lost immense numbers by their attention to it, not more than nine or ten were left behind.

As far as was in our power we advanced upon the enemy and totally repulsed them, after the above shamefull retreat in which we sustained our whole loss, which I believe is greater than ever was known in India, out of the number engaged—fifteen officers—six were killed; Captain Myers and Serle and Lieutenants Morris, Henry, Prosser and Anderson; five badly wounded; Captain Firth, Lieutenants Dawson and Yong, Ensigns Denson and Torrin. After remaining on the field of battle to bury our dead and provide conveyances for our wounded, we marched to this place which is one kos from the banks of the river Máhi, where we propose marching to-morrow, having persuaded the Peshwa not to remain on this side during the rain.

The enemy's loss must be very considerable indeed, though the numbers as yet are not mentioned from any accounts; in general our intelligence is exceedingly bad. Three elephants were left dead on the field and a great number of horses. At the first tank they watered at, I am told upwards of five thousand died of their wound. Two thousand good horse would have made as complete a victory as ever was gained in India, but two hundred cannot be produced in this army. Indeed I impute a great deal of their backward behaviour to their having no pay, and scarce provision to eat; what then can be expected from them? Happy should I be were we rid them; they never stir twenty yards from us except to run away. I must confess they are clever at that worth.

Since the flight of the enemy about noon yesterday we have seen nothing of them; for some days past they had circulated reports of their intention to take one very strong battle with us, as they term it, and live or die. What future effect yesterday will leave upon them I know not, but of this I am convinced that they must have lost two thousand at least, and while we preserve regularity and do not break our ranks they must ever be beaten. They made two attempts to attack us on the 15th but were repulsed with loss. We had only one man wounded but it retarded our march greatly and we did not get to our ground until five in the afternoon. On this day we had the misfortune to lose Ensign Bod who had for some time before been ill of a fever.

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[1] Forbes in his Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 99, writes:—"Many of the Maráthás fell in attempting to carry off the killed and wounded, an act of humanity to which they pay the greatest attention. They seldom leave a body on the field, and venture almost to the cannon's mouth rather than suffer the remains of a friend to be exposed. Out of the number killed in this action only seven bodies were found after their retreat."

The Peshwa wishes to winter in the Khándesh country about fifty kos to the southward of Surat. Being a part that will afford him many resources; but the season in my opinion is too far advanced for such a march for our troops who are now very sickly occasioned by their being obliged to eat coarse flour made into dough instead of bread or rice. Our cash is nearly out, and a great consumption in our first ammunition by daily attacks. This will make it necessary to halt near Broach for a time, if not for the rains. The Peshwa only raised forty thousand rupees at the town of Nariad, though we stayed seven days for that purpose. Thirty thousand he divided among his people, but they are discontented to the greatest degree and declare to me every day that they will quit his service.

I do assure your Honour and Council that the command of your forces is the smallest part of my trouble. It chiefly consists in reconciling the different factions to draw with each other, and conciliate the general mind to put up with their present very disagreeable situation. To do this my own money and necessaries are daily expended, and happy should I be could my endeavours answer my intentions, but I very much fear that by the opening of the next season the Peshwa's army will be very small indeed, if you cannot hit on ways and means to lend him cash.

Since writing the preceding, certain accounts are received from the Ministerial army of the loss they sustained in yesterday's engagement being very great. Thirty officers of high rank, each entitled at the least to the command of one thousand horsemen; two hundred horses valued each at two thousand rupees and upwards; one hundred and fifty of the same kind wounded, mostly mortally. All our accounts agree in Haripant Fadkia being shot through the arm with musket ball, notwithstanding which the present state of their army now dispirited to the last degree made it necessary for him to go from tent to tent to every officer to give them money, and make great promises in hopes of keeping them together. He himself was up the whole night in administering to the necessities of his wounded men, and encouraging them by every means in his power. In short, was it not for the loss having fell so heavy among our Europeans, we should have esteemed it in every respect a most complete victory. A circumstance I omitted mentioning in the loss the confederate army sustained and that by no means the least, was the death of Sayyed Husain their principal gunner, a man exceedingly imminent in his profession, and who had the whole command of their artillery, and was Paymaster General of the same.

I have heard imperfect accounts of the Grenadier Company receiving orders to go to the rightabout and march off when there was not the least necessary for it. Respecting this business I shall make the most minute enquiry. If any man now living did give such an order, your Honor and Council may be assured my utmost endeavours shall be exerted to make him a severe and just example. I have the honour to remain with the greatest respect.

THOMAS KEATING.

Beltassi Camp, 19th May 1775.

P. S.—It has not been in my power to get a return of the killed and wounded sepoys, which shall be sent in a day or two with a duplicate of this address, but am certain they do not exceed the number of Europeans.

By the return of the killed and wounded Europeans enclosed in the foregoing letter, it appeared that exclusive of the officers therein mentioned, twenty-five Non-Commissioned officers

and Private Europeans of the Artillery and Infantry were killed, and 50 Non-Commissioned officers and Private Europeans wounded.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING.

Dubhoi, 23rd June 1775.

Letter from the PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL *to Lieutenant-Colonel* KEATING.

SIR,—We wrote you on the 9th instant, in our Public Department, purposely to transmit to you copies of two letters from Brigadier-General Gordon relative to your conduct and proceedings, and to which your clear and explicit answer was required; since then your letter of the 22nd ultimo has been duly received, to which no answer appears to be necessary.

The Governor General and Council of Bengal, in virtue of the late Act of Parliament, have a controlling power, as you well know, over the political transactions of the other Presidencies. We have lately received letters from them, disapproving of the measures we were pursuing, and containing some directions in consequence of their disapprobation, particularly acquainting us that they should open a negotiation with the ruling powers at Poona for bringing about an accommodation between the Company and the Marátha State, and which it has since appeared they have actually begun.

We sincerely lament that these gentlemen have so unluckily taken upon themselves to interfere, as they have done, at this juncture, because we are sensible that the fate of Rághoba and the securing to the Company the great advantages stipulated to them by treaty depended in a great measure on carrying him to Poona, as we hoped to be able shortly to do; yet circumstanced as we are with respect to the Bengal gentlemen, we are under an absolute necessity of ordering, as we now most positively do, that you cease committing any manner of hostility against the Ministerial party unless you should be attacked by them, which we conclude will not be the case; and you are consequently to remain quiet in your present situation, and not to move from it, until we shall send you orders to return to our own garrisons, which we shall as soon as the season will admit.

We are assured that orders have been transmitted from the Poona Government to all the officers under them to cease from all hostilities against our forces, and that the orders extend to Rághoba and all his adherents. In short, we understand from the Agent of the Marátha State that everything is to remain in the same state as at present till the conclusion of the definitive treaty between the Government of Bengal and the present Poona Sarkár.

Rághoba will doubtless be justly alarmed when he comes clearly to understand the situation he is at present in; his situation might have been more favorable had more haste been made in conducting him to Poona. However, you are now to assure him of our protection and support, as far as it is in our power to give it to him, and they may depend that we shall take care of his interest as far as we can in the treaty of peace, for which purpose we are now sending a Member of our Board to Bengal as well as to explain in general the interest of this Presidency with which the Governor General and Council do not at present seem to be well acquainted.

We hope that Fattesing has paid a large part of the sum which by treaty the Peshwa was to receive from him, and we hope that your endeavours have not been wanting to induce the latter to pay to the Company the arrears due to them on account of the expense of their forces.

Enclosed is a letter from the President to Rághoba; it communicates to him in general terms the restrictions we are at present under from proceeding further in his cause; he will of course apply to you for particulars. You can at present say nothing farther than what is mentioned above, though we hope that our representations to Bengal will not be ineffectual in his behalf. At any rate he may depend on an asylum at one of our settlements.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 16th August 1775.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,
Governor General, and Council,
Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—In our address of the 31st December last, which has already been transmitted in triplicate, we acquainted you with everything needful from the beginning as well with regard to the attack of Sálsettee, as to the negotiation depending with Rághoba, the rightful Supreme Governor of the Marátha empire; we have since been favoured with your letter in your Secret Department of the 16th January, to which our above-mentioned address, we flatter ourselves, will be considered by you as a full satisfactory reply.

Shortly after the date of that address, Rághoba with his army arrived at Baroda, not very far from Surat; the negotiation with him was continued through the Chief of Surat in the manner we before acquainted you here that we proposed doing, and at length it was brought so near a conclusion that we had transmitted from hence a treaty on the terms we proposed, and had every reason to believe that it would be directly executed. Jewels to the amount of six lákhs were deposited by Rághoba and the necessary Sanads were delivered for the several districts and territories the Company were to be entitled to in virtue of the treaty, and for the assistance that agreeably to the treaty we were to afford him.

Our forces accordingly proceeded from hence to Surat, that they might be ready to proceed from thence to join his army as soon as the treaty was concluded, and we had great reason to hope that the war between Rághoba and the Ministerial party would speedily have been brought to a happy and glorious issue, by which, when accomplished, the Company become quiet possessors of sundry districts and parganas whose annual revenue will amount to near 20 lákhs of rupees, and by which we hope this Presidency may be enabled to maintain itself and relieve you from the burthen of sending us large annual supplies; and to add to our satisfaction about this time some material advantages were gained by Rághoba over the enemy's army.

This pleasing prospect was, however, for a short time clouded. The Ministerial party possibly hearing that Rághoba was on the eve of concluding a treaty with the Company, that would most probably for ever overset their ambitious hopes of subduing him, corrupted, as it is supposed, a part of his forces, mostly Arabs, on whom he placed considerable reliance and where he himself was posted, and attacked that quarter with the strength of their army, Rághoba seeing in the midst of battle that the Arabs neglected to do their duty, and then not knowing how far treachery had spread or whom in this emergency to trust, precipitately fled from the field with about one thousand horse towards Cambay. The Nabáb of this place seeing his situation and dreading the power of his enemies refused to admit him. He then made the

best of his way towards Bhávnagar where he luckily met with one of our gallivats, embarked on board her, and on the 23rd ultimo arrived at Surat, where the Chief received and entertained him as a friend and ally of the Company.

Notwithstanding this alarming step, it shortly appeared to us (Mr. Draper excepted, who has given his reasons in writing for dissenting with us in this opinion as per copy enclosed) that Rághoba's affairs were not nearly in the desperate situation there was at first reason to fear. Two principal Chiefs—Khanderáv and Govindráv with many of their great officers—remain firm to his interest and have collected an army to the number of about 25,000 men, mostly horse, within 40 kos of Cambay. Many others are also likely soon to join him. We therefore esteemed it our indispensable duty not to give up the great advantages that were to be reaped by the Company from the treaty, when so fair an opportunity offered of retrieving his affairs by sending our forces to Cambay to join his army. Rághoba earnestly pressed us to this step, and we have little doubt, when a junction is once effected, but that success will attend their operations. Our forces proceeded accordingly and arrived at Cambay the 1st instant.

We have given Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, the Commanding Officer of this detachment, proper instructions for his conduct and have enjoined him to observe the utmost prudence and circumspection, and never to engage in measures beyond his own power to retrieve.

On the 6th instant while Rághoba was as yet at Surat he executed the treaty to the Company. The Chief also executed one to him, which has been since ratified and confirmed by us, an attested copy of which we transmit to your Honour and Council enclosed for your full information, and we hope it will meet with your entire approbation.

From the want of a sufficient military force we were under a necessity of stipulating that a less number should at first proceed than was originally intended, as your Honour and Council will observe by the treaty; but the President and Council of Fort George having with great readiness complied with our request for troops from thence, and two Companies of European Infantry being actually arrived here, and a battalion of their sepoys shortly expected, we resolved to complete the detachment to two thousand five hundred men, the number first proposed, and the remainder accordingly now proceeded to Surat, from whence they will embark for Cambay to join the former detachment; and as the different persons that form the Ministerial party are reported to be very much divided amongst themselves and that Mahádji Sindia has actually deserted that cause, and others it is expected will very shortly fall from them, we therefore have reason to hope that Rághoba may in a short time be able to reduce them all to their due obedience to him.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 31st March 1775.

Letter from the Governor-General and Council, Bengal, to the Governor and Council, Bombay.

Gentlemen,—Our last took notice of the re-call of Mr. Mostyn and of the state of uncertainty in which we were left as to the motive and purpose. Among various conjectures, suspicion remained with us of your being on the eve of entering into hostilities with the Maráthás. This suspicion is now confirmed by letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George, informing us that your troops had taken the field against those people and were actually besieging the fort of Thána on the island of Sálsette, and further that the Maráthás have a large fleet at sea from which the trade of your ports would run some risk if the men-of-war did not speedily appear on the coast.

This intelligence comes to us on the authority of the Chief of Tellicherry. It leaves us no room to doubt of its truth. We therefore cannot refrain from testifying our surprise at the inattention of your Government to keep us duly advised of your transactions, and now peremptorily require you to transmit us immediate and special information as to the facts in question, of their causes and of the motives for your conduct on the occasion. We also direct that in future you constantly and regularly report to us all the occurrences of your Presidency, and advise us of your plans and designs, that we may be enabled to fulfil the commands and intentions of the Legislature and our employers, by watching over and taking the earliest measures for securing the interests of the Company in India. Upon an intelligence so alarming as the present it gives us great uneasiness to be obliged to remain inactive, but till we hear from you it is impossible for us to take any step. In the meantime we shall hold you responsible for the consequences of this suspense.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
JOHN CLAVERING.
GEORGE MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.

Fort William,
3rd February 1775.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,
Governor General, and Council,
Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—In our letter of the 31st ultimo we acquainted you of the treaty we had entered into with Rághoba, of his situation and of the steps we had pursued for fulfiling our engagements. At the same time we enclosed a copy of the treaty for your information; a duplicate of that letter, of the copy of the treaty, and of another paper therein enclosed, accompanies this.

We have now the satisfaction to acquaint your Honour and Council that our forces were joined by Rághoba's army, in number about 40,000 horse and foot, at a village about ten miles from Cambay on the 19th instant, as we are just informed by advices from the Commanding Officer of our forces there. The Ministerial army by the same account is not more than 6 miles distant from the place of their encampment, so that we shortly expect to hear of a decisive action, which we think can only be prevented by an accommodation taking place between Rághoba and the Ministerial party; some overtures for which have been made, though we are yet unacquainted with the particulars, but it appears to us that the heads of that party, divided (we are assured) as they are amongst themselves, are endeavouring to make some terms of advantage with their master while they yet have it in their power.

We before advised your Honour and Council that Mahádji Sindia had deserted the confederate Ministers. We are now assured that he has actually entered into engagements for assisting Rághoba and only waits for the first favourable opportunity to do so. Tukoji Holkar, it is also asserted, will never act against him, and Fattesing, it is said, is entering into engagements with him.

Thus it should seem, from the advices of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, that the grand confederacy will be shortly greatly weakened if not entirely deserted. He represents that nothing is wanted to give life to Rághoba's cause but money, for which he is, it seems, in very great

distress; Captain Keating and, indeed, Rághoba himself have urged us to furnish him with a supply of at least five lákhs of rupees, which request has been denied as out of our power to grant him. Besides, had it been just at that time in our power to furnish that sum or any other, yet whatever sum of money we could have sent, though considerable to the Company, would have gone but a little way with so numerous an army towards retrieving Rághoba's affairs, and he would probably again have fallen soon in the same distress. We therefore judge it more prudent, especially as we had entirely complied with the terms of the treaty on our parts, to give an absolute denial, that he might at once endeavour to find a pecuniary supply from some other quarters.

From this your Honour and Council will judge that it is not yet in Rághoba's power to bear any part of the expense of our forces which by the treaty he has engaged to do. The whole expense of our army therefore at present falls on the Company, which by being in the field is of course very considerable. This circumstance, together with many other urgent calls for money, induces us earnestly to request you will send us a large supply in specie or otherwise as soon as possible, and we hope that when the matters at present depending are brought to a successful issue, and the Company in consequence in quiet possession of the territories ceded to them, that we shall be enabled from those revenues to carry on our employers' affairs without being any longer a burthen to your Presidency.

The "Revenge" and "Bombay" Grab, two of our cruisers, fell in with the Marátha Fleet some time ago in their passage to Tellicherry and were attacked by them; the enemy having sought their safety in flight, one of their vessels only excepted, which was driven on shore and totally destroyed. She was the Commodore vessel and mounted four and forty guns.

We have been favoured with your letters of the 3rd of February, and doubt not but our address of the 31st December would reach you shortly after, when we hope your Honour and Council would be convinced that we had done what the Legislature required of us, in giving you every information you could desire. We did not write you at the time that Mr. Mostyn was ordered to quit Poona, as the notice of your having taken on you the Government of Bengal in virtue of the late Act of Parliament had not then reached us, and when it did, it required some days to compile and to digest the detail of the Company's affairs at this Presidency which you desired, as well as to give you a clear idea of the important matters we had then in hand. At that time the siege of Thána was being carried on, which also occasioned our advices being retarded for a few days, as we were then in daily and even hourly expectation of being in possession of the fort, and we wished, together with the motives for our proceedings, to be able to advise you of the success that had attended them, but somehow it happened that our operations at Thána were protracted much beyond the time we had reasons to suppose. It is not therefore extraordinary that private advices should be received before our letters reached you; but your Honour and Council may depend that we shall always send you ample and timely, and we hope satisfactory, account of our proceedings.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 30th April 1775.

Letter from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL *and* COUNCIL *of Bengal, to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letters of the 31st December, containing as well the general state we required of the political situation of affairs of your Presidency as the particular accounts of your late operations at Sálsette and Bassein. The first will be taken into consideration as soon as the hurry of other business will permit us, and directions in consequence will be transmitted to you. As to the last, the lateness of your advices almost precludes us from saying anything at present on the subject. Our sentiments of this inattention will be sufficiently known to you by our letter of the 3rd February, triplicate of which accompanies this. We must however add that we cannot admit the plea of your being unacquainted with the new Government having taken place here, because we conceive that the operations in which you were going to engage were too interesting to the Company's affairs at large, and too likely in their consequences to affect this settlement not to have become matter of the most early intelligence to the Presidency under the late Administration.

We have received advices from Fort St. George of the steps they had taken in consequence of your application to them for assistance. For the reason we have already given we suspend our opinion on your late measures and the consequence of it, but can assure you, we shall be ready to afford you such support in your present circumstances as may be necessary for preventing, as far as may be in our power, any injury to the Company's affairs.

We are alarmed at the declaration of your intentions of joining Rághoba. We must disapprove this as inconsistent with your negotiation with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this Government. Your own report of his decline and of the power of his opponents prove it to be a measure dangerous; and may force us into a rupture with Sábáji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and our neighbour, with whom we are on terms of friendship. We cannot ratify your engagements with Rághoba without such reason as we cannot now foresee, and we therefore positively bid you to suspend your negotiations with him until you receive our further instructions.

We were disappointed in not receiving an account of the forces on your establishment, with the general state of your political affairs which you sent us, more especially as you informed us of your having found it necessary to require a reinforcement from Madras. We therefore desire that you transmit us such a statement by the first opportunity.

We also desire that you will prepare and transmit to us an accurate statement of the whole revenues of your Presidency, specifying the gross amount charges and net produce of each branch.

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.

JOHN CLAVERING.

GEORGE MONSON.

PHILIP FRANCIS.

Fort William, 8th March 1775.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,

Governor General, and Council,

at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—Our letter of the 1st instant (which has been already forwarded in duplicate) acknowledged the receipt of your favour dated the 8th of March.

In that letter we communicated to you the progress of our army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating; we have not since received any farther advices from him, nor have we received any letters from you since our last; this therefore is chiefly to reply to your letter of the 8th of March, agreeable to what we promised in our address of the 1st instant.

We trust that the reasons which have been assigned in our letter of the 30th of April, for not sending more early intelligence of our designs and operations against Sálsette, will prove sufficiently satisfactory, more especially when you consider that it was, as we well knew from the distracted state the Marátha Government, totally out of its power to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's possessions in Bengal or those of their allies, on account of our proceedings on this side of India, and so the event has fully proved; and provided our present operations in support of Rághoba are crowned with that success which we hope they will, the treaty we have entered into fully binds Rághoba and his successors from ever taking part against the Company, and indeed we doubt not but that the gratitude will induce him always to be ready to act in their behalf.

Your Honour and Council observe "that you are alarmed at the declaration of our intentions of joining Rághoba, which, you add, you must disapprove as inconsistent with our negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and that it is a measure which may force you into a rupture with Sábáji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and your neighbour, with whom you are on terms of friendship."

We never had any negotiations with the Ministerial party, who we suppose you mean by the ruling powers. We only acquainted you on this head, long before we concluded the treaty with Rághoba, and at a time that there was little probability that it ever could be concluded, that in case they gained the advantage in the present contest, that we should endeavor to reconcile them by explaining our motives for attacking Sálsette. The conclusion of the treaty, and the part we in consequence took against them, rendered any explanation or negotiation on this account quite unnecessary, and therefore all thoughts of a negotiation with them independent of Rághoba have been long dropped; and though Rághoba's affairs have an unfavorable aspect, yet we make no doubt but that a steady perseverance and proper conduct will enable him with our assistance to overcome his enemies, or also to accommodate matters favourably with them.

When your Honour and Council take this subject into your consideration, we request that you will particularly attend to the following circumstances; first, that the part we have taken is in support of the rightful supreme Governor of the Maráthás, and who had been in possession of that dignity; and that the Ministerial party are his subjects who have rebelled against him, and most unjustly are endeavouring to dispossess him of his seat. Secondly, that by acting in the manner we have done, we have secured to the Company by the most effectual grants (and which Rághoba was the only person who had any right to give) the right of possessing those places, such as Sálsette and Bassein, which they have repeatedly and earnestly enjoined us to procure for them, and even more. What is still further for their benefit, the expenses that will be incurred in this war are to be amply repaid to them, and in the end we doubt not

such a currency will be given to the affairs of the Companyin these parts, and to trade in general, as will be attended with singular benefit to them and to individuals trading under their protection. In this light we flatter ourselves you will view our proceedings when the whole comes before you.

We were and are convinced that your Honour and Council may be perfectly free from any apprehensions of being forced into a rupture with the Bhonslas on account of our proceedings, even had Sábáji been yet alive; for from the death of Jánoji Bhonsla, which happened about 3 years ago, till Sábáji was killed (as he was lately by Mudáji) that Government which was commonly known to us by the name of the Berar Government was torn in pieces by the civil dessensions between Sábáji and Mudáji; but since the death of the former it has been restored to quiet, and as Mudáji (who now governs for his son that was adopted by the late Jánoji) is a known friend to Rághoba, he will consequently be rejoiced at the part we have taken, instead of being disgusted with it.

Thus we hope that we have removed your Honour and Council's objections to our entering into the treaty with Rághoba, and that you will concur with us in opinion that we were and are pursuing the true interest of our employers, for had we not laid hold of the present opportunity, which was so very favourable to procure grants of the places that we wished to possess, it is more than probable that another such would never again have offered.

We beg leave here to remark that as your Honour and Council are situated so very distant from this Presidency, it would be totally impossible for us to benefit by circumstances as they fall out, provided we always wait for your directions. We need produce no other instance than the letter before us, which is dated the 8th of March, not being received here till the 21st ultimo, and is an answer to our advices of the 31st December last; had we waited for your reply to these advices, Rághoba would have been entirely lost, and the advantages the Company gain by treaty gone most probably for ever; the Legislature has indeed provided against this great inconvenience in the late Act of Parliament which we make no doubt but that you will always consider, and we assure you that we shall take no material step in any political matter, without your concurrence, unless when it may be dangerous to postpone for so long a time coming to a determination thereon.

In the preceding part of this letter we acquainted you that we had no advices from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating since the date of those noticed in our last address, but private letters from Surat mention that the army is arrived in the neighbourhood of Broach in its march towards Poona, that our forces have had another engagement with the Ministerial army in which the latter were again worsted, and that the affairs of the confederacy owing to their want of money and to dissensions amongst themselves are in a very declining way.

The Maráthás lately made an attempt on Sálsette by landing about 3,500 men from Bassein, but they were quickly driven off by a detachment only from the Madras battalion of sepoys, with very considerable loss on their side, while on ours we had only one sepoy killed and two or three wounded.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY,
AND MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 24th June 1775.

Letter from the GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Calcutta, to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have not been favoured with any letters from you or your Select Committee respecting the political affairs of your Presidency since your letter dated the 31st of

December, nor have we received any authentic advices of the late occurrences in your parts, but from private letters and other intelligence all concurring in the same points; we understand you have entered in an offensive treaty with Rághoba, and have sent a considerable force to his assistance which has actually taken the field; this last is confirmed by letters received by the Commander-in-Chief with returns of the force actually sent. Embarrassed and perplexed with these reports, the truth of which we cannot doubt, and ignorant of the force of your enemies, and of the immediate plan of your operations, we are obliged to remain inactive in circumstances which may possibly require our utmost exertion for your support and relief.

In this situation your silence becomes truly astonishing, but under the want of precise and authentic information from yourselves, we are obliged to suspend our final judgment of your proceedings, and in the meantime protest against all the consequences of any hostile measures taken, or offensive engagements entered into by you without our consent. We consider them as directly contradictory to the provisions made in the Act of Parliament for uniting the several Presidencies under the political superintendence of this Government, and equally contrary to the common principles of prudence and policy; since the partial resolutions and operations of a single Presidency may eventually involve all the Company's settlements in a general war, without any previous concert, or a general plan for conducting it.

Our letter of the 3rd February last contained very explicit orders on these heads and we expect you will be full and circumstantial in your answer to it, and in explaining the motives for your late conduct.

Fort William, 25th May 1775.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
J. CLAVERING.
G. MONSON.
R. BARWELL.
P. FRANCIS.

Gentlemen,—We have received your letter of the 31st of March with the copy of your treaty with Rághoba enclosed and the advice of your subsequent operations.

Our duty imposes upon us the painful necessity of declaring that we totally condemn the measure which you have adopted, that we hold the treaty which you have entered into with Rághoba invalid, and the war which you have entered into against the Marátha State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized and unjust; both are expressly contrary to the late Act of Parliament. You have imposed on yourselves the charge of conquering the whole Marátha empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it; the plan which you have formed, instead of aiming at a decisive conquest, portends an indefinite scene of troubles without an adequate force, without money or certain resources to extricate you from him, nor have you the plea either of injury sustained from the party which you have made your enemy, or of any prior obligation to defend the man whose cause you have espoused.

We solemnly protest against you for all the consequences, and peremptorily require you to withdraw the Company's forces to your own garrison in whatsoever state your affairs may be, unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat. We leave the means of effecting this to you, but shall expect your punctual compliance with our commands. You have neither

informed us for what purpose the detachment was sent to a distance so remote from the obvious scenes of its operations as Cambay, nor what plan you have concerted for their subsequent progress. You have not informed us of the situation of the places assigned you for paying the subsidy, in whose possession they were, from whom they were to be either peaceably surrendered, or taken by force, nor of the amount of the revenue of the ceded island; all which points we consider to be necessary for our information.

In the dangerous consequences which we apprehend from the state in which you have placed the Company's affairs in your quarter, we do not advert to any part of your conduct which respects merely the formal line of your conduct. Yet as this Government has been charged by a solemn Act of Legislature itself with the general interest of the Company in India, and armed with controlling powers over the other Presidencies, we cannot pass by without noticing the entire disregard which you appear to have shown to our authority. For the past we content ourselves with leaving to you the consequences of your own act, but for the future in cases of like inattention on your part, after the peremptory injunctions we have found it necessary to prescribe for your conduct, we shall deem ourselves accountable, if we neglect to exercise the authority vested in us by Act of Parliament for supporting the authority committed to us.

In order that nothing may be omitted on our parts to extricate you from any difficulty to which your immediately relinquishing your engagement with Rághoba may expose you, it is our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Marátha State at Poona as soon as possible. We shall advise you of the measures we take for this purpose; in the meantime we direct you to receive and encourage any pacific overtures that may be proposed to you, making the instant cessation of your arms and a continuance of your possession of the island of Sálsette and Bassein, your first object, but you are not to aim at more extensive acquisitions, nor conclude any definitive treaty without our approbation.

We are, &c.,

Fort William,
31st May 1775.

WARREN HASTINGS.
JOHN CLAVERING.
GEORGE MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,
Governor General, and Council,
at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We addressed you in duplicate under the 6th instant, and have since received the duplicate of your letter of the 31st May, the contents whereof give us great concern, not only because the interest of our hon'ble employers we apprehend must be very materially affected by the measures you have thought proper to adopt for bringing about a general pacification, and the due right of this Government affected in a manner we fear scarcely to be retrieved by the letter to Sakhárám Bápu at Poona, but also because your Honour and Council seem to think we had been guilty of a premeditated and intentional disrespect to the power entrusted by the Legislature to

your Government, which we take this early opportunity to assure you was by no means the case; but the negotiation for the treaty with Rághoba began before your administration commenced, and as we thereby secured to the Company the possession of Sálsette, and the right to Bassein and the parganas near to Surat, all of which our hon'ble employers have repeatedly enjoined us to procure for them; and as the revenues of these parganas can be collected without much trouble or expense, and is so considerable as to amount, including Sálsette and Bassein, near 20 lákhs of rupees per annum, which will be the means of enabling this Presidency to support itself, without being longer a burthen to yours, of which the late administration frequently complained; and as it was moreover absolutely requisite for us to determine finally whether we would conclude the treaty or whether we would reject it; for any delay in the then situation of Rághoba's affairs would, we judge, have been the same as if we had determined to remain inactive. We say, for all these cogent reasons, we thought that we were not precluded by the late Act of Parliament from purusing the measures we did.

Another weighty consideration also impelled us to this measure. We had been induced from the motives we fully stated to your Honour and Council in our address of the 31st December last, to attack and reduce Sálsette, and we think that the welfare of this Presidency entirely depended on our preventing that island from again falling into the hands of Portuguese; in this situation, we are of opinion, policy absolutely required that we should side with one of the contending parties in thé Marátha State, that it might be reconciled to our motives for that attack, and to our continuing in possession of that island. This necessity being allowed, justice doubtless required that we should take part with Rághoba, the Peshwa, and in duty to our employers we made this decision as advantageous to them as possible, as we think is evident from the treaty.

We are induced to hope from these reasons that your Honour and Council will not continue to consider our treaty as invalid, nor the war, which was a consequenee of it, either unauthorized, impolitic or unjust; that it was not dangerous the event of it hitherto has shown; but even had it been so in some degree, we flatter ourselves your Honour and Council will admit that something might have been risked for the great probability we had of acquiring a revenue of nearly £250,000 sterling per annum for the future necessary support of this Presidency, and this by a means that equity, as we conceive, allowing for circumstances cannot censure; for though we have not the plea of injury sustained from the Poona party, yet it must be observed that their party is composed of the traitorous and rebellious subject of Rághoba who by his large offers for our assistance, his just pretensions, and the necessity for our taking a part for the reasons above assigned, induced us to espouse his cause and to hope for your Honour and Council's concurrence.

We are convinced that were you fully acquainted with the equitable and undeniable pretensions of Rághoba to the dignity of Peshwa, of which he has been near two years in possession (as you please to observe on reference to a letter from Mr. Mostyn, Resident to the Darbár, to the late Select Committee at your Presidency under date 29th November 1773); and that a large party of the Marátha Empire at present acknowledge him such was the fair prospect we had of shortly fixing him therein; and also of the distracted state of the affairs of the rebellious confederacy, without an adequate army or effectual means to procure one; together with the detriment that must accrue to the Company and the disgrace to this Presidency by the orders you have given for annulling our treaty and in consequence deserting Rághoba; we say that had your Honour and Council been fully apprised respecting all these points, we cannot but flatter ourselves, that your orders would have been very different, or at least that you would have left to us to have carried into execution your resolution for a general pacification, which we are satisfied might have been done with honor and credit, had you not, at the same time that you peremp-

torily required us to withdraw our forces, acquainted the Ministerial party so expressly of your having done so and of your condemnation of our conduct.

This intelligence we received from Poona in a letter to the President as per copy enclosed, and at the same time we received a copy of one from Governor Hastings to Sakháram Bápu. Both were delivered by an Agent from that party which had been here some time to solicit peace, but the indisposition of this Agent, and of our President afterwards, prevented his proposals being received till after he had got this letter; and he will now make no other overtures than that on condition of delivering up Rághoba and the island of Sálsette, and of relinquishing our pretensions to Bassein and all other places ceded by treaty, our expenses may be defrayed; though we are satisfied that those he came with were widely different indeed. He also assures us, as well as the letter from Poona, that orders are gone to their army to cease all hostilities, which orders the Agent declares he understands extend to Rághoba, his officers and adherents. In obedience to your positive injunctions we have also sent directions to our Commanding Officer to cease from all acts of hostility, and as soon as the season will possibly admit, our forces will be withdrawn into our own garrisons.

But in order, more fully than can be done by letter at so great a distance, to represent to your Honour and Council the motives for all our proceedings, the present situation of affairs, with the danger and discredit that must attend our treaty being cancelled and Rághoba deserted, as well as to represent to you at large the particular interest of this Presidency, we have deputed to your Honour and Council Mr. William Taylor, who from being long a member of our Board and of the Select Committee, is sufficiently qualified to give your Honour and Council every requisite information; and we earnestly request that you will attend to the representations that he may make you on the subject in question, and on all others dependent on it; when we hope that on further consideration you may be induced to revoke your present orders, to confirm our treaty and to permit us to carry Rághoba to Poona in the manner first proposed; for we can assure your Honour and Council that with your countenance and support we are firmly of opinion, no ill consequences can result therefrom, but on the contrary that great and permanent advantages must be secured to the Company thereby. We hope also that you will do us the justice to believe that it is our wish and intention at all timos to pay the most implicit obedience to your authority; we would willingly take upon ourselves the consequences of the war for which your Honour and Council by your protest declare we are responsible, provided we have your support and are allowed to conduct it to its issue.

For any other requisite information as well with regard to the places ceded by treaty, as for those granted for the subsidy, also for the situation of the parganas that have been since made over to the Company by Rághoba and by Fattesing, for mediating the reconciliation of the latter with the former, likewise for the Company's general interest at this Presidency in its present situation, permit us to refer your Honour and Council to Mr. Taylor. Assuring that we remain,

Your, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 23rd August 1775.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—We are favoured with your despatch of the 1st of last month, which contained amongst others some advices of the operations of the army of Rághoba and of yours with them.

We find these accounts so incomplete and unsatisfactory that we are still at a loss to form a true idea of these affairs from them. The only part of Colonel Keating's correspondence

which you have communicated to us is a broken extract from a letter containing a relation of his transaction beginning in the middle of an engagement, from which we are unable to judge of his intention before the battle, or of the operations he proposed in consequence of it. We only know that he has arrived near the river Máhi, and had persuaded Rághoba to cross it before the rains, which appears to us rather contrary to your information of his being in full march towards Poona. It should rather seem he meant to cross the river with an intent to put his army in quarters during the rains.

We therefore think it necessary to require copy of your correspondence with Colonel Keating from the beginning of the campaign, and that you continue to furnish us with copy of what may pass between you in future.

We cannot avoid observing that notwithstanding our instructions of the 8th of March last and the peremptory style in which we found it necessary to convey them, you have still thought it proper to send Mr. Mostyn as Public Minister to Rághoba's camp, without informing us of the design or object of his mission, or the measures which you have taken for a compliance with those instructions, although it appears that ten days had elapsed from the receipt of them till the date of your letter now before us. Neither have you informed us what supply you have received or expect from Rághoba for maintaining the burthen of the war you have entered into in his behalf. In a word we are still as much in the dark as we were on the first intelligence of your projected campaign, notwithstanding our earnest entreaties to be furnished with every information to enable us to judge what aid our duty might make it incumbent upon us to render you. We now desire, in addition to the other lights we have required from you, that you send us a copy of your instructions to Mr. Mostyn, and that you give orders to him to transmit to us by every opportunity successive intelligence of the state of affairs in Rághoba's army while he continues there, and of all other affairs relating to his mission and the state of the present war with the Maráthás as may fall under his notice.

From what we have said you will perceive that we can in no shape approve of your late transactions. It is painful to us to repeat remonstrances; we shall leave you to answer for this conduct to the Court of Directors; in the meantime while we lie in the uncertainty of which we complain, we cannot think ourselves justified in sending you the supplies you require; we remain in hopes that the letter you promise us in answer to ours of the 8th March will be more explicit, and both enable us to afford you our aid and point out the objects which are to be obtained by it.

We have already advised you of our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party at Poona for the re-establishment of peace with the Maráthás. We also have written to Sakhárám Bápu at the same time on that subject, acquainting him of our desire to send a person to treat with him there. We have since appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to this charge, who is now ready to set out and will wait at Kálpi on the river Jamna for passports from Sakhárám Bápu.

We enclose a copy of such part of his instructions as we think materially necessary for your information.

We are, Gentlemen,

Your, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.
JOHN CLAVERING.
GEORGE MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.

Fort William, 10th July 1775.

Letter from the Governor *and* Council *to Colonel* Upton.

Sir,—In a letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, dated the 10th of July, they acquainted us of their having appointed you to proceed to Poona and of the object of your mission; at the same time they transmitted an extract of such part of their instructions to you as they said was necessary for our information.

The Governor General and Council in their letter to us mention that they are much misinformed as to the then situation of affairs, and it appears by their instructions that in most points they have been able to give you discretional orders only. In this case we think it becomes a duty we owe to our hon'ble employers to offer you every information that you can possibly want, to enable you to discharge the high commission with which you are entrusted, and as we learn by some of the Ministerial Agents here of your arrival at Kálpi on the river Jamna from whence they shortly expected you at Poona, and as we are fully satisfied that you will receive very partial accounts from the Ministerial Confederacy of the real state and present situation of the affairs of Raghunáthráv and of the Company, so far as they are connected, we will therefore most readily give you, on your signifying your desire for it, every information that you can wish for relative to both, either by letter, or by deputing a gentleman to you from hence to Poona, properly instructed and fully acquainted with the whole, should you prefer. We request that you will procure the necessary passports for him, and on your sending them hither he shall proceed immediately. At any rate we wish you would take no material step in the present business entrusted to you relative to this Presidency till after we may receive your reply to this letter.

In case you should prefer our only writing to you on the subject above-mentioned, it will be then necessary that you should acquaint us whether you are in possession of the Company's large or small cypher for your correspondence.

We transmit this letter in quadruplicate by different routes in hopes that it may safely reach you.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 11th September 1775.

Letter from the Governor *and* Council, *Bombay, to the* Governor General *and* Council, *Fort William.*

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—We had the honor to address you the 4th instant, and agreeable to what we then mentioned we shall now proceed to reply more fully to your letter dated the 10th July.

We are much concerned that you should still continue to think you have reasons to complain of our not being sufficiently full and explicit in our advices respecting our proceedings in consequence of the treaty with Rághoba, which we cannot but in a great measure attribute to your not having then received our letter of the 30th of April of which you have not acknowledged the receipt, and we flatter ourselves that all cause of complaint on this head will be entirely removed by our succeeding letters, and the information Mr. Taylor will personally give you.

In compliance with your requisitions, we now transmit a complete series of our correspondence with Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, beginning with the instructions given him on his

first proceeding with our troops to join Rághoba, and we shall not fail regularly to transmit copies of all letters that may in future pass between us. We also enclose a copy of the instructions we had prepared for Mr. Mostyn, by which your Honour and Council will perceive that the objects of his intended mission were only to press Rághoba to march with all possible expedition towards Poona, to hasten the accomplishment of some points of the treaty, and to relieve the Commanding Officer from all charge of business with the Darbár and negotiation with the country powers. The treaty with Rághoba had been executed long before our determination for sending Mr. Mostyn to the army, and we did not conceive this measure to be in the least repugnant to the directions contained in your letter of the 8th of March, being solely intended to hasten the conclusion of the war which had been already begun. Mr. Mostyn, however, was prevented from proceeding to join the army by the unusual severity of the monsoon, and this design was afterwards entirely dropped upon the receipt of your letter dated the 31st of May.

We most sincerely regret the resolution your Honour and Council have taken to send Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to treat with Sakhárám Bápu at Poona without waiting for further advices from us. We did entertain hopes, that we should have convinced your Honour of the justice of Rághoba's pretensions to the Peshwáship, and that we should have met with your support and assistance in the prosecution of the war, when we did not doubt, but in the course of next campaign, we should have conducted Rághoba to Poona and fulfilled our engagements with him. These hopes, we now fear, are not only defeated by this measure, but the dignity and consequence of this Presidency amongst the neighbouring powers very sensibly injured. We cannot think we were unreasonable in our expectations, that a negotiation in which the interests of this Presidency were so materially concerned, should have been carried on in concert with us, and which indeed we concluded to be your intention from the tenor of the Governor General's letter to Sakhárám Bápu; but when we advert to the extract you have favoured us with from Colonel Upton's instructions, we find him vested with the most extensive powers, and not the least reference to be made to us even for advice or information, the want of which is avowed in these very instructions, and which from the vicinity of Bombay to Poona we could convey to him in two days. Notwithstanding this we thought it our duty to afford Colonel Upton every information we could give to assist him in the execution of his important Commission, being satisfied that he would only receive very partial accounts at Poona both of Rághoba and affairs in general, and we at first proposed to send a gentleman fully instructed to meet him there to confer with him respecting the interests of this Presidency so far as you have committed them to his charge; but not knowing whether this step might be agreeable to your Honour and Council we despatched a letter to him by different routes, a copy of which is enclosed, wherein we made him this proposal, or that if he preferred information by letter, we offered to give him, the most full and satisfactory advice on every point he might wish to be informed of. We have not yet received an answer to this letter, or any advice of the Colonel's arrival at Poona, though we heard so long ago as the 9th ultimo that he arrived at Kálpi on the river Jamna.

The letter from Colonel Keating, dated the 30th August, will show you in what manner Rághoba received the news of your Honour and Council's determination to open a negotiation with the Ministry, and of your positive orders for withdrawing our forces from the army, and a cessation of hostilities taking place. His subsequent letter, dated the 2nd of September, will apprize you of the negotiation; but in the meantime he demands very pertinently from what source he is to supply his exigencies for money until the conclusion of this important adjustment, which must necessarily take up some months, and then makes the following proposals which we intend to communicate to Colonel Upton when we hear of his

arrival at Poona. And we beg leave strongly to recommend to your Honour and Council to obtain them for him, as being in our opinion extremely moderate and strictly consistent with justice.

Rághoba first proposes that half of the country, the produce of which is reserved for the maintenance of the reigning Peshwa, should be put into his immediate possession, or lest this proposal should take up too much time in the discussion, that a monthly stipend be paid him from the Sarkár of Poona for the support of himself and his adherents until some agreement may be concluded. This stipend, his Agent here proposes, should be seven lákhs of rupees per month.

He next proposes and entreats, that before you come to any decision respecting his pretensions to the Peshwáship, you will attend to every evidence that can be produced by either party, when if it should be proved to your satisfaction that a son of the late Náráyanráv does exist, let such son be appointed Peshwa; but he then as next of blood claims the office of Diván for himself until the minority of this supposed son expires, at which period he will rest satisfied with a provision independent of any employment. If on the contrary he should prove to your Honour and Council that this child, said to be the son of Náráyanráv, is a fictitious one, and which he doubts not to make evident, he in such case pleads that as the son of Bájiráv he is justly entitled to the Peshwáship of the Marátha Empire, with which if he is invested he promises instantly to fulfil the whole of his engagements with the Hon'ble Company.

We have sent directions to Colonel Keating to retire with the troops into our parganas contiguous to Surat or Broach so soon as the weather and roads will permit, and as by the agreement for the cessation of arms everything was to remain in the same state until a general pacification might be concluded, we have ordered him to give effectual protection to these parganas and to repel any hostile attempts that may be made upon them. Mr. Tayler will have acquainted your Honour and Council that we had taken possession of most of the parganas ceded to us so long ago as the month of April last.

In the course of Colonel Keating's correspondence you will observe that he has at different times obtained grants from Fattesing and Rághoba, of some other small districts contiguous to Surat and Broach. He lately obtained from the former a grant of a pargana called Sinor, producing a revenue of upwards of a lákh of rupees a year, but as it lay out of the line of territory we wished to possess, and your Honour and Council had forbidden us to aim at further acquisitions, we immediately gave directions for its being restored.

We beg leave to observe in reply to a remark in your letter, dated the 10th of July, that we acquainted your Honour and Council in our letter of the 31st of March of Rághoba's having made a deposit in jewels valued at six lákhs of rupees as a security for the expenses of the war, and by the treaty appears that several districts were made over to the Company, the revenues of which were to be particularly assigned for the payment of the monthly stipend of 1,50,000 rupees; Rághoba has since paid a farther sum of two lákhs of rupees, as mentioned in Colonel Keating's letter of the 30th of August, and we had every reason to expect a most considerable sum would have been received from him in consequence of the treaty with Fattesing, who has already paid about ten of the stipulated twenty-six lákhs, and we are persuaded would have paid the whole, and that Rághoba would have found no difficulty in raising money as he advanced, had we continued to support him.

Whatever may be your determination with respect to the matters at present in agitation, we assure you we will most strictly conform to it, and we request, in the most earnest manner, that you will not continue to withhold the necessary supply of money for our expenses from an

apprehension that we shall apply to any purpose inconsistent with your directions, and likewise that you will if possible assist us in paying off our bond debt, which unless we are confirmed in possession of the places ceded to us by the treaty we see no prospect of being able to effect ourselves.

We should have been more particular in explaining the pretensions of Rághoba to the Peshwáship had not Mr. Tayler been commissioned to give you full information on that head. He will also be able to acquaint you with any particulars you may want to know respecting Fattesing and Govindráv, the sons of Dámáji, or as they are commonly termed the Gáikawárs, the mention of whom so frequently occurs in the letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating. We shall only here observe that this family till lately collected a share of six-tenths of the Broach revenues in participation with us, and that it was their share we wished to obtain, and not the Mogals', as mentioned in your instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Upton. The Mogals' share devolved upon us when we reduced the town, and Fattesing having lately given us a Phirmaund for the Gáikawár's share, we are now entitled to the whole revenue of that district.

Bombay Castle, 14th October 1775.

We have, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Letter from Sakhárám Bápu to the Governor and Council, Bombay.

The Hon'ble Company of England having sent two or there gentlemen of Council to Bengal, who having consulted with the Governor there, he has written two letters to this Sarkár (Sakhárám Bápu). This it is necessary the Governor of Bombay should be acquainted with. Therefore in the Sarkár's letter are enclosed copies of those two letters which you will present to him, and let his answer be sent to me with the news.

Translation of a copy of a letter from the Hon'ble Warren Hastings, Esq., of Bengal, to Sakhárám Pandit.

I am sure you have a full power over the Marátha Government. It is therefore right that I should write you about a dispute that arose between the English Company and your Sarkár. I heard by the Governor in Council of Bombay that they have joined with Raghunáthráv and sent a large army to get him placed in the Government of Peshwa. This conduct is against the Company's order, because they have ordered all officers in India not to make any war nor enter into any dispute. My employer, the King of England, has directed that all the Company's Governors in India should obtain mine and my Council's permission as King's Governor and Council of Bengal either to make a war or peace; we have therefore sent an order to the Governor and Council of Bombay to recall the army that they have sent to the assistance of the said Raghunáthráv, and not to meddle with any Marátha officer unless they be obliged to do it for their self-preservation. I have an intention to send a trusty, wise and deserving man to Poona, that place being the capital city of the Peshwa's Government and is near to Bombay, to settle the dispute that arose between the Government of Bombay and the Maráthás and to conclude a lasting friendship; but I will defer sending the aforesaid man till such time as I may receive your answer and know what you want, but you will in the meantime order all your officers positively to suspend a war with the English, in doing which no hindrance will come between the settlement of peace. The Company having recommended me the care of their affairs, and in order to strengthen and renew a friendship with the Maráthás I write you this. I have heard of your wisdom and capacity from everywhere, therefore trust in your person that you will not fail to get the business done through your interest. If the business is not done agreeable to mine as well as your intentions, we shall both be blamed for the same.

Letter from the President *and* Council *to Lieutenant-Colonel* Keating.

Sir,—We direct that as soon as the weather and road will permit, you return with the forces under your command and with all the guns and stores into either the Broach or Surat parganas dependant on the Company, as may be most convenient. Acquaint Rághoba it is our advice that he and such a large part of his army as he may be able to keep together and to provide for should continue with you till the embarkation of the troops or till we may be acquainted with the final Resolution of the Governor General and Council respecting the matter at present depending.

Your letters of the 30th July and 6th ultimo have been duly received.

We can by no means comply with your desire, and that of the officers of the army at present under your command, by consenting to an allowance of double batta, as it would not only be a most expensive and dangerous precedent for the future, but the orders of our hon'ble employers are express against.

Captain Farre's request to be allowed batta as Major is very unreasonable. The answer you gave him was a very proper one.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 5th September 1775.

From

WILLIAM TAYLOR;

To

The GOVERNOR GENERAL, and COUNCIL,

Fort William.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—By the "Good will" I acquainted you with my arrival here the 30th ultimo. On the 6th instant I received notice from the Secretary to attend the Governor General and Council on Monday the 9th for taking into consideration the business on which I had been deputed from you.

Deeming it necessary to give them the fullest and most perfect information of every circumstance in the least relative to the primary objects of my deputation, I had previously stated at large the nature of the office of Peshwa, the origin of their independant power, the rise and progress of the late divisions in the Poona Government to the time of Rághoba's application to us, the state of the Marátha Empire and the different powers connected with it to that period, the political and commercial views of the Company, the progress of the war, the offers of the Nizám evinced on one hand how much the honor and good faith of the nation, the interests of the Company, the dignity of your Government, were concerned in the strict adherence to our engagements with the Peshwa, and on the other the disadvantage, danger and disgrace that would attend the abandoning of them: earnestly conjuring them to warrant and assist you to prosecute your original plan; and as a previous measure instantly to revoke their orders for withdrawing our army from Rághoba.

These representations I delivered in the form of an address, which was duly perused, and sundry questions put to me; but it is with infinite concern I must acquaint you, that there appears not the least hope of persuading this Government to alter their former resolutions, for notwithstanding all I had to urge, they wrote me in answer, that after duly considering the re-

presentations I had been pleased to make to them, as well as the several informations which I had communicated respecting the nature, motives and objects of your engagements with Rághoba, and the present state of the Marátha Government at Poona, they had for the present to acquaint me that they were confirmed in their opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being recalled from the service of Rághoba into their own garrisons. Their orders for this purpose would therefore remain in force. But as I seemed to understand their directions implied the recall of the troops to Bombay, they thought it necessary to explain their meaning to have been, that it should remain at your option to withdraw them to such of your garrisons, and distribute them as you might see fit, of the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette.

The words Company's possessions appearing to me indefinite I requested it might be explained, whether they meant to include by them such of the several districts ceded to us by the Peshwa and by Fattesing Gáikawár as are in our possession, or whether they meant to confine them only to Sálsette and the territories belonging to the Company previous to the commencement of our engagements with the Peshwa, to which they returned me for answer that their meaning by the Company's possessions was the territories possessed by the Company previous to the date of the treaty with Rághoba, and that they added including Sálsette, because you had taken possession of it before that period.

You have been advised of Colonel Upton's being deputed from this Government to the Poona Darbár, in order to settle a treaty with the Maráthás. I yesterday received a copy of his instructions, and instantly remonstrated in the strongest manner against this measure desiring his recall, but have not yet received an answer. By the "Terrible," which I have spared at the request of this Government, to convey five lákhs of rupees for Bombay to Sir Edward Hughes at Trinconomali, I will transmit copies of every paper that has passed. In the interim I remain with respect.

Hon'ble Sir, &c.,
WILLIAM TAYLOR.

Calcutta, 13th October 1775.

To

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, Esquire,
Governor General, and Council,
Calcutta.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay having deputed me to represent to your Honour and Council the motives of their proceedings in their engagements with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv Bálájí, the situation of the affairs there, the danger and discredit that must attend their treaty with him being utterly cancelled, the general interests of the Company at that Presidency, with other matters as mentioned in their address of the 22nd ultimo, I shall now proceed to enter as fully and clearly as I am able on the several subjects.

The better to explain them it will be necessary to advert to a period antecedent to that in which these engagements commenced; for this reason though it may at first appear foreign to my present purpose, yet I trust your Honour and Council will not deem this recapitulation an unnecessary one.

In the ancient constitution of the Marátha Empire, the affairs of it were conducted under the supreme authority of the Rája, by a Council consisting of eight persons, being the eight principal officers of the State. By the last account I have seen of this Council, it consisted of Bráhmans who were generally employed in all civil departments of the State: the command of armies and other military matters was confided to the Marátha or Rajput Caste.

The principal of these Ministers in power was the Peshwa, which literally means he who precedes the rest. The nature of his office resembles that of the Mahomedan Vazírs.

Báláji Vishvanáth, a Brahman, born in the district of Rájápur, from an inferior state in the reign of Sháhu Rája rose by his abilities to the high office of Peshwa. By degrees he so far gained on the confidence of the Rája as to persuade him to divest himself of all the cares of Government and resign them to him. The Sháhu Rája accordingly invested him with all the ensigns of authority and power incident to the Rájáship. All orders and every detail of Government issued immediately from the Peshwa, who was further styled by the Rája, Pandit Pradhán or chief and elect of the Pandits. This form of Government subsists to this day. On the death of a Peshwa his successor goes to Sátára in order to be formally invested with the *sirpáv* of office by the Rája. There is in the Poona Darbár a person nominally esteemed in some degree superior even to the Peshwa. It is the Pratinidhi, who is the delegate and immediate representative of the Rája, and formerly his fiat was necessary to give a proper validity to all acts of Government; besides the Sháhu Rája had also reserved to himself a considerable degree of actual force, the revenues of a large district were collected by him, with which he maintained a considerable body of troops under his own immediate command.

The Peshwa Báláji Vishvanáth had well availed himself of the indulgence of the Rája, by creating a number of adherents, for we find his son and successor Bájiráv Ballál possessed in fact the supreme power in the Marátha Empire, as he paid little or no regard to his prince. The Rája indeed at first possessed entire liberty of person, but whether it was that the Peshwa did it more effectually to secure his power, or that the intrigues carried on against him rendered it necessary for his own safety the Rája was soon confined to Sátára. At his death he was succeeded by the present Rája Rám, his adopted son, who continuing under the same restriction as his father, the Rája, has ever since been in mere name, an image of authority in the Marátha Empire.

The conquests of Chimnáji Appa, brother to Bájiráv, first engaged the attention of the President and Council of Bombay towards the Maráthás.[1] By the acquisition of Sálsette and Bassein they became our neighbours; and as the Peshwa family also early turned their thoughts towards the establishment of a marine, it was foreseen that sooner or later some points of discussion must arise which might lead to disputes. It was therefore thought prudent to prevent them by stating our several rights in a treaty, as the Rája had formerly ceded to Bájiráv in his own right all the countries conquered from the Europeans. It was feared the attempts of his brother Chimnáji Appa might not stop at the Portuguese settlements; the President and Council seemed to think they might effectually secure themselves by an application to the Rája, and a gentleman was therefore sent to him; but judging from the state of matters at that Court, it was justly to be feared an offer to treat immediately with the Rája might bring down on us the resentment of the Peshwa; sundry articles of agreement were concluded with Chimnáji in behalf of his brother Bájiráv. Since that time the Rája has never been thought of, but finding the Peshwas in absolute possession of all power we have constantly in all transactions with the Maráthás applied to and treated with them, as though they were the lawful Princes of the Empire.

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[1] *Vide* the English Embassy to the Máráthás in 1739, page 67.

The wisdom and policy of Bájiráv firmly established in his family the power they had usurped, and accordingly on his demise he was peaceably succeeded in the Peshwáship by his eldest son Báláji Bájiráv, more generally known by the appellation of Nána, who, in the year 1761 was also regularly succeeded by his son Mádhavráv Báláji, then a minor of fourteen.

On the death of Nána, his brother Raghunáth conducted the affairs of the Marátha Government as Regent during the minority of his nephew, the young Peshwa. There is a treaty subsisting between the English and Mádhavráv formed under the administration of Rághoba. He had conducted matters during the critical situation in which the invasion of the Nizám had plunged the Maráthás, and there is no act to prove that ever he sought to embrace the opportunity of the possession of power to secure it to himself in perjudice to the rights of his nephew.

In all the civil departments of Government the Peshwas continued to employ the caste of Bráhmans. By the influence this gave them they raised immense fortunes, in order to give the security to their power which a large fortune in this country always endangers; their next steps were to create to themselves a consequence. This they sought to effect by dividing the family of the Peshwa, and occasionally siding with the party which policy directed. Hence early began those scenes of intrigues from whence spring the different factions and divisions which first disclosed themselves in the minority of Mádhavráv, and have nearly brought the power of the Peshwa to a total decline, on the ruins of which has arisen the high influence of those persons now known in the Poona Government by the appellation of the Ministers.

The wise and just administration of Rághoba would have totally defeated the views those men had formed of benefiting themselves by the minority of Mádhavráv. They therefore exerted every artifice and intrigue to deprive Rághoba of power. Gopikábái, the widow of Nána, was a woman deeply given to intrigues of every kind and her scandalous licentiousness justly attracted the reproach of one so nearly concerned in the honour of the family as her husband's brother. Hence first arose the bitter hatred of Gopikábái to Rághoba. The ministers availed themselves of this circumstance and of her influence with her young son, to breed a coldness between the uncle and nephew, which ended in a declared breach, the total deprivation of power, and at length in some degree in the confinement of Rághoba.

Their ends thus compassed in this point, they industriously adverted to the primary object to which this was only intended to lead: all favours of Government now flowed from the Ministers, and as none are granted in this country without a valuable consideration, by means of presents and peculations, these men increased their fortunes and influence to an immense degree, whilst from the withholding of the tribute by the Northern Jághirdárs, and by such other of the Pandits on various pretences, as purchased friends to protect them, the treasury of the Peshwa became almost exhausted, and as money alone commands troops, his consequence would have declined with it. But Mádhavráv as he advanced in years showed a firmness and ablities which made him dreaded and respected by every one: in the short time he governed, his wise conduct and great abilities procured him the respect of every power around him, and as he well knew the designs of the Ministers, there is no doubt had his life been longer he would have effectually restored the influence of the Peshwa, but unfortunately for it he died in November 1772 at the age of 25, leaving no children.

The gradual progress of his disorder giving him time to reflect on the consequence of his death, Mádhavráv on perceiving his end approach revolved seriously in his mind the fate and situation of his family. His brother Náráyanráv who was to succeed him he knew to be a weak hasty young man, easily swayed by any counsel and particularly under the influence of his mother Gopikábái whose deadly hatred to Rághoba he was also well apprised of. He was sensible

of the ambitious and independent views of several of the leading Ministers which if not well counteracted must in time wrest from his family the power, and perhaps the office of Peshwa. In this dilemma nothing better presented itself than to repose a confidence in Rághoba. It was true that Rághoba had lately made some secret steps towards liberty and an accession of power, but reflecting on the appearance of his own approaching end, and knowing the influence that would guide his brother's actions Rághoba's attempt appeared to Mádhavráv only a prudent act of self-preservation. He therefore called them to him, explained his views, remembered them of their ancestors, and joining their hands conjured Rághoba to protect the young man, advised Náráyanráv to confide in their uncle, and never to listen to the insinuations of their mother Gopikábái, whose deadly hatred and revenge he himself had experienced would stop at nothing to be gratified.

For a short time after the decease of his brother, Náráyanráv carried it fair to his uncle. It was settled that all business should be conducted by Rághoba as Náib, subject to the control of Náráyanráv, and accordingly when the latter was invested by the Rája with the *Sirpáv* of Peshwáship, he confirmed on the former that of Náib. This harmony was however soon interrupted by the intrigues of the Ministers, but especially by the ascendency of Gopikábái over her son.

Mádhavráv had advised his brother chiefly to regard the counsels of Sakhárám Bápu, the Diván, but it seems his inclinations rather led him to attach himself to Nána Fadnavis whose age and disposition was better suited to his own. Hence arose two parties in the Ministry. His confidants in the interest of Gopikábái had instilled into him jealousies of his uncle. The hatred of this singular and enterprising woman had received an additional force from his adoption of Amrutráv, a young lad in a measure connected with Mudáji; this adoption she represented as contrary to the custom of their caste while he had nephews of his own, as singularly unjust by depriving his family of the riches he might die possessed of, and impolitic as it might in time tend to deprive their race of the Peshwáship. His connection also with so powerful a chief as Mudáji Bhonsla was likewise hinted as a circumstance to prove his own ambitious designs. By these arts and insinuations the good counsels of his late brother were entirely effaced from the mind of the young Peshwa. He deprived his uncle of all powers, then made him a sort of prisoner at large, and on the pretence of Rághobá's concerting a plan with a Náik of Hyder Alli for his escape, he on the 11th April 1773 closely confined him to a chamber in the Darbár debarring him as well as he could of all access.

Had Náráyanráv possessed the least degree of prudence, he might have remained secure in the Peshwáship, for though by the instigation of his mother and the choice he had made of confidants he had created to himself a deadly enemy in the Diván Sakhárám Bápu, yet the influence and abilities of the Fadanavis, Nána and Moroba, and their adherents, were more than a counterpois to him. But without the least share of judgment and wholly devoted to low vices and pleasures, Náráyanráv paid not the least regard to any one; on the contrary he behaved in so senseless, imperious and disregardful a manner even to the Ministers in his own party, that they became lukewarm in his interest and in time suffered him to fall a sacrifice to the machinations of his enemies.

It is said by means of Mudáji Bhonsla the Diván Sakhárám received information of an intention to assassinate him and Rághoba, at the instigation of Gopikábái. Certain it is that this woman was well known to have been constantly advising her son to deprive him of the Divánship which was the first step to the loss of riches and perhaps of life. From this instant Sakhárám and his party set about concerting the means of deposing Náráyanráv, releasing Rághoba, and placing him in the Peshwáship.

Chiefly by means of the intervention of the Diván, Mahomed Essuf and Sumersing, two Subhedárs, were won over to execute the deed. On the 18th August 1773 at two in the afternoon they led their party of 500 men to the Darbár under pretence of being mustered; they forced the gates and put the guards to the sword. Náráyanráv apprehensive of their design ran to his uncle Rághoba begging him to take the Government but spare his life. Rághoba it seems wished to save him, as nothing more than his imprisonment was ever meant, but owing to the resentment of a slave of the family whom Náráyanráv had caused to be publicly whipped his death was determined upon. The assassins threatened instantly to destroy both if he did not loose his nephew; he then thrust him from him, and the young man soon expired at his feet.

On the death of his nephew Rághoba was instantly complimented by the Diván and other Ministers at Poona as Peshwa; and he proceeded to the discharge of that office. Nána and Moroba Fadanavis with some of their party on hearing of the late event had instantly quitted Poona, fearing they might become a sacrifice to their enemies, but Rághoba equally cognisant of the design of all the Ministers, had no particular attachment, or aversion to any of them, and therefore found means to calm the apprehensions of the Fadanavis, who returned and reserved their former offices. Every day for a time seemed to wear the appearance of peace, and Rághoba sent his son Amrutráv to Sátára to obtain from the Rája in his name the investiture of the Peshwáship, which was accordingly granted with every requisite form and solemnity. Every officer in the Marátha army then at Poona paid Rághoba the usual compliments on the occasion, and he was publicly and solemnly acknowledged by us as Peshwa in a visit especially paid him by Mr. Mostyn, a Member of the Bombay Board, appointed by the Hon'ble Company to be their Resident at Poona. Accompanied by the usual presents and the same proofs of our friendship, as had ever been usual on the accession of a new Peshwa, he made him an engagement to maintain the articles of peace and alliance entered into with his ancestor Bájiráv.

The appearance of tranquillity between Rághoba and the Ministers was of no great duration. Sensible of all their designs he could place no confidence in any of them. He had appointed no Diván, but transacted most affairs himself; it seems that in imitation of his brother the Nána's policy, he wished to form a body of troops solely dependent on himself; to effect this money was principally necessary, and as Mádhavráv just before his death had disbursed eighty lákhs of rupees in discharge of the Sarkár's debt, and the troubles during the short reign of Náráyanráv had prevented the regular receipt of the revenues, the treasury of the Peshwa was found very bare. To replenish it Rághoba seems early to have turned his thoughts towards the Karnátak, but being diffident of the troops with him, he wrote to Mudáji Bhonsla to come down and assist him, and having joined his army proceeded against the combined forces of the Nizám, commanded by Rucun-ud-Dowla and Sábáji Bhonsla.

Even those Ministers who had been most forward in establishing him in the Peshwáship never meant he should acquire the least degree of independent influence, well knowing that the first effect would be an invasion of their treasures; seeing him therefore at the head of an army leagued with Mudáji Bhonsla in a way to acquire money and of course troops of his own their apprehensions led them to confederate against him. On different pretences they left the camp, and those who remained betrayed Rághoba to the Mogals. In an action he was not only defeated, but narrowly escaped being cut off, as a party of the enemy had been allowed to advance to his tent without opposition, and dangerously wounded him before he could retreat.

Notwithstanding the late advantage over the Marátha army, the Nizám thought proper to treat with Rághoba and a peace was concluded between Ruckun-ud-Dowla promising in behalf

of the Nizám to comply with Rághobá's demand of twenty lákhs of Jághír and the cession of two or three forts, but the Nizám at an interview he afterwards had with Rághoba, pleading poverty and inability to comply with what his Vazir had promised, Rághoba agreed to wave the whole demand on his engaging to assist him with a body of forces on any particular emergency. From hence Rághoba directed his steps towards Hyder, from whom he demanded the arrears of Chauth, and as a pretence to the same demand meditated on him, Rághoba wrote to Mahomed Alli, Nabáb of Arcot, for assistance, knowing he should meet with a refusal. Hyder compromised matters by paying down twenty six lákhs, for which he obtained the cession of the three provinces of Madgewang, Hansutak and Chivdinrug.

Having thus settled with Hyder, Rághoba then declared his intention of marching into the Karnátak in hopes to get from Mahomed Alli a sum of money as arrears of Chauth. The prospect of plunder attracting every desparado who could muster a horse and sword, his army was soon increased to a very considerable number, and he was in full march towards the Karnátak when his attention was diverted to another quarter.

Justly apprehensive of Rághobá's acquiring sufficient force to be wholly independent of them, the Ministers, while they had it in their power, were determined to prevent him; accordingly the two parties united, and a confederacy was formed under the name of the Panch Bhái or five brothers, five principal persons being the leaders of it. Their intention was to have seized Rághoba and confined him, to have carried on the Government in the name of Gangábái, Náráyanráv's widow, till the birth of the child. She was then industriously reported to be pregnant, whose issue, if a boy, was to be proclaimed Peshwa. In the month of February 1774 a party of them seized Gangábái and Párvatibái, the wife of Sadoba, and carried them to the fort of Purandhar. The better to secure, it is supposed, a male child somehow, five Bráhman women in the same state as the widow of Náráyanráv were said to have accompanied her, every person suspected to be in the interest of Rághoba was guarded, and the confederates immediately set about collecting troops to support this declared rebellion against the Peshwa.

Fortunately for Rághoba, he received the news of this confederacy a few hours before the ministerialists had advised the partisans in his camp of their design, and he retired to Gutti, a fort under the command of Morárráv Gopálráv, a Marátha Chief of high influence. The Ministers now imagined his ruin certain, as Morárráv had always inclined to their party, but they were mistaken by his declaring for, and openly joining Rághoba. As the impolitic avarice of the Bráhmans had clearly evinced their intentions to avail themselves of their present possession of power to call on the Marátha Chiefs for their arrears, whenever a fortunate event gave them hopes of success, many Marátha Chiefs quitted their party and joined Rághoba, which enabled him to face the ministerial army, and by stratagem in the month of March he gained a complete victory, taking prisoner Trimbakráv Máma, the Commander-in-Chief, and one of their most respectable partisans.

This unlooked for event threw the confederates at Purandhar into the utmost consternation; they hourly expected to be surrounded by the victorious army of Rághoba. In this dilemma they had once thought of releasing the Rája at Sátára and restoring the ancient Government in order to gain over the Marátha Chiefs; but justly dreading the evils they might bring on themselves, in revenge for the usurpations of their caste, they dropped all thoughts of this expedient, and had recourse to that of publishing the birth of a son to Gangábái, the widow of Náráyanráv. This child they immediately acknowledged as lawful Peshwa. The partisans of Rághoba declared it to be a fraud, and indeed the general report at this time, the certain circumstances of the pregnant women who accompanied Gangábái to Purandhar, the utility of it to the ministerial cause, inclined many then to doubt the reality of this child, and

the information since obtained by the Resident at Poona, the caution of the Ministers to conceal Gangábái by surrounding her house with a strong wooden fence, together with the manner in which the Nizám treats this reputed child in his late proposals for pacific measures, give much room to doubt the authenticity of the birth of Mádhavráv Náráyan.

The causes of the subsequent retreat of Rághoba to the country of Holkar, his junction with Holkar and Sindia, together with all his transactions and those of the different parties concerned in the confederacy against him till the period of his crossing the Tápti and his march towards Poona, I find, are fully explained in the letters from Mr. Mostyn, the Resident there, to the late Government at Calcutta from April to November 1774, and to them I therefore beg leave to refer you for every necessary information during that time.

From the divided state of the Ministerial party, the doubtful mien of those they deemed their allies, and the respectable force of Rághoba, his success almost seemed infallible. The better to secure it, he, however, in the month of August, made overtures through his Vakil to the Government of Bombay for a body of troops to assist him; his offers were then such as could not be accepted consistently with the plan laid down to them by the Hon'ble Company as the grand object of every military and political engagement, which they were unremittingly to pursue, and constantly to watch every opening afforded by the political state of affairs to obtain. He could not be brought to cede either Sálsette or Bassein; exclusive that the Bráhmans have ever shown singular attention to depress every growing power in the west of their dominions, and have always beheld with particular jealousy the advancement of the English there, a point of honour is concerned in the preservation of these territories; it is the family property of the Peshwás acquired by their famous ancestor Chimnáji Appa, and the only forts and countries that were conquered by natives of Hindustán from the Europeans.

It is not well known whether he had any just cause to suspect them or whether it was only an artifice of the Ministers, very usual in this country, but it is said Rághoba intercepted letters to Holkar and Sindia, wherein they appeared to be bargaining for his destruction. Alarmed at this he found means to quit their army, gave out that he was flying to Delhi but turned off at Indur and joined Govindráv Gáikawár, then before Baroda, who agreed to assist him with all his force. Their combined army was then said to consist of forty thousand men.

Holkar and Sindia deeming Rághobá's affairs desperate by his late desertion, thought best to enter seriously into terms with the Ministers. A new confederacy was then formed consisting of twelve persons, partly Bráhman Ministers and Marátha Cheifs, under the denomination of the Bára Bhái or twelve brothers. The acknowledgment of Mádhavráv Náráyan, for whom they had obtained from the Rája the *Sirpáv* of Peshwa, and the total exclusion of Rághoba from all share in the Government was the basis of their agreements; their private stipulations were not known.

To form the better judgment of the force and expectations of the two parties, it may not be amiss to take a slight view of the state of affairs in the Marátha Empire at this period, and of the States around so far as they have any relation with them.

The Bhonsla is by far the most formidable of the Marátha Chiefs, both by the extent of his dominions and the goodness and number of his troops. The late Jánoji Bhonsla having no children, had adopted his nephew Rághoji, the son of his younger brother Mudáji Bhonsla. This occasioned a warm dispute between the surviving brothers Sábáji and Mudáji; the former claimed the right of Government as the elder brother, and the latter as father and guardian to the adopted child. The Ministers had embraced the party of Sábáji; and Rághoba, while in power, that of Mudáji, who partly for this reason and on account of Rághobá's adoption of

Amrutráv was strongly in his interest. They at first each afforded assistance to the different causes they espoused, but at this period their own affairs, it was thought, would fully engage their attention and compel them to remain neutral.

The Gáikawár, a Marátha family, possessed the whole of the Gujarát country down to Daman. It was reduced from the Mogals by Piláji, grandfather of the present Gáikawár, and was held for some time independent of the Poona Darbár, but in the Government of Nána they compelled Dámáji, the son of Piláji, to yield them several places, part of the revenues, and to furnish a certain quota of troopers when wanted. The whole of the revenue is estimated at about 80 lákhs of rupees, and the Gáikawárs generally maintain a force of between twenty and thirty thousand horse. During the late disturbances at Poona this family had been prevented from taking any active part by their own intestine divisions. On the one hand Fattesing was in possession of the Government by orders from Poona, in the time of Mádhavráv having obtained it by high bribes to the Ministers. On the other hand, Rághoba, on his accession, had granted this Government to Govindráv, the brother of Fattesing, who after various successes in the field, was then besieging his brother in his capital city of Baroda.

The two northern Jághírdárs, Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia, had indeed entered into the confederacy and were the great hopes and support of it; but as they had till now studiously avoided interfering with either party, from the political motive of profiting by the divisions among the Bráhmans, the longer to withhold their tribute, it was imagined they would never heartily endeavour at the total suppression of Rághoba.

Muráráv Gopálráv, an old and experienced Marátha, who possessed the Fort of Gutti with a considerable district bordering on the Nizám's country, seemed only attentive to secure himself in his Jághír, without siding with either party.

The Nizám, whose interest it especially is to keep the Poona Government divided and depressed, had essentially profited by the present feuds. He had obtained cession of forts and countries from both parties (with considerable sums of money from the Ministers) without showing the least intention effectually to assist either.

Hyder, whose interests are in respect to the Poona Government the same as those of the Nizám, was also pleased to see the division among the Bráhmans. He was employed in reducing the forts for which he had the Sanads from Rághoba, to whom, if we may judge from his behaviour, he seemed rather to incline.

The reduction of the Rohilla had left the Company fully at peace in every part, nor was there the least appearance of any occasion for the employment of their troops in the east of Hindustán.

Such was the situation of affairs when the Peshwa Raghunáthráv applied to the President and Council of Bombay for the assistance of a body of troops to join his army, then generally allowed to consist of about 40,000 horse, in order to reduce to obedience certain of his subjects leagued in a rebellious confederacy not only to deprive him of the Peshwáship, which was his acknowledged right, but of every share of the Government of the Marátha Empire.

To form a proper judgment of the motives which guided the Government of Bombay at this juncture it will be necessary to be acquainted with the views of the Hon'ble Company in that settlement.

The safety and accessibleness of the harbour of Bombay at all seasons of the year, together with its vicinity to the Maráthás, and particularly to one of the passes through which the whole of the country above the Gháts might be supplied with the articles of England, seem chiefly to

have engaged the attention of the Company in the acquisition of this island. Their speculations were perfectly just, as woollen and the other staples of England are disposed of at Bombay and the markets which it supplies to the amount of 14 lákhs annually.

Besides this, the convenience of the harbour has secured to the English, and to those who trade under their protection, almost the exclusive trade in Indian commodities with the country of the Maráthás, as well as in the cotton with which Bengal and China is supplied, the whole bringing in an annual profit of lákhs of rupees in customs to the Company.

The influence which the Company have in the Government of Surat not only enables them in a great measure to give a considerable check to the commerce of the European nations already established there, but if well exerted, to prevent any others from interfering, a power the more valuable, as Surat is next to Bombay, the chief mart for the vend of staples, the entire monopoly of which is their great and leading commercial view on the west side of India.

For a considerable time commerce alone engaged the attention of the Company of Bombay; but the construction of the docks and the excellent timber with the number of artificers readily procurable there, gave it a consequence in a military light. Nothing more need be said of this than that the testimony of the Commanders of his Majesty's squadrons, and indeed the utter impossibility of proper repairs elsewhere, serve to evince that to the docks at Bombay and the ready assistance found there was chiefly owing our superiority at sea in this quarter of the globe last war.

Sensible of the importance of these objects and of the defenceless state in which Bombay was, the Hon'ble the Court of Directors in the year 1768 sent out Colonel Campbell to inspect the state of the fortifications, with positive orders implicitly to follow his plan, and knowing also the inadequacy of our garrisons to the defence of the place they very considerably enlarged our military establishment.

Previous to this the expense of Bombay exceeded its revenues, but this great increase they were sensible must distress the Government; therefore they mean to defray them, and furnish their investments for Europe and China. Knowing also that a territorial acquisition alone would furnish a revenue equal to the necessities of that settlement, they laid down a system for the attainment of one. This was the acquisition of Sálsette and Bassein with the Marátha share of the revenues of Surat, which they imagined would complete their views; and this, I must again repeat, they urgently and especially enjoin us to embrace every opportunity to attain, and to this alone to direct all our political and military operations, declaring it at the same time to be the utmost extent of their wishes on the west of India.

In the cessions stipulated for by the treaty with the Peshwa, the views of the Company have been completed beyond their hopes, as exclusive of the chief consideration—a revenue equal to its expenses and occasions—the commercial and military advantages of Bombay are most permanently secured to it.

On Sálsette, Karanja and Bassein, Bombay may safely depend for provisions of all kinds, and possessing Bassein and its districts we ensure to ourselves a part of the timber necessary to our marine yard, the want of which would greatly distress our works there; that were this place to fall into an enemy's hand, or any dispute with the Maráthás to subsist in the time of a war with France, the docks which are now so material would be rendered almost useless for want of this indispensable article.

In the districts ceded in the Gujarát country grows the cotton for the Bengal market, which secures to the English and those under their protection, the entire trade in this article, and of course to the Company the whole customs on it.

Exclusive of these actual advantages, we shall entirely preclude the Dutch, who have long been soliciting a settlement at Bassein, from all rivalry with the Company in the trade to the Marátha dominions; besides preventing the dangerous consequences that might attend the neighbourhood of so active and enterprising a nation, who have never been known to let slip an opportunity of extending themselves, and should they at any time embrace an opportunity to get possession of Bassein with the means they would have to distress ours, and carry on their own trade, it seems very probable that but little would be left to the English at Bombay. This acquisition also defeats the known and declared designs of the Portuguese and the probable views of the French, who, from former steps and their now sending so many ships to the west of India, seem to incline also to participate with us in the commerce there.

The striking advantage of these possessions will I trust be deemed worthy of the most serious regard, when it is considered that the maintenance of Bombay is necessary in the general system of the Company's affairs. From an annual loss of above £150,000 sterling, a burthen upon your Presidency, troublesome at best, but perhaps dangerous in the end by having to remit specie, and all chiefly for a local advantage till then uncertain, Bombay would become a winning settlement of near eight lákhs, which will be a difference to the Company of £250,000 annually; it would be in a state to afford certain assistance of all kinds to a squadron in time of war, secure the commerce of the west of India in the English hands, and above all frustrate the great rivals of the Company in their views of participating in our trade with the Marátha donimions, an object alone of great importance, as on this trade depends their chief vend of woollen and other staples of our native country.

Such were the great and leading motives which induced the Government of Bombay to engage with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv. It seemed the very crisis wished for by the Company, an opportunity of accomplishing the objects they had so strenuously enjoined them ever to keep in view, with honour, with justice and without the hazard of a general war with the whole Marátha Empire. With their special and repeated orders on this head before them unrepealed by the very letter which accompanied the new Act, so far from meaning a disregard to that Act, or to the power with which it vests your Honour and Council, the Government of Bombay would have deemed themselves wanting in their conception of it, to the spirit of the Legislature expressed in the words "except in such cases as when the said President and Council respectfully shall have received special orders from the said United Company" and most highly neglectful to their employers, had they so slumbered over their interests, as to let pass by, unregarded this opportunity, perhaps the only one that may ever offer again of establishing their affairs on the west of India on the footing they have so long sought to place them. To have hesitated closing with the Peshwa, would in effect have been the same as a plain refusal, for in the situation he then was, he must certainly have had recourse to other assistance; and from the respectable footing in which the late increase of their military and total change of Government has placed them, would most probably have been to the Portuguese, who would gladly have cherished a stroke of fortune, so unexpectedly co-operating in the very views to which all their late expenses and arrangements have solely tended, *viz.*, the recovery of the provinces of the North—the grand object of their interest and honour ever since the capture of them in 1739 by Chimnáji Appa; and which they would certainly have now obtained had it not been for an interference equally timely and fortunate for the Hon'ble Company.

Besides these, other strong inducements were not wanting to take the part they did; the reduction of Sálsette without the consent of either party rendered it necessary to side with one, in order to procure a degree of title to the possession, and to prevent the disagreeable alternative of either endangering the safety of the settlement by relinquishing this conquest, or sustaining at some period a general war with the combined forces of the Maráthás to maintain it.

A due attention to the safety and tranquillity of the Company's possessions in the east of Hindustán was also no small motive in these engagements. It was judged that should the success of the confederates at Poona end in the total depression of Rághoba, and once give them leisure to advert to other objects, the very first that would strike their attention would be to enrich themselves by the collection of the Chauth in the name of their Sarkár; in this all parties among the Maráthás never fail to concur. I cannot pretend to say how far the Bengal provinces might be endangered, but from the vicinity of the Karnátak there seems no doubt to their paying it a visit. They never want a pretence, and the reduction of Tanjore had given great jealousy at Poona, particularly to the Marátha Chiefs, as the Rája of Tanjore is related to their Rája. The safety and tranquillity of the Company's territories in the east would for these reasons be insured for a longer time by not suffering the ministerial confederacy to predominate. By the treaty with the Peshwa this great object is for ever accomplished as far as solemn engagements can bind, and could circumstances admit of a general assertion at this period our success in this point might be still more perfect.

Induced by these several motives the Government of Bombay concluded a treaty with the vakil of Rághoba. It was much to be wished that their resources in men and money had been more adequate to this undertaking, but trusting that the same sentiment would generally prevail of the policy and utility of their engagements, the aid of the other Presidencies was not doubted. Accordingly such troops as could possibly be spared embarked for Surat, from whence they were to proceed to form a junction with the army of Rághoba, in the manner that circumstances on their arrival might point out to be most expedient. The capture of the capital of the Gáikawár would put the officers of Govindráv in possession of the country, and direct the march towards Poona which could then be done in greater safety, as we should leave a country in alliance with us in our rear.

Haripant Fadkia, a Bráhman, one of the confederates, and Commander-in-Chief of the army, hearing of Rághoba's intention to secure our aid, judged no time was to be lost, and therefore determined if possible to attack him, while they had yet the superiority. He accordingly directed his march towards Baroda, which obliged Rághoba to raise the siege of it, and retire to the northward of the Máhi, a river near Cambay. Fattesing Gáikawár joined the confederates, and being well acquainted with the country, led their army by short routes through passes and defiles, crossed the Máhi, came unexpetcedly on the army of Rághoba, and attacked the centre of it where he was. A smart action ensued, but a party of Arabs whom Rághoba had got from Govindráv declining to engage, he thought himself betrayed, quitted the field and narrowly escaped to Cambay with about 1,000 horse. His General Mankoji Phaneria retreated with the best of his troops and valuable effects to the Fort of Kapadvanj, about 50 kos from Cambay, as did Govindráv and Khanderáv.

From Cambay the Peshwa made the best of his way to Surat, where our army found him. The treaty agreed on by his Vakil was here ratified by him, and having received advice from his General and allies of their safe retreat to Kapadvanj, from whence they acquainted him that they doubted not of effecting a junction with the English troops, could they advance to Cambay, it was therefore determined our army should proceed there, as we could transport it by sea,

and were well assured of its perfect security; it accordingly arrived there the 18th March, and though the ministerial army was at first between us and our allies, yet by a concerted motion the Commander-in-Chief having brought himself in a secure post, between the enemy and the Peshwá's troops, a junction was happily formed with them the 19th April.

The combined army then consisted of 35,000 horse and foot belonging to Rághoba and Govindráv, and 2,500 English troops: the army of the confederates had suffered a very material reduction of their best troops by the desertion of Mahádji Sindia, the Jághírdár of Ujjain, owing to the impolitic avarice of the Bráhmans, who deeming Rághoba's ruin certain on his late defeat, paid no further attention to their northern friends, but sent orders to Haripant Fadkia to seize Mahádji Sindia and send him to Poona to settle his accounts. The Marátha got intelligence of this and knowing the true meaning was to fleece him, he decamped with about 12,000 of the best horse in the army under pretence that troubles in his own Jághír called him there.

As soon as possible after the junction, Colonel Keating the Commander-in-Chief of our forces, advanced towards the enemy in order to bring them to an engagement, but though something superior, they studiously avoided it, and fled before us at different times. At the request of the Peshwa for some particular reasons, our army moved towards the North, but Poona being our final object, as the Peshwa's arrival there would bring matters to a conclusion, Colonel Keating was ordered not to be diverted from it by any object so remote from his destination but with all expedition possible to direct his march southwards.

Discouraged by the defection of so considerable a partisan as Sindia, by the doubts they were in regarding their other northern ally Holkar, by the duplicity of the Nizám's conduct, who notwithstanding their cessions had still declined advancing any troops to their assistance, by the loss of their ally Sábáji Bhonsla cut off by his brother Mudáji, by their fears of several leading men who not only refused to join the confederacy but they judged would declare openly for Rághoba as he advanced to Poona, and knowing the utter impossibility they were in to resist should the engagements of the English become general, from these several motives the Junto, at Poona, it is said, directed Haripant Fadkia at all events to risk an engagement with us, at any rate their prospects could not be worse, and a fortunate success might give a favourable turn to a negotiation which Sakhárám Bápu and Nána Fadanavis were then meditating with the President and Council at Bombay.

When the Peshwa was compelled to fly, on the unfortunate surprisal of his army, he had only brought off with him about six lákhs of rupees in jewels, the rest of his valuable effects were secured in the Fort of Dhár with his family. These six lákhs were insisted on as a pledge for his engagements with the Company; he wanted to make a loan at Surat, but owing to the uncertain state of his affairs, the shroffs did not choose to trust him, merely on his own security, and the President and Council could not in prudence engage the credit of the Company. From this want of money infinite distress succeeded; and advantages were lost by it as it is well known the hired troops of India can never be brought to engage without some prospect of immediate satisfaction. The Ministers knew this, and were therefore more desirous to come to action, before a turn to his affairs might relieve him from this distress, which they were sensible would in fact deprive him of any great benefit from his own troops, whatever their number might be.

Accordingly on the 18th of May they made dispositions to engage; accounts have already been transmitted of this action in which the confederates were defeated; and though by some unfortunate accident on our side, and the inaction of the Peshwa's troops, it was not so complete

a victory as might have been hoped for, yet it sufficed to throw their troops into utter discouragement, and they never could be brought to face us again, but suffered us quietly to pursue them through defensible passes and defiles without opposition, till on the 7th of June we came up with their rear in crossing the Narbada, killed several people, obliged them to sink their cannon in the river, and many horses, camels, &c., were afterwards found floating down with them, Haripant Fadkia having fled with the remains of the army entirely out of the Gujarát Province.

The approach of the monsoon when it would be impossible for our troops to march, forbade all thoughts of advancing further southward before the rains; not to loose any time however it was determined by the Colonel to avail himself of the remaining part of the fair season to reduce Dubhoi, a fortified place situated between Broach and Baroda, where our army could winter, and on the opening of the season be easily joined from Broach by such reinforcements and supplies as might be sent from Bombay and from thence march to reduce Baroda, should the negotiation then on foot between Fattesing and the Peshwa fail to secure us a friendly country in our rear. On the march of the army towards Poona, the reduction of Dubhoi was effected without loss, and with it concluded all our military operations in that campaign.

The engagements of Fattesing Gáikawár with the confederates seem to have been solely with the views of preventing the ravage and destruction of his country, for even at the time he joined their army he made distant overtures to Rághoba. He knew that the interest which the late cessions gave the English in the welfare of Gujárát would protect it on their side, and his junction with the ministerial army secured it on the other. As soon therefore as the retreat of Haripant Fadkia confirmed his safety in that quarter, he began to make serious overtures of accommodation to Rághoba, who from the general face of things he judged must prevail, and in that case his Government must be for ever lost to him, as the former appointment of Govindráv and his firm attachment to Rághoba left no doubt of his rival being established in the Gáikwár possessions. The better to ensure success he applied for the mediation of the English, to whom he not only gave a confirmation of the grants engaged by the Peshwa to be obtained from the Gáikawár, but further convenient cessions in perpetuity to the amount of about Rs. 1,78,000 per annum. With Rághoba he stipulated for the usual Chauth and aids due to the Poona Darbár, and what was most convenient in his present circumstances 26 lákhs to be paid in 60 days; the Peshwa having previously ratified with Govindráv, a treaty of peace and alliance was finally concluded in the month of July last.

At sea the Maráthás made at first a formidable appearance, induced by the hopes of making some rich captures. The officer at Gheria equipped a squadron consisting of—

1 Ship	...	... 46 guns	
1 do.	...	... 38 do.	2 gallivats of 9 guns.
1 do.	...	... 32 do.	8 do. from 2 to 4 besides.
2 do.	...	... 26 do.	swivels.

This formidable fleet in appearance was met on the 2nd by the "Revenge" and "Bombay Grab," under the command of Commodore John Moore. The Commodore immediately stood towards them, when their whole fleet bore away. He however singled out the Admiral's ship called the "Samsher Jang" of 46 guns, and directed the "Grab," being the best sailor, to chase. The ship stood in for the shore with a design to run her aground, but the "Grab" came up with her, and began engaging, which giving time to the Commodore to come up also, he kept up a smart fire for about two hours when she blew up, and was entirely destroyed with her Commander and most of her people.

Proper convoys being given to the trade going up and down the Malabar Coast we met with no loss whatever at sea, except a small pilot sloop which was surprised by two gallivats under the colours of the Siddhi of Rájápur, our ally, not knowing, at the time, of our being at war with the Maráthás.

As your Honour and Council have desired particular information regarding the several places ceded to us, I will conclude with the account of them at this period.

Ceded for ever by the treaty with the Peshwa :—

Sálsette with Karanja, Hog Island and Canary...	3,50,000	
Bassein and its dependencies	4,00,000	
Olpád	3,50,000	
Jambusar	4,00,000	
Broach, the Gáikawár share	3,50,000	
To be paid annually from Ankleshvar ...	75,000	
		19,25,000
Presented to the Company since, by Rághoba and Fattesing on the conclusion of the treaty between them, *viz.* Corial near Broach ...	50,000	
Chikhli (Surat)	1,00,000	
Variav (Surat)	28,000	
A'mod adjoining to Broach	1,50,000	
		3,28,000
Ceded for ever to the Company		22,53,000

Made over by the Peshwa for the payment of the subsidy, A'mod (since entirely given up) and therefore the others remain as a pledge for the payment of the subsidy.

A'mod	1,50,000	
A'nkleshvar, the pargana of, its Revenue ...	1,10,000	
Hánsot	1,27,000	
Nersaul	1,00,000	
		4,87,000

From the southward port of Bassein to the point of Chaul, the land forms a deep bay, in which are situated the Islands of Sálsette, Bombay, Karanja, Hog Island, Elephanta and Káneri. Bombay is situated about 8 miles from the continent, and forms the harbour to which it gives its name.

Sálsette lies north of Bombay, from which it is divided by a narrow channel of about half a mile in breadth; it is about 20 miles long and the same breadth on a medium. Its chief produce is rice, it is capable of much improvement, not being above two-thirds cultivated and great part of it is also breached by the sea. The fort of Thána commanding a fordable channel dividing Sálsette from the main, is about the middle of the eastern side of the island.

Karanja is a small island on the east of Bombay forming part of the eastern side of the harbour; its chief produce is also rice; it is at present worth about Rs. 6,000 per annum and is capable of improvements. Elephanta is a small island valued at about Rs. 800 per annum. Hog Island and Káneri are little more than barren rocks; the latter is in the mouth of the harbour. Of all these (except Káneri which was not worth reducing) we have possession and the regular sanads for them from the Peshwa.

Bassein is a peninsula formed by a large river on the north, by the sea on the west and by a large river which divides it from Sálsette and to which it gives its name, on the south a rivulet which when filled makes it an island in the time of the rains. It produces rice, many fruits and particularly fine sugarcane; and an extensive fort on the south commands the river. The district of Bassein extends to Baldapaldi northward within 8 kos of Daman including Tárápur, Máhim, Arnála and some other towns situated on small rivers flowing from the Gháts. We have the sanads for Bassein and its districts, but as we had not sufficient force to reduce them, after the departure of our troops to the northward, and as conducting the Peshwa to Poona was the great object, which was to ensure us the peaceable attainment of these places, it was not thought prudent to delay that, or diminish our force by the previous reduction of them; they are not therefore in our possession as you imagined, but still in the hands of the ministerial party.

These are all our acquisitions to the southward of Surat, forming a continued chain with Bombay of about 86 miles from north to south; two additional battalions of sepoys will I imagine be sufficient to maintain the necessary posts, which being called in, on any apprehensions from the French, will be a considerable reinforcement to the standing army of Bombay.

From Bassein to Danse and the rivers comes great part of the timber indispensably necessary for the ships. Sálsette, &c., with Bassein and its districts are only estimated at 7·2 lákhs, but under our Government they will I doubt not in a few years produce ten at least.

For all the cessions to the north stipulated by the treaty with the Peshwa we have not only the sanands, but absolute possession. The sanads for Corial, Chikhli and Variav were just received by the very last accounts, and no doubt we had possession, soon after we were in possession of Amod, of all the places assigned for payment of the subsidy.

Olpád, Variav and Chikhli, lying contiguous to Surat, I see no increase of expense will be requisite on their account, except the necessary one for collection.

The cession of the Gáikawár share of the Broach revenue is only what is called the Chauth, collected from the same towns we did, so that this is all clear profit. Jambusar is a large commercial town near a river to which it gives its name; from its vicinity to Broach very few charges will be requisite, as the same garrison which defends the territory of the one will serve for the other. A′mod is a large town; its districts and that of Corial are all contiguous to Broach. From Ankleshvar when the subsidy is paid, we have only to send a person to collect annually Rs. 75,000.

Ankleshvar, the first of the parganas from which we are to reimburse ourselves for the stipulated subsidy, is between Surat and Broach. Hansot adjoins to our pargana of Olpád. Nersaul is about 40 miles to the southward of Surat, situated on a river from which a great quantity of timber is exported. As it is from the net produce of these assignments that the Company are to be paid, the necessary charges of collection will be on account of the Peshwa.

Although these cessions are not literally the Marátha share of the Surat revenues, by which is to be understood those collected by the Peshwa, yet as they generally answer the views of the Company, it was preferred accepting them for many reasons; different persons collect in many of the districts. Broach being reduced since the date of their orders, they could have no views nor interest in the districts ceded adjoining to it. But another still more forcible reason is, that in order to have completed the sum we had in view, the Peshwa must have taken from the Gáikawár dominions, and at that period it was very material to conciliate

the affections of that family, who may also be made useful allies to the Company, should you deem this a fit junction to form a system for counteracting any future designs of the Poona Darbár.

At the conclusion of the Treaty with Fattesing, the general aspect of affairs was very flattering to the hopes of Rághoba; he had already experienced that with the greatest force they could ever hope to collect, the confederates had never dared to make a bold and determined stand against our army as it then was, although for want of pay his own troops had never been brought to act with any degree of efficacy. This army would have been increased after the rains by Captain Kelly's battalion of sepoys from Madras, which from the experience and the activity of the Commander, the attention of his officers and the excellent discipline the men were in was judged by the military gentlemen to be but little inferior in the field to Europeans. Add to this the junction of Fattesing's troops, and the effectual service that might now be expected from the Peshwá's troops, when they found him enabled to satisfy their demands for arrears, it was natural to imagine the confederate army would not dare to face us. The Gáikawár's country, extending far on the road to Poona, secured our rear and provisions to the army. With this force alone, it might not be very rash to pronounce that we should have reached our destination during the course of the ensuing campaign, had we received the requested reinforcement from Madras. It seems to me there would not have been the least doubt of it.

To increase his hopes, by the latest accounts Mudáji who by the death of his brother Sábáji now enjoyed undisturbed possession of the Bhonsla dominions, was advancing with a very respectable force to his assistance, as was also Ismáel Khán at the head of about 4,000 good horse. Appáji Ganesh then in charge of Ahmedabad, was in treaty for the surrender of it to the Peshwa, part of whose troops were gone to take possession of it, which when effected would have left him free from any enemy to the northward of the Narbada.

But above all the conduct of the Nizám at this juncture, most fortunately co-operated with other events, to give us a most perfect assurance of conducting our engagements with the Peshwa to a happy issue. It was perfectly of a piece with that policy which had attentively watched every turn in the Marátha affairs, to return what the Government had usurped from him in its prosperity, on the defeat of their army, and the bad aspect of their affairs. When the Peshwa crossed the Narbada, the confederates who would advance nothing of their own, thought to bribe the Nizám to action by the cession of the strong and important fortress of Davlatabad with Brahimpur, Assay, and some other districts formerly conquered by the Maráthás. He accordingly entered into a solemn engagement with them. They had actually evacuated Davlatabad, and were withdrawing their troops from the other cessions; in point of territory it seems he had now got all he wanted, but judging that if the English entered generally and heartily into the re-establishment of Rághoba his retaining it might be very doubtful, in order to secure himself more thoroughly, he applied to the north of Surat, to sound whether he could not compass his admission into the party of Rághoba. His terms were the confirmation of all that the Ministers had ceded to him, for which the English were to become guarantees, for this he offered to act against the Ministers with all his force consisting of 5,000 sepoys and a train of artillery, which were to be further joined by 8,000 good horse of Mudáji Bhonsla, should the terms be accepted. Should the Nizám once be determined to act against them the confederates must lose all hopes, and there seems no reason to doubt that he would, with the guarantee of the English to secure him in the stipulated cession, as without it he would have little hopes of peaceably retaining them any longer than just during the continuance of the present divisions.

Exclusive of this application to the English, the Nizám had also sent Vakils to Rághoba with proposals of a general accommodation between all parties on the following plan. That

Rághoba was to enjoy all the honors and sufficient revenues to support the dignity of the Peshwa, but the government to be carried on in the name of his son Amrutráv, and the administration of affairs to be with Moroba Fadanavis, all places stipulated to be ceded by the Ministerial party to be confirmed to him by Rághoba, and the confederates fully pardoned and secured in the possession of their fortunes and effects; exclusive of the policy of it, which suffices to account for the conduct of the Nizám, it is imagined the death of Ruckun-ud-Dowla, who was said to be deeply bribed by the Ministers, was partly the occasion of these overtures.

Far different from this flattering situation was the state of the confederacy; they had been deserted by Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar, on whom rested their chief dependence. Narso Appa, the Governor of Poona, a man well respected, was dead, Moroba Fadanavis, a Minister of the first consideration, with several others, could not be brought to join the confederacy, and his influence was so high that they dared not molest him even in Poona. Already some of their party by no means inconsiderable had quitted it; such were Appáji Ganesh, the Governor of Ahmedabad, and Fattesing Gáikawár, to whose knowledge and influence in the Gujarát country, they are solely indebted to the success they met with previous to our junction with Rághoba. Sábáji Bhonsla, who had formerly been of great service to them, was dead. Always doubtful of the Nizám, the death of Ruckun-ud-Dowla now defeated all their hopes in that quarter. They knew the utter impossibility of resisting the united efforts of the English; add to this the jealousy entertained of the views and ambition of the confederacy made several dread their success almost as much as that of Rághoba. Such was the state of politics at Poona.

Their dependence on their army was nothing better. The Marátha Chiefs who had been brought to engage in the confederacy were given to hope for supply of cost from the Ministers, but here again the Bráhman avarice combated the general interest, for though they have large sums of their own, yet no one being perfectly assured that any particular benefit would especially accrue to himself by parting with it, constantly refused every application and referred to the treasures of the Sarkár, which being only the temporary collections were soon exhausted in subsidies to the Nizám. Haripant Fadkia foreseeing the confusion this want of money would make, absolutely made pacific overtures to the Peshwa at the head of his army when it was in its most flourishing condition; however fit the Marátha troops may be for predatory incursions, strong reasons may be assigned why they will never willingly be brought to act against an army with a well served artillery; from these reasons, and from the little prospect they had of plunder, the army of Haripant Fadkia very soon showed strong disinclination to serve, and having lost numbers of horse in the different attacks we had made on them, the men now became clamorous on their leaders for arrears of pay, who again importuned Haripant Fadkia. By the account of persons sent for intelligence and to watch his motions the Minister had sent bills of fifteen lákhs of rupees, but the shroffs had refused to answer them, from whence may justly be inferred they had not even in this situation advanced the amount. Haripant Fadkia had designed to winter to the northward in order to be at hand to watch our motions on the opening of the campaign, but his troops had absolutely refused. By the last accounts he was at Indore in full march towards Poona with between twenty and thirty thousand men, horse and foot: in his way through Tukoji Holkar's country they had violent disputes regarding some money which Fadkia demanded, but Holkar could not be induced to furnish; and under pretence that the death of Suja-ud-Dowla, and his third son being in arms, might render his presence absolutely necessary in his own Jághír, he drew off his troops from the confederacy.

Sakhárám Bápu and Nána Fadanavis had sent two Vakils to treat of an accommodation, but from the indisposition of one of them, and afterwards of the Resident, they had not mentioned their offers; and though it was rather wished to secure to the Company the late cession by way of peace than of war, yet the precipitancy of dispensing with the President's negotiation,

it was thought, might have bespoken too great an eagerness on our parts, and an impolitic doubt of success in the undertaking we were then engaged.

Such, gentlemen, was the situation of the Peshwa on the receipt of your letter of the 31st May last. I leave you to judge how different from that desperate, friendless and forlorn state, you seemed to apprehend him in. Had you but been pleased to signify to the Government of Bombay alone, your pacific determinations, there is no doubt but a general accommodation might soon have been effected with honor and credit to the Company, and all the cessions and advantages secured to them, which are stipulated for in the treaty with the Peshwa, as the terms of that treaty were never understood by either party to extend further than our assistance to defeat the Ministerial Confederacy, and by conducting him to Poona to reinstate him in the Peshwáship, whether this was effected by force or negotiation the Company were equally entitled to the several benefits which induced them to form these engagements.

But much do I fear, that whatever your future resolution may be in consequence of these my representations, the letter from the Hon'ble the Governor General to Sakhárám Bápu, and your positive orders to withdraw our troops from the Peshwa, will utterly destroy all the fair hopes of success, which from circumstances we had a right to conceive. Nothing can give a stronger idea of the unfavourable consequences which may probably ensue than the triumphant insolence of the confederates, as expressed in their offers subsequent to the receipt of Governor Hastings' letter. Instead of permitting us to retain Sálsette and Bassein (the last of which I have observed is not in our possession), they demand Rághoba to be delivered up to them, Sálsette and other acquisitions to be restored, for which they will deign to reimburse our charges. But a few days before I may venture safely to assert they would have been glad to have compounded for the guarantee of the English to the safety of their persons and property. It is not in their nature to conceive that a spirit of justice dictated this apparent concession; they attribute it to fear or a conscious inability of performing our engagements.

As the Ministers will take every advantage of this circumstance, and no doubt highly exaggerate it, I must confess myself at a loss to judge with precision what consequences may ensue.

The first that strikes me is that Fattesing will fly off from all his engagements, retain such part of his 26 lákhs as are not paid, and refuse the Company quiet possession of the several districts he had ceded to them; by this means the Peshwa will lose all the dependence he had in Gujarát; for having been obliged in some measure to disappoint Govindráv in his expectations on that province, in order more effectually to secure so important an object as having the whole Gáikawár family at his devotion, it is not to be doubted but that Govindráv, when he finds the Peshwa incapable of performing his late promise, will accommodate matters with his brother Fattesing and both decline any further interference.

By our desertion and that of the Gáikawár's, and probably most of his troops for want of money, the Peshwa will really find himself for a time that forlorn and abandoned man which you, gentlemen, imagined him to be. Whatever part he may then take must be detrimental to the interests of the Company in the west of India, and perhaps dangerous to their possessions in the east.

If he embraces the offers of the Nizám, and is reinstated by his means, the Company must not only forego all hopes and title to further possessions, but relinquishing Sálsette, encounter all the difficulties and inconveniences of a Marátha war, which are by no means counterbalanced by the revenues of that island. Exclusive of this, we shall lose about 12 lákhs which will become due for arrears of subsidy; and as we shall have everything to expect from the just

resentment of Rághoba, the commerce of the Company, and the English in general, will be impeded if not totally interrupted by the discouragement which will be in his power to give without coming to an open rupture.

The same consequences will ensue should he throw himself on the protection of Hyder Alli, with the additional disadvantage of increasing the power of a man who has so mortal and declared an aversion to the Company and their allies; and his open partiality to and encouragement of their declared rivals render every accession of country or connection the just object of our jealousy. Hyder has already assisted him of late with money, and no doubt would willingly undertake his cause for much smaller concessions than have been made to us: with 30,000 horse, a body of well disciplined infantry, a good artillery served by about 600 Europeans, he is lately said to have agreed for those with the Dutch; this force, joined to the allies of Rághoba, would be irresistible by the confederates, and then it rests with you, gentlemen, to determine, with the combined armies of Hyder and the Peshwa, in what safety would be our possession in the Karnátak.

His other resources are in his ancient ally Mudáji Bhonsla, in Holkar and Sindia always inclined to his party and now utterly discontented with the confederates, in Moroba Fadanavis and his party and even in Haripant Fadkia whose treatment by the Poona Junto has led him to make frequent overtures to Rághoba; all which equally deprive us of the advantage of the stipulated cessions, and are pregnant with dangers to the Hon'ble Company's settlements.

But there is another object, gentlemen, on which I would wish to fix your serious attention: it is the sacred honor of the English nation and the Company, and that firm reliance which their hitherto unviolated faith has given all the powers around on our word and engagements. It is well known that among the princes of Hindustán the violation of the most solemn compacts enters into the common course of business, therefore they are lightly formed and little relied on. Far different with the English; they have beheld them backward to engage, and making no treaties but with the most deliberate consideration; but then they have ever found them steadfast to their word, and of faith inviolable. The Maráthás have beheld us in the very zenith of their formidable power, with not half our present force, bid defiance to all their threats and boldly oppose ourselves in aid of an inconsiderable ally. After a two years' siege, we hoisted our colours on Janjira which they were on the point of reducing; they admired our good faith and respected our resolution by withdrawing their troops though not without murmurs and strong discontent.

In what light then will they regard our desertion of Rághoba, after the solemn treaty so publicly entered into with him; for whatever errors there may be in the conduct of the Government of Bombay, the application of the Nizám, of the Gáikawár, and the behaviour of all the neighbouring powers strongly bespeak their idea of the force and solemnity of the engagements of the English. They can hardly ever be brought to comprehend the nature of that limited and discretional power, the exact explanation of which can alone clear the President and Council of Bombay in their minds of an unworthy and intended fraud in forming engagements they must know were invalid; by this, and by the public manner in which you have proclaimed their dependence, I am afraid that the requisite respect and opinion of their authority, which are necessary in the common conduct of their affairs, will be totally destroyed; and should they lose this opportunity of accomplishing the views of the Company in the west of India, we may for ever bid adieu to all hopes of it, howmuchsoever the Directors may recommend a continuance of our attention to them; for it is only by availing ourselves of such circumstances as must be embraced the moment they present themselves, that I foresee any probability of bringing matters to the

happy train they were previous to the receipt of your orders of the 31st of May. The intention of the Legislature in the clause of exception before quoted, will, I apprehend, be utterly frustrated. Who again will ever apply to us? They must be sensible the whole face of things may be changed before your consent can be obtained.

Exclusive of our breach of faith with the Peshwa, which would be rendered doubly glaring by espousing the man who was the notorious contriver and conductor of the plot against Náráyanráv, with which the confederates now affect to stigmatize the character of Rághoba; exclusive of this there appears to me many strong objections against acknowledging the administration of Sakhárám Bápu and the Poona Junto. Sakhárám has always shown himself the determined enemy of the Company. Besides that dread and jealousy of their advancement in the west of India, common to every Marátha who has a just sense of the interests of their Government, another good reason may be assigned for it; whether it was from the poverty of his parents, or that the duties of the menial employ he was brought up in, prevented him from giving the necessary application, but unfortunately he does not possess the requisite advantages of education, scarcely being able to read or write; this necessarily, when he came to the charge of affairs, compelled him to repose a confidence in some person who could read and write. His confidant is one Visájipant Lele, a Bráhman, who having long been Supreme Governor of Konkan, in which are Sálsette and Bassein and its districts, and knowing the views of the Company, has ever opposed with all his influence, the least favourable inclination in the Darbár at Poona to comply with them. He has ever fomented disturbances and jealousies between us. Being a man of intrigue and ability he is said to have great weight with Sakhárám, and as he is from interest deeply concerned in preventing our acquisition of these places, I imagine that should we utterly abandon Rághoba, and the confederates perceive his other rescources likely to fail him, whatever they may promise us at first should they at length have no fears from him, they will never acquiesce in any of the cessions made by the Peshwa. Indeed their offers before mentioned sufficiently bespeak their intentions. I leave you, gentlemen, to judge what will be the sentiment of our hon'ble employers on this occasion, after such a sacrifice of men, money honour and national faith, to become the contempt and ridicule of the power in the west of India.

Bad and disgraceful as this may be, it appears to me yet trifling to the serious consequence that may ensue to their territories in the east, on the undisturbed possession of which the very existence of the Company depends. I hold it as a political maxim that all the powers in India are interested in the continuance of the Bráhman Government: the jealousy which from various causes ever subsists between the Marátha Chiefs and the Bráhmans will prevent that union of the whole empire, which must be most formidable to the rest of India. The surprising rapidity with which they overran almost the whole dominions of the Mogal, the numerous armies they sent forth to all quarters, and the bravery of the Rajputs, under their own Rája, and led forth by Chiefs of their own caste, are sufficient circumstances to make us deprecate their reunion. Should the administration continue in the hands of the confederated Bráhmans, what with their own dominion and other circumstances, it seems to me very probable that some of the Marátha Chiefs will expel them from the Government, and either re-establish the Rája or reign themselves. Mudáji Bhonsla whose bravery, policy, and daring character are well known and dreaded, was suspected of this design. Disencumbered from his brother Sábáji, he may perhaps turn his thoughts to effecting it. Should such an event take place and the whole power of the empire be collected in one hand, what prospect of a lasting tranquillity can there be to the other States of India? The Government of a Peshwa, under proper checks and limitations of power, seems to me the only certain way to avert this evil. And should this object be deemed worthy your attention, I apprehend the present crisis to be fittest that may ever again offer for effecting it.

I have thus, gentlemen, as fully and as clearly as in my power explained to you, the rise, progress and present state of undertaking with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv. On one hand you will perceive the interests of the Company and the honor of the English nation deeply concerned in fulfilling our engagements; on the other hand you may judge of the detriment, danger and dishonour attending the utter abandoning of them. I am happy to perceive that the general manner in which the letter from the Hon'ble the Governor General to Sakhárám Bápu is worded, by implying you unacquainted with the nature of our previous acknowledgment of Rághoba as Peshwa, on which is founded the equity of our late treaty, reserves as yet unviolate the honor and good faith of the Company, and leaves you free in the choice of measures. I do therefore most solemnly entreat you in the name of the Government of Bombay to warrant and assist them to fulfil their engagements with the Peshwa, as in their opinions and in mine on the most mature consideration, this appears to be the only safe and honorable expedient at this juncture, and is perhaps the only opportunity that may ever offer again of accomplishing the several important objects before explained to you, and establishing the affairs of the Company on that system in the west of India which they have so frequently and strenuously recommended.

But whatever may be your intentions I must earnestly recommend to you, gentlemen, instantly to revoke your orders for withdrawing our army from Rághoba. This may prevent the effects to which they are immediately liable, by keeping all parties in suspense till your final determination is known; and whether you may be led to terminate this affair by arms or negotiation it is equally important to your success, and pardon me if I add, to your national reputation not to utterly abandon him. The desertion of all his allies would be the infallible consequence of ours, and his death most probably of both, which the world judging only by appearances would lay to our charge. In a word, gentlemen, whatever judgment you may entertain of the original measures this seems to me to be no longer the proper object of your consideration. If we have unnecessarily engaged in a war, to which we had no just provocation, yet its continuance is now become necessary to our safety, for the recall of our army will not only throw us at the mercy of a perfidious enemy who will not fail to take the basest advantage of our weakness, but it will cut off all our hopes of future resources by so dreadful an example held out to those whose alliance we may hereafter find it necessary to solicit. If you suppose that we have violated former treaties, and any neutrality which the Company may have recommended to be maintained with the Marátha State by the treaty lately formed with Rághoba, permit me to say that we have the plea of those very engagements to justify us in the part we have taken with the only legal or known representative of the Marátha nation, and that having executed a new treaty with him in all its forms, we have pledged the nation's faith and honour to the performance of it. The Government of Bombay alone is responsible, and willingly takes upon itself the responsibility for the past and for the future. It is our duty to set before you the alternative which we know depends on your resolutions. On the one hand we are convinced that conquest and honor, the acquisition of revenues and an influence in the first state of India, will be the issue of the enterprise which we have happily prosecuted to this time, if we are allowed to carry it to a conclusion: on the other hand weakness, disgrace and ruin will inevitably follow the retreat of our forces, unless an accommodation shall have first taken place, by which the interests of each party shall have been secured and their safety effectually guarded against all future claims and hostilities.

I have, &c.,
W. TAYLOR.

Calcutta, 9th October 1775.

Letter from the Governor General *and* Council *to W.* Taylor.

Sir,—After duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us, as well as the several informations which you have communicated, respecting the nature, motives and objects of the engagements of the Bombay Presidency with Rághoba and the present state of the Marátha Government at Poona, we have for the present to acquaint you that we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being immediately recalled from the service of Rághoba into their own garrison. Our orders for this purpose will therefore remain in force.

But as you seemed to understand, by the proposition which you urged at taking leave of the Board, that our directions implied the recall of the Company's troops to Bombay, we think it necessary to explain our meaning to have been that it should remain at the option of the President and Council of Bombay to withdraw them into such of their garrisons, and distribute them as they might see fit for the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
J. CLAVERING.
G. MONSON.
R. BARWELL.
P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, 9th October 1775.

To

Lieutenant-Colonel UPTON.

Sir,—Having thought it necessary to depute you to Poona, the Capital of the Marátha State, with powers to act on behalf of this Government in settling with the Peshwa or Acting Minister of that nation, the terms for a restoration of peace with the Government of Bombay, we direct that you proceed thither with all despatch and attend to the following instructions:—

1*st*.—On your arrival at Poona you will deliver the credentials herewith given you unto Sakhárám Bápu, or the Peshwa, or Acting Minister for the time being, and take the first opportunity of expressing to him the regret of this Government for the hostile measures which have been adopted by the President and Council of Bombay in concurrence with Rághoba; you will inform him that we entirely disapprove of the treaty they have entered into with him, which was done without any authority from us, that our only desire is now to re-establish that peace which has been infringed by the Presidency of Bombay, and to live in amity and union with the Marátha nation.

2*nd*.—You will use your endeavours to obtain a cession of the Islands of Sálsette and Bassein to the Company with the other conquered islands, that is Karanja, Kaneri, Elephanta and Hog Islands. You will represent the intentions of the Portuguese to have seized these Islands, and that a naval force had actually arrived at Goa for this purpose; that the Government of Bombay possessed themselves of them as soon as they were informed of this intention without the least degree of enmity to the Marátha Government, but merely to frustrate the designs of the Portuguese which have since proved evident in this respect, they having formally protested against our proceedings and asserted an old claim to the possession of the above places. It might be further urged that the Portuguese will continue to keep a watchful eye upon them, but their Court being at peace with the English nation they would not pretend to set on foot any expedi-

tion against them while they continue in our hands, and if they should be given up again to the Maráthás, the Portuguese would not fail to take the first occasion of making an attack upon them, and either overpower the garrisons usually stationed for their defence or make it necessary to maintain in them such a force in constant pay as the revenues could by no means afford to support.

3rd.—If there is any foundation for the intelligence which we have lately received, and which we believe to be authentic, of some signal advantages which have been gained by Rághoba over the ministerial army, we apprehend you may be able to obtain the cessions of Sálsette and Bassein with the other conquered islands without much difficulty, and in this case you may also have it in your power to gain more substantial advantages to be yielded to the Company; your next object must therefore be to obtain a formal surrender of the moiety held by the Maráthás of the revenue of the town and pargana of Broach, but we must leave these and other points which you may be able to secure for the interests of the Company to your discretion, and you will propose them or not, as you see occasion from the Court, the event of the operations of Rághoba and the inclination of the Ministers to a pacification; if any offers shall have been made before your arrival by the Ministerial party to the Government of Bombay it is unnecessary to recommend to you to invest on them if they should be to the advantage of the Company.

4th.—Although we do not mean to insist absolutely upon all these concessions if manifest advantage should have been gained against the Company's arms, yet we are determined on no account to relinquish the possession of Sálsette and Bassein, therefore should the Peshwa hold out against yielding them to the Company, you are at no rate to agree to restore them, declaring to them if necessary, that the matter having been referred to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors it is impossible to relinquish these places without their express permission, and you are to advise us immediately of what has passed.

Although we have thought it necessary to disapprove of the measures of the President and Council of Bombay in entering into the treaty with Rághoba, and have ordered them to withdraw their assistance from him, yet we think it consistent with the honor of the nation and this Government, to endeavour to stipulate some conditions for him with his adversaries. What these should be must depend on the circumstances in which you may find him on your arrival. We must therefore leave this chiefly to your discretion, and only direct in general, that in whatever treaty you may negotiate with the Maráthás you will endeavour to include Rághoba, and make such terms for him as in his actual situation it may appear to you reasonable to expect, and which may not frustrate the immediate objects of your negotiations.

We enclose the translation of a letter which the Governor General has lately written to Sakhárám Bápu, on the subject of our intentions to depute a person to the Marátha Court, also a copy of the treaty entered into by the Presidency of Bombay with Rághoba, as they may serve as a guide to you in your negotiations.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
J. CLAVERING.
G. MONSON.
R. BARWELL.
P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, 21st June 1775.

Additional Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel UPTON.

SIR,—We think it proper to give you the following instructions in addition to your former, and require you to pay all due attention to them in entering upon your negotiation at Poona.

As the Nabáb of Arcot is a particular friend and ally of the English, and as his intentions may be affected by any treaty that you conclude with the Marátha Government, we direct that you make the Marátha Chief acquainted with the union that subsists between him and the Company, and insist on including him in the treaty in an express article to the following effect: that the Nabáb Wallah Jah Bahádur, Nabáb of the Karnátak, having been for a considerable course of years united to the English Company by the strongest ties of friendship and alliance, and the Company having ever considered his enemies as their enemies, and his friends as their friends, it is agreed that the Marátha Chiefs likewise shall hereafter regard him as their friend, and his enemies as their enemies.

At the same time we are to acquaint you that we have desired the Nabáb of Arcot if there are any particular articles which he wishes to have stipulated for him, to state these articles to us, assuring him that we would take them into consideration, and give you such further orders respecting them as shall be compatible with the other objects which we have in view, in concluding the treaty of peace with the Maráthás.

We have further to direct that whatever treaty you enter into with the Marátha State, you require that it be signed by all the Chiefs collectively and individually, and that you insist on this as a point from which you cannot depart.

A duplicate of this letter will be delivered to you by the Nabáb of Arcot's Vakil at Poona, with whom you will consult upon anything which he may have to propose for his master's interest, and attend to his representations, as far as may be consistent with the general tenor of your instructions.

We enclose for your information copy of a treaty which was executed between the Presidency of Bombay and the Marátha Government on the 12th October 1756.

We are, &c.,

Fort William, 16th August 1775. WARREN HASTINGS.

Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL *and* COUNCIL, *Fort William, to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have just received your letters of the 13th July and 6th August; that of the 24th June had before reached us.

The last advices which you acknowledge the receipt of from us being dated the 8th March, we take this opportunity of transmitting you copies of all our letters since that date, to your Presidency.

The sense we entertain of your engagements with Rághoba and the whole of your conduct in respect to your transactions with him cannot more fully appear than from the tenor of those letters.

We are very sorry to find the truth of our conjectures as to the consequence of this engagement, that the whole burden of the expensive war undertaken by you in support of Rághobá's claim to the Peshwáship has fallen upon yourselves, and that no dependence can be placed on the assistance of his troops.

We have been so particularly enjoined by the Court of Directors to attend to the preservation of peace in general with the country powers throughout India, that we thought it necessary in our letter of the 31st May to give you positive orders to recall your army from Rághoba to your own garrisons, in whatever state your affairs might be, unless their safety might be endangered by an instant retreat. We hope you have acted in conformity thereto; if not we now repeat those directions, judging it more particularly requisite at this period, as it appears that Rághoba is not able to fulfil his part of the treaty, and we require you to confine your views to the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette and the share in the revenue of Broach given up by Fattesing, in the best manner you are able. This last we have also instructed our Minister at Poona to secure if possible by the treaty with that State.

We cannot consequently grant our consent to any further reinforcement of troops being sent to join you from this side of India, and have therefore forbade the Council at Fort St. George to comply with your request for 300 Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys. Another reason which has weight with us against supplying you with troops is that having appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to proceed to Poona to negotiate a treaty of peace with the Ministerial party there, he will most probably arrive and open the business of his mission to that Court before any reinforcement of troops could be brought to operate with your army, even supposing they should still remain in their quarters at Dubhoi. The junction of fresh troops might be alarming to the Maráthás, and appear contrary to good faith at a time we are treating for peace. We have the greatest reason to hope that Colonel Upton will find the Ministry inclined to listen to his proposals for an accommodation, especially if they reflect on the justice and moderation of this Government in the part it has taken, and discover by this that it is our wish and intention to promote a general pacification. Colonel Upton will no doubt under these circumstances effect an honorable peace for the British nation, and upon terms of security to the Company's possessions in India.

We have agreed to furnish you to the amount of 20 lákhs of rupees in the course of the present year commencing the first of May last, in which we include the drafts accepted from your Presidency and Surat since that date, and we authorize you to continue drawing upon us for such sums as you may be able to obtain at the most reasonable exchange in your power to that extent.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
J. CLAVERING.
G. MONSON.
R. BARWELL.
P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, 7th February 1775.

Letter from the Governor General *and* Council *to Lieutenant-Colonel* Upton.

Sir,—Having considered the several questions which you thought it necessary for the elucidation of your instructions to propose to us, we shall proceed to acquaint you with our resolutions upon each.

1*st.*—The direct purposes of your appointment are to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace between the Marátha Government and the Presidency of Bombay, and to obtain a confirmation to that Presidency of the islands of Sálsette and Bassein for the Company; these points you are to consider as indispensable.

If, however, from the success of Rághobá's forces against the Ministerial party, you should find the latter disposed to make further concessions for our neutrality, we have mentioned in our former instructions, that a renunciation of the remaining moiety of the revenues of the town and pargana of Broach is a point which we wish to secure. For the rest you must be guided entirely by your own discretion, which will be actuated by the state and objects of the negotiations which may have taken place between the Government of Bombay and the Ministers at Poona, but we would not have you prolong the negotiation for a day in hopes of obtaining any other conditions than those we have expressly mentioned or required. We cannot point out our intentions herein more explicitly, as your conduct must depend entirely upon the circumstances and situation of affairs.

2*ndly.*—With respect to the terms to obtain for Rághoba:—This likewise is an article on which we cannot give you more particular instructions, because as we have already told you, it must rest wholly on contingent circumstances; but whatever may be settled for him in the treaty, if it forms a clause in it, will of course be guaranteed to him by the Company.

3*rdly.*—The town and pargana of Broach are already possessed by the Company independent of any participation of the revenues of these places with the Maráthás.

4*thly.*—Raghunáthráv is the Peshwa or chief ruler of the Marátha State, but he was obliged by the Ministerial party at Poona to quit that capital, and they have since proclaimed in his stead the son of Náráyanráv, the late Peshwa, who is still an infant. We conceive it impossible to foresee what accommodation will take place between the two parties now contending for the Peshwaship, but it is most probable that if the Ministers prevail, the elevation of the son of Náráyanráv will be confirmed. If the peace is to be effected by a negotiation, the terms of it must be best to the parties themselves, and we shall agree to acknowledge whomsoever they shall finally resolve among themselves to establish. But in the present state of affairs as we cannot formally address ourselves to either of the competitors we have referred you to Sakhárám Bápu, the ruling Minister at Poona, and in case he should not be living at the time of your arrival at Poona you will address yourself in like manner to the person who may be found in actual possession of the chief administration, delivering to him the letter addressed to Sakhárám Bápu, together with your letter of credence, which will contain full power for treating with any person, who shall be possessed of the authority of that State.

5*thly.*—You will advise the Bombay Presidency of your arrival at Poona and inform them constantly, as well as the Presidency of Fort St. George, of all transactions which you may think of use for them to know.

6*thly*.—We do not think it necessary to furnish you with a seal. The Company's seal will be affixed to your credentials, which will give full and ample validity to any treaty which you may conclude with the Maráthás.

7*thly*.—You have been already directed not to leave Kalpi till you hear from Sakhárám Bápu or obtain passports from him. You will have a letter for him delivered to you with your credentials, in which he is informed that we do not admit the authority of any person to conclude a treaty on behalf of the Company with the Marátha Government, but yourself, and if any should have taken place with the President and Council of Bombay it is of no effect until ratified by you.

The Governor and Council of Bombay have already been advised of your appointment; a duplicate of that letter is enclosed with a further notification of the power vested in you by the foregoing paragraph; this packet you will send to Bombay by the first safe conveyance.

The Fort St. George President being informed of your deputation there can be no necessity to furnish you with any letter under their address.

We herewith deliver to you a cypher which you are to keep in your own possession, and of which you are to make use of when you find occasion in your advices to us or the other Presidencies.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.

Fort William, 17th July 1775.

Letter from the Governor General *and* Council, *Fort William, to the* Governor *and* Council, *Bombay.*

Gentlemen,—By a letter received from Colonel Upton under date the 7th February, we are informed that the Ministers at the Poona Darbár have absolutely and peremptorily refused to accede to any terms of accommodation, but such as should be exclusively honorable and advantageous to themselves. Being therefore left without any alternative, he was to receive his dismissal from their Court in 5 or 6 days, when a further interval would be fixed for the renewal of hostilities.

On the presumption that Colonel Upton's negotiations are entirely broken off, that he has retired to Bombay and that hostilities are in consequence renewed, we think it necessary to take the earliest opportunity to release you from the restrictions which we formerly laid upon your operations, and to provide every means in our power for carrying on the war, in conjunction with Rághoba, with vigour. We have therefore authorized you to treat with him, and to give him the strongest assurances of our full assistance and support, which he has also been given to expect in a letter from this Government, whereof we transmit you a copy enclosed.

One of the most important services you can render to the Company is to obtain the immediate possession of Bassein, provided it can be done by negotiation with the Killedár, and by offering him advantageous terms for himself, but we do not mean to make this the present object of your military operations, which should be directed to one point only, the restoration of Rághoba, nor would we have your attention drawn off to any other, till that shall be accomplished.

We recommend it to you to send into the field all the force you can possibly spare, and (if you deem it necessary) to buy a body of fresh sepoys for the duty and defence of your own garrisons, although we shall leave the detail and immediate conduct of the war entirely to your direction, while the scene of its operations lies in your neighbourhood, yet as we are entrusted with the general control and ultimate charge of it, and as it is likely from the nature of it to involve the Company's possessions in every part of India, and the means of conducting it must principally rest on the resources of this Government, we think it incumbent on us to require and insist that you assign the command of the army to General Gordon, whom alone we deem fit to be entrusted with a charge of such consequence to the interest, honor and safety of the Company, by express choice and nomination he was appointed to it; and we also recommend that you give him immediate orders to join the troops with Rághoba, and march the combined forces with all possible expedition to Poona, suffering no object to divert his attention from this main point, which we hope will put a conclusion to the war. The occasion is too critical and important to suffer us to stand on personal respects, and we hereby declare that we shall consider you answerable to the Company for the consequences, if our present recommendation of General Gordon should not be complied with.

We have written to Sir Edward Hughes to request that he will remain with his squadron on your coast, and afford you all the assistance in his power. To this request you will of course add your own solicitation to him, and we have no doubt of his compliance. We have also desired the Presidency of Fort St. George to send you as large a reinforcement of troops as they may be able to spare, and if the season will permit to despatch them either by the way of Anjengo, or by any other road which they may prefer. You are as well able to judge as we are how far it may be prudent to depend on receiving this reinforcement.

We have further written letters to Nizám Alli Khán, Hyder Alli, Mudáji Bhonsla, Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar to engage their assistance or at least their neutrality in the present war; the two first of these Chiefs will receive applications to the same effect from Fort St. George, and we have ordered our Resident at the Court of Oude to open a negotiation with the two last, and if they should concur heartily with us, he is authorized on their solicitation for assistance from us to grant them the aid of three battalions of sepoys to co-operate in any military operation which they may recommend and be disposed to engage in for the service of Rághoba. In the mean time we have ordered the brigade in Oude to march to the frontier of the province of Korah nearest to the Kálpi Pass, professedly to be in readiness for this service, if the situation of affairs should absolutely require it, but with a view also to keep them in awe, if they should be inclined to counteract our measures.

To supply you with funds for carrying on the war, we propose to remit you immediately, either in specie or bills, five lákhs of rupees, and we authorize you to draw on us to the amount of wo lákhs more, the whole to be solely appropriated to the operations of the war, and that we may be satisfied that these great supplies are not only expended with economy but strictly appropriated to the service for which they are given, we expect that you will keep a separate account of the disposition thereof, and of all other sums which you may hereafter receive from us on this account, and that you transmit the same to us. For the rest we leave it to you to use every means that may occur to you to form new connections, and to induce the several Chiefs of the Marátha Empire to espouse the cause in which we are unavoidably embarked. The succession of events which have involved the Company in this quarrel has sprung from measures in which we had no concern and for which we are not answerable; but while we lament the necessity to which this Government is reduced of engaging in war we are equally

sensible of the expediency of pushing it with vigour, and to this object you may be assured our utmost efforts shall be directed.

We are, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
JOHN CLAVERING,
GEORGE MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP PRANCIS.

Fort William, 7th March 1776.

Bombay Castle, 10th March 1776.

The following letter was received this evening from Colonel Upton, dated the 2nd instant, advising his having on the preceding day concluded a treaty of peace with the Ministers at Poona :—

" GENTLEMEN,—I am honoured with your letter of the 25th February, and with the copy of the treaty concluded by Rághoba with Fattesing and Sayájiráv and also the copy of one of the sanads executed by Sayájiráv.

I am sorry we differ so widely regarding the sense of my instructions. You will permit me to observe that the words relinquish, restore and confirm imply having possession, which never was our case; and I am quite clear also that I have acted very consistently with the private verbal instructions I received before I left Calcutta, and I have neither had nor seen cause since to deviate from them.

The treaty of peace between the Hon'ble Company and the Marátha Government was signed yesterday afternoon. Such articles of convention as concern the Presidency of Bombay I have the honor to forward.

Your influence with Rághoba that he may quietly aquiesce in the conditions stipulated for him, will, I am convinced, not be wanting. If he expresses any fear or uneasiness at going to the residence appointed for his reception with the Marátha Sardárs sent to escort him, they consent to his being accompanied by an English gentleman with an escort of one hundred of our troops.

The establishment made for Raghunáthráv amounts to about ten lákhs of rupees per annum. It was impossible to procure for him any part in the Government of the country. The Ministers have most solemnly promised to live ever on friendly terms with him unless he should occasion disturbances in the country. An English gentleman being here will be the security for their good behaviour towards him. The Ministers request, when the English army march into their own garrisons, Colonel Keating will advise Haripant Fadkia of it, and at the same time inform him if the conditions obtained for Raghunáthráv are accepted of by him, and if he is putting the part depending on himself in execution.

A Vakil will be sent in a day or two by this Government to Bombay to explain anything that may not be fully comprehended.

Broach is the place appointed for the two Maráthás to meet at, to fix the boundaries of the ceded country amounting to three lákhs per annum. The persons sent by this Government will be furnished with a letter from me signifying that they are the persons appointed by them to assist in carrying this agreement into execution.

As soon as advice is received at Poona of the English army having marched into their own garrisons, they will order the communication to be opened.

I shall be much obliged to you, gentlemen, to furnish me with the English and Marátha names of the small islands in or near the Bay of Bombay, now in our possession. Not knowing them by each other's names prevents their nominally being inserted in the treaty. We are to keep only such as we possess.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servant,
JOHN UPTON.

Purandhar, 2nd March 1776.

P.S.—You will be pleased to appoint two gentlemen to proceed to fix the boundaries of the parganas to be ceded near or adjoining to Broach. The ministers agree to our taking any district that is not jághír land.

JOHN UPTON.

Treaty between the Hon'ble the English East India Company and the Marátha State, dated Purandhar, 1st day of March 1776.

Whereas differences have arisen among the Chiefs of the Marátha State and the Government of Bombay having taken a part therein by sending forces into the Marátha dominions, which the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Fort William disapprove, and being desirous of conciliating these differences have determined accordingly to enter into such measures as may most effectually contribute to so desirable an end, they have for this propose, therefore, authorized, deputed and given full powers unto Lieutenant-Colonel John Upton, in the service of the Hon'ble English East India Company, to conclude a peace between the Government of Bombay and the Marátha State. And Colonel Upton having accordingly arrived at Purandhar has concluded a solid and firm peace, on the part of the English Company with the Ministers Sakhárám Pandit and Báláji Pandit on the part of the Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán and all the Marátha Chiefs; and the following are the articles of convention which they have engaged into:—

Article I.—Peace shall be established and take place from this day between the Hon'ble the English East India Company in general and the Government of Bombay in particular, and Ráv Pandit Pradhán and his Ministers Sakhárám Pandit and Báláji Pandit on the part of all the Maráthás, and the following articles are to be observed inviolably by both parties.

Article II.—The peace is to be forthwith proclaimed between the Hon'ble Company and the Marátha State at the Presidency of Bombay, and all its dependencies at the head of the English Troops encamped at Mándvi, and in every part of the Gujarát province where there are British subjects. The Marátha Government will also order proclamations to be made throughout all their dominions.

Article III.—The Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán and his Ministers being desirous of having Sálsette and the small islands subdued by the English in this war restored to them do offer to give in exchange a country of three lákhs of rupees with its Chauth, &c., in the neighbourhood of Broach. Colonel Upton having declared that he could not restore the said islands, it is therefore agreed that they shall remain as they now are, and that they shall write to the Hon'ble the Supreme Council of Calcutta and both parties engage

to abide by their determination. If the Governor General and Council of Fort William do not restore them, they shall continue in the possession of the English, and the Maráthás will then give up all right and title to the said islands. Should the Governor General and Council of Calcutta restore Sálsette with the said islands the English will accordingly deliver them over to the Peshwa.

Article IV.—The Maráthás do agree to give, to the English Company for ever, all right and title to their entire share of the city and pargana of Broach, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Mogals or otherwise, without retaining claim of Chauth or any other demand whatever, so that the English Company will possess it without participation or claim of any kind.

Article V.—The Maráthás do agree (by way of friendship) to give for ever to the English East India Company a country of three complete lákhs of rupees near or adjoining to Broach, on which there is to be no claim of Chauth or any other demand whatever. Two persons on the part of the Company, and two persons on the part of Ráv Pandit Pradhán, to proceed and determine the place and boundaries, when the Peshwa will give the Sanads.

Article VI.—The Peshwa and Ministers agree to pay to the Company twelve lákhs of rupees in part of the expenses of the English army in two payments, *viz.*, six lákhs within six months of the date of this treaty, and the other six lákhs within two years of the same date.

Article VII.—The English do agree that every part of the Gujarát country ceded to the Company by Ragunáthráv, or taken possession of by them, shall be forthwith restored with all the forts and towns thereunto belonging, except what is treaty. The country ceded to the English by Sayáji or Fattesing Gáikawár shall also be restored, when it is proved by their letters and copies of the Sanads granted by the former Peshwas (and now in their, the Gáikawár's, hands), that they do not possess power or authority to make such cessions. The parganás of Chikhli and Corial with the town of Variav, three villages of the pargana of Chorási and the village of Batta Gang are to continue as pledges in the possession of the English till the Sanads for the country of three lákhs are made over. All treaties and agreements subsisting between the English and Raghunáthráv, are hereby annulled; and those of Sayáji and Fattesing, Gáikawárs, are to be also annulled, when the above-mentioned proofs are produced, and these treaties are to be destroyed in the presence of the Peshwa's ministers, when they come to hand.

Article VIII.—The English do agree that the troops now in the field from the Presidency of Bombay are to be marched immediately into their own garrisons and districts.

Article IX.—It is agreed that Raghunáthráv is to disband his army within one month of this date, his followers and adherents (except the servants about his person) are to separate also within the same time; and proclamation is to be made by the Marátha Government granting a full pardon to all the adherents and followers, and all such as have been in arms with Raghunáthráv; the four following excepted, *viz.*, Abáji Mahádev, Nur Khán Gardi, Tula Khidmutgar, and Karigsing Chokidár, who for crimes and misdemeanors committed against the State are for ever banished from the Marátha dominions.

Article X.—If Raghunáthráv refuses to disband his army, the English are to withdraw their forces, and are not to assist him.

Article XI.—The conditions of the ninth article being complied with, the Peshwa and Ministers then consent to establish a household for Raghunáthráv, consisting of our

thousand horse and some foot, who are to be paid, and relieved at the pleasure of Government. But to obey all legal orders given them by Raghunáthráv. Also two hundred domestics, to be chosen by Raghunáthráv, and paid by Government; they will also cause to be paid to Raghunáthráv, to defray his other expenses. Three lákhs of rupees per annum by monthly payments, at the rate of twenty-five thousand rupees per month, conditionally that he resides at Coopergang on the banks of the Ganga Godávari. If at any time he may want to change his place of residence, application is to be made to the Peshwa, without whose permission such a change is not to take place, and he is not to cause any disturbance or carry on improper correspondence with any person.

Article XII.—It is agreed that no assistance is to be given by the English to Raghunáthráv or to any subject or servant of the Peshwas, that shall cause disturbances or rebellion in the Marátha dominions.

Article XIII.—The Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán and his Ministers do declare that the Chauth of Bengal and its dependencies has for time out of mind been part of the jághírs of the Bhonsla; they therefore cannot withdraw it; but if the said Bhonsla or any of his descendants or successors or any other person cause disturbances by claiming or demanding the Chauth on Bengal or its dependencies they do engage never to assist them themselves, or permit any Marátha Chief dependent on them or the Rájáship to give them any assistance.

Article XIV.—It is agreed that in case of shipwreck of any English ships or vessels, or ships or vessels trading under their protection on any part of the Marátha coast, every assistance shall be given by that Government and the inhabitants to save as much as possible; and the whole that may be saved shall be returned, all reasonable charges being defrayed by the owners; in like manner the English Company engage their assistance should any Marátha ships or vessels be wrecked on any of their coasts.

Article XV.—The treaties between the Government of Bombay and the Maráthás, dated July 1739 and the 12th October 1756, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered into unless any article or articles of either of them should in other manner be provided for by this treaty; in such case such article or articles are to be rejected and those of this treaty abided by.

Article XVI.—All other treaties or agreements subsisting between the Government of Bombay and the Marátha Government, not having undergone alteration or otherwise provided for by this treaty, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered upon.

Article XVII.—It is agreed that if Raghunáthráv has lodged any jewels belonging to the Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán in the hands of the English, they are to be restored, on the obligation being complied with, for which they were lodged.

Article XVII.—The Hon'ble the English Company shall be considered as the sole lords and proprietors of all the places ceded by this treaty, from the dates of the respective sanads or grants: and are therein accordingly to exercise their own laws and authorities, and the Maráthás are not to cause any disturbances in any of the ceded countries, nor shall the English occasion any disturbance in the Marátha dominions.

Article XIX.—In the places hereby ceded to the Hon'ble Company and in all the places restored to the Marátha Government by the English, it is agreed that both parties shall commence to collect the revenues thereof from the day on which they are delivered; and no demand of collections for any past time shall be made.

Article XX.—A copy of this treaty under the seal of Colonel Upton and a copy shall be sent to Calcutta to be signed and sealed by the Hon'ble the Governor General and members of the Supreme Council of Fort William and afterwards given to the Peshwa.

(Signed) J. UPTON.

The signature of BA'LA'JI PANDIT.

The signature of SAKHA'RA'M PANDIT.

Letter from the Governor *and* Council, *Bombay, to Lieutenant-Colonel* Keating.

Sir,—We are now to acquaint you that we received advice from Colonel Upton, late in the evening of the 10th instant, that he had concluded a treaty of peace between the Honourable Company and the Ministers at Poona on the 1st instant.

Enclosed is a copy of an extract from the treaty as transmitted to us by Colonel Upton, and it is necessary for us to give you the following orders in consequence :—

The peace must be immediately proclaimed at the head of the Company's forces under your command agreeable to the second article.

You are immediately to march our troops into such quarters as will be assigned them by the Chief Council at Surat within the Company's districts.

The detachments from Broach and Surat are to return to those garrisons and the remainder is to be held in readiness to embark for the Presidency as opportunities offer.

The stipulations respecting Rághoba must be communicated to him in a proper manner and the absolute necessity of our separating the Company's forces from him explained to him. The Hon'ble the President has written to him upon this occasion, and if he expresses any fear or uneasiness at going to the place appointed for his reception with the Marátha Sardárs sent to escort him, the Ministers consent to his being accompanied by an English gentleman with an escort of one hundred of our troops. Colonel Upton tells us the Ministers have most solemnly promised to live ever on friendly terms with him, unless he should occasion disturbances in this country. You will lose no time in acquainting us with whatever resolution Rághoba may take now and with his future intentions.

If Rághoba refuses to accept the conditions stipulated for him in apprehension of danger to his person, and in consequence thereof applies to you to be received into any of the Company's garrisons, you may receive him with his family and a suitable number of domestics only; but the four persons mentioned in the 9th article must on no account be protected.

When our troops march into garrison you will advise Haripant Fadkia thereof and at the same time inform him if Rághoba accepts the conditions stipulated for him, and if he is putting into execution the part depending on himself.

The 13th article is omitted in the extract sent us by Colonel Upton.

You will acquaint us what part of the stipulated twenty-six lákhs has been paid to Rághoba by Fattesing and how you have disposed of the goods and jewels you mentioned in your letter dated the 30th August 1775, to have retained in your hand on account of Rághoba's debt to the Company.

You will send to Broach one syrang, two tindals and sixty artillery lascars to relieve the lascars doing duty in that garrison.

We are,
Your loving friends,

Bombay Castle, 15th March 1776.

WILLIAM HORNBY, and COUNCIL.

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel KEATING *to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—The 9th instant at night I received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, a copy of which is enclosed.

Yesterday I had a long conference with the Peshwa, who positively declares he will never accede to the terms stipulated for him by Lieutenant Colonel Upton. He writes your Honour and Council by this conveyance; and desires me to represent to you as follows:—

That on the known and the long experienced good faith of the English nation he entered into a solemn treaty and covenant with the Hon'ble Company, whereby they are bound to punish his rebellious servants and to restore him his just and lawful right, the Government of the Marátha Empire.

In respect to himself he has agreed to grant certain advantages to the Hon'ble Company, the particulars of which are too well known to your Honour and Council to need recapitulating, that nothing on his part has been wanting or ever will.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Upton's letter to him he finds the stipulation alluded to is neither more nor less than his receiving from his rebellious Ministers the paltry sum of three lákhs per annum in consideration of his remaining their discretional prisoner for the rest of his life which he has every reason to suppose would, in such case, be of short duration.

He has a firm reliance on the good faith of the English nation and relies on their fulfilling engagements made in the face of heaven. But should he by untoward fate be for a time disappointed by means not in his power to account for, he is still resolved to reject every other proposal and appeal for justice to England. In the meantime he throws himself on the protection of the British nation in full confidence of receiving proper support and maintenance at Broach, Surat or Bombay until the determination from England can be obtained.

Lieutenant-Colonel Upton having mentioned to the Peshwa that the Sarkár of Poona will be at the annual expense of ten lákhs of rupees by his whole establishment, he wishes the Company to receive it towards defraying the expense they may be put to on his account until a final determination takes place.

He observed as his firm opinion that the terms agreed to by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton were not voluntarily but compulsorily obtained by the Ministers in consequence of having him entirely in their power.

I have received a letter from Haripant Fadkia informing me that in consequence of Lieutenant Colonel Upton having agreed to surrender to the Marátha Sarkár all the parganás granted by Raghunáthráv Peshwa to the Hon'ble Company, he is preparing to come so far as Sangam to receive them from me. I replied that I acted in strict conformity to your Honour and Council's orders and that as yet you have not instructed me relating to his expectations.

Mándavi Camp, 11th March 1776.

I am,
With the greatest respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
Your greatly obliged and most devoted Servant,
THOMAS KEATING.

Bombay Castle, Saturday, 16th March 1776.

At a Consultation, present—

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.
W. DANIEL DRAPER. | THOMAS MOSTYN.
W. ASHBURNER. | ROBERT GARDEN.
ANDREW RAMSAY.

Read and approved our consultation of yesterday, likewise the letter received last night from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating.

As we have already given directions for affording an asylum to Rághoba any further resolution on that part of the letter respecting him is unnecessary. The President lays before us letters from Rághoba to His Majesty and to the Hon'ble Company, which are ordered to be transmitted by His Majesty's ship "Dolphin" accompanied by proper translations.

Messrs. George Perrot and James Crape are appointed to meet the Marátha agents at Broach to fix upon the country of three lákhs to the Hon'ble Company by this treaty; and they must be instructed to endeavour to secure such a district as lays most convenient to our present possessions, and to take all possible care in ascertaining the revenue beforehand.

The Chief and Factors at Surat and Broach must be instructed to carry into execution the seventh article respecting the places to be given up to the Ministers when persons properly empowered come to receive them.

W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER.
W. ASHBURNER.
A. RAMSAY.

Translation of a letter from RAGHUNA'THRA'V BA'JIRA'V, *Pandit Pradhán, to the* KING *of* ENGLAND.

After compliments.

Upon account of an old and firm friendship subsisting between me and the Company, Mr. Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, did after being convinced of the usurpation and injustice of some servants of this State, grant me assistance of troops and stores under command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Keating to punish the above-mentioned ungrateful servants, and the said Colonel did with the help of God behave in battle valiantly, bravely and courageously, and God was pleased to send us complete victory. We had five or six battles with the rebel army, in the country of Gujarát, in which they were always beat, after which it was agreed to go into the Deccan, but as soon as the English artillery, stores, &c., were ready for our march, the rains began to fall, so that I wintered in the Gujarát country. After the rains, I intended to go into the Deccan, to settle my Government through the favour of God and your assistance, but Governor Hastings of Calcutta did send an order to Governor Hornby, and suspend the war, at which I was greatly surprized, because the English custom is very well known everywhere like the sun, that is, if any Governor has undertaken any business the others unite to confirm the same, and join him to get it accomplished. I believe the said Governor Hastings may have done what he did, not understanding the business, all which your Majesty may have heard from the representations of the said Governor Hornby. Good fame, reputation and uprightness of English nation is publicly known in this part of the world. It is therefore right that every one of them ought to join to get the just and solemn agreements, which their Governor may have made with any man, accomplished, not suffering any man to interrupt it. Had this

hindrance not happened my business would have been accomplished, as it is already nearly done, all which I beg that your Majesty will out of regard to my firm friendship take into your consideration and order the Governors of Calcutta and Bombay to join and assist in my enterprise, and to confirm me in my Government. Your Majesty well knew the treaty concluded between me and the Governor of Bombay by his representations to the Company.

Pray send me a favourable answer as soon as you can; what need I say more? I always pray for an increase of your riches and happiness.

Letter from Colonel Keating to the President and Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—The most part of yesterday the Peshwa employed in consultation with his principal Ministers and officers. In the evening I was with him upwards of two hours, and before we parted he communicated to me the following sentiments and resolves which he declared to be final.

That he has the most ample dependence on your Honour and Council for the due performance of the treaty of Surat, the more so, as you must be perfectly conviced that he has punctually fulfilled every part of his promise, so far as has hitherto depended on him.

That he is fully determined never to accept of any compromise, much less that mentioned to him by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton.

That should your Honour and Council refuse to fulfil the treaty of Surat he then appeals to the Hon'ble Company for justice, and in the mean time is resolved as far as possible and with God's assistance to defend his just right, against the evil designs of his rebellious servants, and retracts that part of his former resolutions as transmitted yesterday to your Honour and Council, of placing himself under the protection of the English in Surat, Broach or Bombay until the determination from England can be obtained, by which the Hon'ble Company will be eased of the heavy expense for his support during that period.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS KEATING, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Mándavi Camp, 12th March 1776.

Bombay Castle, 29th May 1776.

Received the following letter from Colonel Upton:—

"Gentlemen,—It has been agreed between the Governor General and the Peshwa and his Ministers that the following alterations and clause should be made in the treaty. This has been accordingly done and the treaty finally signed and made over by both parties.

I have the honor to be, Gentlemen, with respect,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
J. UPTON."

Purandhar, 26th May 1776.

The 13th and 17th articles are omitted entirely. The fourteenth article therefore becomes the 13th and so on, and the 18th article becomes the 16th and so on.

The concluding words of the 7th article "and these treaties are to be destroyed in the presence of the Peshwa's Ministers when they come to hand" are also omitted.

Additional Clause.

Whereas it is declared by the third article of the foregoing treaty that "the Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán and his Ministers being desirous of having Sálsette and the small islands subdued by the English in the late war restored to them, do offer to give in exchange a country of three lákhs of rupees with *chauth*, &c., in the neighbourhood of Broach, and further that if the Governor General and Council of Fort William do not restore them they shall continue in the possession of the English and the said Peshwa Ráv Pandit Pradhán and his Ministers will then give up all right and title to the said islands." The said Governor General and Council hereby declare their intention and resolution not to relinquish the said islands of Sálsette, Karanja, Elephanta, and Hog, or to accept the territory offered in exchange for those islands: and the said islands are accordingly to remain for ever in the possession of the English by virtue of the present treaty.

(Signed) J. UPTON.

Purandhar, 22nd May 1776.

Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL *and* COUNCIL, *Fort William, to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have just received advices from Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, dated the 28th ultimo, with which he transmits us a copy of your letter to him of the 20th August and of his reply to it, on the 27th.

We have read with great surprise the resolutions declared in your letter to Colonel Upton that you were determined at all "events to keep possession of such of the late cessions as are not yet relinquished," and we are equally alarmed at the fatal consequences which may attend such a notorious breach of public treaty and consequently a violation of the national faith.

We hope however that the arguments urged to you by Colonel Upton, and supported by our resolutions on receipt of the Company's orders respecting the Marátha war, which we communicated to you in a letter of the 1st July, will have had sufficient influence on your conduct to prevent the execution of the measure you have resolved on, or at least to have suspended the issue of any orders in consequence thereof until this may arrive.

We now desire you will call to mind that the treaty with the Marátha State has been executed under the sanction and by the authority of an Act of Parliament. That therefore it is not only binding on all the Company's settlements in India, but even on the Company themselves.

We claim and demand your aid in supporting and maintaining the treaty which is now in force, declaring at the same time that we shall hold you responsible for all the consequences which must follow a breach of it on your part.

But we see no difficulty in reconciling the conditions of the treaty with the object of the Company's orders, although those orders are manifestly framed without any knowledge of the part we had taken. The interchange of Jambusar and the other lands stipulated to be restore

to the Maráthás for the country adjoining to Broach, which is specified in the 5th article of the treaty, to be ceded on their part to the Company, will leave the Company in possession of a territory obtained by peaceable means from the Maráthás equally convenient in point of situation, and not much inferior in value to that which the Company have empowered you to keep possession, though originally obtained and still requiring to be preserved by force of arms.

If our positive injunction should effect no change in the resolutions you had agreed to, we desire you will reflect on the means you are possessed of to carry on a war. You have represented to us that the state of your treasury is very low; your supplies from this Presidency have been anticipated to a considerable amount. The returns of your troops prove that the establishment of your army is very deficient, and upon the whole we think your actual condition very far from being such as would in prudence justify your exposing the Company's possessions under your Government to the immediate hazards of a war, admitting that no other motives opposed your engaging in it.

We are, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient Servants,

WARREN HASTINGS.
JOHN CLAVERING.
PHILIP FRANCIS.

Fort William, 30th September 1776.

Minute by Brigadier-General Gordon.

Brigadier-General Gordon is not informed of the cause that induced Rághoba to come to Bombay nor of the mode of his conveyance; but the Brigadier-General continues of opinion that agreeable to the late treaty of peace with the Ministers for the Marátha Government, the repeated and peremptory orders of the Supreme Council, this Presidency should give no protection, countenance, nor support to Rághoba, unless where humanity directs, to save him from immediate danger, and no longer; for it should be remembered that by this treaty of peace a provision and place of residence was assigned him, which provision was afterwards enlarged and the place of residence changed to make this matter more agreeable to Rághoba. By the former and last letters this Board received from Lieutenant-Colonel Upton at Poona it appears that the Ministers there for the young Peshwa are determined to fulfil every article of the late treaty of peace to our satisfaction; but if we on our part continue to adhere to Rághoba, the declared enemy of the present Marátha Government, an immediate war will be the consequence when their other affairs will permit, and in the meantime we may expect every interruption to trade and correspondence; nor can it be supposed that Lieutenant-Colonel Upton's situation at Poona under these circumstances will be very pleasant, when the Poona Ministers will no longer confide in us. The Brigadier-General with all deference submits these considerations to the Secret Committee, and which he requests may be entered on their minutes.

23rd November 1776. ROBERT GORDON.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, *to the* President *and* Council.

Gentlemen,—In my letter of the 17th instant, I acquainted you that a report prevailed here that Raghunáthráv was then at Bombay. I am exceedingly concerned to find this report confirmed by a letter I have just now received from the Peshwa. He desires you may be made acquainted with the contents of this letter, and that your answer may be immediately procured. For this purpose, therefore, I have enclosed a copy of the Peshwa's letter, and have to request, gentle-

men, you will favour me, as expeditiously as possible, with the reply to the Peshwa's accusations; some of which are, admitting the truth of them, but too obviously in my opinion, infringements of the late treaty. The Peshwa's Ministers think them highly so, both of the late and former treaties, and complain accordingly.

I have, &c.,

19th November 1776. JOHN UPTON.

Translation of a letter from the Peshwa MÁDHAVRÁV *to Lieutenant-Colonel* UPTON, *received November 19th, 1776.*

I have just now heard that Raghunáthráv arrived at the port of Bombay on the 28th of Ramzan, and the Governor of that place gave him an asylum in the said port. He, also, before gave protection in the above port and Sálsette to the followers of the seditious Sadáshivráv with elephants, horses, and baggage belonging to the Sarkár. These actions are very foreign to the meaning of the treaty under the Company's seal, concluded by you between the Sarkár and all the English.

Prior to this, I received letters from the superior Council of Calcutta, that " we will not give Raghunáthráv a residence in any of the Company's settlements, and all the Councils of the English ports will act according to treaty."

It is entered in the present and former treaties, that the rebels of each side are to be delivered up to one another. Notwithstanding these treaties, which are existing at present with the Sarkár, the above measures by the Governor of Bombay have caused astonishment. What can be the meaning of giving habitations to the enemies of the Sarkár; causing the ruin of the Sarkár's dominions; constantly raising new seditions, and throwing my business into disorder? and what connection has the Governor and Council of Bombay with this business?

In order to remove the disturbances which were between the Sarkár and the Council of Bombay, you brought a credential letter from the superior Council of Calcutta; we placed an entire dependence on it, and peace and friendship was established between the Sarkár and all the English. Notwithstanding this, the Governor and Council of Bombay are repeatedly acting in this inconsistent manner; then how can the writing or engagement of the English be depended upon?

You should in friendship write distinctly the purport of this to Bombay, and procure a clear answer immediately that measures may be taken accordingly.

It has happened well, that during your presence, breaking the engagements appeared on the part of the English of Bombay. To this moment, on the part of the Sarkár, no deviation from the treaty has occurred. Never was such improper conduct as this heard or seen in Chiefs of high rank.

Prior to this the Council of Bombay broke the engagements of former Governors, took possession of Sálsette, &c., ruined the Gujarát country and other places belonging to the Sarkár, and in consequence of the assistance they gave Raghunáthráv, we sustained the expense of crores of rupees, but for the satisfaction of the superior Council of Calcutta it was dropped. Now the Council of Bombay are beginning mischief in the same manner. If they will not immediately withdraw their hands from all actions that are contrary to treaties, what advantage is there in making a treaty with the English.

Measures satisfactory to Raghunáthráv had nearly been concluded, and it was hoped that all the family disturbances would have been at an end, when Raghunáthráv without notice or cause, took the road to Bombay. It is most extraordinary. We took so much pains that he might be settled comfortably and satisfactorily. Had we wished otherwise, our army was round him.

Probably the Sarkár's enemies will say he went to Bombay, his life being in danger, but this was never the case; if any person thinks so, it is without foundation. An answer to this is necessary; what more is to be written?

Translation of instructions from the Peshwa MÁDHAVRÁV to the MARÁTHA AGENTS at Broach, for making over the country of three lákhs of rupees, December 1st, 1776.

You were formerly despatched to give the English Company a country of three lákhs of rupees; I now write that the parganas Amod, Hánsot, and Dehegebarch are settled with Colonel John Upton to be given to the English Company. An account of the full revenues of them in former years is taken from the Sarkár's office and sent you.

In conjunction with the English Agents, the Zamindárs, and Kanugows[1] of the said pargana are to be called and the above account shown, and you will also enquire particularly into their full revenues in former years according to their papers.

If the full revenues of the said parganas should exceed three lákhs, you will retain villages to that amount from Amod or Hánsot for the Sarkár. If the full revenues of the three parganas should happen to be something less, villages to that amount are to be given from the pargana of Ankleshvar.

If the English should wish to fix the revenues according to the present year, whereas those parganas were laid waste by the march of the armies of Raghunáthráv, the Sarkár and the English, the present collections are not equal to the revenues of former years, but their collections will hereafter become as before.

It is entered in the treaty that parganas of a complete revenue of three lákhs shall be given to the English.

Colonel Upton has written to the Council of Bombay concerning this, and the Council of Bombay will write accordingly to the Chief of Broach.

You are, agreeable to the above, to deliver to the English of Broach a country of a complete revenue of three lákhs of rupees, and take their receipt in the name of the Sarkár, and come away.

An account of the yearly revenues of the following parganas as collected by the Marátha Government and the Mogal of Surat, sent by the Peshwa's Ministers from their revenue office to Lieutenant-Colonel Upton:—

Parganas.	By the Marátha Government.	By the Mogal of Surat.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Dehegebareh, belonging entirely to the Sarkár .	40,000	......	40,000
Amod do. do. ...	1,63,791	......	1,63,791
Hánsot	1,19,159	8,650	1,27,809
Ankleshvar	1,67,401	12,600	1,80,001
Total ...	4,90,351	21,250	5,11,601

[1] Kanugows for Kanungo, meaning a speaker or expounder of law. This term was generally applied to village or district revenue officers who, under the former Governments, recorded all circumstances within their sphere, which concerned landed property and the realization of the revenue, keeping registers of the value, tenure, extent and transfers of land, assisting in the measurements and survey of the lands, reporting deaths and successions of revenue-payers, and explaining, when required, local practices and public regulations. They were paid by rent-free lands and various allowances and perquisites.—(Wilson's Glossary of Indian Terms, p. 260.)

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,

Governor General, and Council, at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—Having lately received from Mr. Mostyn some very alarming accounts of the proceedings of the French with the Poona Government, we think it our especial duty to lose no time in transmitting you copies of his letters, that you may take what measure you may judge proper for guarding against the bad consequences which must ensue from too close a connection between those powers.

If the French succeed in obtaining the port of Chaul, or any other so immediately in our neighbourhood, it will wholly ruin the Company's trade at this settlement, and materially injure the commerce of Great Britain, exclusive of the advantage such an establishment would afford them in case of a national war. Much, therefore, in our opinion, ought to be hazarded to subvert their scheme, whether, on further intelligence, it should prove to be directed to views of trade only, or to the forming a treaty of alliance with the Poona Government; but we have only considered ourselves authorized to direct Mr. Mostyn to expostulate with the Ministers on the impropriety of their giving encouragement to our natural enemies, after the peace so lately concluded by Colonel Upton, and to demand from them the nature and design of Mons. St. Lubin's deputation. We have also instructed him to endeavour to excite their jealousy by representing the ambitious views and encroaching disposition of that nation, and their attachment to Hyder Alli; and at the same time to make it his study himself to preserve the most amicable correspondence with the Darbár. Mr. Mostyn will, by our direction, continue to keep you constantly and fully advised of such of their proceedings as may come to his knowledge.

Whilst we have such reasons for suspicion of the designs of the French, we beg leave to submit to your judgment how far it is expedient we should remain in our present defenceless state. The enclosed return will show you the great diminution of our European corps; and until the dispute with America is subsided, we have no reason to expect any considerable recruits from England. At any rate it is good to be prepared against every event, and the appearance of a respectable force will at least have a good effect on the conduct of the Poona Government, and may deter the French from designs, which our weakness might otherwise tempt them to undertake. From the same motives, and as they have had lately several ships of force upon this coast, we have applied to Sir Edward Hughes, or his successor in command, to bring round His Majesty's squadron to Bombay as early as he possibly can.

We are, with respect, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COUNCIL.

ombay Castle, 10th May 1777.

To

THE HON'BLE WILLIAM HORNBY, ESQUIRE,

President and Governor, and Members of the Select Committee, at Bombay.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—On the 15th instant I was honored with your commands of the 10th.

It affords me much satisfaction to find that my answers to the Darbár's papers have met with your Honor and Council's approbation. My reason for not mentioning therein the obstacles thrown in the way of our trade, was my having particularly represented it to Sakhárám Bápu

on my first audience; when he assured me the communication was open, which I believe to be true; but from the distressed circumstances the Government are in for want of money, the merchants are fearful, if they make any very considerable purchases, that loans will be required of them.

On the 8th instant the Chevalier St. Lubin had his audience of the Peshwa; at which the principal Ministers were present, when he delivered his credentials, being letters from the King and Ministers of France, and made a present. I cannot help here observing the difference of his reception and mine on this occasion. Sakhárám Bápu and Nána Fadanavis going without the tent walls to receive him as he alighted from an elephant the Darbár had supplied him with, and introduced him into the Darbár; but they only sent Mádhavráv Jádhavráv and Bahiru Pant to receive and introduce me. Indeed in every respect they pay the greatest attention to the French.

Your Honor and Council may depend on my continuing to exert my endeavours not only to penetrate into the true object of Mons. St. Lubin's deputation, but also to prevent his carrying any schemes into execution to the prejudice of my hon'ble employers. His real view is undoubtedly to obtain a port on this coast in the Marátha dominions, and a factory at Poona. In several conversations I have had with the Ministers, I have always endeavoured to excite the jealousy of the Darbár, by representing to them the ambitious disposition of the French; particularly so long since as the 5th April I represented to Mádhavráv Jádhavráv, one of the people appointed by the Ministers to transact our business with the Darbár, the impropriety of their permitting the French to send an ambassador to this Darbár; and that I doubted if they considered the ill consequences which might attend this conduct; for that I was well assured the French had not only this year sounded the harbours of Kolába and Chaul, but last year that of Gheria, which in my opinion clearly pointed out their views, notwithstanding any professions of friendship they might make, to be on one of those ports, and desired him to make a proper representation of it to the Darbár, that they might not hereafter blame us for not giving them a timely caution: I at the same time mentioned to Mádhavráv the connection between the French and Hyder.

On the 12th instant Mádhavráv Jádhavráv and Bahiru Pant waited on me with the Darbár's replies to my answers to the papers delivered me on the 20th ultimo, and to my demands made on them; translates of which I now enclose. I repeated to them the above-mentioned conversation, and addressing myself particularly to Mádhavráv, demanded in the name of my hon'ble employers to know the real intentions of the Darbár regarding the French, having been informed that the Chevalier intended to stay here during the rains; that orders had been given for their ship being brought into Chaul river; and that there was some talk of giving them a settlement on the coast, which, if true, would certainly cause a breach in our friendship, as we could consider such behaviour in no other light than an intention to injure the Hon'ble Company, it being so contrary to the real intent of the treaty, and the professions of friendship the Darbár had made both to Colonel Upton and me. To which he replied, that he now spoke to me as the Peshwa's Vakil, and as such assured me, nothing had yet been determined on by the Darbár; that they were to have a meeting with the French in a few days in order to settle matters, but I might depend nothing was intended which could cause a difference between us.

Sakhárám Bápu paying me a visit on the 17th instant, I took the opportunity of again representing the extraordinary conduct of the Darbár respecting the French; when he gave me the same assurances that Mádhavráv had before done, but confessed that the French had obtained permission for bringing their ship into Chaul river and for landing their goods and stores, but were on no account to land any warlike stores. Then informed him of the close connection

there was, and had for a long time been, between the French and Hyder; when he replied that he was not ignorant thereof, and that the Darbár would not comply with any views the French might have until they knew what this Government was to expect from them. I likewise again represented to him the obstructions thrown in the way of our trade, which I hoped would have been entirely removed on my arrival here. In answer to which he assured me the communication had been ordered to be as free as heretofore, but should he, on enquiry, find any obstacles had arisen thereto, they should be removed.

By the translates of the Darbár's replies your Honor and Council will observe, that they really have no intention of carrying any one article of the late treaty into execution, until we have complied with every demand they may choose to make on us.

Raghuji Bhonsla took his leave of the Darbár on the 5th instant, when he was presented with a *sirpáv.* He the next day broke up his camp here and marched to Sásvad, where he stayed only three days, and it is said is now returning to his own Government. By the last accounts from the Karnátak, Hyder Alli and Hari Pant's armies were about thirty kos distant from each other, when the latter was much distressed for money, which this Darbár is using every endeavour to supply him with.

I shall strictly obey your Honor and Council's orders with respect to ingratiating myself with the Ministers, but while they continue on the fort, where I am not permitted to go, it is impossible for me to have that free intercourse with them I could wish, or that I might have were they to reside in Poona.

The copy of the receipt from Colonel Upton to the Darbár mentioned in their replies to be inclosed, and for which I have waited these two days, has not yet been sent me.

I am with respect, &c.,

T. MOSTYN.

Curreel near Purandhar, the 19th May 1777.

Paper enclosed in Mostyn*'s letters.*

Mons. St. Lubin's operation was taken in the beginning from Mons. de Bussy's memoirs, and proposed to the Ministry by him and Mons. Dumas, a Commanding Officer in Canada in the last war and late Governor of the Isle of France. They both jointly worked it till such time as they had obtained Mons. Sartine's consent and approbation. Mons. St. Lubin was by the first plan to embark at Bordeaux on the "Paix", to be commanded by de Santy; and was named by the Commercial Department as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Marátha Court. Mons. Dumas on the other hand was to embark at Brest on the Ship "L'Indien", commanded by Mons. Lande, at the head of 1,500 men, which joined to 1,000 which were to be shipped on the "Paix" make 2,500 men under the command of Mons. Dumas, who alone had the Department of War in this expedition. Besides the 2,500 men above mentioned there were 500 more to be landed at the Isle of France by a private merchant ship, which de Santy immediately after his arrival at this coast was to return for, and land where appointed by Mons. Dumas. This plan was so far advanced that Mons. de Sartine visited the ports wherein the above ships lay, with a view of examining them, and of applying for them to the King. Mons. de St. Lubin seeing Mons. de Sartine much inclined in favour of Mons. Dumas, seeing that he alone stood in the fairest way of making his fortune, and perhaps fearing that he would deprive him of the glory he expected from such an undertaking, worked underhand with the Minister and in several memoirs he presented him exposed Monsr. Dumas's incapacity, as well

as the bad consequences of bringing an army here without a certainty of success; and proposed at the same time to send a proper person, acquainted with the country, to try how the Government was disposed in favour of the French nation. Mons. de Sartine seduced as well by the eloquence as the apparently true prospects he gave in his memoirs, proposed him the expedition, as the only man he could find capable of undertaking it; and had orders to sail in a private ship from Bordeaux, lest his affair might be discovered were he to sail in a King's ship. Mons. Dumas so little expected such traitorous proceedings from Mons. St. Lubin, that he believed he had gone to Lyons to see his parents, and little thought he was despatched for India. Mons. de St. Lubin in his engagements with Mons. de Sartine is obliged to send an express to Europe, and give an exact account of the affairs he has hitherto transacted. If it gives sufficient hopes of success Mons. Dumas will be immediately despatched with the above force, which he will land before the English establishments on this and the Coromandel coasts, are able to strike and reduce them jointly with the Maráthás. Notwithstanding this is the plan of operation that Mons. de St. Lubin is come upon, his ambition will certainly subvert and ruin the whole scheme. He is far from coveting a partaker of the emoluments he thinks himself entitled to in case the affair takes; for that reason he has written for the above troops and desires the command thereof for himself. He lays, by what I am informed, fair prospect before the Ministers.

The above is taken word by word from J. M.

(A True Copy)
T. MOSTYN.

Letter from James Madjett *to* William Lewis.

Sir,—According to your desire I now proceed to acquaint you of such circumstances as occur to me relative to the deputation of Mons. St. Lubin.

The paper delivered to Mr. Mostyn was framed verbally from the information given me by Mons. de Santy, who acted as confidential Secretary to Mons. de St. Lubin. I had always understood, even in France, that some overtures transmitted to the Court of France from India had first given rise to the steps taken relative to an alliance with the Maráthás. When at Bordeaux, being in the mercantile line, I had not an opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with Mons. de St. Lubin's designs; but, even in Bordeaux, it was mentioned, and generally believed, that he was deputed by the French Ministry and was to form an alliance which would restore the influence of France in this country, be the means of crushing the power of the English, and give rise to many commercial and other advantages to the French nation. In this light I regarded him when he embarked on the "Sartine". This ship was originally intended for America, belongs to Mons. Laffonde of Bordeaux; but by the management and persuasion of Mons. de St. Lubin, and the high advantages held out by him to the owners, she was appointed to the service she came on. Mons. de St. Lubin assured the owner that shortly after the cargo was landed—if it was landed according to his directions—he would ship five lákhs of rupees in specie on board, and send her away to China. The orders from the owner to the Captain, which I have frequently seen, are framed in consequence of this agreement, directing him to endeavour to sell his cargo on the Malabar coast, to ship on board what sandal and pepper he could get, and go off to China. This was to be his great view. But in all things to follow the advice of Mons. de St. Lubin, to land the cargo wherever he directed him, to leave one of his officers with it, and proceed to China with the five lákhs Mons. de St. Lubin would put on board him. Unfortunately for the deluded Mons. Laffonde, he has made contracts for the delivery

of tea at Bordeaux from the full assurance he had of his ship going to China with means to procure a valuable cargo there. The Captain is directed to behave with all possible attention to Mons. de St. Lubin in consequence of the most pointed recommendations from Mons. de Sartine.

From the especial confidence reposed by Mons. Laffonde in Mons. de St. Lubin, the articles to form the cargo were entirely left to him; they were chosen entirely according to his views, *viz.*, military stores—15,000 muskets rejected from the King's service were spared to him at a very low price from the King's stores by means of the influence of Mons. de Sartine. Cloth of different colours with assortments for facing formed also part of the cargo, which I frequently heard Mons. de St. Lubin mention was to clothe the troops that might be raised in India for the purpose of the alliance. Having perhaps forgot it in the owner's cargo, he pursuaded an officer of the ship to get made and bring out a considerable quantity of buttons. The device of the button was given by Mons. de St. Lubin; it is a *fleur-de-lis* in a crescent, which probably Monsr. de. St. Lubin imagined to be the Marátha standard, and had therefore intended as emblematic of the alliance. Mons. de St. Lubin even caused to be shipped a quantity of gold thread and spangles, which he frequently mentioned would be wanting for the embroidery of palankins, &c.

Mons. de St. Lubin embarked with him the two brothers de Santy, the elder of whom was his Secretary, and Mons. de Corcelle, a young gentleman of family in France. To all of them he held out during the whole passage splendid and deluding hopes of fortune. His conversation generally ran on the subject of the great objects that were to result from the alliance he was coming to form, the accounts of this country were as splendid as we have since experienced them to be false. During the whole passage from France to the Coast of Malabár he never made known the particular port he was destined to. Even on his arrival at Máhi he did not declare his particular intentions, and to deceive Mons. Picot procured bills from him on Surat for the appointments directed to be paid him by the Court of France during this service, which I understand are 30,000 livres per annum. He was exceedingly alarmed at the news brought off from Cochin by the Captain, and Mons. Warnet, the supercargo, that intelligence was received on the Malabár Coast of his destination there; that the Dutch Chief assured them he had received information of it in a letter from Mons. Belcombe and Chevrieul, dated Pondicherry, which letter the Dutch showed them. He could hardly believe it, and even took the pains of examining them separately; and when he met the "Consolante" frigate, which they had also brought word they should meet, he was exceedingly alarmed, particularly on the score of the English. He directed the name of the ship not to be mentioned if spoken to; the men for three weeks were kept in constant alarm; the guns loaded and all ready for engaging. At Mangalore the Captain had advantageous offers made him for part of his military stores, and was to receive sandal and pepper in return; but this not suiting perhaps the views of Mons. de St. Lubin, or his fears interfering, he prevented him from accepting these offers, in virtue of the powers lodged in him by the owner's orders, at the same time telling him that he would carry him to where they would sell infinitely better, and to a country where they were obliged to cut down sandal to make roads through the woods of it, and where he would trample pepper under his feet. Shortly after we left Mangalore Mons. de St. Lubin declared his intentions of carrying the ship into Chaul, where she accordingly arrived the 16th March. From his arrival there he began to assume to himself both in public and private all the state of an ambassador of the King of France. His confidential Secretary, Mons. de Santy, went ashore with written instructions relating to the points to be insisted on for his reception. He insisted the Subhedár should send the officer next in rank to him with a letter of congratulation on his safe arrival; that the troops at Chaul should be under arms, and the Subhedár at the head of

them to receive him as he stepped out of the boat; that the fort should salute him with 21 guns, and an elephant and palanquin be ready to carry him to the place of his reception. All the points were complied with, except the palanquin and elephant; and he directed the Commander of the ship to salute him with 21 guns on his putting off, which was also complied with.

From Chaul he sent Mons. de Santy to Poona with a letter to Nána expressing his impatience to see him, and to deliver the letters he had from the King his master and the Vazir of France. He made a demand of two elephants, forty-six horses, six palanquins, and forty camels, with sufficient bigáris and bullocks to carry his baggage. A part of this demand only was complied with, and the Chevalier after having stipulated some arrangements regarding his reception at Poona set off from Chaul the 11th of April and arrived at Poona. On the road from Poona to Purandhar he was met by Bhimráv, the Commandant of the Artillery. He remained a few days at Purandhar before he had a meeting with the Ministers. The persons present at his introduction were Nána, Sakhárám, and Krishnaráv. He delivered two letters, one from the King in a gold bag for the Peshwa; and one in a silver bag, said to be from the Vazir of France, which was delivered to Nána. At this meeting nothing material passed. He was afterwards introduced to the young Peshwa. This was the 12th or 14th of May. Shortly afterwards being totally disgusted with him, I left him.

The different meetings he has had with Nána in this city are too well known to need mentioning. About the latter end of June he sent a circular order directed to every subject of the King of France then residing in Poona, and requiring them to meet at the house of Nána Fadanavis at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to be witness to the oaths taken by the Ministers of the respective nations (meaning himself and Nána) relative to a perpetual alliance to be formed between the King of France and the Marátha State. Amongst others this paper was brought to me; but having then declined all connections with Mons. de St. Lubin I did not obey it.

I have heard it repeatedly mentioned by the different gentlemen who were there, that there was some written instrument; on one side of which Nána swore by the cow and to the other side Mons. de St. Lubin swore by the holy Evangelists; that Nána farther kept the book Mons. de St. Lubin was sworn on. Being totally disconnected with the Chevalier, since my departure from Purandhar I have never been able to learn the particulars of the agreement with Nána, but I have heard in general the basis of it was the sending out a body of troops to assist against the enemies of Nána. About 9 days after that he introduced Mons. Pascoal de Santy, brother to his confidential Secretary, to Nána. This Mons. Pascoal de Santy went to Surat about the beginning of August, as I have learned, with a packet from Mons. St. Lubin to Mons. de Sartine, directed to Mons. Briancourt at Surat, and was to follow his directions in respect to getting to Europe as expeditiously as possible. The Nána, I have learned, made Mons. Pascoal a present of Rs. 700 in money and about 300 more in rich piece-goods. I have also since heard that this Mons. Pascoal de Santy has left Surat, but I do not know where he is gone to.

At different times all his suite has quarrelled with him and left him, and some have joined him again. In these intervals I have frequently heard from de Santy his Secretary and others that he has sent home to France the most flattering accounts imaginable of the success of his mission here; his having obtained the port of Chaul and great commercial advantages; but above all his being in perfect intimacy with the Nána, who is in supreme command of the Marátha State, and the great political benefit that may result if no time is lost in sending here a body of men.

It would be needless to recite the various falsehoods and artifices Mons. de St. Lubin has made use of to lead the different persons that embarked with him to his purposes; the discovery of them and a train of very base and unbecoming behaviour disgusted every one. The Captain and supercargo of the ship after finding themselves totally deceived in respect to his assurances to their owners, took on themselves the management of the cargo. He himself placed such obstructions, and led them, till they had lost all confidence in him, into such steps, that it was and still is beyond a doubt with them, that instead of assisting the owners, Mons. de St. Lubin has a view of sharing the cargo by means of his influence with Nána. I have heard that he even gave him to understand that the military stores were meant as a present from the King of France. In short after much trouble and fatigue they effected the despatch of the ship to China the 24th August last with 150,000 Marátha rupees, the only return they have yet got for an invoice of 900,000 livres, besides the costs and charges of the ship; and for this they have lodged the allowed value here of three lákhs, and pay 12 per cent. per annum on the Rs. 150,000 till the sale of the goods enables them to pay off that sum. To prevent any accounts of these transactions and the real state of this country and affairs here from reaching France, Mons. de St. Lubin had the baseness to open all our letters which we had delivered to Mons. Pascoal de Santy in confidence. Unfortunately in mine something was mentioned disfavourable to his political purposes. It was shown to Nána, interpreted to him, and insinuated that such representations might ruin the business between them by preventing the troops from arriving. In consequence of this I have been ever since in perpetual alarm for my life and obliged to keep on my guard. A few days ago Mons. de St. Lubin went on a visit to Nána. In the evening, after his quitting him, and at about nine at night a party of Nána's people who are constantly with Mons. de St. Lubin attacked the house where I was with Mons. de Corcelle. I had but just time to escape to the English Factory. It proved a providential retreat to me, for a poor German, who was mistaken for me, had nearly lost his life. He was carried to Nána's; and a dispute arose on the manner of his death, whether by an elephant, by opening his bowels, or beheading him. It was decided for the latter. His hair was laid over his head and the sword lifted, when luckily a Bráhmin knew him to be one of Mr. Noronhia's people belonging to the Toffkhána here.

The same dread that Mons. de St. Lubin had of what I might write or do to prejudice him, he also entertains of Messrs. de Coronet and de Corcelle, only in an higher degree; because from their superior interest and connections in France they will be able to do him infinitely more prejudice. I saw Mons. de Coronet on the 6th instant, on his return from Bárámati, where he had been to endeavour to obtain justice from the Darbár on Mons. de St. Lubin, who has taken to himself 100 muskets, a bag of 1,000 dollars, and other effects belonging to the owners to the amount of Rs. 13,000. He told me, that had it not been for the interference of the merchant here, with whom he has engaged for his cargo, it was past a doubt that he should have been in irons in a fort about five kos beyond Purandhar. It seems that St. Lubin informed Nána that Mons. de Coronet had written to France representing the Marátha nations as a band of robbers, himself as a mere usurper, that no certain benefit could be derived from an alliance with them, no dependence had on their promises, nor any safety to merchant vessels in their ports. It could not be denied that Mons. Coronet had written thus. Mons. de St. Lubin urged the necessity of at least securing Mons. de Coronet in some fort in irons, and fining him one lákh of rupees, if he, the Nána, did not think fit to take away his life. By Mons. de St. Lubin's superior influence orders were given to seize him, and the sepoys ready to set off with him; but the before-mentioned merchant represented the necessity of his being at liberty to adjust the concerns of his purchases, made some interest with the Ministers and procured his dismission. It may be remembered it was confidently reported that the French Captain was in irons.

As to the other gentleman, Mons. de Corcelle, you have seen to what lengths he has been driven. I can myself bear witness to his assertion of the danger his life was in, having been present when Mons. de St. Lubin almost surrounded with guards fired two pistols at him, one shot of which grazed his side. The house we lived in, after separating from Mons. de St. Lubin, has been constantly surrounded with sepoys, and he had nothing to trust to but the humanity of Mons. de St. Lubin and Nána's. This he had great reason to believe was but a weak defence against the danger that resulted to him from their political views, which may be impeded if either him or his advices can ever reach France.

If I was to enter into the minutiæ of Mons. de St. Lubin's conduct, it would serve to convince you, that he is a man capable of insinuating himself into the esteem and confidence of most men, of deceiving, misleading and betraying them. Every person that came out with him has experienced this, and his various arts and falsities have been detected since their several disputes with him led them mutually to recall his several professions, promises and engagements to them. I should not have mentioned this but that I imagined some knowledge of his character may enable you to judge how far it is probable he may or may not lead the Court of France into his views. The many deceits and falsities they detected him in with respect to themselves, has frequently led those who embarked with him to consider whether his character was not an assumed one; but after the strictest scrutiny there has never yet been the least ground to doubt, that in consequence of overtures from hence, he has been sent out at least to examine the state of affairs here, perhaps to make some definite agreements, and send home his report as soon as possible. How far this may be true I leave you to judge from the simple circumstances of Mons. Picot at Máhi and Mons. Briancourt at Surat having acknowledged him and answered his drafts. It is true that Mons. de Belcombe disowns him as Ambassadeur Extraordinaire from the King of France, but still it seems he knew of his coming out. From the smallness of his appointment, and no staff being sent out with him, it should seem that it was meant he should act as covertly as possible, which was certainly the mode good policy would dictate, but as St. Lubin is I believe very capable of sacrificing the public benefit to his own private views, I believe he has been led into an ostentatious display here, ruinous perhaps to the purpose he has been sent for, the better to impose himself on this Government as a person of great importance, in hopes of attracting such presents as would make him perfectly easy on the event of public affairs. There were unguarded moments during the passage out, in which I believe he spoke from his heart; and then he was very sanguine in his hopes of the favourable reception he was very sure to meet with here, that the nations of India in general, and particularly the people here, in the situation he supposed them to be, would gladly seek a refuge in the arms of France from the oppressions of the English, and therefore must receive with particular attention the person who offered them that refuge. Even after he found circumstances altered, and that it was very difficult to draw money from a Bráhman by mere words, I have heard that as a preliminary to the treaty with Nána, he insisted on two lákhs of rupees being paid him. It is too evidently his interest that a body of men should be sent here, to suppose that he would not make the most favourable report, to induce the Minister of France to that measure. I have already mentioned the flattering light in which he has set forth the advantages that must result from it, in his despatch to France, and that above all no time should be lost in completing his agreement by sending out a body of men. He instructed those in his confidence what they should write, and you are already informed of the measures he has taken and still seeks to take in order to prevent the detection of his misrepresentations. Even though he is now in some measure disappointed by the protection afforded to Mons. de Corcelle and myself, yet still it remains a doubt, whether or not it is possible to destroy at this distance that confidence which there is every reason to think Mons. de Sartine places in him; for among

many other qualities he possesses in a great degree the talent of persuasion; he sticks at no assertions and has a pen capable of baffling even truth itself, and to give whatever impressions he may think suitable to his views.

Poona, the 9th November 1777.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) J. MADJETT.

(True Copy)
(Signed) WILLIAM LEWIS.

To Mr. William Lewis.

Extract of a letter from WILLIAM FARMER *at Poona.*

This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the Ministry of France in this business. He introduced himself to the confidence of Mons. de Sartine as to Indian matters by a memorial he presented relative to this country, which Mons. de Corcelle assures me he has frequently seen. In this memorial he has not forgotten himself. He has made himself generallissimo at one time of Hyder's Army; the very man who framed the treaty between him and the Maráthás, for which he next day received two lákhs of rupees; but what chiefly introduced him to this business was his particular intimacy with the Rája of the Maráthás. He was the constant companion of his children, used to learn them to ride; in short he had not in the world a better friend than the Rája. There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to send out to sound the ground here and to form an alliance with the Marátha State, if circumstances should prove favourable. You may partly judge from this what the Chevalier is capable of in the way of representation.

Drunk and sober, jointly and separately, I have examined all the Frenchmen with whom we have yet had connection, that is, Madjett, Mons. de Corcelle, who was to have been made engineer by St. Lubin, and Mons. Coronet, the Captain of the ship, whom I found means to get to eat soup with us. They are in such a situation with respect to St. Lubin, that it is the first wish of their lives that he may prove totally a counterfeit, and not be supported by the Ministry of France; for in fact their lives may perhaps depend on Lubin's reality and the justifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to pursuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fish out their arguments to the contrary; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts mentioned in Madjett's letter. The Captain of the ship confirmed to me repeatedly what Madjett had often mentioned, that his owner had given him his orders relative to St. Lubin, in consequence of recommendations from Mons. de Sartine. They all agree perfectly in regard of the ideas entertained of him at Bourdeaux; that it was first talked of sending out a body of men under Mons. Dumas. The fact of the intelligence the Captain and supercargo received at Cochin of Lubin's destination, the Captain confirmed to me. Picot and Briancourt acknowledge him; and Briancourt has gone so far as to request the Consulship of Chaul. The Count de Mendave, a man of good family in France, who has been seeking his fortunes in this country and is now with Busalut Jung, heard of him; has offered to join him, and makes interest for a good employment under him. You will observe, Sir, that although it seems de Belcombe disavows him as an ambassador from the King of France, yet

he takes no effectual measures to remove him; and it is a known fact that St. Lubin sent by a Frenchman a despatch to Belcombe in the month of July or August last. They all perfectly agreed in the circumstance of the summons given to attend at the Nána's to witness the treaty. Nána was sworn by his Bráhman and St. Lubin by his Pádri; and Nána kept the book. The despatch of Mons. Pascoal de Santy to Surat in order to carry from thence his despatches for France, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman lately arrived here that he has been seen at Briancourt's; his destination is *viâ* Suez. This Frenchman says that he wanted to take his passage on an English snow, I suppose "Barrington", but that it was refused, and he is now to go in a vessel belonging to a black person. You will see, Sir, how much Lubin has at stake by the total defeat of all his schemes, perhaps the loss of life or imprisonment, if these fellows find that he is totally an impostor, and the test they will judge by is the event of his assurances to them. Every thing therefore with him depends on his being able to pursuade the Minister to hurry out a body of men instantly on the receipt of his despatches, or to order them from the islands. I leave you further to judge what he is capable of, when he has written, they are in perfect possession of the harbour of Chaul, and to make this possession the more valuable, he wanted the gentleman who took the draft of it for him to put 7 fathom water where there was only 3½, The flourishing state of this country, the power of Nána, the certain destruction of the English, the great advantage to France,—all these he has dwelt on, I am well assured, in a manner that cannot fail to make great impression in France.

On the whole I think you will agree with me, Sir, that we cannot be too alert in endeavouring to parry a blow, which at all events must be very ruinous to our settlement; and therefore in the first place I think we ought to make the most of the disagreements between him and his suite. I look upon it as a very fortunate circumstance that Mons. de Corcelle has been driven to the necessity of taking our protection. They allow him to be a young man of very good connections in France; he was just entering into the Engineer Corps when St. Lubin met with him, and persuaded his friends that he could make his fortune in India. He is a young fellow of good parts, and very soon found out St. Lubin had made a dupe of him which, operating with other circumstances in St. Lubin's conduct, has fixed in de Corcelle a rooted enmity to Lubin. There is nothing he would not venture on to ruin him, and there is no one St. Lubin so much dreads, because he knows that de Corcelle from his connections is the most dangerous of his enemies here. You will see by Madjett's letter the attempt he made on him; it was as cowardly done as it was horrible to attempt. De Corcelle was walking up towards him; St. Lubin advances to meet him between two rows of sepoys with his hands behind him, and a pistol in each, at what he thought an infallible distance he fired them one after the other and providentially missed him; one of the balls grazed his rib and went through his coat. If he is not secured to our protection well backed I think his life is yet in danger, for St. Lubin constantly instils to Nána the danger to their mutual cause if either his advices or any other of their enemies, that is Madjett and the Captain, reach France, but particularly should they go there themselves.

This seems so natural a conclusion that the first point I would recommend in this business is to approve and continue the protection given to Madjett and Corcelle. You will perceive, Sir, that allowing him sent out by the Minister of France they must feel themselves in justification of their own conduct, under the necessity of proving to that Minister that St. Lubin is an impostor. The different accounts which the Minister will receive must I think of course throw a doubt in his mind of the propriety of what St. Lubin recommends, which will at least breed a delay in the execution that must be favourable to us. Coronet, the Captain of the ship, finds himself equally under this necessity of proving him a counterfeit to his owners. St. Lubin

knows this and has stopped all their letters; but I have promised them to convey all their advices *viâ* Suez, provided that I may first have the perusal of them. I have further instilled the necessity of sending home some one of their party to counterwork St. Lubin at Paris. They see the propriety of this, but are afraid; for as they justly observe the Ministry of France may first try them and condemn them for counteracting St. Lubin as their chief and then try St. Lubin afterwards. I believe however I may be able to pursuade de Corcelle to venture by assuring him that he may yet arrive before Lubin's messenger, and I mentioned to him that we had a packet always ready for Suez. If you think fit to encourage this idea, I beg an answer as soon as possible with a promise that you will afford this gentleman a passage to Suez, and I should also be glad to know your opinion how this Mons. Pascoal is to get to Suez but on our vessels, and if he does not go *viâ* Suez how he is to reach France sooner than a person who might set off for Suez in the beginning of December.

Perhaps the fear of the remonstrances of the present Government may be made an objection on the part of some to give the protection afforded to the French; but on this side I think you have nothing to fear. By the rights of nations, and by treaty with them we have a clear right to receive Europeans of all nations, even in their service. They can certainly therefore form no just objection to our receiving them who are neither their servants nor their subjects; but their own interests seem to me your best security for their silence on this occasion, howmuchsoever they may dislike the protection afforded to the French. There is every just reason to suspect that Nána seeks to fortify himself in this Government against his competitors, and against us, by means of his connections with the French, and his hopes of what St. Lubin may effect are strongly marked in the great protection he affords him. He must feel that if we were once but well convinced of this, that our interest would lead us into the necessary measures to prevent this connection, and the only effectual one is a total change of the Government here, which he must be sensible we could effect long before the time that he can expect the French here. His policy therefore must be to keep us quiet, and the Bengal Government amused and unsuspicious, till he sees the event of his negotiation with Lubin. Too public and violent an execution in favor of Lubin, whom they affect to disown as an ambassador, would be held as clear proofs of a connection with him. Their silence hitherto on this subject of the protection afforded to de Corcelle confirms I think my opinion of the conduct they will observe; and the signifying it in writing was meant to make them feel that their conduct in this business would be stated to Bengal in a manner that would leave them no room for evasion.

Hon'ble Sir, &c.,

W. G. FARMER.

Poona, 11th November 1779.

Letter from the Governor *and* Council, *Fort William, to* Governor *and* Council, *Bombay*

Gentlemen,—We have this day received your letters of the 22nd and 30th Angust and 10th September after the intelligence which you transmitted to us of the arrival of the Chevalier de St. Lubin at Poona, and of the favourable reception he had met with from the Ministers there, which circumstances were also reported to us from other quarters, we waited with impatience for further advices from you or Mr. Mostyn, of his transactions at that Darbár, but we have been

greatly disappointed in all the letters which we have received from you, since that of the 21st June, to find no further information on the subject. The paper of intelligence obtained by Mr. Mostyn from a person lately in the service of Mons. St. Lubin, and enclosed in your letter of the 2nd of August, has left no room to doubt of the commission with which he is charged from the Court of France; and the secret conferences which he has been admitted to hold with the Poona Government, too surely indicate that they may have listened to negotiations of a hostile nature to the Company; Mons. de St. Lubin remains still at the Marátha Court, and may possibly by this time have entered into engagements with the Peshwa of a dangerous tendency to the Company's establishments. At such a crisis therefore every circumstance is of consequence, and we are under great anxiety to learn the progress and bent of his negotiations.

In your letter of the 22nd of August you acquaint us with the sudden call of Mr. Mostyn to Purandhar, and we understand that previous to the departure of the "St. Helena," which brought us this letter, he was actually arrived at Bombay. Connecting these two circumstances together, which have such an intimate relation to each other, we must conclude that he was charged with some very important commission from the Poona Darbár to your Government. We wish, for the sake of our mutual interests, that you had taken that opportunity of communicating it to us, or of apprising us of the result of his interview at Purandhar; and as you must be sensible of the necessity of a speedy and unreserved communication, of any serious political intelligence which may in its consequences affect the Company's affairs, we request that you will continue to give us the earliest and fullest information in your power on this subject.

In the general return of the troops on your establishment dated the 30th June, and which was transmitted by Colonel Egerton to our late Commander-in-Chief, we observe that though your force in Europeans is very defective of its compliment, yet it is considerably weakened by the manner in which they are distributed amongst your different garrisons, less than one-half being left for your garrison of Bombay, where the whole ought to be collected. We cannot but consider your whole military strength as exposed to great dangers by such a dissipation of it; and most earnestly recommend to you to withdraw all your Europeans, both infantry and artillery, to the Presidency, substituting sepoys and native artillery for the defence of all your other garrisons without exception. We need not use arguments to prove the expediency of giving the greatest possible strength to that part of your possessions, on which the existence of the Company in that part of India must essentially depend, or of collecting into one body that part of your military establishment which is as essentially necessary to the preservation of the rest. We persuade ourselves that you will see equally with us the force of this advice and allow it to prevail, although we offer it only as such, and should have avoided even this kind of interference in the detail of your Government on a point of less importance to the safety of the Company's possessions.

The Governor General has written to the Peshwa upon the subject. The original letter will be sent directly to the Peshwa; a duplicate goes enclosed in this with a copy for your information. We hope it will obtain the due effect.

We are, &c.,

Fort William, the 20th October 1777.

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
P. FRANCIS.

Bombay Castle, 10th December 1777.

At a Consultation, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

WILLIAM JOHN CARNAC. | DANIEL DRAPER.
NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE. | WILLIAM ASHBURNER.

ANDREW RAMSAY.

Read and approved our last consultation of the 18th ultimo.

Read the letter and papers received the 21st instant from Mr. Lewis at Poona.

As Messrs. Madjett and Corcelle have taken the Company's protection they ought undoubtedly to be considered as British subjects and exempt from Marátha jurisdiction. The President is therefore desired to write to the Darbár to insist on their being treated as subjects of Great Britain and to grant a passport for their safe conduct to Bombay.

Read a letter from the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán, received by the President at Onore, which is ordered to be enclosed after this consultation.

The President acquaints us that he has received certain intelligence that Mons. Pascoal de Santy, charged with despatches from Mons. de St. Lubin for the French Ministry, accompanied by the Secretary to the French Consul at Surat, found means to get a passage from that place in a dingy bound to Muskat, which started about the 26th August last month, and that from Muskat they are to proceed to Grain on the Arab Coast of the Gulf of Persia, and from thence to Europe.

The President lays before us a letter from Mr. William Lewis at Poona, relating that some overtures have been made to him on the part of Sakhárám Bápu, Moroba Fadanavis, Bajába Purandare, and Tukoji Holkar for the assistance of the Company to bring Rághoba to Poona.

This letter having been considered with the attention the importance of the subject requires, the following circumstances strike us in the most forcible manner:—

That if four persons above-named join in making a formal application to us, it may certainly with the utmost justice be considered as an application from the Marátha State, and treated accordingly, as Sakárám Bápu is the Diván or first officer in the Government and the principal person with whom Colonel Upton concluded the late treaty on behalf of that State, he being the Minister first named in the treaty: that Moroba Fadanavis and Bajába Purandare are also persons of the first consequence and the highest hereditary officers; and Tukoji Holkar, a very principal Jághírdár and one of the constituent parts of the Marátha empire.

That it can in no wise affect our alliance with that State whether Rághoba or Sakhárám Bápu is the Diván.

It is an incontestable fact that Nána Fadanavis, the colleague with Sakhárám Bápu in the administration, has been engaged in a negotiation with Mons. de Lubin; and that some treaty or agreement has been concluded between them, in consequence of which Mons. Pascoal de Santy has actually proceeded to Europe overland charged with despatches from the latter for the French Ministry, who we cannot suppose, as observed by Mr. Lewis, will neglect so favourable an opportunity of getting a footing in the only part of India which is now open to them; and will doubtless make it their first object to secure a settlement and port in our neighbourhood.

If time is given to the French for the French Ministry to take their measures, and to supply Nána with a body of forces, we can expect nothing but a repetition of the scene of wars and intrigues formerly acted on the Coast of Coromandel, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the English on this coast, and may end in our total subversion.

The circumstance of Lubin being now at Poona, and the consequence given him by Nána Fadanavis has also its due weight in our deliberations, as it may probably lead to the introduction and establishment of a new and dangerous competitor to the Company's power and commerce in India.

We have now a fair opportunity offered to us of averting these great evils without any breach on our part of the alliance with the Marátha State, though it is observed the repeated violations committed by the other party would justify any measures we might take. If this opportunity is not lost, we shall have it in our power not only to accomplish the Company's views on this side of India in their fullest extent and in the most honorable manner to them by restoring Rághoba to his just right, but also to establish their influence so firmly in the Marátha Government, as to prevent the possibility of their forming connections with the French, or any other European nation, to the prejudice of the Company.

The Marátha Chiefs in general are much disgusted with Nána Fadanavis, and jealous of his ambitious views, which apparently tend to fixing himself at the head of that Government, and the whole body of the people are much inclined in favour of Rághoba, from whence there is the greatest reason to conclude he may be carried to Poona with little or no opposition the moment it appears he is supported by the Company. The presence of His Majesty's squadron now daily expected will not only add weight to our interference, but enable us to spare a larger body of troops to join the forces of Sakhárám to escort Rághoba to Poona. We are also well assured of Hyder Alli's favourable disposition towards him, and his readiness to afford his assistance if called upon.

The premises therefore being duly considered, together with the Company's orders received by the "York," which express a strong predilection in favour of Rághoba and his pretensions, and the urgency of the case which will admit of no delay, but above all the imminent and absolute necessity of some immediate measures being taken to prevent the French from getting a footing in the Marátha country, it is unanimously resolved that it is our duty to make use of the opportunity thus thrown in our way to avert the dangers and secure the benefits above set forth. It is therefore further unanimously resolved that in case Sakhárám Bápu, Moroba Fadanavis, Bajába Purandare, and Tukoji Holkar will make application to us under their own sicas and handwriting for the assistance of the Company, we will instantly on the receipt of such a letter and after the necessary preliminaries are settled, join with them in taking every measure in our power for the support and benefit of Rághoba and to carry him to Poona agreeably to their wishes.

Ordered—That Mr. Lewis be immediately advised of our resolution, and directed to communicate the same to the party with all possible caution and secrecy.

The President acquaints us that he has conversed with Mr. Mostyn, who is too much indisposed to meet us, on the subject of the letter from Mr. Lewis, and he has apprised him that the utmost dependence may be had on Anantrav's being fully authorized to make the overtures, and upon the sincerity of the party in Rághoba's favour.

It is remarked that Mr. Lewis has not been explicit in mentioning the station in which Sakhárám and others mean to place Rághoba, which he must be desired to explain; as until the legitimacy of the young Peshwa can be clearly disproved, Rághoba can be only entitled to the Regency.

Mr. Mostyn will proceed to Poona to negotiate his important business as soon as his health will possibly permit.

Ordered—That a copy of Mr. Lewis's letter and of our resolutions thereon be immediately forwarded to the Governor General and Council, who, we flatter ourselves, will do justice to our motives, and afford their approbation and support to the step we have taken, and to the measures we may further pursue.

WILLIAM HORNBY.

Pesident and Council's instructions to Thomas Mostyn.

Sir,—Your health being now sufficienty restored to permit of your return to Poona, we direct that you proceed thither, and resume your station of Resident at the Marátha Darbár.

Mr. Lewis having represented in a letter received yesterday that two or three chowkies had been put upon the Factory and near restrictions laid upon his people, also that Nána Fadanavis had sent him a message to the following purport, that he wanted all the Europeans to leave Poona and that if the English must have a Vakil there, he thought a Kárkún would be sufficient, your first aim must be to obtain a proper explanation from the Darbár of his conduct.

For this end we direct that immediately on your arrival you make a remonstrance to the Darbár in the strongest terms upon the disrespect shown to the Company by the restrictions laid upon their representative and insist upon being allowed the same freedom and privileges to which all ambassadors are entitled and which their vakil enjoys at Bombay. You will in particular demand from the Darbár and insist upon an answer in writing whether they avow the message above recited from Nána Fadanavis, and they must be expressly told that if they continue to treat our Resident with such indignity, we shall consider it as a breach of the treaty on their part, and certainly recall him.

In order to add the more weight to your remonstrance, the President has written a letter to the Peshwa to the above effect.

You will as soon as possible send us an account of the conduct the Darbár may maintain on this occasion.

As we are willing to suppose that they will give you proper satisfaction, we shall proceed to give you instructions on other necessary points.

You will communicate to the Darbár the issue of the commission they gave you to make proposals to Rághoba, and the answer he made thereto, with all which you are well acquainted.

The obstacles raised by the Darbár to the completion of the 5th article of the treaty having been referred to the Governor General and Council, they tell us that they understand the term *kamil tumne* to be synonimous with *gross revenue*, and that it appears most reasonable the gross amount of the actual collections is the sense implied by the words of the treaty. Upon these terms therefore we are willing to receive the country of three lákhs; and as according to the agreement of the Ministers with Colonel Upton, mentioned in your former instruction, the cession of the ceded country was to have taken place from the beginning of the last Marátha year or the 4th June 1776, it is but reasonable that the Company should receive an equivalent to the amount of the revenue they have been deprived of by the delay on the part of the Marátha Government in making over the said country; and we accordingly consider that we have a just claim upon them for such equivalent, over and above the sum for which it is already mortgaged, in which we have the pleasure to observe the Governor General and Council concur.

As we wish to give all possible satisfaction to the Darbár, that justice is done to them in the management of Jambusar, we have agreed and given orders that their Amaldár shall be permitted to be present, and assist at the jamábandi, or annual settlement of the revenues, and you may assure them that the Government charges have been, and shall be, conducted with the utmost frugality.

The Peshwa in a late letter to the President has repeated the demand for the Gáikawár cessions being given up to the Poona Sarkár, and seems to found it upon a letter received by the Darbár from the Governor General and Council. We enclose for your notice an extract of what they wrote to us on the same subject under the 18th August last, by which we shall be governed, and you will observe to the Ministers that if these countries must be relinquished by the Company, they revert to Fattesing, from whom we received them, and not to the Poona Sarkár.

The Governor General and Council having transmitted us a duplicate letter from the former for the Peshwa upon the subject of the "Aurora," the same is now enclosed, to be delivered him by you, with a translation for your notice. You will call upon the Darbár for a compliance therewith, and desire to know in what manner they propose making reparation to the sufferers, acquainting us with the result.

You will as soon as possible send us the most exact account you can of the state of matters at Poona. Moroba's conduct in departing from thence without explaining himself to Mr. Lewis, and afterwards appearing so suddenly upon Nana's invitation, appears very ambiguous; but we shall suspend forming a direct opinion until we hear from you on the subject; and in the meantime you will be guided by our orders of the 10th ultimo to Mr. Lewis, unless you should see good reason to the contrary.

We wish you safe and pleasant journey, and are,

Sir,

Yours, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COUNCIL.

Bombay Castle, 3rd January 1778.

Letter from the GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay, to the Hon'ble* WARREN HASTINGS, *Esq., Governor General, and Council at Fort William.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter, dated the 20th of October.

It is equally our duty and desire to maintain the most free and unreserved correspondence with your Hon'ble Board in all matters necessary for your information, or that may be conducive to the execution of the high powers reposed in you, and we assure you that we punctually transmitted every intelligence we received of Mons. St. Lubin's proceedings at Poona; for after the paper transmitted in our letter of the 2nd of August, we collected nothing respecting him until Mons. Madjett put himself under the English protection, and delivered the information which has been transmitted to you, both by Mr. Lewis and us.

Our letter of the 19th September which we hope you received soon after the despatch of your above letter, will have given you an account of Mr. Mostyn's interview with the Ministers at Purandhar. Our subsequent letter informed you of the trifling proposals the Darbár commissioned him to make to Rághoba and of his answer.

We shall at all times receive your advice with becoming deference, and allow the force of your reasons for collecting all Europeans at the Presidency. We shall therefore speedily take the necessary measures for that purpose, though, as Broach is a frontier garrison, we apprehend we shall find it expedient to continue some European infantry and artillery there. We have no native artillery on our establishment unless you mean lascars.

Our last letter, dated the 10th December, has been already forwarded in duplicate.

We have now the honor to enclose copies of two letters, since received from Mr. Lewis, on which we have only to observe that in the fluctuating state of affairs at Poona, and considering the intricacy and mystery of Marátha politics, you must not be surprised if the intelligence appears at times much contradictory. We shall suspend forming a judgment on these letters until we hear from Mr. Mostyn on the subject; but however unsatisfactory you may find the information contained in them, our desire to give you the best in our power induces us to carry them before you.

Mr. Mostyn will set out on his return to Poona to-morrow, and enclosed is copy of the instructions we have given him. This packet will be forwarded by him with any material intelligence he may be able to send.

We are with respect,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servants,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, 3rd January 1778.

Letter from THOMAS MOSTYN *to* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I have the pleasure of informing you that I arrived here the 10th in the morning without meeting any obstruction, though not the least compliment was paid me on the part of the Darbár, notwithstanding they had been publicly advised by Mr. Lewis of my intentions to enter the town that morning. Immediately upon my arrival I gave the proper notice to the Darbár, and requested an audience as soon as possible. Nána sent me word that that day being a holiday, and the next an unlucky day, he could not consider of it before the 12th. After repeated messages I at last obtained an audience on the 13th, at which were present Nána Fadanavis, Mádhavráv Jádhavráv and Bahiru Pant, when I delivered the letter from the Hon'ble the President to the Peshwa, sent some time since to Mr. Lewis, but which Nána had declined receiving from that gentleman, unless conveyed to him through the hands of Mádhavráv Jádhavráv and Bahiru Pant. I at the same time, agreeably to your instructions, remonstrated in the strongest terms on the disrespect shown to the Company by the restrictions laid upon their representative, and demanded a positive and speedy answer to every point of the letter. To which Nána replied that the Darbár would give such an answer as was usual with them; when I observed to him that none but a plain and direct answer would be received. I then told the Darbár that no answer had been sent to a former letter from the Hon'ble the President, on which they observed it required no answer, that letter being only a reply to some letters the Peshwa had written him; but on my reminding them that it contained a demand for a *dastak*[1] for two gentlemen who came to us from the French, they pretended to recollect it; and said they would likewise give their answer thereto in writing. I then acquainted them with the issue of my commission to Rághoba, to which I received no reply.

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[1] A pass-port or permit.

After I had taken my leave of the Darbár, knowing Bahiru Pant has great influence with Nána, I repeated to him the absolute necessity of a speedy answer to the above letter, which he promised should be sent me in two days; however, from the knowledge I have of the dilatoriness of this Government, not choosing to place an entire confidence in this promise, I wrote under the 14th to Mádhavráv Jádhávrav that I hoped he would procure it to me as soon as possible; and sent a message of the same kind to Bahiru Pant. They replied that they had spoken to Nána on the business after I had left him, who said it was necessary he should first consult with Sakhárám Bápu; in consequence of which your Honor and Council will plainly perceive Nána is using every artifice to evade giving an answer. I shall therefore write to the Peshwa in hopes of procuring some reply; and in the meantime beg leave to observe that the chowkies are still continued. I should have done myself the honor of addressing you before, but was induced from promises made me by the Darbár to wait a few days in hopes of being able to transmit you their answer to the Hon'ble the President's letter.

On the evening of my arrival, I endeavoured to bring Moroba to an explanation, in consequence of which he sent me a letter for the Hon'ble the President, which was forwarded on the 11th; and notwithstanding I have since frequently urged him, he declines being more explicit until he receives an answer thereto.

The following, according to the best information I have been able to procure, is the state of the different armies:—Mudáji Bhonsla is still at Lackunwaddy Ghát about 30 kos to the eastward of Aurangábád: Holkar continues at his own village of Bambgam, and by his refusing to see Nána or any one he may send, appears to be determined on not coming to any terms with him: Mahádji Sindia in endeavouring to raise contributions on Jánoji Páttenkar's Jághír near Rahimatpur, has had a skirmish with him, in which Jánoji was killed: this action, it is said, has caused great discontent amongst all the Marátha officers in Sindia's camp.

Hari Pant has again been defeated by Hyder and has retreated to Panch Mahál̀s on the northern bank of the Krishna in hopes of receiving some assistance from Downsa, who is encamped at Nanavi Pent about 12 kos from Hari Pant's camp. Hyder's army has crossed to the northern end of the Tungabhadra in pursuit of him. The Darbár are using every endeavour to persuade the Nizám (who on account of a wedding in his family has not yet left Hyderabad as was reported) to join them against Hyder, but which he refused doing until they comply with the promises made him when he joined them against Rághoba, which are their delivering to him the forts of Ashur and Ahmadnagar. I have reason to believe this intelligence can be depended on, having received it from several hands.

On my entering the town observing several parties of horse encamped about it, I sent people to make enquiries of the numbers, from which reports I find there are from eight to ten thousand belonging to different officers.

Mons. de Corcelle, the French gentleman who some time ago took our protection, on the 14th at night delivered me a letter, and immediately left the factory.

I am, very respectfully,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS MOSTYN.

Bombay Castle, 16th January 1778.

Bombay Castle, 19th January 1778.

At a Consultation, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

William John Carnac. | Daniel Draper.
Nathaniel Stackhouse. | William Ashburner.

Andrew Ramsay.

Read and approved our consultation of the 14th instant.

The President informs us, that he has received a message from Rághoba, acquainting him that advice has been sent him from Poona, that an agreement has actually been concluded in writing for giving Revdanda or Chaul to the French, but that the sanads have not yet been issued.

It being of the utmost importance to ascertain the truth of this intelligence, Mr. Mostyn must be directed to spare neither pains nor expense for that purpose; and to send immediate advice of the result of his enquiries to us, and to the Governor General and Council.

From the uniform conduct of the Poona Government for a long time past, and from the repeated intelligence we have received, it is past a doubt that some agreement has been concluded between them and the French, of which indeed the Governor General and Council appear to be convinced by their letter of the 20th October. We think it very probable that the intelligence sent by Rághoba may be true; and more particularly from the circumstance of a French gentleman having been landed at Chaul on the 30th ultimo from a vessel directly from Pondicherry, who may have had some commission from Mons. Belcombe, the Governor, which may have occasioned the cession of that place. The consequences of such an event would be of such a ruinous nature to the interests of the Company, that it is resolved to send instant advice of the intelligence we have received to the Governor General and Council; and to ask them expressly and demand an explicit answer, whether in case a party of French should arrive to take possession of Chaul, or we should receive certain advice of such a measure being intended, we are to suffer them to proceed without interruption, or to use all efforts to prevent such a settlement from taking place?

It is our fixed and deliberate opinion which we think it necessary to record for our own justification, and to make the same known to the Governor General and Council, that nothing but a change in the present administration at Poona can secure the Company from the dangers and bad consequences of an alliance between the French and the Maráthás, and that there is no other method to avert the impending evils but the Company's immediately taking a decisive part.

Read the letter received this morning from Mr. Mostyn.

We think Mons. de Corcelle quitting our protection appears a very extraordinary circumstance after what has passed; but we hope during his residence with Mr. Lewis he has not made himself master of any intelligence of consequence.

Mr. Mostyn must be directed to send advice of every material circumstance to Bengal at the same time he does to us, and particularly respecting the French, whereby much time will be saved.

W. HORNBY and others,
Secretary.

Translation of a letter from the Peshwa MÁDHAVRÁV NÁRÁYAN, *to the Hon'ble the* PRESIDENT, *dated the 27th January 1778, and received the 1st February following.*

After compliments.

The letter which you favored me with I have received and observe its contents. Your Honor therein, from the representation of Mr. Lewis, says "that a chowki is put near his house; that his people cannot stir out unless attended by this Sarkár's people; that Nána said that if the English must have a Vakil, a Kárkún was sufficient, and that the rest might go away; that if these are my intentions I should let you know the same, when you would immediately order them away from Poona; that unless Nána acts agreeably to the custom observed by all powers with respect to ambassadors, you will esteem it a breach of the treaty, and that Mr. Mostyn would set off to-morrow for Poona". To all this I reply that Mr. Lewis has written to you another matter entirely, and in a different manner; the old custom is this, that the Sarkár's *Jasoods* attend the Vakil who comes from another Darbár. If he wants anything these people make application and procure it for him. The Jassoods in like manner did attend upon Colonel Upton when he came here from the Supreme Council of Calcutta as they do now upon Mr. Mostyn. My Ministers did acquaint Mr. Lewis that if his people who went to Bombay took this Sarkár's *dastak* with them they would meet with no hindrance; and that in case they took their way it was necessary they should have *mircanah* and a *dastak* too, which Colonel Upton always had when he despatched any people to Bombay, and this custom your Vakil should also observe. What is termed a chowki is when armed men remain at the door and stop the communication, the attendance of mircanahs came therefore to be called a chowki, so that Mr. Lewis is mistaken and had no chowki about them.

Mons. St. Lubin, a Vakil from the French King, came here with a letter from him to this Sarkár; two of his gentlemen were detected in writing untruths to Europe, and therefore went to Mr. Lewis who protected them. The Vakil upon this made a complaint to this Sarkár alleging that Mr. Lewis had protected these people; that he ought to send them back to him as they were his servants. This I have frequently desired Mr. Lewis to do, but he does not pay attention to it. When the Governor wants much to do justice, it is wrong to have such a dispute. I ask, if he will grant his protection in the like manner to every bad man that will go to him, how can the Sarkár's authority be preserved. Justice is requisite to be kept in every kingdom, and I therefore told Mr. Lewis that he ought to endeavour to increase our friendship, but instead of that he was making a quarrel. Colonel Upton who was here about 15 or 16 months never caused any quarrel nor played a trick, and to prevent a difference between the English and this Sarkár agreed that a Kárkún should be kept here with 5 or 10 men in the same manner as one belonging to this Sarkár is now at Bombay; but that if business of importance was to be transacted, Mr. Thomas Mostyn should be called from Bombay. The above-mentioned two Frenchmen are still with Mr. Lewis; the French therefore refuse to go, and say it is not customary for one ambassador to protect the bad men of another. Notwithstanding the letters that have come from Bengal your Honor does not act agreeably to the terms of the treaty, and yet say from what Mr. Lewis has informed you that "you shall esteem it a breach of the treaty on his part". At this I was surprised. Mr. Mostyn, notwithstanding having been absent six months for that purpose, has settled nothing regarding Raghunáthráv, about the delivery of Chikhli, &c., the country of three lákhs to be ceded to the Company, and the payment of twelve lákhs of rupees to them from the revenues of Jambusar by means of the Sarkar's *Kamávisdár*.[1] I thought he

[1] The term Kamávisdár was applied to the head revenue officer of a district who was sometimes also entrusted with the administration of the police.

would now confer on the articles of the treaty, but instead of which he talks the same as before. Your Honor will therefore write to him to settle the articles with this Sarkár agreeably to the treaty, and also get the Company's articles settled, after which he shall be despatched. Your Honor will do everything to increase our frienship, which I also intend doing.

Translation of a letter from the Nava'b Hyder Alli Khán Ba'hadur, *to the Hon'ble the* President, *dated 9th January, and received the 3rd February following.*

After compliments.

Hari Pant Fadkia and Parashurám came into the country belonging to the Jamidár of Haran Pulley with 40,000 horse, and my army went against them to punish them ; whereupon the enemy being afraid thereof and not being able to stand before my said army, did retire into the country called Adhooney, where my said army was encamped in my country at the distance of twelve kos from him, from whence a few of my troops with artillery marched against him, and from the fear of them they soon dispersed and endeavoured to escape, but in the meantime my troops came up with his and fell upon them, by which many of his officers were killed and wounded, the rest threw themselves into the river. My army did not fail to pursue the enemy as far as the river Krishna, and by which they possessed themselves of many horses, camels, guns, &c. Your Honor being my friend I have given you this news. You have for a long time assisted Raghunáthráv, and I make no doubt but you will out of regard to him place him in the Government at Poona, and likewise assist him with an army.

Letter from the Governor General *and* Council *to* Thomas Mostyn *at Poona.*

Sir,—We have received a letter from Mr. Lewis, under date the 29th ultimo, with the several enclosures which he refers to.

We have no doubt that Mr. Lewis has advised the President and Council at Bombay of the protection which he has granted to Mr. Madjett and to Mons. Corcelle, and that you will be guided in your future proceedings by the directions which you may in consequence receive from them. We for our part do not think it was advisable for the Resident at Poona to afford the protection of the British flag to the dependants of a foreigner who had been well received by that Government, as such an act might tend to embroil them with the Marátha court. Indeed the glaring improbabilities in their own narative of the causes which obliged them to solicit this protection and the strange manner of their appearance before the Resident made us strongly suspect them to be impostors. The general character of Mons. St. Lubin for intrigue affords also a great probability that he has made these men instruments to foment animosity between the English and the Peshwa Darbár. We therefore think it necessary to advise you to be on your guard against the conduct and insinuation of such persons.

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
EDWARD WHELER.

Fort William.
29th December 1777.

Bombay Castle, 8th March 1778.

Received per pattamar a letter from the Governor General in Council with the paper therein referred to as follows :—

"Gentlemen,—We have received your letters of the 7th, 12th and 17th December.

Having taken the last of these letters with your proceedings which accompanied it into our fullest consideration, we have agreed to sundry distinct resolutions upon the general subject of them ; a copy of which we transmit to you for your authority and guidance.

At the same time that we refer you to these our reply to your letter, we must request that you will attend particularly to the following explanation of the circumstances and considerations on which they have been formed.

We have supposed, that your intentions were to act in concert with the Marátha Government; to assist in composing its intestine divisions at the particular solicitation of its Chief Minister; and by means of such a policy to prevent the growth of an influence dangerous to the Company's interests, and to defeat the intentions of a party adverse to the Company's possessions. In this view we give our opinion and sanction to the plan which you propose to engage in ; making it an express condition of our concurrence, that you restrict your operations merely to the objects so required and defined; and that you withdraw your forces as soon as these shall be fully accomplished.

We are, &c.,

Fort William, 2nd February 1778.

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
EDWARD WHELER."

Resolutions of the Governor General and Council.

1*st.* Resolved,—That it is the opinion of the Board, that the President and Council of Bombay are warranted by the Treaty of Purandhar, to join in a plan for conducting Raghunáthráv to Poona, on the application of the ruling part of the administration of the Marátha State.

2*nd.* Resolved,—That it is the opinion of the Board, that the President and Council of Bombay are warranted by the orders of the Court of Directors, to give their support to the pretensions of Raghunáthráv if they can afford it without a violation of the treaty.

3*rd.* Resolved,—That the plan which the President and Council of Bombay have agreed to form with the Marátha Government, as explained in their proceedings of the 10th December, and in their letter of the 12th December 1777, be approved.

4*th.* Resolved,—That the sanction of this Government be given to the plan which the President and Council have agreed to form with the Marátha Government as above expressed ; and that they be authorized to carry the same into execution by such means as they shall judge most advisable, provided these be consistant with the treaty, and the orders of the Court of Directors.

5*th.* Resolved,—That the Company not being bound by the treaty of Purandhar to take part in the disputes in the Marátha Government, are therefore entitled to any farther advantages that may be obtained by negotiation, as a compensation for the hazard and expenses of their interposition and assistance.

6*th.* Resolved,—That it is the opinion of this Board, that the following are proper objects to be required as a compensation for the interposition of the Company; and that it be recommended to the President and Council of Bombay to obtain them accordingly, *viz*:—

1*st.*—That such reasonable and practicable security be obtained for the personal safety of Raghunáthráv as he shall require.

2*nd.*—That a specific sum be required to reimburse the Company for the military charges which may be incurred by their interposition.

3*rd.*—That the fort and district of Bassein be added in pepetuity to the Company.

4*th.*—That an additional grant of territory be made to the Company, adjacent to Bassein or to Bombay, in exchange for Broach and the lands ceded to the Company by Fattesing Gáikawár, and for the parganas of Hánsot, Amod and Dehegebareh.

5*th.*—That no European settlements shall be allowed on any of the maritime coasts of the Marátha dominions, without the consent of the Governor General and Council of Bengal previously obtained.

7*th.* Resolved,—That a supply of money, to the amount of ten lákhs of rupees, be immediately granted to the President and Council of Bombay, for the support of their engagements above-mentioned, independent of the ordinary annual supply to that Presidency.

8*th.* Resolved,—That military assistance shall be sent to the Presidency of Bombay.

In explanation of the grounds of the 3rd resolution the Board think it necessary to remark that they understand the plan of the President and Council of Bombay to be confined merely to the objects of security to the English possessions in India, and to the exclusion of the natural enemies of the British Government from any influence or connection with the Maráthás.

(A True Copy.)

(Signed) W. BRUERE,
Assistant Secretary.

Letter from Thomas Mostyn *to the Hon'ble* William Hornby.

Hon'ble Sir,—I addressed you early yesterday morning, and this is purposely to advise you of the revolution I have so long expected. About noon Moroba accompanied by Chinto Vitthal and Nárro, Junher's son, with about ten thousand horse, came and encamped on the other side of the river, and immediately sent fifty horse into town, seventy-five of which went to the palace, and the rest through all the streets directing the inhabitants in Raghoba's name to open their shops and not to run away on pain of punishment, for they had nothing to fear. The appearance of so large a force without knowing who they were, had put the town into the utmost confusion, and everybody was moving off as fast as possible. At one o'clock Moroba came into town and went directly to the palace to pay his respects to Párvati Bái, who immediately invested him with the *sirpáv* of Diván, and presented him with the *Mutalik Sicca, Kattar, Nobat* and *Jerry Patka.*[1] Moroba after removing all the old chowkies on the palace and placing his own people, also putting a chowki on the house of Nána's Diván, and receiving the compliments of Visságji Pant Binni, Sadáshiv Rámchandra and Jánuba, the Governor of the town, these being the only people of consequence left there, returned accompanied by them to his tent on the other side of the river. This letter would have been despatched in the evening, but having sent my man to Moroba with compliments of congratulation, and to learn what further steps he

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[1] Bestowed on him the Premier's seal, the sword of state, the drum and the Imperial standard.

intended to take, I waited for his return. He is this moment come, and gives me the following particulars: On his arrival at Moroba's tent he found Moroba with Bajába Purandare and Chinto Vitthal were gone to meet Holkar, who is come and encamped about three kos off; that Sakhárám had left Purandhar and reached Couree about six kos distant, and would join Moroba in the morning; that the whole of their force now here amounted to 30,000. This intelligence I have had confirmed by other hands, with the addition that Krishnaráv Ballál and Iduráv were both coming. On Moroba's return from Holkar my man met him, but had only time to give my compliments when Moroba desired him to stay; that he must go to his victuals, having eaten nothing all day, and come fifteen kos in the morning, and been busy ever since. My man waited until near eleven o'clock, and finding he did not come out, sent in to desire to speak with him. He was sent for, but there was such a concourse of people to pay their respects, that Moroba could only return his compliments, and request I would send him again in the morning. I am also informed that after all the party is met, they intend to march to Purandhar. It may, therefore, be some days before I see Moroba unless he sends for me; in which case I shall not hesitate going, as Sakhárám and in short the whole of the Government except Nána, are here. I do suppose they will determine soon to send some persons of consequence to Bombay to settle matters, and to attend Rághoba if he comes; in which case it is probable they will desire me to accompany them. Therefore to save time I should be glad to have your directions on this point. I am sorry to find the party are likely to succeed so easily, for I see no resource Nána has, but to come in to Moroba's terms, or to fly into one of his forts, which are Lohgad and Pratápgad, but the latter is most judged to be the place. Should Nána condescend to make up matters, I fear it may induce the party to object to comply wholly with Rághoba's treaty; and should Rághoba refuse to accept of their invitation on any other terms, Moroba and his party may look upon themselves absolved from the oath they gave to Rághoba, which is the reason of their having made this effort, and think no more of him. Our consideration seems now to be whether it would not be more advantageous for the Company to recede something, and thereby fix Rághoba in the Government with a body of our troops, and remain in strict friendship with the Márátha State, and consequently entirely shut out our natural enemies the French, and all other Europeans, than by persisting in a full compliance of the treaty, have Rághoba thrown upon our hands without any further prospect; be at variance with this Government, lose all hopes of any future advantage from them even by the present treaty, than what we are in absolute possession of, and give them an opening to admit the French or any other power they please. This is only conjectural, and what has occurred to me may be the case; for I cannot tell what may be their ultimate resolutions on this head, until I come to talk with them.

The revolution has set the French Captain at liberty to come here. I saw him this evening and he tells me he has received a letter from Mons. Picot, dated Mahi, the 29th January, informing him that his ship would leave Pondicherry the 5th February in company with the "Brilliant"; that Mons. Belcombe was on board the latter, and proposed proceeding on her up the coast as high as Surat, where he intends staying the rains. I know not what may be his views, but by the time he reached Máhi he will have full knowledge of Lubin's conduct and character here, not only from the officer of the "Vigil" sent up, but also from a black spy, who talks French, he sent here in the character of a merchant, and who found means to get to hire with Lubin, by which means he got at all his proceedings. He also learnt from the Captain every thing respecting him and what had passed between the Darbár and Lubin. Lubin at last heard that this man often visited the Captain, and, suspecting his errand, acquainted Nána therewith, who directly ordered him to be watched and, if possible, seized. In consequence the fellow was one day pursued, but got off by running

into the Captain's house and desired to be secreted. This raised the Captain's curiosity and he questioned the man more particularly, when the man candidly confessed his errand and that he was employed by Belcombe, who, having heard various reports concerning Lubin and the Captain, sent him to know the truth, and that he was ordered to meet Belcombe at Máhi. The man further told the Captain he came to Poona in company with a pair of Madras pattamars bound to Bombay, who promised to call on him on their way back. One of these pattamars was seized, supposing him to be the man, but Nána finding his mistake only kept him one night, and next morning sent him with a guard out of town to prevent his making a complaint to me. This affair happened about twelve days ago. These circumstances, with the news of the revolution in the Government, will, I hope, induce Belcombe to lay aside his scheme of coming up to Surat. Mons. Lubin has already met with some disgrace by Moroba having ordered away the elephant Nána sent him to carry his colors; and I flatter myself he will soon be glad to quit Poona, unless detained by the Captain who has thoughts of complaining to Moroba of him for money owing to him by Lubin, and get him made a prisoner. If the Captain cannot do this he is in hopes Belcombe, who is a relation to Belford, the owner of the "Sartine", will stop at Chaul and demand of the Governor that Lubin be delivered up to him. I will use my endeavours that Lubin be sent away before this can happen, otherwise it may lead to an intercourse by no means for our interest.

As I do not intend to address you publicly until I have talked with Moroba and Sakhárám or somebody from them, I beg you will be pleased to lay before the Board such parts of this letter as you may judge necessary and proper.

I remain, &c.,
THOMAS MOSTYN.

Poona, 26th March 1778.

Bombay Castle, 30th March 1778.

At a Consultation, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

William John Carnac.	Daniel Draper.
Nathaniel Stackhouse.	William Ashburner.

Mr. Ramsay, indisposed.

Read and approved our consultation of yesterday.

The President acquaints us that an agent arrived last night from Moroba, who had been despatched before the late revolution took place, and that he has had a conference with this agent who signified to him Moroba's desire that no time should be lost in conveying Rághoba to Poona, but without making any particular proposals.

In order to save time until some proposals are received, it is judged necessary to make preparations for taking the field and determine what force can be detached, which will have the further good effect of giving encouragement to Rághoba's friends.

The state of our force being therefore considered, and a general return laid before us, it appears thereby that we shall be able to detach three hundred European infantry, rank and file, two companies of artillery, two thousand sepoys, rank and file, and five hundred artillery lascars, which force will be held in readiness to march at a moment's warning.

It is judged proper that Colonel Egerton should proceed in command of the forces, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn as second in command.

A suitable field train with a proper quantity of tents, stores and provisions must also be held in readiness.

Ordered,—That two companies of sepoys be re-called from each of the garrisons of Surat and Broach, and replaced with local to be raised at those places.

The President acquaints us that he shall have a meeting with Rághoba this evening to learn his sentiments and intentions on this extraordinary revolution.

Wm. HORNBY, and others.

Letters from the Governor General and Council, Fort William, to the Governor and Council, Bombay.

Gentlemen,—We have now to acknowledge the receipt of two letters from you, dated the 3rd and 20th ultimo, and two from Mr. Mostyn, under date the 19th and 24th ultimo.

We refer you to our letter of the 2nd instant, a triplicate of which you will receive by this ship for our resolutions passed on the receipt of your advices of the 12th December.

For the purpose of granting you the most effectual support in our power we have resolved to assemble a strong force near Kálpi, the Commanding Officer of which will be ordered to march by the most practicable route to Bombay, or to such other place as future occurrences and your directions to him may render expedient. Although the event of the overtures which have been made to you yet remains doubtful, we cannot help being exceedingly alarmed at the steps which are taken by the French to obtain a settlement on the Coast of Malabár so near to Bombay, to establish a political influence in the Marátha State, the immediate object of which must be the overthrow of your settlement, and the future consequence dangerous to the Company's possessions in the other parts of India.

We are therefore of opinion that no time ought to be lost in forming and carrying into execution such measures as may most effectually tend to frustrate such dangerous designs, especially as the season is so far advanced that the rains might set in before we could furnish you with any military assistance, if we waited for definitive advices from you. We propose therefore to give immediate orders for collecting the force above-mentioned.

We shall direct it to march as soon as the stores shall be provided, and the other necessary preparations completed, unless from any intermediate advices received from you, we shall judge the prosecution of this design unnecessary.

We shall use every precaution which can depend on our care or influence for insuring a safe and unmolested passage to the detachment, and obtaining regular supplies of provisions on its march, and we earnestly recommend to you to assist us in these objects. For this purpose we shall direct the Commanding Officer to advise you continually of his progress and wants, and shall place him under your command from the day on which he shall move with the forces under his charge.

As we have no property, nor pretensions to property, in the port of Chaul, we cannot authorise you to use any overt measure for preventing the French from forming an establishment at that place, however dangerous their neighbourhood may be to your Presidency. This must be effected by other means, that is, by an appeal to that power which alone can give them the right of possession; we think it necessary also to add the following injunctions that you do not on

any pretence become the aggressor by commencing hostility against the French directly or against the Marátha State, but that you continue to adhere, as you assure us you will do, to the strict letter of the treaty between the Company and the present Administration of the Marátha State.

We are, &c.,

Fort William, 26th February 1778.

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
EDWARD WHELER.

Gentleman,—In the late despatches from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors by the ship "Besborough" we were furnished with a copy of their general letter to your Presidency, dated the 4th July, and concluding with following paragraph:—

"Although we cannot but agree to the protection you have given to Rághoba considering the connection you have had with him, by which we must suppose the Company have been benefitted, yet we are under some apprehension that the Maráthas will think it a breach of the treaty entered into with them by Colonel Upton; for though that treaty is not upon the whole so agreeable to us as we could wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it on our part. You must therefore be particularly vigilant as long as Rághoba is with you, to prevent him from forming any plan against what is called the ministerial party at Poona; and we hereby positively order you not to engage with him in any scheme whatever for retrieving his affairs without the consent of the Governor General and Council, or the Court of Directors. At the same time we think common humanity will warrant us in giving you orders to protect his person from violence, if any such should be made from the partisans of the Ministers."

We have given this extract at full length, because we shall make it the groundwork of our instructions on that part of it which restrains you from forming any engagement with Rághoba without our consent.

Although two years are past since the conclusion of the treaty made by Colonel Upton, yet it does not appear that one article has been yet accomplished, except those which contain the declaration of peace between the Company and the Maráthás. These from the inefficacy of the rest, and the dangerous connection which has been formed by one of the ruling members of the Marátha State and the French, stand on so insecure a footing, that we can place no dependence upon them. We think it neither consistent with good policy nor with our public duty to suffer the interest of our employers to remain longer in this state of suspense and alarm, nor the obligation of the national faith to be made the instrument of a policy, which aims at the ruin and extirpation of the English influence in the East Indies, without making such effort as our means will afford, and the treaty will allow to remove the first, and frustrate the last.

Your late advices contain no grounds for any rational expectation or conclusion, but that the distractions and weakness of the actual administration at Poona were so ripe for a change, as to make it probable that some great event will have taken place before you can receive this letter, and the objects of it be anticipated or precluded by your own application of the advantages which may have been presented to you, to the more permanent security of our common interests. Yet as the reverse is possible, we shall proceed to give you such instructions and authorities for your guidance as are necessary on the supposition that the same administration remains, and that the treaty continues on the same footing as that on which it has stood for the two years past.

First.—We direct that you demand immediate possession of a country of three complete lákhs of rupees, near or adjoining to Broach, conformable to, and in the manner provided by the 5th

article of the treaty; but as the execution of this article has been hitherto suspended by the disputes which have arisen between you and the ministers, concerning the interpretation of the original words of the treaty *Jumma Caumil*,[1] which are rendered by the word complete in Colonel Upton's English draft of it. Although we must regard the advantages taken by the Ministers in this instance as disingenuous, yet as a proof of our resolution to abide by the strict letter of the treaty, even against the evident spirit and natural construction of it, and against our own ascertained intentions, we direct that if on enquiry you should learn that the technical meaning of the words *Jumma Caumil* is such as the Ministers have ascribed to it, and such as under that interpretation will justify them in their application of it to the value of the lands offered by them in virtue of the 5th article of the treaty, although estimated by you at only 2,10,000 rupees, you do accept the same as a full performance of that article. But if it shall appear to you on valid authority, that the words *Jumma Caumil* mean in their official acceptation, what their natural construction implies, a complete rent, or a rent equal to the estimated sum, you will in such case insist on the performance of the 5th article of the treaty conformably to this interpretation; and if in either case the Ministers shall refuse to comply with your demand, we direct that you declare their refusal to be a violation of the treaty.

Second.—We direct that you demand immediate payment of the sum of twelve lákhs of rupees due by the 6th article of the treaty, or of so much of it as still remains unpaid; and that the Pargana of Jambusar be thereupon restored to the Ministers, unless you shall have accepted of the same as an assignment under such engagements as shall have absolved them from the literal performance of that article, and those engagements have been fulfilled on their part; and if they shall refuse to comply with the demand made to them that you declare their refusal to be a violation of the treaty.

Third.—We direct that you keep possession of the Pargana of Chikhli and Corial, the town of Variav, the three villages of the Pargana of Chorási, and the village of Balla Ganj, which were ceded to the Company by Fattesing Gáikawár, since the Ministers have failed in producing the proofs that Fattesing did not possess power or authority to make such cessions.

Fourth.—We direct that you cause a remonstrance to be made to the Ministers against the countenance afforded by them to the Chevalier Lubin; against the engagements formed between him and Náná Fadanavis; and against the grants of the port of Chaul made to him or to the French nation through him, if you shall have obtained any satisfactory information either that such a grant has been actually made, or that the forms of office only are wanting to render it a complete title. The grant without these forms may be the same to the French, and equally dangerous to us, which appears to be the case from the intelligence contained in Mr. Mostyn's letter of the 24th January last.

Although we do not insist on any positive right to demand the dismission of the Chevalier Lubin nor the exclusion of the French from the harbour of Chaul, yet we have a right to require a knowledge of the intention of the Ministers in regard to these points, so far as they respect the treaty of peace subsisting between the Marátha State and the English Government in the East Indies. We therefore desire that you will demand from the Ministers a clear and satis-

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[1] *Jumma Caumil* for *Jamá Kámil*, or *kamál*, meaning complete or standard assessment. In Bengal the term usually denotes the settlement made by Akbar's financial minister Todar Mal. In the Madras Provinces it was applied to the assessment of the revenue of the Northern Sarkárs made about A.D. 1512—1570, or to one subsequently framed in the reign of Alamgir, or about 1684—1687, for the whole of the Deccan on the principles of Todar Mal's assessment, and accordingly in Khándesh it denotes the highest rate which any village had been made to pay although not unfrequently falling short of the estimated rental or *tankha* as calculated at an earlier date.—(Wilson's Glossary of Indian Terms, p. 229.)

factory explanation of their intentions; and that you declare to them that we shall take such measures accordingly as prudence shall dictate for the future safety of the Company's interests and possessions committed to our care.

We recommend it to you to obtain if possible a copy of the engagements entered into by Nána Fadanavis with the Chevalier Lubin, and a knowledge of the measures which may have been taken for their execution. We cannot view this intrigue without feeling the most alarming apprehensions of the consequences. In effect this is the sole motive of all the late measures we have taken for the support of your Presidency. We regard the Maráthás as the only native, and the French as the only foreign power in the East Indies capable of affecting the influence which the English nation has acquired in it. The former were prevented from giving us an immediate or effectual trouble, by their internal distractions, and the inequality of their number to the effect of our discipline; the latter by their want of landed property or any alliance which might supply it. An alliance formed between them would at once relieve all their mutual wants, and afford them all the requisites to dispute with us on equal terms the dominion of the East Indies, which we at present in a degree possess without a rival. By timely provision and a spirited negotiation it may be prevented, but if it be once suffered to take effect by the admittance of a French force into the Marátha State, which may be the work of a few months, all our efforts may prove insufficient to defeat; and the whole empire become the theatre of war between two European nations backed by their respective allies, with the same calamities attending it, which we formerly experienced in the Karnátak, but rendered more dreadful by the superior magnitude of the contest.

Fifth.—We have informed the Peshwa and the Ministers of our intention to send a military force for the defence of the Company's possessions on your side of India; and have desired that they will issue the necessary orders both for their safe passage, and such things as they may require on the march, assuring them that the strictest orders will be given to the commanding officer of this force to conduct himself in every respect in a manner suitable to the peace and friendship which have been established between the Marátha State and ours; and that we are resolved most rigidly to adhere to the letter of the treaty, and to maintain the peace intended by it. These assurances we desire you will cause to be repeated, and that you will make the same requisition for the free passage and assistance to our troops.

Sixth.—While Sakhárám Bápu and Nána Fadanavis continue to hold the administration and adhere literally to the treaty to which they are parties, we recommened and enjoin the same literal adherence to it on your part. This obligation will remain in equal force if a change of Government should take place, and the new members of it shall declare the state to be bound by the treaty, and pledge their own faith to it. But if the present or future members of the administration shall either directly infringe the treaty, or permit it to be infringed by persons acting under their authority, or shall refuse to fulfil the conditions of it, we are authorized by the Company to invest you with authority to form a new alliance with Rághoba, and to engage with him in any scheme which you shall deem expedient and safe for retrieving his affairs. The like authority we have already given you in case of your receiving a formal invitation to that effect from the first Minister Sakhárám Bápu. In our letter of the 2nd February, we at the same time recommended certain advantages, which on such an occasion we were of opinion ought to be required as a compensation for the Company's interposition, but under every circumstance we recommended to you in the most earnest manner to make the establishment of a lasting peace, which can only be effected by good conditions of reciprocal advantage with the Marátha Government, and a total exclusion of the French influence, interest and property from the Marátha Government and country, your sole general objects, as they are ours.

Seventh.—We do not mean, however, to preclude you from any advantages which it may be possible to obtain by negotiation, though we instruct you to be bound by the treaty, in case the new members of the Marátha State shall declare themselves bound by that treaty, and shall pledge their own faith to it. But as a change in the administration at Poona will probably enable you to gain political advantage highly beneficial to the Company and to the general good of the nation, and to amend the defects in our present engagement, we leave it to you to pursue such a policy as circumstances shall require, independent of any particular interests of Rághoba, whom you must regard in the great political objects of our Government as simply meriting our consideration, and not necessarily connected or blended with them.

We are, &c.,

Fort William,
23rd March 1778.

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
E. WHELER.

Bombay Castle, 3rd May 1778.

At a Consultation, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Gevernor.

WILLIAM JOHN CARNAC. | DANIEL DRAPER.
NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE. | WILLIAM ASHBURNER.

ANDREW RAMSAY.

Read and approved our last consultation of the 1st instant.

Also the letter received this morning from the Governor General and Council.

After consideration thereof the first point that appears to be necessary is to take off the restraint we have laid on the march of the troops from Kálpi and to order the Commanding Officer to move forwards. Resolved, therefore, that a letter be immediately despatched to him by different routes desiring him to lose no time in marching forward agreeably to his orders from the Governor General and Council, and that he be directed to give us the most constant and punctual intelligence of his motions and wants, and the particular road he may intend to pursue, that we may afford him every assistance in our power to facilitate his march.

Resolved, also, that a copy of the Bengal letter be sent to Mr. Mostyn for his observation, and that he be acquainted the above is the only resolution we have as yet formed upon it, agreeably to which he must make the necessary application to the Ministers to give the most effectual orders for the safe and unmolested passage of the troops from Bengal, and to furnish them with all requisite supplies.

It appears at present better to defer any further resolutions in consequence of the letter from Bengal till we can form a more certain judgment of their intentions and dispositions towards the Hon'ble Company.

D. DRAPER, AND OTHERS.

Bombay Castle, 15th May 1778.

At a Consultation, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

WILLIAM JOHN CARNAC.	DANIEL DRAPER.
HENRY MOORE.	NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.
WILLIAM ASHBURNER.	ANDREW RAMSAY.

Read and approved our last consultation of the 31st instant.

Met to take into consideration the late letters from Bengal and the advices from Poona, which are accordingly now read.

The letter from Bengal of the 23rd March and our present situation with the Poona Government having been thoroughly considered, the following resolutions are unanimously agreed to:—

First.—Resolved,—That Mr. Mostyn be directed in the name of this Government, and under the authority of the Governor General and Council, to call upon the new administration at Poona to declare expressly whether they consider the Marátha State as bound by the Treaty of Purandhar and whether they will pledge their own faith to it.

Secondly.—Resolved,—That Mr. Mostyn be directed agreeably to the said treaty to demand immediate possession of a country of three lákhs, near or adjoining to Broach, and in case the Ministers shall refuse to comply with the demand, he must declare such refusal to be a violation of the treaty.

In order to avoid any further discussion on this head, it must be signified at once to the Ministers that we are willing to receive in full completion of the 5th article a country that will produce to the Company three lákhs of rupees a year in the gross revenue, without any allowance for the charges of collection.

Thirdly.—Resolved,—That Mr. Mostyn be directed to acquaint the Ministers that the Governor General and Council have directed us to keep possession, and which we shall accordingly do, of the countries ceded to the Hon'ble Company by Fattesing Gáikawár, since they (the Ministers) have failed in producing the proofs required by the treaty that Fattesing Gáikawár did not possess power or authority to make such cessions.

Fourthly.—Resolved,—That Mr. Mostyn be directed to make a remonstrance to the Ministers agreeably to the tenor of the letter from Bengal, against the countenance afforded to the Chevalier de St. Lubin, who, notwithstanding their promises, since the late change in the Government, still continues at Poona; and that he demands from them a clear and satisfactory explanation of their intentions with respect to the French, declaring to them that the Governor General and Council will take such measures according as prudence shall dictate for the future safety of the Company's interests and possessions committed to their cares.

Fifthly.—We have experienced so much equivocation and delay in the members of the Poona Government that we think it necessary, and it is accordingly resolved, in addition to the orders from Bengal, to direct Mr. Mostyn to deliver his demands in writing, and at the same time to acquaint the Ministers we shall expect an immediate and explicit answer likewise in writing; but that if such an answer is not returned within fourteen days, we shall consider any further evasion or delay as a refusal, and take measures accordingly.

The settlement made by Colonel Upton respecting Jambusar, which was agreed to by us, renders it unnecessary to make the second of the demands enjoined by the Governor General and Council; but whenever the Ministers will make good the balance of the twelve lákhs, the sum due in lieu of the country of three lákhs, and the amount due to the concerned in the "Aurora," we shall be ready to restore that province.

As we find by Mr. Mostyn's letters and Lewis's report that there is little chance of procuring from the Ministers the proper orders for the passage and supplies to the Bengal detachment, Mr. Mostyn must be ordered to make a direct application for these purposes to Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia themselves, to whom the President is likewise desired to write, making them at the same time the assurances mentioned in the Bengal letter.

The moment Mr. Mostyn obtains information of Colonel Leslie being on his march, he must send him every information he may judge can be of service, and Colonel Leslie must be directed likewise to correspond with Mr. Mostyn.

The Governor General and Council must be apprized of the difficulty we have met with in procuring passports for their troops, and it must be suggested to them, that if on any future occasion they shall deem it expedient to send us reinforcement, the easiest and best method will be to order troops from Madras and to replace them if necessary with others from Bengal.

In this place it is judged necessary to explain more particularly the reasons for our reluctance on the 3rd instant to take off the restraint we had laid on the march of the Bengal Detachment, and to direct the Commanding Officer to advance to this coast.

When the late change had been effected in the administration at Poona, we at first entertained hopes, that it would have been followed by the admission of Rághoba into a share of the Government, and of course the full performance of our treaty with him, but we more particularly depended that the French influence at the Marátha Darbár would be destroyed by that event. Though we had soon cause to abate in our expectation with respect to Rághoba we still thought the overthrow of the French schemes would render the revolution a circumstance of the highest advantage to the Hon'ble Company, and make the further progress of the Bengal troops unnecessary, as their aid was intended solely to enable us to effect that point, for however much we might be disappointed at the neglect shown to Rághoba by the new administration, we were not authorized to assert his pretensions so long as they continued to observe the late treaty.

Upon these grounds, and for the reasons mentioned in our proceedings of the 22nd ultimo, we judged it most prudent to direct the Commanding Officer of the Bengal Detachment to remain at Kálpi till further orders, but upon receipt of the letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 23rd of March, which more fully explained their views, and gave us authority to demand proper explanations from the Darbár regarding certain points, we at our last consultation resolved to send orders for the Bengal Detachment to advance; which from the nature of the instructions we had received prior to that letter we did not think could answer any end adequate to the expense and danger of the march, for after the plan for restoring Rághoba had miscarried, it was impossible for us to defeat the design of the French without breaking the treaty of Purandhar, which was precisely the substance of their instructions under the 26th of February.

Upon a review of our late advices from Poona, we find too many instances of duplicity in the Darbár to let us doubt but that they still mean to continue the same line of evasive conduct so long pursued by that Government. Mons. de St. Lubin is still permitted to remain at Poona, although his dismission was the very first object of our instructions to Mr. Mostyn after the late change in the administration took place, and he received every satisfaction on that head that promises could give, so long ago as the 10th of that month. Notwithstanding the request then made to him in public Darbár to accompany their Agent to Bombay with proposals respecting Rághoba, we find by his latest letters that they have been only trifling with him, nor have they to his knowledge yet taken one step towards settling the business, or fulfilling the unexecuted articles of the treaty. We now begin to suspect that Moroba means to tread in the

footsteps of his predecessor Nána Fadanavis, and, unwilling to part with any share of his power to Rághoba, may probably seek to secure the whole to himself by the same means. Though the executive power is transferred from Nána to Moroba, the former is still in office and a member of the Darbár; and upon the whole we are fully of opinion that we have no reason to conclude the new administration are favourably disposed towards the Company, and that we can no longer in prejudice take our measures upon that presumption.

Whilst we had the smallest expectation of obtaining better terms, it would have been impolitic in us to have demanded the performance of Colonel Upton's treaty; but that with the orders from the Governor General and Council before us, and considering the late mysterious and evasive conduct of the Darbár, we can no longer defer putting our demands in expectation of proposals from them. By the conduct they observe on this occasion, we shall be able to form a judgment as to the footing we are to be on with the new Government, but the Governor General and Council must be desired to inform us what measures they intend to pursue if the Darbár's answer with respect to their connections with the French should not prove satisfactory, as much will depend upon our being furnished in time with their sentiments and instructions on this head.

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND OTHERS.

Bombay Castle, 2nd June 1778.

At a Consultation, present:

THE HON'BLE WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

WILLIAM JOHN CARNAC.	DANIAL DRAPER.
HENRY MOORE.	NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.
WILLIAM ASHBURNER.	ANDREW RAMSAY.

Read and approved our last consultation of the 22nd ultimo.

Read the advices received from Mr. Mostyn since our last meeting, when the President also lays before us a letter and an extract of a letter to him from that gentleman, both entered hereafter.

Afer the instructions we have given to Mr. Mostyn in consequence of express directions from the Governor General and Council, and after we have advised them of our having actually taken our resolutions conformably thereto, we do not think we are warranted, neither do we judge it expedient, to defer making our demands on the Darbár in expectation of proposals from them. Mr. Mostyn must therefore be directed not to quit Poona, but immediately to take his measures agreeably to the orders contained in our letter to him, dated the 16th ultimo.

If Chinto Vitthal should still choose to come to Bombay, proper orders will be given for a boat and every necessary accommodation being provided for him.

Mr. Mostyn should have insisted on the persons who intercepted the President's letters being exemplarily punished.

A letter to Mr. Mostyn agreeably to the above resolutions is now drawn up and despatched from the Council table.

Read translations of the Portuguese letters obtained by Mr. Mostyn.

Copies thereof must be transmitted to the Governor General and Council.

Resolved,—That a representation be made to the Portuguese Government at Goa and Daman to the following effect:—

That we have reason to believe schemes are concerting between the French and the Poona Government, which have for their objects the annoyance and detriment of the British nation, but that from the alliance and good harmony so happily subsisting between His Most Faithful and His Britannic Majesty we have every reason to hope, and shall rely that the Portuguese will not in any shape interfere or take any measures that may tend to promote the success of the French schemes, which in the end would prove equally subversive of the Portuguese influence in India.

Though we are still in uncertainty with respect to the situation of the Bengal Detachment, and have no advice what route they have pursued, yet we think it highly necessary that the Commanding Officer should have timely instructions whither to direct his march, which point being therefore seriously considered, together with an extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings to the President, which he now lays before us, Surat appears to us in point of situation, accommodation, and every other respect to be the most eligible place, and it is therefore resolved to send directions to Colonel Leslie to direct his march to that city, unless, from circumstances he should think it more expedient, or it should prove more convenient to him to proceed to Broach, in which case he must have a discretional power for that purpose.

The necessary advice and orders must be sent to Colonel Leslie and to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach agreeably to the above resolution: and the latter gentlemen must be directed to spare no pains or expense to open a correspondence with Colonel Leslie, for which purpose as common harkárás may be suspected, it must be suggested to them to employ Bráhmans or other proper persons.

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND OTHERS.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Mostyn to the President.

The remonstrance you have been pleased to direct me to make to the Darbár, I could wish had not been sent. I have advised them it shall be delivered as soon as translated; but for the following reasons I intend to detain it until I can be acquainted with your answer to this letter. First, because the Darbár, to pursue their present plan of amusing you and gaining time to carry their views respecting the French into execution, will undoubtedly promise to comply therewith. Secondly, because it entirely debars us from further expectation either for ourselves or Rághoba, and we may be saddled with him as long as he lives. Thirdly, because the Darbár are amongst themselves much divided, Holkar urging them to bring Rághoba in which Sindia will most likely concur; and also seeing us determined to be no longer trifled with should they be inclined to make any offers worth our acceptance, this remonstrance would certainly put a stop to them. Lastly, because the time fixed for the Darbár to deliver their answer, and by the time it can be transmitted to you, the rains will set in, therefore the delay of a few days can be of no material consequence in case you should still think it proper to be delivered. Therefore I flatter myself you will approve my conduct and speedily favour me with your commands upon it. Excuse me, Sir, for having given my sentiments thus freely, and I have to entreat you will put a favourable construction on them, my only wish being that you should be informed of every thing that can be of any use in your deliberations upon this important matter.

Sindia is advanced within twelve kos of Purandhar. I hourly expect answers from him and Holkar regarding the dastaks; your letters to them you will perceive by the public address, are stopt and carried to Moroba. I have written both Moroba and Holkar about it. By a note from Purandhar this evening I am informed the Darbár have intelligence that the Bengal forces are on the banks of the Narbada, and taking the road for Brampore (Barhánpur?); but as I have had

repeated reports of this, I don't give entire credit to their being advanced so far, as I think I should have heard from them by this time if they were. From Bachoba I learn to-night that the Darbár has written to Mudáji Bhonsla to desire the officer of our troops in a freindly manner to return; and should he want any assistance to advise them (the Darbár); but I am under no apprehensions on his account as I hear he stands well with the Bengal gentlemen. The only danger I think to be apprehended for the army is their want of provisions, from their having no horse with them to forage.

(Signed) T. MOSTYN.

Poona, 28th May 1778.

Letter from Mr. Mostyn to the President.

Hon'ble Sir,—Agreeably to what I wrote you last night this morning both Tombackur and Chinto Vitthal waited on me, when they informed me they were sent on purpose to request I would accompany Chinto Vitthal to Bombay, with some proposals to Rághoba. I made the same objections I had done to the Darbár before, that I did not see any necessity for my going unless the Darbár would explain themselves, particularly after the evasive manner they have behaved with respect to this business. They made me the same answer the Darbár had done, that it was to assure Rághoba of their good intentions towards him. I told him that I considered this as all finesse, only intended to gain time and stop our troops from Bengal advancing, for had they been sincere the Darbár would long since have despatched me, and sent away Mons. St. Lubin, but that I was convinced from the extraordinary attention Moroba and the Darbár had paid him, the former had taken up Nána's plan and entered into the same engagements with Mons. St. Lubin. This they positively denied, though they acknowledged Lubin had made the tender to Moroba, who replied, as long as they were in friendship with the English this Government would not enter into any alliance with any other European nation, and that Moroba absolutely despatched him. I replied that it was very true Mons. St. Lubin had been publicly despatched, but it was only with a view to blind us and perhaps others; that I had in my possession what I esteemed as sufficient proof of my allegation, and produced copy of a letter written by Mons. St. Lubin to the Captain General of Goa by Mons. de Santy, which I luckily this morning procured. They answered it was possible Mons. St. Lubin might have written in that manner, but denied my being able to produce any writing from the Darbár. Upon which I observed it was the art of this Darbár not to give any thing under their hands, that they might have an opportunity of denying it, and that it was for this reason before I could give credit to their having finally despatched Mons. St. Lubin, or promise to proceed to Bombay with Chinto Vitthal, that I insisted on a writing from the Darbár with their seal affixed to the following effect: "That in order to satisfy the English Company, they declared that they had not at present, nor would have so long as they continued in friendship with the English make any treaty with the French or suffer the French to trade in any of their ports", being exactly conformable to the promises made me by Sakhárám Bapu, Nána Fadanavis, Mádhavráv Jadurai and Bahiru Pant, when I was despatched to Bombay by the Darbár in August last. This they promised to deliver me, with a letter for the President, accounting for the Darbár's having kept me here so long; and requested I would send the linguist in company with Tombackur, who returns this evening to camp to bring them, which I consented to. Chinto Vitthal informed me he should set off on the 30th. If the linguist returns with the above papers in time I shall accompany him, otherwise will follow as soon as I receive them, agreeably to the permission the Board have already given me. Enclosed is copy of the letter from Lubin to the Captain General of Goa, men-

tioned above. Mr. Lewis being taken ill, and as I have been much employed in seeing a number of people to-day, I take the liberty to request you will favour me in laying the above before the Board.

Chinto Vitthal informs me he shall be four days in going to Panvel, where he will wait two days for me, by which time I hope you will order a proper boat to carry him over.

I have not been able to procure the written intelligence from B———to-day, but he has promised to send it me in the morning.

I remain, &c.,
THOMAS MOSTYN.

Poona, 28th May 1778, midnight.

Copy of a letter from Mons. St. Lubin to the Captain General of Goa.

The high esteem I have for your Excellency makes me desirous at all times to hear of your good health, and believe that I am even interested in executing your commands.

Mons. Bernardo Picot de La Motte, Governor and Chief of Máhi, in his letter of the 18th February, advises me of having obtained your resolves on all points that he wished respecting the interest of His Most Christian Majesty as well as the proposal which he made to the Supreme Council of His Most Faithful Majesty, for which an acknowledgment is due to your Excellency, and I wish the circumstances were of greater moment, for, then you would have known the excess of my gratitude.

As to the difficulty your Excellency expressed to Mons. Picot about passing the two regiments through your dominions, to be transported to this coast, on account of the alliance subsisting between their Britannic and Most Faithful Majesties, and that your Excellency as well as your Council would not consent thereto without special orders on this point, your Excellency's reasons are very good, but I beg leave to observe in reply that the two regiments aforesaid do not come with any designs to the prejudice of the English, but for motives which I will make known to you by messenger, whom I intend to despatch to you by the end of March with a special commission from His Most Faithful Majesty, which I every moment expect from Pondicherry, and which very matter I have confidentially mentioned to the Chief of Máhi. But should our ships suddenly arrive with instructions to call at your port, I as well as my King expect to be indebted to your Excellency for the attention, consistent with good harmony, to our Chief named Peter Russel, who comes from Pondicherry with instructions for his conduct in treating with your Excellency, and he will hope that you will also give timely orders to the Government of Daman that they may not raise any obstacles or plead in excuse the want of your instructions. In token of my regard I send your Excellency ten pairs of quails, as also a repeating watch, being the work of a new artist, which I have the confidence to hope you will accept, not as a present, but as the tribute of my respect, being desirous to show you how much I am,

Your Excellency's, &c.,
LeCHEVALIER de St. LUBIN.

March 12th, 1778.

Copy of Mons. St. Lubin's letter to the Governor of Daman.

To

The Most Illustrious SEBASTIÃO de AZEVEDOR.

Most Illustrious Sir,—Mons. de Briancourt, Director of His Most Christian Majesty at Surat, in his letter of the 19th January of the present year assures me of having mentioned to you the circumstances which might occasion our cruisers or ships arriving at your port, but you showed repugnance to such a step and declared it not allowable without the special orders of His Most Faithful Majesty, through his Excellency Senhor Captain General de Goa. Without this that you would not consent to any disembarkation exceeding ten men at a time, being agreeably to the rules of your Government. This I allow to be reasonable and proper, as a due obedience ought to be shown to the orders of your Prince, on which account I have written to his Excellency the Captain General to provide against that which Mons. Briancourt meant to do, as you might otherwise on the arrival of the said ships be disagreeably situated. Understand therefore that I am now at this Court for the execution of matters committed to my charge by my Prince which the Captain General will explain to you; but in the interval should any of our cruisers or ships arrive at your port for refreshments and any officers from them should be desirous of passing through your dominions, I trust that you will show them every countenance and assistance in your power; an acknowledgment for which favour is reserved until the time when I shall be made known to you, and trust that you have in me a faithful friend. In testimony of my obligation to you, I send you 6 pairs of quails and a repeating watch made by an able artist, which I hope will prove acceptable, and that you will give me opportunities of showing how much I am,

Sir,
Your, &c.,
LeCHEVALIER de St. LUBIN.

12th March 1778.

Copy of an answer from the Captain General.

I have received your much esteemed favour and heard with great satisfaction of your health. By what has been written to me by the Governor of Máhi, Mons. Bernardo Picot de La Motte, I learn that His Most Christian Majesty had despatched you to the Court at Poona to treat on matters of the greatest weight, and as in what Mons. Picot relates, there are things respecting His Britannic Majesty, and matters that require mature consultation, and on which the Captain General cannot alone resolve, I have, therefore, referred it to the Supreme Council, Dajunta of the State, who determined not to refuse the port to any cruisers, ships or vessels belonging to His Most Christian Majesty to remain for any reasonable time, for such is the orders of my sovereign. As to our dominions becoming free ports for the transportation of troops to this coast, is a matter I cannot permit (the dignity of my sovereign being concerned therein) without special license, and for such being obtained the most urgent reasons must be given, as great consideration will be paid to the appearance of any designs contrary to the interests of Great Britain. We as faithful vassals ought not to concur in any thing which might diminish the firm alliance subsisting between the two crowns. As to the other circumstances which Mons. Picot has advised me, I cannot reply thereto, being ignorant of the just rights of such points. The Prince my master who knows of your despatch has given me instructions in consequence, which shall be executed when it may appear convenient, and for his interest your cruisers or ships may refresh in this port, and the Supreme Council have agreed to their staying 15 days, and the same order is sent to the Governor and Captain General at Daman. I return you thanks

for the honor you did me in the present you sent, and now beg your acceptance of a pair of pistols, three rolls of gold lace and a pair of dogs. I remain ready to execute your orders, being,

Panjim,
27th April 1778.

Yours, &c.,
JOZE PEDRO DE CAMARA.

Answer from the GOVERNOR of DAMAN.

Yours of the 12th March of the present year I received on the 25th of the same month, by which I learn you enjoy good health to my great satisfaction.

I have considered of what you have written me, as also of what I have been before advised of from Mons. de Briancourt, and seriously reflecting on the said points I answer you as follows: The secret and cautious manner of your proceeding to Poona has occasioned much noise and suspicion. As your intentions are still unknown, I should have been much perplexed and embarrassed how to act had any of your ships suddenly arrived at this port. The rules and orders of my King and his representative the Captain General at Goa do not leave me at liberty to take any steps of my own, and as common report declares your designs to be contrary to the interests of His Britannic Majesty, I cannot promise you, without special orders from my Prince, a compliance with the proposal made to me by Mons. Briancourt, which proposal I have transmitted to his Excellency the Captain General. You are not ignorant of the alliance subsisting between my King and his Britannic Majesty, for which reason I cannot consent that your ships of war or other vessels should continue at this Bar for any considerable time. As to affording assistance to any of your officers who may wish to proceed to you, this you may depend on, and of their having my protection. I return you thanks for the present you sent me, and remain with readiness to execute your commands,

Sir,
Yours, &c.,

Daman,
26th March 1778.

SEBASTIÃO DE AZEVEDOR BRITTO.

Translation of a letter from the Chevalier LUBIN to the CAPTAIN GENERAL at GOA.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I Mons. de St. Lubin now proceed to write to your Excellency to enquire after your health, and lay before you the true motives which induce me to request of your Excellency and your Supreme Council leave to bring through your dominions two regiments which were sent by his Most Christian Majesty to the Most High Bráhman Ministers of this Darbár of Poona to put a stop to the disorders resulting from the death of their sovereign, and as the granting this succour redounds to the credit of my King in giving his protection to those who solicit it; and as our own ports are too distant for our cruisers to return in case of accident, should there be occasion so to do, I am obliged thus early to solicit your Excellency and your Supreme Council's leave, until his Most Faithful Majesty shall signify his real commands to you, respecting which we have had conferences with the Prime Minister the Marquis of Pombal, Sebastião Jozé de Carvalho. This being the case, with what I transmitted to your Excellency under the 12th of March, as also the circumstances which I have before particularly related to the Chief of Máhi, Mons. Bernardo Picot de LaMotte, ought to impress you with a true knowledge of me, and your

Excellency is not ignorant of the great friendship subsisting between your Prince and ours. Your Excellency observes that as my arrival was silent and void of all that ceremony and compliment which is due to an Ambassador Extraordinary, much more so to and from His Most Christian Majesty to a Darbár so opulent as that of Poona; and as reported it was chiefly to embroil the affairs of the English, and considering the alliance that subsists between their Majesties of Great Britain and Portugal you could not assent to or grant leave to our troops to pass through your dominions without special decree from your King, and that it was right to explain to me the circumstances that caused the objection. This observation appears very just, but I must observe to your Excellency, that it was necessary, that neither the populace nor some persons of consequence in France should be privy to the motives of my despatch until a distant period; therefore such conduct was necessary to avoid suspicion, and on this account I embarked according to the orders of my sovereign, and came hither in a merchant ship, and the leave I now ask of your Excellency is that, as the season is far advanced, and the ships will not be able to come to Chaul Bar on account of the bad anchorage and insufficiency as a port in the rainy season, that you will permit the said ships to winter in your ports, and transport their troops to this Darbár. As I judge your Excellency will have received the commands of your King on this business, I wish to avoid being prolix on this business, observing only that my stay here will not a little disgust the English, who by every underhand practice (so natural to their genius) are aiming at having me dismissed from this Darbár, but happen what will, I have taken care to effectuate my designs.

The Governor of Daman, Sebastião de Azevedor Britto, has written me as he has done your Excellency, and by the same messenger, as your Excellency will observe by the copy which I enclose. I have only to remark to your Excellency that great is the fortune of the English to have the Portuguese so steady to them, and in faith of this have they (the English) arrived to such a period, that laying aside all respect and right, they have at various times treated the Portuguese nation with the utmost disrespect in India, and this notwithstanding they have shown themselves steady to the English. I do not mention this to your Excellency to revive the past and remind you of the future, only as a reply to your Excellency's observation to me.

Under the 8th April arrived a packet to me from Pondicherry, sent to 'your Excellency from the new Prime Minister of Portugal, and desiring to insure its safe arrival with you, I sent it by my Secretary to your Agent here, asking his receipt for it; he returned it to me with the most frivolous excuses, which I acquaint you of; however it may arrive with you though later.

Mons. de Santy, my Secretary, will acquaint your Excellency minutely the reason of his new proceeding, and the objects he has in view, and will deliver your Excellency the packets and letters for the Governor and Superintendent General for His Most Christian Majesty at Pondicherry, and for your Excellency I beg the utmost expedition from you in forwarding the first, and a favorable reply to mine to your Excellency.

I purpose going in a short time to Daman (in consequence of my orders) to transact matters which alone Santy will acquaint you of. I am prevented doing them effectually unless your Excellency determines and recommends my business to your Chief there. I shall pursue my journey on the return of the person I now send to your Excellency.

The letters I send your Excellency for Mr. Bernardo Picot de LaMotte, Chief of Máhi being of the utmost consequence, I sent to your own particular care, requesting your forwarding them by careful hands. Be assured, excellent Sir, that I shall not fail to acquaint my Prince with the affection and benevolence I have received from your Excellency, and he will thank His Most Faithful Majesty, from whom your Excellency will receive just eulogiums.

Respecting the charge of the ship "Du Surtur," Mons. Vernem has solicited my recommending him and his affairs to your Excellency. I beg you will grant me this favor in his behalf.

The letter, which the first Minister now sends, is sent solely to your Excellency and to lay open his designs; the other, for your Supreme Council, will be separately delivered you by my Secretary. Since your Excellency knows well the cunning and malice of the British nation, and how much they are bent on extirpating me from hence, such being the case, your Excellency should seriously reflect ere you resolve on this business. Notwithstanding fortune has given us a bitter pill in the death of His Most Faithful Majesty Dom Jozé, and of the dismissal of the Marquis of Pombal, for whom I particularly feel, and to whom I have written a separate letter of condolence.

I send to your Excellency a ring with twenty-five diamonds, a snuff-box set with rubies, two pairs of pistols and a set of buckles, which you will accept not as things of worth but as a tribute which my esteem pays you.

I am, &c.,

Poona, 26th April 1778. LeCHEVALIER de St. LUBIN.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings to the President, dated Fort William, 18th March 1778.

On the 23rd of last month orders were issued for forming the detachment intended for your assistance. It will consist of six of our best battalions with their guns, and a company of native artillery with 4 twelve-pounders and two howitzers. I do not know whether any cavalry will be added to it: this I propose to leave to the option of the Commanding Officer, who, I hope, will not want it: the party will form at or near Kálpi. Colonel Leslie will command it, and I hope he will be in readiness to march early in the next month. His route will be through Bundelkhand and Berar, or near the confines of that province, for the greater convenience of receiving supplies of provisions and other assistance, which I expect to be afforded by Mudáji, having written to him for both, and I have many reasons of great weight to believe that he will not disappoint me.

I formerly requested that you would endeavour to obtain from Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holker passports and orders for the subsistence of our troops if they should pass through the province of Málwa. If you have been able to succeed in this application, I beg the favor of you to despatch an express with advice thereof, and with duplicates of the above orders to Colonel Leslie, as he may possibly take that route, it being possible that Mudáji may not consent to let him pass through his dominious, although I think it is now probable. At all events such is the universal disaffection of the Zamíndárs and other petty Chiefs to the Marátha Government, that I know they will all gladly afford their assistance to our detachment and even solicit its march through their lands. The only assistance that we require from them is provisions, and this is the only article in which the Maráthás can distress us; but to effect this, they must lay waste the country within many miles of our line of march, and of course lose so much of their own revenues, which we may be sure neither Mudáji nor Tukoji will consent to for the sake of the present administration, having never manifested such attachment to it, or indeed to any other princes but their own interest. The ambassador of Mudáji and of the Rája of Jeynagar and Bundelkhand are with me; the first indeed has lately taken leave to go to Benares, where he may be of essential service.

I will not lengthen my letter by enumerating all the recourses which I depend upon for the security of our detachment. I beg, Sir, that you will rest perfectly satisfied on this head. I will engage to provide for its safety and easy progress at least to the frontier of the Deccan; nor

have I a doubt of its accomplishing the remainder of the route, but in that it will require your assistance, as it will be guided by your orders in the line which it will have to follow, whether it be to Poona, Bombay, Broach, or to any other quarter.

Bombay Castle, 27th September 1778.

Received the following letter from the Governor General and Council:—

"Gentlemen,—We have received your letters, dated 25th ultimo, by the "Terrible".

That no time may be lost in conveying our sentiments to you, we send this by different routes to acquaint you that we approve your resolution of the 21st July, and authorize you to assist Rághoba with a military force to conduct him to Poona, and to establish him in the Regency there on the following express provision:—

First.—That it does not interfere with any engagement formed with Mudáji Bhonsla by Mr. Elliott, and previously noticed to you by him.

Second.—That your latest advices from Europe shall be equal to an assurance that the force required for this service may be spared without endangering the safety of Bombay in the event of a French invasion.

Third.—That the engagement you may form with Rághoba himself, or Moroba and his associates, be not contrary to those concluded with Mudáji by Mr. Elliott, and noticed to you, nor of a hostile tendency to the Government of Berár.

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.
R. BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
E. WHELER.

Fort William, 17th August 1778."

Bombay Castle, Monday, 12th October 1778.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble W. Hornby, President and Governor.
John Carnac. | Colonel C. Egerton.
Daniel Draper.

Read and approved the minutes of our last meeting on the 28th ultimo.

The Committee being assembled Mr. Carnac delivers in the following minute:—

"Mr. Carnac is sorry to observe, that although we had by an unanimous vote pronounced the treaty of Purandhar to have been infringed in almost every article, not a single step has yet been taken in prosecution of our resolutions of the 21st July, to avail ourselves of the opportunity afforded by the distractions in the Bráhman Ministry, to exclude Nána from any share in the Peshwa Government, who ever since he has had the lead thereat, has been incessantly plotting mischief against us, and to invest in his room, during the minority of the Peshwa, Raghunáthráv with the chief administration of the Marátha State, to which he has the fairest claim, and whose pretensions, good policy requires us to support, on account of the close connexion we have had with him, and of his known favourable disposition towards us. The times will not admit of further delay; and if we do not soon openly espouse the cause of Raghunáthráv, there is great danger that the happy moment for establishing his authority, so essential to our welfare, will be irrecoverably lost. It is not to be questioned that the French have

been invited to Chaul by Nána, and should he be joined by four or five hundred men of that nation (which it may be expected will be the case) it is to be apprehended he will with their aid acquire such a preponderancy in the government, as to be able to baffle our utmost efforts, and perhaps to usurp the dignity of Peshwa. The degree of power Nána actually possesses is already so considerable, that if he be suffered to retain it, the most serious evils must ensue to the Company from his avowed enmity to the English, and the French will be admitted to the exclusive trade and intercourse with the Maráthás, which by a timely exertion we might have secured, and without which our possessions on this side of India are scarcely worth our holding. Mr. Carnac entertaining these sentiments, is inclined to believe we were warranted, by the most urgent plea of necessity in behalf of the Company's interests, to give our most strenuous assistance to procure for Raghunáthráv the office of Regent, even independently of the Governor General and Council; how much more then must it be incumbent upon us so to do, when we have their express sanction of the measure; especially as in the present state of affairs there is no risk likely to be incurred by the settlement during the short time the troops may be supposed to be employed in effecting this service. He does not conceive we ought to be deterred from our purpose, as it has been argued we should, by the paragraphs in the Governor General and Council's letter to us, dated 17th August, respecting any engagements formed with Mudáji Bhonsla by Mr. Elliott, and previous notice to us given. By a strict attention to the words, and to the contexts, nothing more seems to be meant than that we should enter into no final engagements with Raghunáthráv, which may be contrary to such as shall be concluded with or of a hostile tendency to the Government of Berár. If the letter is to be understood as containing a direction that we are absolutely to undertake nothing till we have advices from Mr. Elliott of the nature of progress and result of his commission with the Bhonsla, it would be tantamount to a prohibition of the expedition we had meditated, and which they have approved, by suspending it to so distant a period as to leave us little or no hopes of success.

It will be proper here to remark that there is no reason to believe Moroba's party is so depressed, but that in conjunction with the other favourers of Rághoba, they may render us material service in the execution of our plan; however, at all events Mr. Carnac deems it an indispensable duty to use every endeavour to anticipate, if possible, the French in so important a point as their having the prevailing influence at the Marátha Darbár.

Our conduct must appear strongly inconsistent to our hon'ble employers, if, after having so earnestly and repeatedly lamented to them, as we have done, our misfortune in being precluded by the controlling power of the Bengal Government from taking advantage of these lucky circumstances, which have occurred, we should now remain wholly inactive, when that Government has given us a full latitude to act, and has provided us with the necessary resources to do it with vigor and with effect."

The subject of this minute being taken under consideration, it is thought necessary before we come to any resolution to consult Mr. Mostyn on some points; who attending accordingly, the subject of debate was communicated, and the necessary papers being read to him, he delivers himself as follows:—

"If the Committee are determined to take any measures of placing Rághoba in the Regency of the Poona Government it evidently appears to me the sooner it is undertaken the better. The less opposition you will meet with, the greater certainty of success, of which, indeed, I have not in my own mind the least doubt, and I do not con-

ceive there can offer a more favorable crisis than the present, and for the following reasons :—

First.—The army is at present dispersed, and though this is the time for their beginning to join, it will be at least six weeks before they are assembled; and even then I do not suppose a man will move until they are in some measure satisfied for the arrears due to them (now three years, except a few partial payments), and the advance of a further sum for the ensuing season, which is usually two months' pay. This, it is well known, the Government is in no capacity to do, and the disunion amongst the party now in power, particularly Sakhárám Bápu and Nána, which you, gentlemen, are well acquainted with, will prevent their adopting any effectual means to remove this difficulty. They will not advance any money themselves, none but Nána is indeed able to do it, and no one else while their dissensions continue will lend.

Secondly.—Another very material reason why it should be deferred as little as possible is that Holkar with several other Marátha officers, now adherents of Moroba, will naturally conclude (if you let slip this opportunity) that you have quite given up Rághoba's cause, and be under the necessity for their future support and security to take part with Nána. It may occur to you, gentlemen, that Moroba being under some restraint in Ahmadnagar, little assistance can be expected from him; but I have reason to believe, and from pretty good information, that whenever he is convinced you are determined to espouse Rághoba's cause, and are landed on the continent, he can easily effect his enlargement and join you on the other side of the Gháts with his friends.

Thirdly.—That with respect to the distance of Colonel Leslie's detachment, though it might be of more utility if nearer, yet I am of opinion they in their present situation render material service by keeping Mahádji Sindia (in the neighbourhood of whose capital they now are) in awe, should he be inclined to oppose us; but this I think from his known character he will not venture to do, when he finds a respectable English army along with Rághoba, but be one of the first to make his submission, not only from the immediate danger he will apprehend on account of Colonel Leslie's army, but in future, from his knowledge of the influence the English have over the king, which might deprive him totally of his jághír north of the Narbada; and the sooner you begin the speedier, in my humble opinion, will Colonel Leslie be able to advance, as it will no doubt put an immediate stop to the opposition and delay he has and will otherwise continue to meet with.

Fourthly.—But what appears to me the most weighty reason of all is, that by any further delay, the danger there is of the French gaining an influence at the Marátha Court, which I took the liberty to mention under 21st July, and which is fully stated by Mr. Carnac; and I can assure you Nána will spare neither pains nor expense to procure assistance from them, in which case I much fear it will render any future attempt very hazardous, if not wholly impracticable.

As you have been pleased to favor me with the perusal of the Governor General and Council's letter of the 17th of August, it is my duty to inform you, from what knowledge I have of the Marátha Government, I do not apprehend any engagements you may have with Raghoba can interfere with the treaty Mr. Elliott may enter into with Mudáji in the Rájáship. They are both Ministers of the Rája and their governments entirely distinct; however, to prevent a possibility of the two treaties clashing, an article may be inserted in yours with Rághoba to provide against it."

On full consideration of all circumstances it is resolved by a majority of the Committee, Mr. Draper only dissenting thereto, that we forthwith carry into execution the plan agreed to under the 21st of July last for conducting Rághoba to Poona and placing him in the Regency during the minority of the young Peshwa, and that the necessary measures for that purpose be undertaken as soon as possible.

Mr. Draper acquaints us that he will deliver his reasons in writing for dissenting to the above resolution.

Directions must be sent to the Chief at Surat to do everything in his power to prevent any correspondence being carried on between Mons. Briancourt, the French Consul, and the Poona Government, and to use his endeavours to intercept their letters.

W. HORNBY.
J. CARNAC.
C. EGERTON.
D. DRAPER.

Copy of a letter from the French *at Pondicherry to the* Peshwa.

I have been favoured with your letter together with one from Nána Fadanavis and another from Hari Pant, saying I should commence a war with the English nation, and to grant you an assistance of money and force which has given me satisfaction, and I have in consequence and in the manner you ordered me, begun the war. I am ready to obey you with all my heart. You will know all the particulars by the letters of Nána Fadanavis and Hari Pant. What more can I say?

Translate of a letter from the French *at Pondicherry to* Nána Fadanavis.

I have received your friendly letter with one from the Peshwa, saying I should commence a war with the English nation; that the Sarkár of the Peshwa will assist me with money and an army, and after the war with the English was over a factory shall be settled at Poona. You have in your said letter made many proposals to me by which I have great profit, but I defer answering them till a proper time, and now write you what is necessary. You have acquainted me that the English nation have violated their faith; that they are troublesome, and occasion disturbances, and that Mr. Mostyn, a Vakil of Bombay, is the cause of the troubles. You have also written me that their affording protection to Raghunáthráv Dáda never fails to create troubles; that if I will assist you immediately in this business you will get me paid rupees twenty lákhs from the Sarkár of the Peshwa directly, and when I go against Bombay that you will assist me with twenty lákhs of rupees and ten vessels armed with sepoys. I have agreeably to the Peshwa's orders and your advice now commenced a war, and have daily engagements with the English army that is come from Madras against this place. We are firing shot on both sides, all which your Sarkár's harkárás have seen; as also that we have destroyed three grabs; the four ships which lie in deep water we shall, please God, also destroy; it is right that you keep your word and agreements. You may reckon that we shall reach Bombay after the trouble at this place is over.

The same to Hari Pant Fadkia, with the following addition: You will explain to Nána Fadanavis all that I have written you and send me his answer, with the money that is agreed, and after I have finished the present business, will come your way.

Bombay Castle, 26th October 1778.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

J. Carnac. | Col. C. Egerton.

Daniel Draper.

The consideration of the force to be detached on the intended service being now resumed, returns and statements of the troops are laid before us, which not appearing sufficiently clear and distinct, the Colonel is desired to order the proper officers immediately to prepare a correct statement and disposition of the forces under this Presidency when this point will be settled.

Mr. Mostyn called in.

In reply to the reasons alleged by Mr. Draper for dissenting from the resolution of the Committee under the 12th instant, the other members who concurred therein have only to observe, that in their opinion the success of the measure determined on, the absolute necessity of which Mr. Draper admits, depends upon its being immediately undertaken; and that the execution will become much more difficult, if not altogether impracticable, by being suspended to so distant a period as that gentleman proposes. It is certain that very advantageous offers have been made by Nána through Mons. Lubin to the French nation, in order to engage their assistance in support of his usurped authority; and if a junction of their forces with him be once effected, they will acquire so predominant an influence at the Poona Darbár, as will occasion a perpetual warfare between the Maráthás and us, whereby the Company's possessions on the western side of India must be rendered insecure and unprofitable; they therefore deem themselves bound in duty to their hon'ble Masters to prevent (if possible) an incident so ruinous to their interests, by a timely interposition of the only resource that is left, namely, to take advantage of the present divisions amongst the Bráhman Ministers to establish Raghunáthráv in the Regency, and to assist him with as considerable a part of our force as we can spare for that purpose. Although it is near two months since we had the first advice from the Governor General and Council of their having deputed Mr. Elliot on an important embassy to the Government of Berar, we have had as yet no information whatever of or from him, and it is hard to guess when we may. But it is no way likely the degree of support we mean to give Raghunáthráv can be at all effected by any negotiations that may be concluded with Mudáji, for even supposing it should be recommended to him to assert his pretensions to the Rájáship of Sátára, and that he should in consequence assume that dignity, most probably he would continue the first Pradhan Government, taking care to reduce them to their original subjection to the Rája, and the sovereignty being in the person of Mudáji, who is in friendship with the Bengal Administration, it would perhaps be more for the general interest that the Asht Pradhan or council of eight should be dependent.

The Secretary now lays before us a draft of the letter from Rághoba to the principal Marátha officers to be circulated on his landing on the continent, which being approved is ordered to be explained to Rághoba, and if approved by him, a proper number of copies must be made in the country language and the Company's seal and Rághoba's private seal affixed to them.

The propriety of communicating our plan to Rághoba being now considered, it is resolved to defer it till we receive an answer from Surat about the coolies we have written for, which may be daily expected, as we can be at no certainty when the army can move till we have secured a proper number of coolies, and it is of the utmost importance to keep our intentions secret.

Mr. Mostyn acquaints us he hopes he shall be able to find means of getting two or three hundred pack bullocks ready at Panvel, and he is desired as custom master to deliver an account of the Hamals and Kámáthis that can be procured on this island.

Mr. Lewis must be advised in cypher of the scheme we have in agitation, and be directed to hold himself in readiness to quit Poona on the first warning. He must endeavour to send away his papers, and as many of his sepoys as he can, and if he should at last find it necessary he must be permitted to take the protection of Tukoji Holkar, who is now encamped near Poona with a considerable body of troops, and we have the strongest expectations will declare for Rághoba the moment it appears we have entered heartily into his cause.

W. HORNBY.
J. CARNAC.
C. EGERTON.
D. DRAPER.

Instructions to Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

SIR,—Having judged it expedient to send a body of forces into the field to conduct Rághoba to Poona and to establish him in the Marátha Empire, we direct that you take upon you the command of the said forces, observing for the present the following instructions :—

When the troops and stores are embarked in the boats provided for that purpose, you are to proceed to the fort of Belápur on the Marátha shore. Your first step must be to take possession of the fort, which must be done in the name of Raghunáthráv, and we imagine will be effected without any opposition, and to secure it with a proper garrison for the lodgment of your stores.

After Belápur is secured you will move the army to Panvel, when you will receive further instructions from us.

Captain Stewart has been already detached by the way of Apta with a division of the army to secure Bor Ghát, and you will afford him such further support or assistance as may be necessary.

Several manifestoes are herewith delivered which you will dispense on your landing, and make it generally known that our forces are not sent with any hostile intentions, except to those who may oppose them or quit their habitations.

We doubt not but you will cause the strictest discipline and regularity to be observed by the army, and do your utmost to prevent all plundering, and for the better preservation of discipline we now enclose a commission empowering you to appoint and confirm General Court Martial and wishing you all possible success in your operations.

We are, Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,

Bombay Castle,
23rd November 1778.

WILLIAM HORNBY.
JOHN CARNAC.
C. W. EGERTON.

In the evening of 27th November 1778 Messrs. Carnac and Draper, the President being indisposed, waited upon Rághoba, accompanied by Mr. Mostyn, when the treaty was exchanged in form and a royal salute was fired from Rághoba's artillery.

Rághoba then acquainted the Committee that the orders to the officers of the several places ceded to the Hon'ble Company should be delivered as soon as they could be got ready, and to-morrow noon being mutually settled for his public visit, the Committee took their leave.

On their preparing to depart, presents were brought in, according to the custom of the country, of money and dresses, which the Committee were very earnest to decline, telling Rághoba it was against law and the orders of the Great Council of the Nation to accept presents of any kind, but Rághoba urging that a public refusal would be the greatest indignity and discredit him much in the eye of his own officers, the Committee at last agreed to receive for the benefit of the Company the present intended for them, when one hundred gold mohurs were presented to Mr. Carnac, seventy-five to Mr. Draper and fifty to Mr. Mostyn, with articles to make a suit of clothes for each in the European fashion, all of which were accordingly delivered into the Hon'ble Company's treasury as their property.

Rághoba met the Select Committee at the Governor's house to take leave, when he was treated with every demonstration of respect, and a proper present made to him and his principal officers in the name of the Hon'ble Company.

When he took leave he expressed the utmost satisfaction at the friendship and attachment shown them by this Government, and promised, if he met with success, to be ever a firm friend and ally to the Hon'ble Company, and always to promote their interest to the utmost in his power.

TREATY WITH RA'GHOBA, 1778.

Rághoba's Sicca.

Company's Seal.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor, and the Select Committee of Bombay, on the part and behalf of the Hon'ble United English East India Company on the one part, and Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán on the other part. Done and concluded at Bombay, this 24th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1778, and on the 3rd day of Jeelend Sookhursun Tessah Subein Mia-wa-Alluff, or year 1179, Mahomedan style; or according to the Gentoo era, the 5th day of Márgashirsha Shuddh, in the year 1700.

Article I.

The treaty concluded by Colonel Upton with Sakhárám Pandit and Báláji Pandit, Ministers in behalf of the Peshwa and the Marátha State, having been violated by those Ministers in almost every article, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, with the sanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree, in behalf of the said Hon'ble Company, to assist Raghunáthráv Pradhán to the utmost of their power to put him in possession of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Marátha Empire during the

minority of Mádhavráv Náráyan, the infant Peshwa, hereby declaring that the true intent and meaning of this treaty is not to alter the form of government, or to interrupt the peace between the Hon'ble Company and the Marátha State, but only to remove the administration out of the present improper hands, and to place in the Regency the person who has the justest title to that office.

ARTICLE II.

Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán on his part doth hereby engage and agree to accept the office of Regent, which he is to exercise with full power during the minority of the Peshwa Mádhavráv Náráyan, in whose name he further engages to continue the sicca and conduct the government. But Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán having expressed his doubts of the legitimacy of the Peshwa, Mádhavráv Náráyan, the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby engage, on Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán's strong solicitation, to request explicit orders from the Company, whether, in case he should prove to their satisfaction that the child is supposititious, they will place him in the Peshwaship, which, on such proof, will be his unquestionable right; and whether, in case the child should prove to be really the son of Náráyanráv, they will guarantee him an equal division of the government and country on the Peshwa's attaining to the age of seventeen, agreeably to what Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán says he is entitled to by his birth-right according to the Gentoo law.

ARTICLE III.

The Governor and Select Committee of Bombay do hereby stipulate, and Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán for their satisfaction and that his upright intentions may appear manifest, doth hereby engage and agree, that the person of the Peshwa Mádhavráv Náráyan shall be kept under the charge and custody of such persons as may be agreeable to the Select Committee, who wish that the child may be committed to the charge of Párvatibái, if she will undertake the charge; and, in such case, the Matchy of Purandhar, where the child is kept, must be guarded with a party of the Company's troops, and Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán may keep a chauki on the outside of the gate to see that no improper persons be admitted; but no person whatever must have admittance to the child's presence without the permission of Párvatibái. In case Párvatibái should refuse to undertake the charge, the child shall be put under the care of any of his relations on the mother's side; but should all these decline the trust, the child shall then be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed most advisable for his security and for the honor of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE IV.

Moroba Fadanavis, Bachoba Purandhare and Tukoji Holkar having invited Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán, to take upon himself the Government as Regent and promised their assistance, Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth hereby engage, upon condition of their performing their promises to his and the Select Committee's satisfaction and behaving like faithful obedient servants, that he will show favour to them, according to their ranks and services, in settling the offices of government, and that their persons and fortunes shall be unmolested.

ARTICLE V.

The Governor and Select Committee engage not to interfere in the appointment or nomination of the officers to the forts, army, artillery or revenues, or in the management of the government, provided nothing be done in breach of any of the articles of the present treaty, Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán on his part faithfully promising to observe the terms mentioned in the circular letter with respect to the personal safety of those who he may be of opinion have injured him.

Article VI.

In consideration of the assistance to be afforded by the Hon'ble Company for placing Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán in the Regency at Poona, Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth hereby engage to confirm and ratify the former treaty concluded with him at Surat, the 6th March 1775, and to cede and make over to the Hon'ble Company for ever the several places and territories granted by the said treaty, which were restored by the treaty of Purandhar and Bassein and its districts, and the island of Kennery, which were not put in possession of the Company. The several acquisitions which will devolve to the Hon'ble Company by virtue of this article are as follow:—

Bassein, fort and town, and the whole of its districts and dependencies, in their fullest extent, according to the just and fixed boundaries of that province.

Jambusar and Orpád, in the same full and ample manner as ceded by the treaty of Surat.

The Island of Kennery.

An assignment upon the Pargana of Occlaseer (Ankleshvar) for the sum of Rs. 75,000 per annum, as settled by the 8th Article of the Treaty of Surat.

There being also some small places, known by the name of the Antgoms, always annexed, and actually making a part of the district of Sálsette, which have been withheld from the Company by the Poona Ministers, Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth hereby engage and agree that the said Antgoms shall be ceded to the Hon'ble Company; but although the Governor and Select Committee have ever understood that the Antgoms made a part of the district of Sálsette, yet, if the contrary should be made plainly to appear, they will give up their claim.

Article VII.

In addition to the several grants and cessions hereinabove specified, Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth hereby engage and promise to cede and make over for ever the parganás of Ahmood and Hansoot, which grants are to be considered as an instance of his goodwill and affection to the Hon'ble Company, the conditions upon which they were formerly granted not having, as he declares, been fulfilled.

Article VIII.

All the places herein ceded to the Hon'ble Company are to be considered as their sole right and property from the day this treaty is executed, without any claim of chauth to the Marátha Government or any other demand whatever, and may be taken possession of by the Company's people whenever they may think proper; for which purpose Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth, with these presents, deliver the necessary orders to the Marátha officers to surrender the said places. Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth further promise and engage that, immediately after his taking charge of the Regency of Poona he will execute and deliver to the Government of Bombay regular sanads, under the Peshwa's sicca, for the several cessions granted to the Hon'ble Company by this treaty.

Article IX.

Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán engages to pay and make good the charges and expenses of the army and stores with which he is now to be assisted, which he hereby faithfully promises to make good in ready money as soon as the situation of his affairs will possibly permit; and for the further security of the Hon'ble Company, he, by these presents, assigns over the pargana of Versaul and the remainder of Occlaseer, the revenues of which are to be collected by his Amaldárs and paid to the Hon'ble Company, till the amount due for the expenses of the army is fully discharged; but in case of failure herein, these parganas are to

be put in possession of the Company and the revenues collected by them till the said amount is fully discharged, when all right and title thereto, on the part of the Hon'ble Company, will be relinquished: or if Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán regularly pays the monthly sum stipulated in the next article, the Hon'ble Company will not interfere with the said parganás.

ARTICLE X.

Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán engages to pay in full for the body of forces, consisting of four thousand men, with which he is to be assisted, the sum of two lákhs and a half of rupees per month, which the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay agree to accept, without further account in full of every expense attending the army, and is to commence from the day the forces leave Bombay.

ARTICLE XI.

Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán faithfully promises and engages to discharge his present debt to the Company as soon as the state of his finances will admit, agreeably to an account which will be delivered to him.

ARTICLE XII.

The English forces are to continue with Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán until the object of this treaty is accomplished, which is to place him in the Regency at Poona, and when that is effected, they are to be at liberty to return to Bombay. The Company will be at all times ready to assist Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán with their forces so far as may be consistent with their other engagements, or the situation of their own affairs will permit.

ARTICLE XIII.

The several treaties and agreements subsisting between the Government of Bombay and the Marátha Government are hereby ratified and confirmed, and shall be held and continued in as full force as when they were first concluded, unless otherwise provided for in this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

After the establishment of Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán in the Regency at Poona there shall be a firm peace and alliance between the Hon'ble Company and the Marátha Government. Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán engages never to assist the enemies or molest the dominion of the Company in any part of India, nor to make war or commit depredations in the Karnátak, or any other part of the dominions of their ally the Naváb of Arcot. The Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, in like manner, engage, in behalf of the Hon'ble Company, not to assist the enemies of Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán.

ARTICLE XV.

Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhan hereby engages and agrees that no European settlements shall be allowed to be made on the maritime coasts or in any other part of the Marátha dominions without the consent of the Company or of their representatives being previously obtained, and that no manner of intercourse or connection shall be maintained between the Marátha Government and the French nation; any failure in which stipulation will be considered as a breach of the alliance between the Marátha Government and the Hon'ble Company.

Article XVI.

Raghunátráv Bájiráv Pradhán doth hereby stipulate and engage that the English shall enjoy all their former privileges and freedom of trade in the Marátha dominions without interruptions; and he further engages to give all possible encouragement to the Hon'ble Company's trade, and to promote, as far as he can, an exclusive vend to the English for European commodities in the Marátha dominions; but the Hon'ble Company will make no settlement therein without permission from Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán.

Article XVII.

If any article of the present treaty should interfere with any engagement formed by the Governor General and Council not yet known to the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, such article may be liable to be altered or amended as may be necessary.

The foregoing articles having been mutually agreed to by the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, on the part of the Hon'ble Company and Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán, the contracting parties have interchangeably affixed their hands and the seal of the Hon'ble Company, in Bombay Castle, the day and year above written.

WILLIAM HORNBY.
JOHN CARNAC.
DANIEL DRAPER.

The Diary and Proceedings of John Carnac, *Esq., Colonel* Charles Egerton *and* Thomas Mostyn, *Esq., appointed by the Hon'ble the President and Select Committee of Bombay a Committee to accompany Raghunáthráv to Poona, commencing the 7th of December 1778.*

Monday, 7th.—A packet from the Hon'ble the Select Committee directed to John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles and Thomas Mostyn, Esq., the Committee proceeding to Poona, having this day been delivered to Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn, they embarked on board the yacht for Panvel, in order to meet Rághoba and proceed with him from thence to join the army under the command of Colonel Egerton, now on its march towards the Bor Ghát.

Tuesday, 8th.—Landed at Panvel at 6 a.m. and hearing that Raghunáthráv had passed that place on his way from Kalyán determined also to proceed with the utmost expedition. The want of bullocks, &c., for the transport of our baggage prevents our setting out this day; but expecting a supply from the Commissary of the army I hope to be able to proceed early to-morrow. Learnt that the army was last night at Chauk. The inhabitants of Panvel had mostly deserted with their effects.

Wednesday, 9th.—Proceeded to Burwa; where finding that Raghunáthráv was up in the Fort of Purbull, where he had been three days, sent him a message acquainting him of our arrival. He sent word in return that he should come down to-morrow morning; that Amrutráv with all his baggage, guns, &c., was ordered to march from Panvel to Burwa, and when they arrived he would accompany us to the army.

At 8 p.m. received a letter from Amrutráv directed to Mr. Carnac, wherein he informed him he had his father's orders to march and join him at Panvel, but the want of bullocks for the transport of his baggage had prevented him; that the bullocks which he had hired had been taken for our army; that he was endeavouring to procure others, and would march to join him to-morrow morning. A village near the fort of Purbull (Prabal) deserted.

Thursday, 10th.—Chinto Vitthal waited on us, and acquainted us in the name of Raghunáthráv, that he requested we would remain at Burwa this day; that to-morrow he would certainly come down and settle with us about proceeding to the army. Though our present delays do not appear in the least to retard the march of the army, yet in pursuance to the injunctions of the Hon'ble the Select Committee, to expedite as much as possible our march to Poona, it was thought fit to avail ourselves of this opportunity to urge to Raghunáthráv the necessity of this point; and therefore a letter was written by Mr. Carnac in return to this message, acquainting him, that from his message of yesterday, it was hoped he would have come down this morning, and therefore that he (Mr. Carnac) had proposed to proceed to Chauk this afternoon; but that in consequence of his message by Chinto Vitthal, that he would certainly come down to-morrow, and desiring he would wait till then, he had determined to remain where he was, but earnestly entreated he would lose no time as his affairs required the utmost despatch; and any further delays might be attended with inconvenience by giving his enemies time to strengthen themselves, that he therefore depended on having the pleasure of seeing him to-morrow morning. This afternoon Amrutráv came from Panvel on a visit. The receipt of his letter was mentioned to him, and he was desired to be quick in forwarding baggage of his father Raghunáthráv from Panvel. He said it would be here to-morrow, and that he should return instantly for that purpose.

Friday, 11th.—At about 1 P.M. Ragunáthráv came to visit us. After previous complimentary discourse, the utility of his speedy appearance above the Gháts being represented to him, he acquiesced therein; and it was settled that as soon as Amrutráv had joined him, he would proceed directly with us to Khandála, and there remain till the army and heavy baggage had come up, and act in pursuance to the advice we might give him relating to the main point of reaching Poona. He desired we should proceed on to Kalipore, where he would follow us to-morrow with Amrutráv, whom he expected at Burwa this morning. In consequence of this we determined to proceed on to Chauk on our way to Kalipore. Arrived there in the evening, and found it almost deserted. Many complaints made of our sepoys plundering.

Saturday, 12th.—At About 2 P.M. decamped from Chauk, where Raghunáthráv had just arrived and proceeded on to Kalipore. At half-past 10 at night a message came from Raghunáthráv informing us that some of his cannon and heavy baggage not being come up would prevent him from proceeding on to Kalipore to-morrow. Kalipore chiefly deserted, and complaints brought of our sepoys plundering.

Sunday, 13th.—This morning intelligence was received that Raghurám of Bambory, Tapkeer and Bandy left Poona last Monday with 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot in order to come down Dew Ghát towards Tully Gonsalah, which is about 12 kos to the southward of Bor Ghát. As it seems probable the enemies of Raghunáth, if they mean to act with vigour, should advance a body of men into the Konkan, as well to distress us for provisions on our march by cutting off our communication with Panvel, as to endeavour to seize the person of Raghunáthráv, whom they may have heard has not yet joined our army, we think it necessary to apprise him of this intelligence, and desire he will immediately move forward to the army at Kampoli. We also think it necessary that Colonel Egerton should be acquainted with the receipt of this intelligence, and to direct Lieutenant Harvey at Panvel to be on his guard and to have boats ready for shipping off our stores at a moment's warning:—

"From

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire;

To

RAGHUNÁTHRÁV.

I received your message last night acquainting me that some of your heavy cannon being still behind you should not be able to leave Chauk this day, and requested I would therefore remain at Kalipore till you could join me.

It is very necessary to inform you, that I this morning received intelligence that Raghunáthráv of Bambory with 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot, together with Tapkeer and Bandy, left Poona on Monday last with an intention of coming down Dev Ghát into the Konkan. As your personal safety is the first thing that must be attended to by your friends, I must take the liberty to advise you to secure it, by joining the English army at Kampoli as soon as possible. In full confidence that you will follow my advice, I shall immediately proceed to that place, and hope at farthest to have the pleasure of seeing you there to-morrow.

J. CARNAC.

Kalipore, 13th December 1778.

"To

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON,

Commander-in-Chief of the English Forces,

Kampoli.

Sir,—Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn have directed me to acquaint you, that intelligence has been received this morning of the march of 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot from Poona, on Monday last, with the intention of coming down Dev Ghát towards Gonsalah, about 12 kos to the southward of Bor Ghát. If the enemies of Raghunáthráv mean to oppose him with vigour, it seems probable that they should advance a body of men into the Konkan; and, therefore, they have thought it requisite to apprise you of this intelligence having been received that you may take such measures in consequence as may appear to you expedient.

They farther direct me to inform you that they mean to proceed from hence this day towards Kampoli; and that they hope to be able to join you with Raghunáthráv to-morrow, or next day at farthest.

H. G. FARMER,
Secretary to the Committee.

Kalipore, 13th December 1778."

"To

Lieutenant HARVEY,

At Panvel.

Sir,—Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn have directed me to acquaint you that intelligence has been received of the march of a body of troops from Poona towards the Konkan; and they have thought fit to advise you of this, that you may be on your guard, and have boats in readiness to transport to Bellipore the detachment with you, and such stores as may be at Panvel. Should not the armed boat, which you mentioned to them while at Panvel, have yet been sent you, you will please immediately forward a copy of this letter to Bombay, as an instance of the expediency of its being sent forthwith.

W. G. FARMER,

Secretary to the Committee.

Kalipore, 13th December 1778."

At six in the evening arrived at Tope near the village of Hull, about 3 miles from Kampoli. The inhabitants of the village all fled.

No answer being yet received from Raghunáthráv to the letter addressed him by Mr. Carnac, and contrary to our hopes no appearance of his advancing this evening near to our army under Colonel Egerton, the following reflections occur on the retardment that seems studiously to have been made of his junction with our forces. There is no point which his enemies have so studiously aimed at as to possess themselves of his person for many evident motives. In the situation which Nána Fadanavis appears to be, to us it seems probable that he would attempt this as his last and most certain resource for retaining the government, and for defeating the hopes of the party that may be formed in favour of Raghunáthráv. It seems beyond a doubt that he receives certain intelligence of everything that passes relative to Raghunáth, and perhaps some of the persons in his confidence may be engaged with Nána Fadanavis to embrace any opportunity to seize and carry him off. It must be owned, that if the conduct of Raghunáthráv has been regulated by such treacherous advisers, it concurs strongly with other circumstances to warrant the supposition that a design is formed for seizing him. He was first led to Kalyán, then to the Fort of Purbull (Prabal), where he remained four days; when he came down he promised to leave his heavy baggage behind him and proceed directly to our army. This was almost a proposal of his own. The next day he sent word that one of his heavy cannon being retarded he should remain at Chowke a day longer; and now, notwithstanding the advice that was this day sent him, he still remains at Chowke, which is at least eleven miles from our army at Kampoli—a distance that renders it impracticable to afford a timely aid, should any design be formed by his enemies to possess themselves of his person. These several circumstances concurring with the advice received at noon, of a body of men having marched on Monday last towards the Konkan, renders it our duty to take the best means in our power for effectually securing the person of Raghunáthráv, whose seizure would be equally disgraceful, distressful and disadvantageous to us in the present state of our connection with him. This may be done, we apprehend, by advancing a farther guard instantly for his protection, and acquainting him instantly with our apprehensions and our intentions to advance this guard. It was therefore resolved to send William Gamul Farmer directly to Colonel Egerton to Kampoli to state our ideas to him, and to recommend it to him, to order a farther guard of not less than 300 sepoys to be immediately advanced to Chowke for the protection of Raghunáth. A message was also sent to Raghunáthráv as above stated.

At ten at night Mr. Farmer returned from Kampoli, and informed us, that having acquainted Colonel Egerton with our opinions as above set forth the Colonel returned for answer that the army was but just come to its ground, and that it would be harassing the men too much to march them back 10 or 11 miles to Chowke. That he apprehended the guard with Raghunáthráv was sufficient for the security of his person, and that if it was not thought sufficient, it would be much easier for Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn to advance the guard with them than to send one from the army.

Monday, 13th.—No answer being yet received from Rághoba to the letter sent him yesterday, Mr. Sibbald was sent at about 9 A.M. to represent suitably to him our apprehensions of what might possibly be the design of his enemies, and to urge farther to him our wishes that he would effectually secure his person by advancing nearer to our army.

Received the following letter at 9 A.M. :—

"To

W. G. FARMER, Esquire,

Secretary to the Committee appointed to accompany Raghunáthráv.

Sir,—I am directed by Colonel Egerton to acquaint you, that he has received your letter of this date, and that he is much obliged to Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn for the intelligence they have sent him. He thinks there is nothing to be apprehended from any opposition the enemies of Raghunáthráv may attempt against him in the Konkan; but he will however take such measures in consequence as to him shall appear necessary. The Colonel is very glad to hear he may so shortly expect the pleasure of seeing Rághoba and Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn in Kampoli.

M. MURRAY,

Secretary to Colonel Egerton, Commander-in-Chief.

Kampoli, 13th December 1778."

At about 10 A.M. an answer was received from Raghunáthráv to the letter written him yesterday, of which the following is a translate :—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire.

After compliments.

You sent me a letter, in which you mention news being received of the march of the horse, &c., of the Bharobaries to the Konkan, and recommended me to move on to Kampoli. I also got intelligence that their horse were come to the Ghát; but now they are gone back. Should they perchance come down I will seize them. There is nothing to fear. I have great trouble to get bullocks and people for my cannon and baggage, but I will use my best endeavours, and to-morrow or Tuesday will arrive at Kampoli. You will please to send me 300 men. What should I write more?"

13th December.—At about 6 in the evening Mr. Sibbald returned from Raghunáthráv, and brought an answer, in substance the same as the foregoing letter. He further expressed himself much obliged for the attention shown him and to his safety; and though by the detachment with him, and his own Gardis he apprehended no danger, yet, if convenient, he would further wish to have the force sent him proposed by Mr. Carnac. Mr. Sibbald had persuaded him to advance beyond Kalipore. As he is now within about a mile from hence it does not appear requisite to advance any farther guard for his protection.

At about 8 this evening the following letters were received forwarded under cover to Mr. William Leiws from the camp at Kampoli:—

"To

WILLIAM LEWIS, Esquire,

At Poona.

Sir,—This is purposely to enclose you duplicate of a letter to the Hon'ble the Select Committee, together with one wrote to yourself the 31st ultimo.

Since my last I have left Bálájí's territories and am arrived within 4 kos of Seronge, which I have upon the right, and proceed towards Bhopál.

I have met with no material interruption since my last letter. Upon the day of quitting Bálájí's territories his troops made their appearance and made repeated attempts to carry off the baggage, &c., in all which they were however baffled, for knowing the deceitful character of the Marátha, notwithstanding his peaceful and amicable professions, I observed the most particular precautions against any treacherous designs he might intend to me.

The nature of the service I am engaged in, requiring me to avoid all unnecessary delay, I am proceeding towards the Narbada and shall at present defer giving the chastisement due to Bálájí's conduct.

THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp 4 kos from Seronge, 12th November 1778.

"To

Captain JAMES STEWART.

Honoured Sir,—A letter came from Goa, dated the 3rd of October, written by William Bolts and directed to Mons. St. Lubin. He mentioned in his letter he sent what news he could pick up, *viz.*, the French have acknowledged the avowed independence of the Americans, but Spain will not join them; Prussia has declared war with Austria for their pretensions in Bavaria; the Ottoman Porte has declared war with Russia. Some say 16, others 22, ships of war have sailed from Toulon, which some say destined for America, others say for India. The Naváb Hyder Alli has given him a factory at Billiapatam, one at Mangalor, and one at Karvar in the neighbourhood of Goa. The Naváb of Scindy (Scinde ?) has given him a factory at Sattah (Tatta?) and Shábandar. He desires St. Lubin to acquaint Nána Fadanavis that he was very willing to serve Nána if he pleases in making alliance between the Poona Darbár and Hyder Alli; and promises the utmost secrecy, fidelity and obedience to Nána's commands and instructions. He also mentions that if Nána does not employ him in this affair he will shortly return to Bombay. The East India Company send out 21 ships under convoy this year, and two regiments of Infantry are destined for Bombay. He desires St. Lubin to send him Nána's determination concerning the affairs of Gogah, but he is not anxious about it, because Scindy and Dumaon (Daman) will be sufficient for him in this part of India. Thomas Barnes explained this letter to the Darbár and gave me this extract."

Addressed the Hon'ble the Select Committee as follows:—

"To

The Hon'ble WILILAM HORNBY, Esq., President, and Council,

Select Committee,

Bombay.

Gentlemen,—The occasion of the present despatch is to forward you a letter from Colonel Goddard, sent under cover to the Resident at Poona. As a letter he writes at the same time

to Mr. Lewis informs us generally of the contents of his despatch to you, and as we have not your express permission to open letters directed to you, we have forborne to take that liberty at present, but beg leave to submit to you the propriety of having this permission in future, as a speedy knowledge of the contents of advices both from the Governor General in Council and from Colonel Goddard may hereafter be very important to us in our negotiations.

We have also thought fit to forward to you, without loss of time, copy of a letter from Dádáji Odowji at Poona to Captain Stewart, because as it seems this M. William Bolts means shortly to proceed to Bombay, you will be able to judge of the danger of admitting to an English port a man who under neutral colours appears to be immediately connected with our most dangerous enemies both in Europe and this country. The mode in which this intelligence was obtained by Dádáji Odowji appears to be through Thomas Barnes, an Englishman who has been long in the service of the Poona Government, and is usually employed by them to explain intercepted letters written by Europeans.

Although we arrived at Panvel so long ago as the 8th instant, yet owing to the various delay of Raghunáthráv, whom we wished to be as near to us as possible, we have not yet joined Colonel Egerton. As these delays have in no shape we believe retarded the march of the army they cannot have had any material consequence; but as the appearance of Raghunáthráv above the Gháts must tend to encourage his partisans and to expedite the accomplishment of what the Committee have in charge, by inducing those partisans either to join him or to act openly and decisively in his favour, we have never ceased to urge to him the propriety of proceeding expeditiously, and having once brought him to consent to leave his cannon and heavy baggage to come on at leisure, we hope in a day or two to be able to advise you of his being at Khandála.

The 13th instant we received intelligence of the march of 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot from Poona towards the Konkan. If the enemies of Raghunáthráv mean to act vigorously, it seemed to us they would endeavour to intercept our communication with Bombay, as well in the hope of distressing us by cutting off our supplies of provisions and stores, as perhaps with a view of attempting something against the person of Raghunáthráv, who they must have known went first to Kalyán and afterwards up to the Fort at Purbull. We therefore advised Colonel Egerton of the receipt of this intelligence, and have persuaded Raghunáthráv to advance nearer to our army. There has yet been no advice of these troops having entered the Konkan; on the contrary it appears to us by a letter yesterday from Raghunáthráv that they had advanced to the Gháts, but retired again.

Dádáji Odowji also writes to Mr. Lewis, under the 11th instant, that Sakhárám and Nána have despatched one Anantráv to Sátára with orders to proclaim a new Rája and to procure from him a sicca to Mádhavráv Náráyan.

J. CARNAC.
THOMAS MOSTYN.

Hull, 11 kos from Kampoli, 15th December 1778.

P.S.—We are just advised that 2 six-pounders more yesterday got up the Gháts by hands and are now with the detachment at Khandála under Captain Stewart."

At six in the evening arrived in the camps at Kampoli the Secretary to the Committee and sent the following summons to Colonel Egerton and Mr. Mostyn :—

"To

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON,

AND

THOMAS MOSTYN, Esquire.

Gentlemen,—I am directed by Mr. Carnac to request you will please to meet him at his tent to-morrow at 10 o'clock in order to open and peruse a packet from the Select Committee of Bombay addressed to John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Mostyn, Esq., the Committee proceeding to Poona.

W. G. FARMER.

Camp at Kampoli, 15th December 1778."

Received a letter from Dádáji Odowji, at Poona, to Captain Stewart, dated the 14th instant, forwarding one from the Naváb of Táll Bhopál, to Mr. Lewis, which he could not read; but that he had learnt that Colonel Goddard was arrived at Táll Bhopál, and had stayed there eight days; that the 13th instant a new Rája was proclaimed at Sátára, but that the sicca was not yet arrived; that some person had desired him to acquaint Mr. Lewis that Rághoji A'ngriá, who was a relation of Sindia's and entirely devoted to the Ministers, intended to offer Rághoba 1,000 horse for his service with a view to betray him.

The letter from the Naváb of Táll Bhopál mentioned the arrival of the Bengal army in the district of Bhopál, and that agreeably to what had been written him, he (the Naváb) should furnish the Colonel with grain and afford him any other friendly aid in his power.

Wednesday 16th.—In consequence of the contents of the letter received yesterday from Dádoji Odowji, Mr. Carnac at 9 a.m. sent to Rághoba to advise him of the intelligence received relative to the treacherous designs of A'ngria; to caution him against those designs; and to advise him to advance nearer to our army.

At a meeting of the Committee, present:

John Carnac, Esq., and Colonel Charles Egerton.
(Mr. Mostyn, indisposed.)

Opened a packet from the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay directed to John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles Egerton and Thomas Mostyn, Esq., the Committee proceeding to Poona, containing the following papers:—

Instructions dated 5th December 1778.

Gentoo copies of Raghunáthráv's circular letter.

Copy of the translation of Raghunáthráv's circular letter.

Copy of the Treaty concluded between the Select Committee and Raghunáthráv.

Copy of the cypher framed for Colonel Leslie.

Copy of the Treaty of Surat.

Perused the Commission and instructions directed to the Committee.

Resolved,—That the copy of the Commission be sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who is directed to publish it in general orders.

Colonel Egerton requesting it, the Secretary is also directed to furnish him with a copy of the instructions to Committee.

Mr. Mostyn being indisposed and no further particular business offering,

Adjourned.

J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

We the President and Select Committee for all political, military, and naval affairs of the Hon'ble United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, on the coasts of India, Persia and Arabia, and of His Majesty's Castle and Island of Bombay,

To all whom these presents shall come, greeting. By virtue of a power given us by the Hon'ble Court of Directors of the said United Company, and derived unto them from the authority of our Sovereign Lord George III. and his Royal predecessors, denominate and appoint you, John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles Egerton and Thomas Mostyn, Esq., a Committee for concerting and conducting all the necessary operations, political and military, for conducting Raghunáthráv Bájiráv Pradhán to Poona, and for placing him in the Regency of the Marátha Government. Hereby giving you full power to execute and perform all matters and things in any way appertaining or conducive to the due discharge of the trust reposed in you, agreeable to the instructions herewith delivered to you. And we hereby require and order all factors, officers, servants or others in the service of the Hon'ble Company that may be employed on this service to conform, submit and pay due obedience to you, John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles Egerton and Thomas Mostyn, Esq., you following all such directions as shall be given by us, or by the President and Select Committee for the time being pursuant to the trust hereby reposed in you. Sealed with the seal of the aforesaid Hon'ble Company and given under our hands in Bombay Castle, this fifth day of December, in the nineteenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord King George III. and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight.

(L. S.)

W. HORNBY.
J. CARNAC.
D. DRAPER.

Ed. RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON,

and

THOMAS MOSTYN, Esquire.

Gentlemen,—You are well informed of the several steps that have led to the conclusion of a new treaty with Raghunáthráv, by which the Hon'ble Company are bound to assist him with a body of forces to conduct him to Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Marátha Empire.

As the welfare and, we may almost say, the existence of this Presidency will depend upon the success of the measure we have embarked in, we have thought it proper to commit to you the execution of our plan; and you are appointed a Committee by the accompanying commission, vested with the necessary powers to concert and conduct all political and military operations in the course of this expedition, relying upon your zeal, address and judgment to bring the business to a speedy and happy conclusion.

Upon receipt hereof Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn are to proceed with all convenient expedition to Panvel, where the army intended for this service is now encamped under the command of Colonel Egerton. Rághoba proceeds by the way of Thána; and as soon as he has joined the army, we direct that you urge him to march without loss of time to Poona—a measure which we trust will be effected with little difficulty or opposition, as the passage of the Gháts is already secured by Captain Stewart's division, and we have strong reason to believe that a very general disposition prevails amongst the Marátha officers and people in favour of Rághoba and his pretensions.

You will not fail strongly to inculcate to Rághoba the necessity of his making himself master of Poona without a moment's loss of time, and take the utmost care to keep him steady to this point, which ought to be and must be his first object; for according to the treaty we are only bound to put him in possession of Poona, and to place him in the Regency of the Marátha Empire; and it is equally for his interest and the Company's it should be accomplished in the most expeditious manner possible.

We shall deliver to you herewith a number of circular letters under Rághoba's sicca and the Company's seal and translation thereof for your notice. These are to be sent to the principal officers, and dispersed over the country, that our intentions in bringing over Rághoba may be made known to all ranks of people; and if after this declaration your march should be opposed by the Poona Ministers or their adherents, we hereby authorise you to repel force by force and conduct Raghunáthráv to Poona against all opposition.

If overtures should be made on the march to Poona by any of the Marátha Chiefs or Ministers, you will assist Rághoba with your best advice, and promote to the utmost of your power any accommodation that you may judge favourable to our views, which are, to connect Rághoba with men of influence and estimation in their own country, and well inclined to the Hon'ble Company; and in this light we must regard Moroba Fadanavis, Tukoji Holkar and Bachaba Purandhare in the foremost rank.

We flatter ourselves that from the experience Rághoba has had of our attachment, and his confidence in your judgment and regard to his interest, that he will pay great attention to your advice upon all occasions; and the better to secure your influence we recommended to you to cultivate his good opinion by every consistent method. We are likewise very earnest in your injunctions that you are to use every means in your power to conciliate the minds of the people in general to the English, and to the undertaking we are engaged in; for which purpose no violence must be offered to the persons or property of those who remain quiet in their habitations, and every act that can give offence to the religious scruples of the Gentoos must be carefully avoided.

After Rághoba is put in possession of Poona, you are to see him placed in the Regency, and the sicca put into his hands with all the usual forms and ceremonies, and upon the terms stipulated in the Article II., from which we cannot admit the smallest deviation. Our part of the treaty will be then performed; but here will begin a task in which the utmost delicacy and judgment will be necessary on your part to secure on a firm and permanent footing the advantages by

which we are attracted by this expedition, and on which the safety of this Presidency will so much depend, namely, the entire subversion of the party in the French interest, and filling the offices of trust under the Poona Government with persons well disposed towards the Hon'ble Company.

By the copy of our treaty with Rághoba, now put into your hands, you will see the limitations we are under with regard to our interference in the appointment or nomination of the officers of Government. You are well acquainted how much Rághoba's jealousy was excited by our stipulation in favour of Moroba Fadanavis, Bachoba Purandhare and Tukoji Holkar, which you will see duly performed; and for the rest, it must be your rule, by a line of judicious conduct, to make the persons you approve of, the men of Rághoba's own choice. We would wish, and we imagine, Moroba will expect to be Rághoba's Diván, though it is not improbable Rághoba may for some time at least conduct the executive part of government himself, but this is entering upon a matter so much depending upon future circumstances that we shall waive saying any thing farther at present as we shall have sufficient time to give you more explicit instructions when we are better informed.

It will be particularly requisite that Rághoba should, as soon as possible, place the forts in the Konkan and upon the sea-coast under the charge of persons we can depend upon for obedience to his orders, and that will oppose the admission of the French into any part of the Marátha dominions; on which head you must desire Rághoba to give them immediate and particular instructions according to the terms of the treaty.

The personal safety of the young Peshwa is a point wherein our own reputation and the honor of the nation are so deeply concerned, that we give it you in charge with the most implicit confidence of having our intentions faithfully executed, and that every precaution be taken which your prudence can suggest, or the treaty will warrant, to prevent any possibility of injury happening to him.

The other parts of the treaty that will rest with you to see executed are, to receive from Rághoba the monthly stipend for the payment of the forces, and the sanads under the Peshwa's seal for the several places ceded to the Hon'ble Company, which we shall rely on your care to see punctually performed as soon as Rághoba's circumstances will permit. As it is highly proper that this garrison considering the state of affairs with France, should be in a respectable situation, we recommend it to you and hereby give you a discretional power to return to Bombay such part of the forces as you may think can be spared, whenever you may judge the objects of this expedition are brought to such a point as to admit of the force being lessened with propriety.

We recommend and enjoin as a point very essential to the success of this expedition that the utmost harmony and good understanding be observed among yourselves; and in order to avoid all mistakes or misconceptions, we think it proper to describe the following line between the power of the Committee and the Commanding Officer, which must be strictly observed by both:—

All political intercourse with Rághoba must be confined entirely to the Committee, who are to have the sole management of all matters of negotiation.

The execution of the general plan of the expedition being as before mentioned entrusted to the Committee, it is our intention and order that the decision and determination on points that may appear to them conclusive to the accomplishment thereof shall rest solely with the Committee, and the Commanding Officer is hereby enjoined punctually to comply with all requisitions made to him in writing by the Committee on all such points.

On the other hand, the Committee is hereby expressly prohibited from interfering in the detail of the duty of the army, or from prescribing to the Commanding Officer, in respect to the mode of march or encampment, or the method of carrying any military measure into execution, all of which are the distinct province of the Commanding Officer.

We have given orders to the Commanding Officer agreeably to the above; and directed him to appoint a guard and treat the Committee with all proper respect.

The correspondence with this Board must be conducted solely by the Committee, who must likewise advise the Governor General and Council of all material transactions. Mr. Lewis left the Company's cypher buried at Poona, but we now furnish you with a copy of one we framed for our correspondence with the late Colonel Leslie, which will serve your purpose till your arrival at Poona.

A regular diary must be kept of all your proceedings and the motions of the army, in which every circumstances of moment must be punctually recorded, and two copies thereof delivered to us upon your return.

Your expenses will be defrayed by the Hon'ble Company, and we permit you to keep a table at their charge suitable to your station.

The accounts of the Paymaster and Commissary of the army must be subject to your superintendence and control, and you will take care they are forwarded to the Presidency at such stated times as you may judge reasonable. The Paymaster has been furnished with a lákh and a half of rupees, and should that sum be expended before you can obtain a supply of money from Rághoba, we have given authority to those officers to pass their necessary drafts upon us, subject to your approbation.

Mr. William Gamul Farmer is appointed your Secretary and Marátha Translator, for both which offices he is to be paid an allowance of three hundred rupees per month. Mr. James Rivett is ordered to the assistance of Mr. Farmer in his business of Secretary and is likewise to act as Chaplain to the army.

Mr. James Sibbald, who is under orders for an embassy to Hyder Alli, is to act as your interpreter and is to be despatched to Hyder's Court from Poona, whither we shall send his instructions in due time.

We wish you all possible success and honor in the discharge of your important commission, and are,

Gentlemen,
Your, &c.,
W. HORNBY.
J. CARNAC.
D. DRAPER.

Bombay Castle, 5th December 1778.

Circular letter from RAGHUNA'THRA'V BAJIRA'V *Pant Pradhán.*

To

ALL THE MUTSADDIS, SARDA'RS, JAGHIRDA'RS AND SUBJECTS OF THE MARÁTHA STATE.

You will no doubt hear with pleasure that the Government of Bombay, with the sanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council of Calcutta, have now determined to support my cause with vigour, and with the assistance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of the Marátha Empire, which you well know is my just right. The Governor and Select Committee

have been moved to this resolution in my favour by the unjust conduct of the present administration at Poona, who have violated in almost every article, the treaty concluded with the Hon'ble Company in March 1776, and by their great desire to restore, through my hand, peace and good order to the Marátha Empire, which has been so long involved in troubles and confusion, and experienced so many calamities by mismanagement and discord.

That no officer or subject of the Marátha State may be deterred from following the dictates of his duty by any suspicion of the rectitude of my intentions, I have in the most solemn manner granted this circular letter, and declare this in the face of the world that my only view is to remove the government out of the present improper hands, and to take upon myself the full power of Regent, during the minority of the young Peshwa Mádhavráv Náráyan without doing injury to any one who does not oppose my just designs or to endeavour to abscond; and shall bury in oblivion all past injuries from every person whatever unless provoked by any new acts of enmity after this notice.

I now call upon and require you immediately to join my forces and the English army who are with me, and to attend me to Poona, where I hope by the Divine blessing to settle the government upon a firm and solid footing, and to restore the Marátha Empire to its former happiness and splendour.

In further confirmation of what is herein contained the Hon'ble Governor and Select Committee of Bombay have caused the seal of the Hon'ble Company to be affixed.

(A True Copy.)

EDWARD RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Pursuant to the resolutions of the Committee this day the Secretary wrote the following letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army :—

"To

Colonel CHARELS EGERTON,

Commander-in-Chief to the English Forces at Kampoli.

Sir,—I am directed by the Committee appointed to proceed with Raghunáthráv to Poona to enclose you a copy of the commission from the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay, vesting them with the necessary powers to concert and conduct all political and military operations in the course of the present expedition; and to require you to publish the said commission in the general orders to the army under your command.

I am, &c.,

W. G. FARMER,
Secretary to the Committee.

Kámpoli, December 16th, 1778."

Received a letter from Dádáji Odowji at Poona, to Captain Stewart, dated the 13th instant, in which he mentions the receipt of two letters from Colonel Goddard, one for Mr. Carnac and one for Mr. Lewis, both which he then forwarded. That by the reports at Poona Sindia and Holkar had taken an oath to act with the Ministers. Nána having further prevailed upon Sindia by a present of 3 lákhs that Mahádji Sindia was first to go against the English troops, and if he was worsted, Holkar was to aid him; that on the 11th instant Nána had despatched Bhimráv Pansia and Rámchandra Ganesh with some guns to Talegaon; that the Ministers were

desirous to try their success in an engagement with us, and if they were defeated it was to be left to Sakhárám to make the best peace he could with us; that Nána Fadanavis was for despatching troops through the different Gháts into the Konkan.

For the information of the Committee Mr. Lewis delivered different letters received by him since his departure from Poona, one, from Colonel Goddard, dated Camp near Bimlass, October 31st, 1778, received at Bombay 1st December 1778.

Different letters from Dádáji Odowji, dated 27th and 29th November and 2nd December 1778.

At about noon Mr. Sibbald returned with a message from Dáda Sáheb to Mr. Carnac thanking him for his friendly caution, that he thought he had nothing to apprehend from Rágoji A'ngria who had presented him with an elephant and 25 horse; that he should advance and encamp within a mile of us.

Sunday, 20th.—At a Committee, present:

JOHN CARNAC, Esq., and Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.
(Mr. MOSTYN, indisposed.)

Read and approved the minutes of the last Committee.

Colonel Charles Egerton now delivers in to the Committee the following minute:—

"The Commission granted to the Committee appointed to attend Rághoba to Poona, bearing date Bombay Castle, December 5th, 1778, being in my opinion highly contradictory to a paragraph in the instructions accompanying the said Commission, and repugnant to the military powers vested in me as Commander of the Forces of the Presidency of Bombay, and now in the field, do most strenuously protest against publishing the same in general orders.

"I do also protest against this commission vesting military authority, and also to the mode in which it was granted, together with many articles of the instructions appertaining to the said Commission, for such reasons as I shall hereafter exhibit at a more seasonable opportunity."

For the foregoing reasons the Colonel is of opinion, that the commission should not at present be published in generel orders to the army; and farther, that according to the letter of the commission appointing the Committee he holds any meeting incomplete and informal without the presence of every member; and therefore the orders issued to him in consequence of the resolution passed at the last meeting of Mr. Carnac and himself was in his opinion of no validity, till he shall have received farther instructions from his superiors at Bombay, or till the recovery of Mr. Mostyn permits him to attend in Committee.

Mr. Carnac is of opinion, that the sickness of one of the members of the Committee disabling him to attend, does by no means render the proceedings of the other two invalid. According to the general rules of the Company's service, a majority of any Board can form a legal meeting of it, and that therefore the Colonel was bound to have obeyed the requisition sent to him in consequence of the resolution passed at their last meeting. However being unwilling to enter into any discussion on the subject, he consents to refer the matter to the judgment of our superiors at Bombay, and therefore proposes that the minutes of the last Committee relative to the publishing the Commission, together with the minutes now made, should be instantly forwarded with an address to our superiors, requesting their instant decision on these several points. According to the opinion entertained by the Colonel it seems to him (Mr. Carnac) of no utility to sit again in Committee, and that of course the business

committed in charge to them must remain at a stand till such decision comes, or till the recovery of Mr. Mostyn, which, he is sorry to observe by the authority of the Surgeon, is very doubtful, and at least not likely to be for some days.

The Colonel concurs in opinion with Mr. Carnac, relative to the transmitting with an instant address to our superiors, the minutes he makes mention of, but differs in opinion with him as to his general conclusion; for though he (Colonel Egerton) thinks fit to insist that the point immediatly relates to himself, *viz.*, the publication in general orders of the commission to the army under his command should be discussed in a full Committee, yet he is far from thinking that this proposal can give any impediment to the conduct of affairs committed in charge to the Committee, as Mr. Carnac and himself can meet, deliberate, conduct and give final answers to Rághoba relative to those affairs.

Mr. Carnac observing that from the accounts of the Surgeons there is great room to apprehend Mr. Mostyn may not recover, thinks it necessary to observe to our superiors the very great loss the Company will sustain at this critical juncture by his death, and how much it may probably impede the execution of the material points they have in charge, both from the want of local knowledge, and particular abilities and acquaintance Mr. Mostyn possesses in Marátha affairs; and because that most of the engagements formed at Poona were immediately formed with him, and that the persons he treated with looking immediately to him may now be backward in making fresh overtures to the Committee. To which the Colonel concurs.

Mr. Sibbald now lays before the Committee a paper, as entered hereafter, containing intelligence transmitted from Rághoba, with which he was made acquainted by Náro Gopál and Trimbak Bháleráv. With respect to the proposal of having a body of men from Bombay, we are sensible from the state of the garrison it is impossible to accede to it.

Mr. Carnac lays before the Committee the following minute: —

"As the speedy arrival of the army upon the Gháts, and their being pushed forward as quickly as possible, is very essential to the easier accomplishment of the service on which the army is now employed, the enemy having thereby so much the less time to prepare and collect themselves; and as our troops have been hitherto but very slow in their progress, they having disembarked at Panvel 25 days ago, and yet are little more than the same number of miles distant from it, it is much to be regretted that a more expeditious mode had not been found out for conveying to the top of the Gháts the ordnance stores and baggage than the one at present pursued. It appears to Mr. Carnac that much labour, time and a considerable expense are unnecessarily wasted in the making a carriage road up the Gháts; and that with the same number of people now employed for this purpose, everything intended to be carted up might have been carried up by hand with more ease, security from accident and despatch, and from the conversation he has had with many on the subject he is inclined to believe this to be the general opinion. The Commander of artillery has actually passed some of his guns beyond the road constructed by Major Spaeth and by a route wide of it, which may be adduced as a testimony that this part of the new made road at least was wholly needless."

As an answer to Mr. Carnac's minute might be productive of altercation and argument, the Colonel defers saying anything on the subject till he has an opportunity of having his conduct properly scrutinized by his superiors at Bombay.

J. CARNAC.
C. EGERTON.

This morning Rághoba sent Náro Gopál and Trimbak Bháleráv to Mr. Carnac to inform him of the following intelligence he had just received from the enemy's camp:—

That the ministerial forces under the command of Bhimráv Pansia, Báji Pant Joshi and Ganesh Pant, consisting of 10,000 horse, 15 pieces of cannon and a large number of Bhondars, were encamped at Wargaon, 3 kos this side Talegaon, in order to harass our troops and obstruct their march so soon as they might make their appearance above the Gháts; and that a body of 5,000 horse were ordered to proceed down Thensora Ghát with an intention to cut off our communication with Panvel.

That Nána Fadanavis, Sakhárám Bápu, Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holkár were encamped near Poona with 5,000 horse, but whether they meant to join the main body at Wargaon was not yet known.

Rághoba desired the above persons to acquaint Mr. Carnac, that he submitted to his consideration, whether it would not be advisable to have a detachment of sepoys with 2 guns sent from Bombay, to be kept below the Gháts, in order to protect our convoys of provisions and to keep the communication open with Panvel. Rághoba is confident that the ministerial party have adopted the above plan, as they make no scruple to declare that it is the only likely mode of harassing and destroying the English troops, being unequal to an actual engagement with such a body of forces as we have now in the field.

Monday, 21st.—Despatched the following address to the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay:—

"To

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esquire,

President, and Select Committee at Bombay.

Gentlemen,—On the 15th instant Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn arrived at this place, and on the evening of that day, Mr. Carnac directed the Secretary to the Committee to desire the attendance of Colonel Egerton and Mr. Mostyn at his (Mr. Carnac's) tent on the following day, in order to open a packet from you, directed to Mr. John Carnac, Colonel Egerton and Mr. Mostyn. The latter gentleman being indisposed, the meeting was held by Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton only.

Mr. Mostyn being still indisposed, those two gentlemen only again met this day conformably to a summons sent by Mr. Carnac, when it was agreed immediately to transmit the whole of both days' proceedings for your consideration. From the nature of the doubts and questions that have arisen you will no doubt perceive the necessity of favouring us with your decisions as speedily and as explicitly as possible as from the nature of the service and the accidents common to all men it may frequently happen that only two of the members can attend in Committee. The particulars of the intelligence received from Rághoba are, that the ministerial forces under the command of Bhimráv Pansia, Báji Pant Joshi and Ganesh Pant consisting of 10,000 horse, 15 pieces of cannon and a large number of Bhondars were encamped at Wargaon, 3 kos on this side of Talegaon, in order to harass our troops and obstruct our march so soon as they might make their appearance above the Ghát; and that a body of 5,000 horse were ordered to proceed down the Thensora Ghát with an intent to cut off our communication with Panvel; that Nána Fadanavis, Sakhárám Bápu, Mahádji Sindia and Hari Pant were encamped near Poona with about 5,000 horse, but whether they meant to join the main body at Wargaon was not yet known.

Rághoba says he is confident the ministerial party have adopted the above plan, as they make no scruple to declare that it is the only likely method of harassing and distressing the

English troops, being unequal to an actual engagement with such a body of forces as we have now in the field, and he therefore directed the persons whom he sent with this intelligence to acquaint the Committee, that he submitted it to their consideration, whether it would not be advisable to have a detachment of sepoys with 2 guns from Bombay, to be kept below the Ghát, in order to protect our convoys of provisions, and to keep the communication open with Panvel.

The above intelligence from Rághoba generally corresponds with the contents of a letter received from Dadáji Odowji at Poona, except that he mentions the Ministerialists were determined to engage us and that Holkar had engaged to assist them, which latter circumstance we hope and trust will prove untrue. If the Ministerialists mean to act with vigour it seems to us probable they may adopt the plan mentioned by Rághoba.

For these two days past Ráv has been encamped close to us. He had determined to have proceeded up the Khandála Ghát, and had absolutely marched for that purpose, but fearful of the consequences of his being widely separated from us, and from the whole tenor of his conduct lately having reason to apprehend that treacherous designs were formed relative to the security of his person, Mr. Sibbald was deputed by Mr. Carnac to represent to him the apprehensions entertained and at the unnecessary risk he at best exposed himself to by proceeding up another Ghát, whilst we had one open and guarded by our own troops. He paid due attention to these representations, and this night, at midnight, being a lucky hour, he has determined to march up Bhor Ghát to Khandála.

We are, &c.,
J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Camp at Kampoli, 20th December 1778.

P. S.—Last night Rághunáthráv proceeded up the Ghát, December 21st, 1778."

At about 3 P.M. received the following letter from the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,
Colonel CHARLES EGERTON, and
THOMAS MOSTYN, Esquire.

Gentlemen,—We have received a letter from Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn, dated the 15th instant, and authorize you to open any packets addressed to us which may come to your hands.

Having just received a letter of importance from the Governor General and Council, we transmit an extract of all the material parts for your information; and we have in consequence sent orders to Colonel Goddard to move forward with all possible expedition, although we doubt not he will have already prosecuted his march in consequence of our former orders.

Our latest advices from Colonel Goddard are dated the 26th ultimo, from Bhopál, within 18 kos of the Narbada, which he hoped to cross in 5 or 6 days at Hussangábád, and in two days more enter the country of the Berár Rája.

We hope soon to hear of your having ascended the Gháts with the army and stores; and strongly recommend to you to proceed with all possible expedition and to urge Rághoba so as that no delay may arise on his part.

You will correspond with Colonel Goddard on all necessary points, and we have directed him to send you advice of his motions. A packet is now enclosed for him, in duplicate, which is sent open for your perusal; and you will forward it by separate conveyances in the most secure and expeditious manner.

We now return 5 passes of pattamars arrived from the army with advices, and are,

Your, &c.,
W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER.

Bombay Castle, 19th December 1778.

(Signed by the Secretary for and by order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a pen.)

E. RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary."

Extract of a letter from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL *and* COUNCIL, *dated 15th October 1778, and received the 18th December following per "Terrible".*

We advised you in our last of the appointment of Mr. Elliot to the Court of Mudáji Bhonsla, the Rája of Berár, with instructions to negotiate and conclude a treaty of alliance with that Chief; but we are sorry to inform you of the demise of Mr. Elliot on his way to Nagnipore at a place called Sarungur. The Rája having expressed great satisfaction at the overtures which we made for a connection with him by this deputation, and being, as we have every reason to believe, firm in his attachment to the English, we conclude, as soon as he hears of the] unfortunate event of Mr. Elliot's death, that he will take an active part in prosecuting the intended negotiation either by deputing a proper Minister to us on his part, or by soliciting our alliance on such terms as may prove a general advantage to the Company's possessions. For these reasons we do not mean to appoint any one to succeed Mr. Elliot until our advices from the Rája shall enable us to determine on the expediency of that measure.

We have thought it incumbent upon us to remove Colonel Leslie from the command of the detachment of forces which was ordered to march for the support and assistance of your Presidency, on account of the little progress it had made under him, as we understand he was advanced no further than Bajgur on the 25th ultimo, and of his manifest disobedience also of our positive orders, in forming, and conducting a treaty of perpetual peace and friendship in the name of the Company with the Rájas Gomaun and Comaunsing, Chiefs of a part of the Bundelkhand District.

Colonel Thomas Goddard is now appointed to the chief command of these troops, and we have ordered him to prosecute his march without further loss of time into Berar, where, on his arrival, he will apply to Mudáji Bhonsla, and if that Chief shall agree to join him with a sufficient body of forces for the purpose, he is to continue his route in conjunction with them; but if he shall not have received any fresh directions for his march, or if the Rája shall decline or refuse to grant him his assistance, we have then vested in him a discretionary power to suspend his proceedings.

If the plan which you had resolved to adopt and to carry into execution in September for the restoration of Rághoba, and which you notified to us in your letter of the 25th July, still subsists; or if you shall have formed any other for the same end, consistently with the terms

prescribed for our assent to that measure; or if you shall judge a strong reinforcement immediately and indispensably necessary to insure the safety of Bombay against a French invasion, and shall deem it requisite or advisable in either of these cases, to command the detachment at all hazards to proceed further towards Bombay, even without the junction of the troops of any power in alliance with us, you will in such cases, and such only, require Colonel Goddard to advance with it, but in all other cases you will give him notice of your intentions, and leave him to act under our directions.

(True Extract.)
EDWARD RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

"To

Colonel GODDARD.

Sir,—The Governer General and Council have advised us of their resolution to have removed Colonel Leslie, before they heard of his death, and of their having appointed you to the chief command of the detachment of forces ordered for the support of this Presidency. They have also informed us of the orders they have given for your conduct on your arrival in the Berár country. We congratulate you on this mark of distinction conferred on you by the Governor General and Council; and though we hope this will meet you well advanced on your march in consequence of our letters of the 15th November and 6th instant; yet to prevent all disappointment, and that you may not be at any loss in your proceedings, we judge it proper to repeat to you that our forces have actually taken the field, in prosecution of the plan communicated to the Governor General and Council for the restoration of Rághoba, and that we deem it requisite and advisable that the army under your command should move forward towards Bombay. We therefore hereby require you to advance according to our former orders, even without the junction of the troops of any power in alliance with the Hon'ble Company; and we likewise desire and enjoin you to conduct your march with all possible expedition.

The settlement of the Government at Poona is committed to Messrs. Carnac, Egerton and Mostyn, with whom we desire you will correspond; and we flatter ourselves the movement of our forces will facilitate your march, in like manner as we expect the advance of your detachment will lessen the opposition to our forces.

We yesterday received your letter dated at Bhopál the 26th ultimo, and we now send a fifth copy of our letter of the 6th instant.

We are, &c.,
D. DRAPER.

Bombay Castle, 19th December 1778.

(Signed by the Secretary for and by order of the Governor,
who is unable to hold a pen.)

E. RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary."

Tuesday, 22nd.—This morning Thomas Mostyn being dangerously ill set out for Bombay.

It is worthy observation, that by the accounts taken this day, either in or after the attack made on Captain Stewart's post at Khandála, it appears that the body of men which made this attack first went to Counda Ghát, where they were purposely despatched to seize the person of Rághunáthráv, of whose intentions to proceed up that Ghát his enemies at Poona had been well advised.

Wednesday, 23rd.—The army proceeded up the Ghát to Khandála. In the evening received a letter from Dádáji Odowji at Poona to Mr. Lewis, informing him that he had learnt from Mádhavráv Jádavráv, that Nána Fadanavis would not permit of his (Odowji's) remaining in Poona; requesting to know what was to be done with the Company's effects at Poona, the removal of which would cost very dear on account of people having mostly deserted Poona. It was said Nána expected some troops from Goa—French and Portuguese—who were to set out this day from Kirki; that our factory was given to the French gentleman who before lived in Krishnaráv Ballál's stable.

Friday, 25th.—At 3 P.M. received the following letter from the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay:—

" To

JOHN CARNAC, ESQUIRE,
COLONEL CHARLES EGERTON, AND
THOMAS MOSTYN, ESQUIRE.

GENTLEMEN,—We have received the letter from Messrs. Carnac and Egerton, dated the 20th instant.

We are very sorry to observe that any occasion of difference has already arisen, and at the same time surprised to find an idea could be entertained that the powers of the Committee were suspended by the sickness or accidental absence of one of the members, when it is so obvious that the practice in all committees or bodies of men associated in any public service is directly and universally the reverse. But since such an opinion has prevailed, we find it necessary to direct and lay it down as a possitive order, that when any one of the members of the Poona Committee is by sickness or any other accidental cause unavoidably absent, the full exercise of the powers granted to the Committee shall be vested and continue in the remaining two, and in case of the difference of opinion, the senior member must, as always usual, have a casting voice.

To prevent any further dissatisfaction we wish that the point of publishing the Committee's commission was waived.

We are, &c.,

(Signed by the Secretary for and by order of the Governor, he being unable to hold a pen.)

W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER.

EDWARD RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary."

Wednesday, 6th January 1779.—On Wednesday last the troops marched from Khandála to Mount Snarl, on Thursday from Mount Snarl to Dungargaon plain, on Monday from Dungargaon plain to Karla, where Captain Stewart was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot, proceeded from Kárla on the Wednesday following to Mondhurna plain.

At a Committee, present:

JOHN CARNAC, Esq., and Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Colonel Egerton represents to the Committee, that having borne up as long as he could against an illness which he has now for some time past been afflicted, he at length finds himself under the disagreeable necessity of acquainting the Committee, that the Surgeon-Major is of opinion, that the fatigues of a campaign co-operating with his indisposition certainly endangers his life, and that at any rate he cannot hope to have the requisite strength to attend properly to

the many avocations of the Commander-in-Chief; for these reasons he requests permission to resign the command to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn and proceed immediately to Bombay, which is agreed to.[1]

The Committee taking into consideration the necessity of having an able and experienced officer to command the army now in the field in case of accident to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, think proper to recommend it to the Commander-in-Chief to appoint Major Dagon, of the Artillery, to act as Lieutenant-Colonel till the pleasure of the Hon'ble the Select Committee, Bombay, shall be known; and that it shall further be recommended to our superiors to continue this appointment.

The departure of Colonel Egerton, the unfortunate loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Cay and of Captain James Stewart, the first wounded and returned to Bombay, and the latter killed, and the prospect there is that the present service may be much more severe and of much longer continuance than was expected, renders it very expedient that the army should be supplied with as many officers of experience as can be spared from Bombay; and it is therefore resolved to recommend it to the Hon'ble the Select Committee to send up Major Hopkins, Captains Eames and Jameson to join the army as soon as possibly can be done with safety to them.

We reflect with some concern, on the difference between the expectations we were flattered with on our arrival at the top of the Gháts, and the actual state of affairs. We were given to hope, that immediately on the appearance there of the standard of Rághunáthráv, Holkar and many other Chiefs of rank and respect would join him with a numerous body of horse; and there was every reason to hope we might have terminated speedily the objects of our Commission. Instead of these respectable partisans, none but a few mercenaries have yet joined us; and Raghunáthráv in a message yesterday by Mr. Sibbald gave us explicitly to understand he had been deceived. That unless we could convince his friends of their safety in joining us, by the speedy defeat of his enemies, he had no hope of being joined by any one; and that our situation would rather prove worse than better as we advanced towards Poona by being cut off from all communication with the Konkan, from whence we may be now supplied with provisions and stores. The mode adopted by the enemy of retiring before us, and ravaging the country seems to render his reasoning apparently just; but we still hope as we advanced towards Poona, Holkar, on whose junction there may be some dependence, will be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the promises he had given us through the late Mr. Mostyn. It is further observable there is too much reason to apprehend that Raghunáthráv, trusting to subdue every one by our arms, has not only neglected the fit means to conciliate the respectable Chiefs to his cause, but has acted in such a manner as will naturally tend to unite them against him. The grounds of this suspicion are these: The agent of Moroba in our camp informed Mr. Lewis, that he had learnt from his master, that Rághoba instead of taking the proper means for his release from Ahmadnagar, had secretly sent directions to the Killedár not to release Moroba till he got further positive orders from him on his arrival at Poona. This is in direct violation of his agreement with us, and could the fact be clearly proved, it would have been so signified to him.

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[1] Colonel Egerton started for Bombay, but on hearing that a party of the enemy's horse were in the road, he returned to camp, and resumed his seat at the Committee, but not the command. The Committee of Secrecy wrote as follows on his conduct: "As Colonel Egerton's want of health did not prevent him from resuming his seat at the Poona Committee, it will be necessary hereafter to state the part which he took in the subsequent proceedings of that Committee; but your Committee nevertheless thinks proper in this place to express their unanimous opinion that the conduct of the late Colonel, now Brigadier General Charles Egerton, during the late disgraceful expedition towards Poona was such as renders it highly improper that he should be continued in the command of the Company's forces at Bombay, and that he be therefore dismissed from the Company's service."—(Commons' Reports, East Indies, 1781 and 1782.)

Resolved,—That we do immediately acquaint our superiors at Bombay with the foregoing, that they may send requisite orders, in case it should appear that the extent of our military operations in the cause of Rághoba may be very indefinite and uncertain; at any rate assure them that at present we see no prospect of their terminating on our arrival at Poona which, by their instructions to us, they seem most confidently to expect.

By the death of Mr. Mostyn and the departure of Colonel Egerton the powers of this Committee may seem suspended for the present. It is however recommended to Mr. Carnac to continue still to act when it may be requisite till explicit orders may arrive from our superiors at Bombay.

Saturday, 9th.—The army on Thursday last moved from Mondhurna plain to Carculla, on Friday from Carnilla to Wargaon, and on Saturday from Wargaon to Talegaon.

At a Committee, present:

John Carnac, Esq., and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Read and approved the minutes of our last Committee.

The apprehensions expressed in the minutes of our last meeting seem verified now beyond all doubt. So far from any person of consequence having yet joined Rághoba, Holkar, the only one from whom there appeared the least assurance of support to his cause, is now in arms against us, and joined with Sindia and the other Chiefs, whose guns have been firing on our camps, and who are now before us with a large army. The burning of the large and populous town of Talegaon also confirms our suspicion, and the general information we daily receive from all sides of their intended mode of procedure, *viz.*, by the destruction of the country for harassing us and cutting us off from all supplies of provisions. In short there appears to be a general determination to oppose the establishment of Rághoba with that degree of authority, which from his confident assurances of effectual support, and from the representations of the late Mr. Mostyn, the Hon'ble the Select Committee have not been led to engage for.

This disappointment in our expectations opens to us a scheme very widely defferent from what we had in view at our first setting out from Bombay. From the open division amongst the Bráhmans and from positive engagements with the party in opposition to Nána Fadanavis, we were given most confidently to expect immediate and effectual aid, if we once openly and declaredly entered on measures for the subversion of his Government. A general reputed indisposition to that Government amongst the Marátha officers and people also afforded good grounds of expectation for effectual aid. The words of our instructions warrant these suppositions; from all which it was concluded that the march to Poona would be all ended with little difficulty or opposition; that little time would be employed in military operations; and that our great difficulty would not be in reducing the Marátha officers to obedience, and placing the Government of the country with Rághoba, but in settling the different pretensions of these Chiefs, and bringing Rághoba to form his Government from men on whom we might depend for effecting the great object of this expedition, namely, the entire subversion of the party in the French interest. After having thus conducted him to Poona and settled his Government, there remained only to receive the sanads for the grants that were to form the rewards of our aid, and the monthly stipend for the expense of our army. It seems never to have been doubted that all this would have been done, and the army returned to Bombay timely enough for its defence.

Instead of this definite and limited scheme, it appears to us that we are engaged in an infinite scene of military operations, without any resources but our own, against the most respectable Chiefs of the Marátha Empire, and against an enemy, with whom we cannot hope to bring matters to the only issue from which we can obtain reasonable assurance of success, *viz.*, the trial of arms. We must repeat that we are confirmed by the destruction of Talegaon as to their

intended mode of procedure—a mode which must infallibly force us back in a short time to Bombay without reaping the least benefit in any one point both from the great exertions and expense of the Governor General and the Government of Bombay. It is requisite here also to observe, that from every information we can obtain from deserters, prisoners, and others, it is determined to burn Chinchvad, a town still more large and populous than Talegaon, and that measures are also taken even for the destruction of Poona, so bent are those now in opposition to Raghunáthráv to avail themselves of every possible means in their power in order to frustrate the plan we are now proceeding on in conjunction with him.

From all these circumstances it appears to us, that the plan of establishing Raghunáthráv even but in the Regency of the Marátha Empire, without the immediate co-operation of a respectable party in that State is impracticable, with any probability of success; and having decided this point in our own minds, the present state of our army with respect to provisions, and the total improbability of a supply, renders it necessary to turn our attention immediately towards the means of compassing as well as in us lies, the main object which led towards our engagements with Rághoba, the defeat of the designs of the French.

From every experience we have had of the Maráthás, and particularly in this business, it appears to us, that the tie of their own interest is the only one to be depended on. From all the late Mr. Mostyn's advices, and from every information we can obtain, it appears that Sakhárám Pandit and Nána Fadanavis, though at times apparently united, have each been aiming, though by different modes, to secure to themselves the effectual power in the Poona Darbár. As Nána from several circumstances, seems peculiarly to look to the French, and is indeed the very man whose subversion is the object we now aim at, we are of course precluded from forming any connection with him. It therefore appears to us that Sakhárám Pandit is the only man with whom we can hope to form the engagements that must lead to our main object. Moroba Fadanavis and Bachoba Purandhare, the two persons mentioned in our instructions, being at present imprisoned, and as far as we can perceive wholly incapable of affording us any effectual aid, whatever their interest may incline them to do. The two next persons who strike our attention are the Jághírdárs, Holkar and Sindia, whose troops form the chief force of our enemies, and whose decisions, if favourable to us, must to all appearance enable us effectually and speedily to crush the powers of Nána Fadanavis and his party. During the divisions amongst the Bráhmans, we are given to understand, they have made great accessions to their jághírs; and were the Poona Darbár once in power to enforce their demands, they would probably insist on the restitution of these, as well as the arrears due from them for the country they hold. These are considerations that must influence them to prevent the unconditional restoration of such power among the Bráhmans; and therefore it seems they are naturally led to oppose the establishment of Rághoba, which great line of interest seems now to influence them both, notwithstanding any promises or writings they may have given relative to a junction with Rághoba.

The mode of securing these several persons and their partisans appears to us as follows: To assure them that we mean the Government shall go on in the name of Mádhávráv Náráyan, leaving only to Rághoba the Náibship as in the time of the minority of Mádhávráv; to assure Sakhárám of the Divánship, of our support to him in the real powers of it, and of the aid of our army in conjunction with Sindia and Holkar against Nána Fadanavis; to offer to the two Jághírdárs our guarantee securing to them their Jághírs free from all demands for arrears from the Poona Darbár.

Agreed, therefore, that Mr. Sibbald who was desired to be present at this meeting should acquaint Rághoba in a suitable manner, with our sentiments relative to the cause we are embarked in; to remind him we have been led into this distressed state by too great a reliance

on his promises and assurances relative to a plentiful supply of provisions when we got above the Gháts, and to the junction of Tukoji Holkar, which he acquainted Mr. Sibbald on the 21st ultimo he was confident would be in 8 days; that the single circumstance of having now but sufficient provisions to conduct our army back into the Konkan, added to the total impossibility of procuring a supply in a country laid waste all round us, must infallibly force us to retire, which would be the total ruin of his cause, possibly for ever; that the only probable mode to remove this distress was to make immediate overtures of accommodation to Sindia and to Holkar and Sakhárám, which must be done by committing to us the power of negotiating from him, signifying to these different persons his consent to any agreements we might conclude for him; that we see no alternative between this and an instant retreat to Khandála, and that unless he consents to it our army must perforce immediately retire in order to prevent a total distress from the utter want of provisions; that we must leave to him the mode of opening this negotiation; and that during the course of it we should be guided as much by his advice and interest as we consistently could.

J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Sunday, 10th.—At a Committee, present:

JOHN CARNAC, Esq., and Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Read and approved the minutes of our last Committee.

The Commissary, Mr. Holmes, being sent for, and asked how long he can depend for a certainty on supplying the army with provisions, informs the Committee, from his stock now in hand, which is all he can depend on, he can supply the army to the 22nd inclusive, barring the accidents, which on our further advance into the country we may expect, having met with some loss on our march of yesterday: and the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Cockburn, being called in, further acquaints the Committee, that without a body of horse he thinks it impossible, as we advance further into the open country, to secure our baggage from the numerous cavalry, and that of course the provisions are equally exposed with the rest of it.

Upon duly weighing these circumstances, it appears clearly that the prediction of Raghunáthráv mentioned in our proceedings of the 6th instant, relative to the multiplication of our distress as we advance forward are now certainly verified, and that even if we should proceed to Poona in the hopes of a supply of provisions, during the course of any negotiation that might be opened, the army would most probably be reduced to such distress as would compel us into any terms the party we might treat with should think fit to impose upon us, for it is certainly not presumable that they would fail to avail themselves of a circumstance so signally favourable as our total dependence on them for provisions which they must very soon perceive.

With respect to the confident assertion of Rághoba relative to the junction of Holkar, and to his supplying our army with provisions for some days from this place, we must observe from the information of Mr. Holmes, who has examined into the probability of this with his own eyes, that Rághoba, whatever he may be led to believe by the people about him, must be so totally deceived in this point of supply that there is no dependence on him. It appears that what grain the enemy could not carry off from the plunder of this place, they have scattered in the streets and mixed with pernicious seeds, so as to render it almost wholly useless. As to the junction of Holkar, it appears wholly imprudent to suffer ourselves

to be led into a scene of distress by this so long protracted hope; but as from the report of the Commander of the artillery it appears requisite to remain here a day longer, we may make a virtue of this necessity by a compliance with his request, and at the same time acquaint him if we are deceived, this compliance he must feel to be the last we can possibly give into. And further to do as much as in us lies towards fulfilling the hope he entertains of the junction of Holkar, it is resolved immediately to write that Chief a suitable letter reminding him of his promise made to Mr. Mostyn, and expressing our surprise that instead of joining with us, he appears now in league with our enemies, and acting hostilely against us; as we mean to oblige Rághoba to fulfil all the promises and engagements which had been made him relative to his jághír.

Mr. Lewis presents to the Committee a paper, containing information relative to the march of a body of troops belonging to Moroba Fadanavis into the Konkan. On this we must observe, that however useful this body might be, it does not appear to us that this circumstance can effectually relieve our present main difficulty, which consists in the total improbability of any further supply of provisions but through the Konkan.

Upon due consideration of every circumstance, it is resolved instantly to send off copies of the minutes of yesterday's and this day's consultation, for the information of our superiors at Bombay; and unless the army of Tukoji Holkar does join us conformably to the assurances of Rághoba, it is farther resolved, however displeasing the circumstance may be, to secure effectually the preservation of our army, by falling back so far from this place, as is requisite to secure our communication with the Konkan, and that the Commander of the army must be instantly acquainted with this our resolution, in order that he may have time to concert the requisite means for putting it into execution.

As to the troops of Moroba said to be below the Ghárts, they will be of infinite service in conducting our supplies of provisons through the Konkan, and therefore the officer who commands them must be directed by the agent of Moroba Fadanavis to remain at Kampoli till he receives further directions from him. Mr. Frazer must be immediately acquainted with the circumstance of these troops being friendly to us, but directed not to suffer them to ascend through the pass he commands till further orders.

J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Mr. Sibbald this evening waited upon Rághoba by the Committee's directions to make known to him their resolutions of this day, which he delivered to the following effect: That Rághoba must be sensible that when the Governor and Select Committee first engaged by treaty, to support him and place him in the Regency of the Marátha Empire, that they were induced thereto by the assurances of being joined by a considerable body of troops belonging to Holkar and other Marátha Chiefs, who had entered into engagements with the late Mr. Mostyn to this effect, and which assurances had been repeatedly confirmed to the Committee by Rághoba himself, at their different meetings since leaving Bombay, till within these few days past. But that he himself now allowed matters were entirely altered, that he did not expect to be joined by any one, unless a defeat could be given to the ministerial army now in our front, which by their mode of proceeding in retreating as we advanced, appeared impracticable; that he must therefore allow that we were greatly deceived and disappointed in his assurances

and representations; and that so far from having any friends in the empire, that the whole empire was in arms against him, and Holkar amongst the rest, who was the person he seemed to have the most dependence upon; that it was with concern the Committee must observe that they had too good reason to believe that there subsisted a total want of confidence on the part of the Marátha Chiefs in his promises and assurances; and that no negotiation would ever be set on foot with them unless commenced by us. In this situation of affairs (as he was acquainted we had only sixteen days' provisions for the army) the Committee saw an absolute necessity of taking such measures as appeared to them eligible, without further dependence on him and had therefore sent to advise him that they were determined, in the name of the English Company to invite Holkar, Sindia and Sakhárám to a conference, and upon their showing an inclination to join the English in the present business, that we would guarantee to them their respective jághírs, together with all their other pretensions as officers of the Marátha State. After deliberating some time upon the subject of the Committee's message, he allowed that their reasons for their determinations were just; that he certainly did give us the strongest assurances of being joined by a large body of troops, in which he had found himself deceived. He allowed that Holkar appeared in arms against him, and that he had this day two guns firing upon our camps, but that conformable to his assurance all their shot had fallen short. He however earnestly requests the Committee would defer for one day writing to any of the Marátha Chiefs but Holkar, as he expected in the course of to-morrow a Vakil from Sindia, which a letter from the Committee might probably prevent, as he would from thence infer that we began to despair of success, which would of course encourage the whole of the ministerial party to hold out. Mr. Sibbald observed to him, that the loss of a day would be no great matter of consideration, had we any prospect of meeting with supplies of provisions for our army, but as that was not the case we had not an hour to lose. To this he replied that the care of supplying the army with provisions was his, and that he would furnish the Commissary from this town with a sufficient quantity for some days, and that we should get more at the next village.

The following letter was written:—

"To

THE HON'BLE WILLIAM HORNBY, ESQUIRE,
President and Select Committee,
Bombay.

"GENTLEMEN,—We addressed you on the 6th instant and now send a duplicate of that address.

On the 7th in the morning the army moved from the plain below Mondhurna to Carculla, on the 8th from Carculla to Wargaon, and on the 9th from Wargaon to this place, where we were given to expect they had assembled their whole force, and were determined to make a stand and oppose our advance. The event however has proved to us their determination of adhering to their plan of burning the towns, ravaging the country, harassing us and cutting off our supplies of provisions. We are informed that on Friday last, the 8th, at about noon, this town was given up first to be plundered, and on the evening of that day it was set on fire. We found it yesterday in flames as we entered, which was with so little opposition, that we are convinced they do not mean to hazard an engagement with us, but under some manifest disadvantage on our side. The mode they have invariably pursued is a very distant cannonade, and by movements with their horse harassing our men by constantly engaging our attention on every side.

For the sake of expedition we determined to send you immediately copies of the minutes of our consultations when met in Committee yesterday and to-day, which will fully inform you of our situation and intentions. We are informed that Sakháram, Nána, Holkar, Sindia, Bhimráv Pánsia and Hari Pant with other Chiefs are now in the field, and that the real number of their troops is about 25,000 horse.

We are with respect,
Gentlemen,
Yours, &c.,
J. CARNAC,
CHARLES EGERTON.

Talegaon, 10th January 1779.

" To

TUKOJI HOLKAR.

After compliments.

The agreements which you made with Mr. Mostyn are well known to you. The English army is now come to this place on their way to Poona, and I am much surprised that you had not yet acted according to your promise. If you have any doubts about what was promised you by Mr. Mostyn on the part of the Company, I must tell you that the Government of Bombay has given the full powers to settle these matters into my hands. I know what Mr. Mostyn told you; and I write this letter under the seal of the Company, to acquaint you, if you comply with your agreements, I will secure to you fully all that was promised by Mr. Mostyn, and the English friendship to you will last for ever. What can I say more?

J. CARNAC."

Monday, 11th.—At a Committee, present:

John Carnac, Esq., and Colonel Charles Egerton.

Read and approved the minutes of our last meeting.

The Committee meet to consider on the following report from Mr. Sibbald:—

That Raghunáthráv had told him, that finding the necessity of gaining over Sindia to his party, he had three days ago written him a letter, signifying to him that though the

Ministers had confederated against his Government and were destroying the State, yet it was ill in him and Holkar, the two ancient officers of the Sarkár, to abet them; that he wished to end everything amicably with them, and therefore offered them his friendship; and that if Sindia would send two persons to talk with him, whom he named, he trusted by their means to accommodate all differences; that he must not think he made this overture from any sense of an inability of opposing his enemies, or he held himself equal to it by the aid of the Europeans only, but that these Europeans in taking part in his quarrel sought only their own aggrandisements and to obtain the country which neither suited his views nor Sindia's. That Sindia had returned an answer, the purport of which was, that he had sent two persons who would communicate what he had to say on the subject; and if it then pleased Rághoba, he might send his orders, and the two men he requested should come. That Rághoba had sent back these two men, desiring Sindia's Vakils might be sent, and that he expected them this evening. He said his scheme in this was by a total compliance with the demands of Sindia to gain him over for the present, and afterwards he would do as he pleased; that he meant even to desire the Company's guarantee to his agreement with him.

Whilst the Committee was debating on this business, a message arrived from Rághunáth to Mr. Sibbald, who on his return acquainted the Committee, that Rághoba now told him that the two men he had sent back to Sindia had been prevented from going by a party of horse, and that therefore he could not expect the Vakils of Sindia to-night. But as the people were gone in the habit of Jogis, and as it was now three hours since he had sent them, he hoped they would get safe, and that he soon should have an answer.

Whatever importance the gaining over Sindia may be in our present situation, yet this uncertain ground we do not think sufficient to warrant any departure from our resolution of yesterday, particularly as it is now certain that though Holkar may not act against, yet that he cannot act for us. This Rághoba plainly declared, and in further confirmation Mr. Carnac now lays before the Committee a letter from Lieutenant Richardson, this instant received.

Resolved, therefore, that the Commander of the Army, Colonel Cockburn, who was present at this Committee and concurred in opinion with us, be directed to march back the army this night towards Khandála.

J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

To

Colonel GODDARD,

Commanding the English Forces from Bengal.

Sir,—You will no doubt ere this have received advice from the Select Committee at Bombay of our being appointed conjointly with Mr. Thomas Mostyn, who is since deceased, a Committee for conducting Raghunáthráv to Poona, and their directions for your communicating with us all important occasions.

Within these two days past the face of our affairs is so changed with respect to the primary cause that led to directing your march towards Thincer Fort in possession of Moroba Fadanavis that we must now give you the following desire :—

If you are joined by such a body of the forces of Mudáji Bhonsla, that you can advance forward in spite of any enemy, who with a large body of cavalry will keep hovering round you on all quarters, aiming at the seizure of your baggage and provisions; and if you have also a sufficient quantity of provisions to last you till you can either reach Broach or Surat, we would then advise you to proceed forward to either of those places as may be most convenient for your speedy arrival there. But if you think you cannot proceed forward in face of such an enemy as we have described, without immediate hazard of distress on your march from accidents happening to your provisions, of a supply of which you may not be certain till your arrival either at Broach or Surat, we then advise you to remain on the borders of the Berár country, or wherever you think you can secure provisions, till you can receive further directions from the Select Committee at Bombay.

We are, &c.,
J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Camp at Talegaon,
11th January 1779.

To

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM COCKBURN,
Commanding the English Forces now at Talegaon.

Sir,—Having maturely deliberated upon the necessity of the measure you are hereby directed to march back the army under your command towards the pass at Khandála as expeditiously as possible.

Talegaon, 11th January 1779.

We are &c.,
J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Tuesday, 12th.—The army fell back to the village of Wargaon.

Wednesday, 13th.—Received the following letter from the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay :—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,

and

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Gentlemen,—Having thought proper to promote Major Gaspar Dagon to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel we now enclose a Commission for him, signed by the Board, which you are accordingly to deliver to him.

We are very sorry to advise you that Mr. Mostyn departed this life the 1st instant at this place.[1]

Bombay Castle, 7th January 1779.

We are, &c.,
W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER."

Addressed the Hon'ble the Select Committee at Bombay in the following letter:—

"To

Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq.,
President, and Select Committee,
Bombay.

Gentlemen,—Agreeable to what was written you under the 9th instant from Talegaon, we fell back with the army to this place yesterday morning; and the enemy having by some means got intelligence of our moving, attacked us on the march before day-light, which they continued with great vigour until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Their numerous bodies of cavalry rendered it impossible to protect our baggage, a part of which consequently fell in their hands, as the Commanding Officer foretold would be the case; and it is with concern we acquaint you, that in the course of the very long attack our people yesterday sustained we suffered some loss, the particulars of which shall be hereafter transmitted. In justice to our troops, both Europeans and sepoys, we have the pleasure to acquaint you that they behaved with the utmost intrepidity and alacrity during the whole attack.

We shall continue our march to Khandála with all possible expedition, in the pursuit of which we expect to be much harassed; but to render our baggage as little troublesome as possible, and our body as compact as circumstances will admit, the Commanding Officer means to reduce every part of the baggage that is not absolutely necessary.

Wargaon, 13th January 1779.

We are, &c.,
J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON."

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[1] The Bombay Cathedral contains a tablet to the memory of Thomas Mostyn with the following inscription:—

Sacred to the memory of Thomas Mostyn, Esq., who died January 1st, 1779, aged 48 years. Skilful in the politics of Hindustan. He resided several years in a public character at the Mahratta Court. Of a cool discerning mind. He discharged his duty with Diligence, Firmness and Integrity. A faithful Servant of the East India Company. In private life he was blessed with mildness and gentleness of manners. A cheerful Companion. A benevolent Master. A steady sincere Friend.

Wednesday, 13th.—A Committee held to deliberate relative to overtures for the peaceable return of the army to Bombay. No minutes taken, being in a severe cannonade and a number of persons standing round.

Letter to the Peshwa sent by Rámsing.

Ditto from ditto in answer.

Ditto to ditto at night.

Thursday, 14th.—This morning Mr. Farmer was sent to the Marátha Camp to propose an accommodation which we judged might be brought about by Rághoba going over to Sindia, which he seemed determined to do, rather than run the risk of another day's march with our army, as he declared his fears of its proving fatal both to him and us, so great an idea does he seem to entertain of the enemy's strength. We directed Mr. Farmer to deliver the following message to the Darbár: That having had assurances given us, that the establishment of Rághoba in the Regency of the Marátha Empire was a measure much wished for by many of the Sardárs of the Marátha Sarkár, as well as by the country in general, we had consented to conduct him with an English army for that purpose, but contrary to our hopes and expectations we found his establishment opposed by the whole empire; that we had seen with infinite concern the country laid waste and destroyed at our approach, which being so very contrary to our intentions by espousing the cause of Rághoba, that we were determined to be the occasion of no farther desolation and were therefore resolved to march back with the army to Bombay; that after this declaration we expected all hostilities would cease, and by so doing, peace and friendship would be established between the English and Marátha State. If on the other hand should we experience the least act of hostility on our march we should consider it as a declaration of war against the English nation.

Received the following letter, with a note written in cipher, from Mr. Farmer:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,

and

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Gentlemen,—I was conducted to the top of a high hill, where I was presented to Mahádji Sindia, Nána Fadanavis and Hari Pant Fadkia as to the Darbár, and delivered them your letter. They appointed Hari Pant Fadkia and Dádji Pant Pansia to talk with me, and deliver their answers. I explained the cause of our coming in the manner you directed; and the reason of our return. I left it to them to accept on one hand the friendship of the English nation by suffering us to return peaceably, or their enmity by molesting us on our march. After many exclamations for our coming thus uninvited, and representing the great charges and loss their State had sustained by the aid given to Rághoba, their final answer is this, that if we wish to remain at peace with them, Raghunáthráv must be delivered up, and then we may return quietly, otherwise we may do as we please. I write surrounded with people, not permitted to go down to my chest for paper, and hardly permitted to have my palanquin brought up, and I am to wait your final answer, regarding which I dare not venture any opinion.

I am, &c.,

W. FARMER.

Marátha Camp, 14th January 1779."

The purport of the note received from Mr. FARMER written in cipher.

They are fully informed of your state. I see no remedy, but either to give Sindia to understand through Rághoba that you shall push on with him in your hand at all peril, or to treat with them whilst you have him, which must still be on their own terms. Of provisions there are no hopes.

As Rághoba has already intimated his intentions of delivering himself up to Sindia rather than run the risk of marching with our army, and has in consequence carried on a correspondence with Sindia for 2 days past, we think, in the present situation of affairs, it is most advisable to write to Mr. Farmer, that all difficulties of accommodation are removed by Rághoba's design of going over to Sindia; and that we expect in consequence the proper securities from the Darbár, for our proceeding unmolested on our march.

Sent off the following letter to Mr. Farmer at 10 o'clock this morning:—

"To

MR. WILLIAM GAMUL FARMER.

SIR,—We have just received your letter, and have answer to acquaint you that we do not conceive there will be any difficulty in complying with the proposition of the Ministers, as Rághoba has just informed us of his desire to deliver himself up to Mahádji Sindia at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning, in consequence of a conference he had this morning with his Vakils; and upon his so doing we have no doubt that the Ministers will give us proper security on their part for a due performance of the terms now proposed, and that you will return with them. Mr. Sibbald will accompany Rághoba to Sindia's encampment.

We are, &c.,
J. CARNAC.
CHARLES EGERTON.

Wárgaon Camp, 14th January 1779."

Friday, 15th.—This morning Mr. Farmer's servant returned with the following letter despatched last night:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, ESQUIRE,

AND

COLONEL CHARLES EGERTON.

GENTLEMEN,—I waited on the top of the hill where the Darbár sat till near sunset, when I received yours; and having sent to acquaint Hari Pant Fadkia with an answer being come, he conducted me to Nána Fadanavis. I there told them that the difficulty which I apprehended was removed by the determination of Rághoba to surrender himself to Mahádji Sindia; and I now imagined the Darbár would preserve the friendship of the English nation by suffering our army to return quietly to Bombay. Nána Fadanavis said, as we had broken the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, before our army moved we must agree to remain as we were by our treaty with the late Peshwa Nána. I observed, that in the morning, the only difficulty that was started was relative to Rághoba, who had smoothed it by consenting to surrender himself; that I desired at once an explicit answer whether or not hostages would be given for the march of the army

to Bombay if Rághoba did surrender himself. They then said they must consult with Mahádji Sindia. I then withdrew; and after some time Hari Pant came again to me, and told me I might go to my tent to-night, and that an answer would be delivered to me in the morning. But I insisted on a clear and positive answer instantly to that question relative to hostages for our proceeding unmolested if Dáda Sáheb was permitted to surrender himself to Sindia. Hari Pant went back, and I was soon after introduced into a Darbár, where Mahádji Sindia entirely presided. Hari Pant was there, and other persons whom I did not know. After stating the business which I came on this morning, which related only to the two questions whether they would suffer us to proceed peaceably to Bombay, or whether they would declare war by molesting us, and reminding him of the objection relative to the person of Rághoba being removed by his voluntary consent to surrender himself, I desired an explicit answer. He said, that as to the surrender of Rághoba it mattered little; that we must settle a new treaty with the Marátha State, the one made by Colonel Upton being entirely broken by the present invasion of their country. In a few words they seem to me to feel themselves in that situation with respect to us, which the Turkish Vizier felt himself in with respect to Peter I., at the time the Empress Catharine sent in her jewels to the Vizier. I dare not speak any plainer; but by their language you may judge what they think; in any situation whatever they could not speak in a higher tone. The result of my conversation with Sindia was, that whether it was peace or war it was equal to him; but that having broken the treaty made with Colonel Upton, we must on the spot set about forming a new one to serve as a future between the Marátha State and the English. I told him, that my business at first related only to the two points of their permiting us to proceed peaceably or not; that I had then further to desire an explicit answer relative to the wilful surrender of the person of Rághoba. To both which he replied, that exclusive of this, a peace must now be settled betwixt the Marátha State and the English on the spot. That I had no directions about this; but I would communicate to you this night what he said and get an answer to-morrow morning. Although my heart is full yet I must restrain my pen; nor dare I by any means in such a case offer any mark to guide you by. I beg a speedy answer to this and remain with respect,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

W. G. FARMER.

P.S.—I waited on the hill where the Darbár met till past 7; and where I was then led and how conducted the bearer will inform you. I am afraid no good will come from my deputation though I risk my life. By want of food and watching I am fatigued to death, so you will excuse my writing.

11 o'clock, 14th January."

Colonel Cockburn being called upon by the Committee to give his opinion in writing relative to the practicability of marching back the army to Bombay, delivers in the following:—

"Being called upon for my opinion on the possibility of making a retreat to Bombay, I must declare that I think the same utterly impracticable. Our troops are already much harassed and dispirited from the necessity we were under of retiring from Talegaon; and were we to sustain another attack from the Marátha army, I am of opinion the troops would not stand it; and that consequently the whole army with its numerous followers, would be cut to pieces. But the distance from Panvel being about forty-five miles, it is not the attack of one day we should have to sustain, as I think were it possible to move from hence, that we could not gain that place in 20 days; and it is therefore chimerical to the last degree to suppose that our small army could support themselves from the daily attacks they would be certain of for so long a period. I therefore cannot charge myself to conduct the army under these circumstances to

Bombay; and humanity must prompt some other method than an attempt to retire in the face of the whole strength of the Máratha Empire with such a handful of men, who must in such case be sacrificed.

W. COCKBURN.

Camp at Wargaon, 15th January 1779."

We observe with concern, that the enemy appears too sensible of our present very disagreeable situation from the dictatorial strain in which they now deliver themselves. It is, however, necessary we think to advise Mr. Farmer that we have no powers to enter into or to conclude any treaties, such powers being lodged solely with the Governor General and Council of Bengal; but if the Darbár will abide by their first proposal, we are ready to agree to it on our part:—

'To

Mr. WILLIAM GAMUL FARMER.

Sir,—We received your letter of last night only an hour ago, the harkárás having been detained by some accident. In answer to which you must acquaint the Darbár, that they demand what we have no power to agree to, the entering into and concluding treaties being solely confined to the Governor General and Council of Calcuttta, to whom therefore they must send their Vakils. The only power left to us, is the giving up the cause and person of Rághunáthráv, which done, must certainly put an end to all disputes between the English and the Marátha State, and there is no doubt that peace and friendship will then subsist between us from henceforward.

You must inform them, should we enter into any treaty we should only deceive them, having no such powers; we therefore desire they will immediately acquaint us, whether upon our abiding by the conditions first proposed of delivering up Rághoba, they will comply on their part by suffering us to march unmolested to Bombay, and for which purpose to give us the necessary securities.

We are, Sir,
Your, &c.,
J. CARNAC,
CHARLES EGERTON.

Wargaon, 15th January 1779."

As we have good reason to believe that a gentleman being sent from us to Mahádji Sindia is more likely to produce an accommodation than a depution to the Darbár in general; Resolved immediately to despatch Mr. Thomas Holmes, who has offered himself for that purpose; and to give him full powers to settle with the Darbár for the peaceable return of the army to Bombay, on such conditions as he may be able to obtain, since it is the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief that a retreat is impracticable.

At noon to-day received the following letter from Mr. Farmer, dated this morning, which it is now unnecessary to answer, as Mr. Holmes is despatched with full powers:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,

AND

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Gentlemen.—I am this instant arrived at the Darbár, where your letter was delivered to me by Appáji Bháu, on the part of Mahádji Sindia, as representing the Darbár. He desired to be informed of the contents; when I explained what you said relative to the want of powers, and

desired an explicit answer relative to the single proposition, whether on the delivery of Rághoba, securities would be given for our safe and unmolested arrival at Bombay. He observed in answer, that if you had not powers to make new treaties, he wished to see by what powers you broke that made by Colonel Upton, by the aid given to Rághoba, and desired an explicit answer whether or not it was by virtue of any direct authority from the Governor General and Council; that if it was, he desired to see that authority, in order that he might look to them about it. I told him this was foreign to the business, and that I requested the explicit answer mentioned in your letter; but he insists first knowing by what authority you acted, because, if you acted on your own authority you must answer it, and make a new agreement. A true translation of your letter was demanded of me, and I was given to understand, that if I did not give one, there were people in the camps who understood English. I am sorry for it because your own declarations seem to preclude all peaceable arrangements. After much talk I brought the matter to this point, that in respect to what was past, we expected everything to be forgotten in consequence of our returning back; that Dádá Sáheb had cost us many lákhs of rupees; that all we had now left of him was his person; that I desired to know whether on the delivery of his person our army should be permitted to proceed quietly to Bombay without further dispute, and whether securities would be given for that purpose? The answer I received is plainly this, that Dádá Sáheb may be surrendered or not as we please; but till a new treaty is made between the English and the Marátha State our army must remain where it is, whatever may be the consequence.

I am, &c.,

W. G. FARMER.

Marátha Çamp, 15th January 1779."

This night about 10 o'clock Mr. Holmes returned from the Marátha camp, and advises us that he has settled matters with Mahádji Sindia and the rest of the Darbár, for the peaceable return of the army to Bombay on the only conditions they would hear of, and which are such as cannot fail to fill us with the deepest concern, being humiliating in the highest degree, and which nothing but the avowed opinion and declaration of the principal officers as to the impracticability of executing our retreat could justify our acceding to. We must however observe, that Mahádji Sindia and the whole Darbár cannot plead ignorance of our want of powers to conclude such a treaty as they have now prescribed to us; they having demanded both a true explanation and translation of our letter of yesterday to Mr. Farmer, wherein we expressly direct him to acquaint them, that we have no powers to enter into any treaty whatever; that were we to pretend such powers, we should be only deceiving them, so they have evidently compelled us to enter into a treaty they were apprised we had no power to agree to.

Saturday, 16th.—Mr. Holmes returned this morning to Sindia's encampment, in order to finish the agreemeent, of which a rough sketch was yesterday drawn out.

This evening Messrs. Farmer and Holmes returned from the Marátha camp with Sindia's Vakils, in order for their having an interview with us, and to see the treaty entered into duly executed; of which a translation is hereafter entered, as also of a separate article in favour of Mahádji Sindia which Messrs. Farmer and Holmes advise us they were obliged to consent to:—

Translation of the Articles of Agreements between Shrimant MÁDHAVRÁV NÁRÁYAN *Pandit Pradhán on one part, and the* ENGLISH COMPANY *on the other part.*

In the time of the late Shrimant Pandit Pradhán Mádhavráv Ballál matters went on peaceably. Since then the English obtained possession of several places belonging to the Sárkar, such as the islands of Sálsette and Uran, Jambusar, and the Mahals and Parganas of Broach, both

belonging to the Sarkár and the Gáikawár, and the English gave their aid to Raghunáthráv Dáda Sáheb, upon which war having commenced, Colonel John Upton came from Calcutta with full powers and made an agreement; and according to that agreement matters were to go on between the Company and the Marátha Sarkár. But on the side of the English this agreement was not adhered to; they having given aid to Raghunáthráv, and making preparations for war, mounted the Gháts, invaded the districts of the Marátha Sarkárs, and began to make hostilities; upon which the Sarkárs also prepared for war. At the district of Wargaon near Indonny Talegaon, Mr. John Carnac and Colonel Charles Egerton, of the Select Committee of Bombay, being fully empowered, did depute Mr. Thomas Holmes and Mr. Farmer. Farther, from the beginning there was a friendship between the Sarkár and the English; which being interrupted, Colonel John Upton made an agreement, according to which treaty matters did not proceed, and therefore that treaty is annihilated; and in the same manner and on the same footing as the English and the Sarkár were in the time of the late Mádhavráv, in that manner are they now to remain, the aid and cause of Rághoba to be given up, no protection to be afforded him, nor any aid to be afforded to the enemies of the Marátha Sarkár. The islands of Sálsette and Uran, and the other islands and places at Jambusar, and the Maháls of Broach, formerly belonging to the Marátha Sarkár and the Gáikawár, such as Chikhli, &c., were taken passession of; these we give up, and agree to go on and remain as we were in the time of the late Peishwa Mádhavráv Ballál Pandit Pradhán. Upon which this agreement is made with the Sarkár. That in the time of the late Mádhavráv Ballál Pandit Pradhán matters went on peaceably; and since then different places belonging to the Sarkár, such as the islands of Salsette and Uran and other islands, and farther Jambusar and other Maháls, and the ammils of Broach belonging to the Sarkár and to the Gáikawár the English got possession of these must be delivered back to the Sarkár, and no aid or protection must be afforded to Raghunáthráv or to any of the enemies of the Sarkár. In this manner do we faithfully promise to perform, and on the part of the Sarkár good faith is also to be observed. Raghunáthráv Dáda Sáheb was with us. He by his own force and consent committed himself with all his effects to the care of Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia. The English army with us is now at Wargaon. It must be permitted to proceed with all its effects and appurtenanees to Bombay; and as security for this on the part of the Sarkár two persons will proceed belonging to each of these Sardárs, by name Nazoo Ganesh and Wisáji Krishna, Bhálleráv Govind and Rana Khán, to conduct the army to Bombay; and for this purpose troops shall be sent with you or not as you please. The English army that is with us shall not offer any molestation to any person on the road. The Antrewede and Bundelkhand provinces, and their Sardárs being always under the Sarkár, no damage is to be done to them; and the English army from Calcutta having crossed the Narbada is now at Hussengábád, it is not to be permitted to proceed forward, but is to be sent back to Calcutta, and on the road no molestation is to be given to any one. The above-mentioned agreement is formed by the mediation of Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia, and according to it matters are in future to proceed without any kind of failure. This we pledge the English faith to observe and the Sarkár is also to observe it. No aid or protection to be afforded to the French.[1]

In the Marátha Camp by	In the English Camp by
THOMAS HOLMES.	JOHN CARNAC.
W. G. FARMER.	CHARLES EGERTON.

[1] Mr. Carnac minuted on the proceedings of the Select Committee at Bombay, 16th March 1779: "That having, since his return from the expedition, perused the translation of the treaty and separate articles, he finds them couched in such terms, that he should certainly have objected thereto at the time of signature, had they been literally explained to him; and indeed was the more indifferent as to the particular wording of them, as he always bore in his mind the idea that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by his superiors."

Agreement of John Carnac, Esquire, and Colonel Charles Egerton, and English Committee of Bombay, with Mahádji Sindia.

That after falling out with the Sarkár of Mádhavráv Náráyan Pandit Pradhán, we with an army came upon the Ghát and remained at Talegaon; on which you ordered a fighting and we both parties did fight, in which we were defeated, returned back and encamped at Wargaon with Dáda Sáheb. We could hardly reach Bombay with our army and stores; considering which we sent Messrs. Farmer and Holmes to you, desiring you would come between us, and get the Sarkár's and our treaty settled as before and conduct us and the army to Bombay, on which you did suspend the war. You came between us, and got the Sarkár's and English treaty settled, and you promised to conduct us and the army to Bombay, without molestation from any body. You made our escape entirely; all which we took into our consideration and were very glad. You are a principal officer and well wisher to this Government, which has induced us to keep friendship with you. This came into our mind, and we were satisfied that you made us free from the Sarkár's and every body's molestations and got the treaty settled as before without any dispute from the Sarkár. Therefore we thought we should serve you and for which reason have of our free will and accord agreed under the King's and Company's seal to deliver up to you the fort of Broach with its government in the same manner as the Mogal did hold it, which fort is now in our possession and which we have given you. We further agree that we will on our arrival at Bombay obtain the Governor's dastak under the King's seal to the Killedár of Broach and deliver the fort and its country, in the manner the Mogal did hold it up to you; under oath no dispute shall arise in this. This we promise solemnly, and we have left Mr. Farmer and Mr. Charles Stewart with you as hostages for the performance of this agreement. We will let no dispute arise. This we agree to in writing.

Dated at Wargaon near Talegaon, 27 Julheze.

N.B.—The above was translated by a native linquist, and is an exact copy thereof.

Sunday, 17th.—This morning Mr. Farmer returned to the Marátha Camp with Mahádji Sindia's Vakil, with the papers executed, and by whom we sent Mahádji Sindia a present of a horse. He came back to our camp about noon, with a party of horsemen, who are to accompany the army to Panvel; and acquaints us we may march immediately, and that the hostages mentioned in the treaty will overtake us before we reach the village of Kárla. The army marched this afternoon at one o'clock and reached Thámsetta about six in the evening.

Monday, 18th.—At 5 this morning the army marched from Thámsetta and arrived at Khandála about one o'clock.

Tuesday, 19th.—This morning despatched the following letter to Colonel Goddard:—

"To

Colonel GODDARD.

Sir,—We despatched you on the 16th a letter containing orders which, upon recollection, we do not think ourselves authorized to give you; you are therefore to pay no regard thereto.

We are, Sir,
Yours, &c.,
J. CARNAC,
CHARLES EGERTON."

Kampoli, 19th January 1779.

The letter which we mention in the foregoing to have written Colonel Goddard under the 16th instant is not entered upon our diary as Mr. Farmer carried the original letter with him to the Marátha Camp, and it escaped him to leave a copy. The purport however was to advise Colonel Goddard that the face of things was so materially altered since writing to him

last, as to occasion our marching back to Bombay, and that in consequence of an agreement entered into by us with the Marátha State, we now directed him to march back with the army under his command to Bengal.

This morning the army moved down the Ghát to Kampoli.

Wednesday, 20th.—This evening received a pair of harkárás with the following letter from the Hon'ble the Select Committee:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, Esquire,

AND

Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

Gentlemen,—We have received your letter of the 6th instant, and having fully considered your representation of the state of affairs, we are of opinion, that the best and most effectual way to improve your own situation, and to induce Rághoba's friends to declare openly in his favour, will be for our army to advance with vigour and expedition towards Poona; and we now accordingly send instructions to that effect to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, to whom we find Colonel Egerton had delivered over the command. Colonel Egerton's bad state of health and the death of Mr. Mostyn rendering it necessary to make a new arrangement in the Poona Committee, we have resolved to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn and Mr. James Sibbald to supply the places of the aforesaid gentlemen in that committee, with the same powers and instructions as given to the former Committee by our Commission and general letter bearning date the 5th of last month, and hereby appoint John Carnac, Esq., Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn and Mr. James Sibbald to be a Committee accordingly for the uses and purposes mentioned in our said Commission and letter of instructions; observing nevertheless, that this appointment is not to take place unless Colonel Egerton's bad state of health should still continue to disqualify him for public business, or to oblige him to return to Bombay; in either of which cases Mr. Carnac is to act jointly with the above-named gentlemen in manner aforesaid, and this letter will be to him a sufficient warrant. Our appointment of Major Dagon to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, has anticipated your application on that subject; but we cannot consent to send to the army the other officers you mention. The President has written very plainly to Rághoba our sentiments respecting the circumstances mentioned in your letter; and we think a very good method to bring the matter to a proof would be for you to desire Rághoba to deliver to Moroba Fadanavis' Vakil an order to the Killedár of Ahmadnagar for his release. And to open the communication through the Konkan by affording relief to the post at the head of the Gháts, which we are much surprised has been left destitute of all kind of supplies, we have determined on sending a detachment of a company of Europeans, three of sepoys with two field pieces, and a party of artillerymen under the command of Captain Richardson to clear the roads between Panvel and Kampoli of the Marátha horse which we learn are hovering in these parts, and to convey a supply of provisions to that post. The party is to be a separate command and not to be considered as belonging to the army now above the Gháts.

We have just received a letter from the Governor-General and Council, of which we shall send you a copy when the roads are open. The contents in short are, that they have given Colonel Goddard full powers to conclude a treaty with Mudáji Bhonsla, for which reason they think it necessary to revoke the control they had given us over that detachment, though they observe, their intention is not to withdraw the services of the detachment entirely from the support of any measures we might have formed in reliance of such support if those measures shall not prove incompatible with the instructions given to Colonel Goddard, and with the

engagements he may form in consequence. We shall however immediatly describe our present situation to Colonel Goddard, who on the 22nd ultimo was still at Hussengábád, and press him to march towards Poona.

Bombay Castle,
11th January 1779.

We are, &c.,
W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER."

The following letter to Colonel Cockburn was enclosed in the foregoing one to the Committee:—

"To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL COCKBURN.

SIR,—As we find Colonel Egerton has been obliged by bad health to resign to you the chief command of the army, we judge it proper to observe to you that from the representations we have received of the state of affairs it appears very necessary the army should advance with the utmost vigour and expedition towards Poona, in order to give spirits to Rághoba's friends and and secure provisions for our own troops. We shall therefore trust to your activity and zeal for the service that no time be lost in moving forward, or measures neglected to distress and frustrate the attempts of the enemy.

Bombay Castle,
11th January 1779.

We are, &c.,
W. HORNBY.
D. DRAPER."

Thursday, 21st.—At half past five this morning the army marched from Kampoli and came to their ground at Chauk at one o'clock.

Received on the road the following letter from Mr. Farmer:—

"To

JOHN CARNAC, ESQUIRE,

AND

COLONEL CHARLES EGERTON.

GENTLEMEN,—The Darbár have appointed on their part Ganesh Hari, and Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia on their part Apáji to see the different articles on the late agreement performed; they bring with them the requisite letter from the Darbár and from these sardárs; and they farther desired one from me to introduce them to you and signify their being the persons so appointed.

In the articles of Darbár expenses, which formed part of the late stipulation for the unmolested march of the army to Bombay, it was settled that a thousand rupees should be paid to Chobdárs, &c., belonging to the Darbár of Mahádji Sindia, and the like sum to the Darbár servants of Nána Fadanavis; you will please to pay the whole amount immediatly to Apáji, who is responsible to them; and for the other sums settled for secret services, I could wish the notes should, if possible, be returned to me.

Mahádji Sindia sent yesterday to acquaint me that as he was security to the Darbár for the due performance of the late stipulations, he desired that Mr. Stewart and I would accompany him wherever he went. The change is very agreeable to me in every shape, as he treats us with great civility and attention; and the cultivating a proper connection with him seems to me the only mode to retrieve the sad sacrifices we have been compelled to make in capitulating for the safe and unmolested retreat of our army to Bombay. Whatever he may have to propose I believe will be through Apáji Shivji, who seems to possess much of his confidence, and to whom I would therefore venture to propose a particular attention should be shown, keeping everything that he may propose or mention a secret from the Agent of the Darbár.

I could wish that a pair of pattamars should be sent me as soon as possible to despatch any advices I may have to send.

I am with respect, Gentlemen,
Your, &c.,
W. G. FARMER.

Camp near Talegaon, 19th January 1779."

Friday, 22nd.—This morning Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton took their leave of the army and set out for Panvel, where they arrived about noon, and reached Bombay the same evening.

It escaped us to notice under the 16th instant, that we found the prevailing custom of giving presents among the officers and others of the Darbár, was not to be dispensed with, and that their expectations were very considerable. We however settled this charge by means of Apáji Shivji, for the sum of Rs. 41,000 to be paid to him on his arrival at Bombay; and he made himself answerable to the dependants of the Darbár for this amount.

Report from Lieutenant RICHARDSON *to Colonel* EGERTON *as noticed in Committee held the 11th instant.*

SIR,—Agreeably to your desire I send you the information that I received last night on examining two men that Rághoba had sent to Tukoji Holkar. They told me that there was no hope of his joining us until we had beat the ministerial army; that Holkar declared himself thoroughly acquainted with our situation; that our force did not exceed four battalions, and with that number we could never expect to reduce the Marátha Empire; that his force added to ours would give us very little more weight; that by joining Rághoba, he risked everything without the smallest prospect of advantage to himself; therefore all that he could promise was to be neutral; and though he might be obliged to bring his troops into the field, yet he engaged they should not fight against Rághoba. I have further to inform you that in a private conversation with Rághoba, two days ago, he told me that he had deceived the Governor in the hopes he had given of people joining him; but that he had been deceived himself, and that he was ashamed of it, as he now found he had been led into an error by false promises.

I am, Sir,
Your, &c.,
WILLIAM RICHARDSON.

Talegaon, 11th January 1779.

Minutes of the Consultation held by the Poona Committee at Wargaon the 15th January, which Colonel Egerton disavows and protests against, and to authenticate it Mr. Carnac has brought the evidence of Mr. Sibbald, the Secretary, Colonel Hartley, and Mr. Holmes, as per their letters entered the diary of the Select Committee under the 10th of March 1779.[1]

Camp at Wargaon, 15th January 1779.

At a Committee, present:

JOHN CARNAC, Esq., and Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

The Committee now meet to take into their serious consideration measures necessary to be immediately pursued for extricating the army from its present very critical situation, surrounded

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[1] The following are the letters above referred to:—

Letter from Mr. JAMES SIBBALD.

To

MR. EDWARD RAVENSCROFT,
Secretary.

SIR,—I have received your letter of yesterday's date acquainting me that the Hon'ble the Select Committee require of me a clear and full statement of the circumstances relative to a meeting of the Poona Committee at Vargaon the 15th of January. In answer to which I have to acquaint them, that being desired on that morning to

as it is by the whole strength of the Marátha Empire, and with only about ten days' provisions in camp.

It is judged necessary to have the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, now in command of the army, as to the practicability of effecting our retreat to Bombay, who is accordingly called in.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn delivers in his written opinion, as entered hereafter.

Colonel Egerton's opinion being also required, declares, his sentiments are the same with those of Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn; that a retreat in our present situation is impracticable, and if attempted, the consequences must be the loss of the whole army.

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attend at Colonel Egerton's tent, in consequence of a letter just received from Mr. Farmer of the 14th, I concluded that the meeting was a Committee, and prepared to take minutes accordingly, by beginning the usual preamble; but the immediate despatch of the answer to Mr. Farmer's letter being required, I did nothing more while in the tent that morning than writing the letter to Mr. Farmer and taking a transcript of it for the diary; but so soon after as I got a place to write in, which I believe was the next day, I took minute of what passed in argument on the 15th to the best of my recollection, which I showed to Mr. Carnac, and he thought them nearly expressive of his own sentiments, but not deeming this sufficiently full, he then delivered me his opinion at large, when a fair copy was made of the minutes, and signed by him, and afterwards presented by me to Colonel Egerton.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
JAMES SIBBALD.

Bombay, 2nd March 1779.

Letter from Mr. James Hartley to John Carnac, Esquire.

Sir,—In answer to your letter of yesterday, where you desire to know if I recollect what passed in Colonel Egerton's tent at Wargaon on the 15th of January last, I have to inform you that I perfectly remember you there declared, (where Colonel Egerton, Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, Mr. Sibbald, Mr. Holmes and myself were present,) that you were decidedly of opinion that the army ought at all events to attempt a retreat, and not submit to the mortifying terms proposed by the enemy; but that as Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn declared their opinion, that the army could not make good their retreat, and that the troops would not stand another attack, you could not take upon yourself under such circumstances to press a retreat.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Bombay, 5th March 1779.

Letter from Mr. Thomas Holmes to John Carnac, Esquire.

Sir,—I have a perfect recollection of the opinions delivered at the meeting held in Colonel Egerton's tent at Wargaon the 15th January last, where yourself, Colonel Egerton, Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley, Mr. Sibbald and myself were present, and I well remember you declared in presence of us all that you were decidedly of opinion the army ought at all events attempt a retreat rather than submit to the extravagant terms proposed by the enemy; but that as the principal officers, Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, had declared it as their opinion the army could not make a good retreat and that the troops would not stand another attack, you could not, under such circumstances, take upon you singly to press a retreat.

I am with great regard,
Sir,
Your very obedient Servant,
THOMAS HOLMES.

Bombay, 9th March 1779.

Mr. Carnac is so convinced the army is sufficiently numerous, and so well provided with artillery, as to be able to force their way back against all opposition, if the officers and men will do their duty, that there is no doubt with him the attempt ought to be made at all events, rather than submit to the terms prescribed by the enemy, to which we have no authority to bind our employers; and for his own part he declares he would much sooner run his share of the risk than that they should be complied with. However as Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn have given it as their positive opinions that the troops will not stand, and consequently must be cut to pieces, Mr. Carnac dares not take upon himself singly to press a retreat, which it is pronounced must be inevitably attended with consequences that cannot fail endangering the preservation of the settlement. He therefore reluctantly and contrary to his own sentiments, finds himself obliged to concur in the acceptance of whatever conditions can be obtained. Allowing therefore that the opinions of Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn to be well founded (in which we are given to understand many officers of the army also concur), there seems to be no other resource left, but to accept of such conditions as can be obtained from the enemy.[1]

J. CARNAC.

Copies of letters from Lieutenant-Colonel COCKBURN *to the Hon'ble the* PRESIDENT, *from the 6th January 1779, the day he received charge from Colonel Egerton, until his return to Bombay, the 25th following.*

HON'BLE SIR,—Colonel Egerton from his very bad state of health finds himself unable to attend to the duties of Commander-in-Chief, and has been obliged on that account to deliver over the command of the troops to me. I take this opportunity of acquainting you therewith as also of what has happened since I took charge, which was yesterday.

In the morning of the 6th the army left Carla and had proceeded about two miles, when the enemy appeared in front on the summit of a rising ground, and cannonaded us from four or five pieces of cannon, upon which I ordered the line to be formed. As soon as it was done, the whole marched on and attacked them with the greatest spirit and alacrity, and drove them from their ground in a very short time; they retreated before we could get near enough to fire either grape shot or musquetry at them. We continued pursuing and cannonading them for near two miles. Several of their horses were seen on the ground, and it is said Bhimráv Pansiá's nephew was killed and his Sar Nobat two days before. Our loss was as follows:—

Europeans wounded	1
Sepoys killed ...	...
Do. wounded ...	...

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[1] The Secret Committee came to the following conclusion with regard to Mr. Carnac's conduct in this matter: "It cannot be doubted, that Mr. Carnac continued in possession of authority without control, except to make treaties; he was confident, if the officers and men did their duty, that the army was sufficiently numerous and so well provided with artillery as to be able to force their way back against all opposition; he had no doubt but the attempt ought to have been made; his words are—'At all events rather than submit to the terms prescribed by the enemy;' yet under all circumstances rather than press a retreat he ventured to pledge the English faith in the most solemn and sacred manner, for the observance of treaties of which, he owns, he did not at the time expect the confirmation. * * *And your Committee do not find that any censure has been passed on Mr. John Carnac at Bombay, nor that any enquiry has been made by the Select Committee into his conduct and behaviour during the late expedition. And upon the most impartial review of the whole conduct of Mr. Carnac during the late expedition towards Poona and after duly considering all the circumstances relative thereto the Committee are unanimously of opinion that Mr. John Carnac be dismissed from his office as one of the Council and Select Committee of Bombay."

The army marched this morning to this village, which is not more than two miles and a half from our last encampment. We passed the river twice at very difficult passes, and it was near one o'clock before all our baggage was got up. The enemy did not interrupt us on our march to-day, but after we came to our ground they fired at us at about two miles distance, and though some of their shot fell in our camp they did us no damage.

The army marches to-morrow morning and I hope to reach Talegaon, or near it.

Lieutenant Noyes of the Artillery died on the 5th instant, and I have put Lieutenant Thomas in orders as Adjutant in his room at the recommendation of Major Dagon, which I hope will meet with your approbation.

I have the honor to be with great respect,

Hon'ble Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble Servant,

WILLIAM COCKBURN.

Careala Camp,
7th January 1779.

Hon'ble Sir,—I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th instant this morning. You are pleased to say that from the accident happened to Colonel Cay and the bad accounts you have of Colonel Egerton's health you look to me for the accomplishment of the present undertaking. I had the honor of addressing you yesterday when I informed you that Colonel Egerton had been under the necessity, on account of his bad state of health, to give over the command of the army to me on the 6th instant. I gave you also some account of our operations since that time.

I am truly sensible of the great importance of the present enterprize, and I consider myself bound by the strictest sense of duty, independent of every other inducement, to exert myself to the very utmost of my abilities to advance and bring to a happy conclusion the present service. Give me leave to assure you that I cannot for a moment lose sight of this grand object, and that nothing else shall occupy my care and attention while anything depending on me remains to bid me that can in the smallest degree contribute to that end.

I am equally sensible how necessary it is to the good of the service that a good understanding and harmony should be maintained between Mr. Carnac and me. I most sincerely wish it, and it shall be my study on all occasions to preserve it by every means in my power.

You cannot have a higher opinion of Captain Hartley than I have, and I am so well convinced of his great abilities as an officer and exceeding zeal to promote the service that he justly merits every attention and confidence from me. He was appointed by Colonel Egerton to take the command of the Grenadier Corps when it became vacant a few days ago by the most lamentable and unfortunate accident of the death of Captain Stewart.

You may depend on being constantly advised of our proceedings. The army marched this morning to this village about 5½ miles without meeting with any opposition from the enemy on the way. When we were near they began cannonading us from a rising ground in front, from which we suffered nothing, and it was returned by some of Rághoba's guns.

The army marches at 4 o'clock to-morrow and I expect to reach Talegaon early. The enemy have collected all their force near that place, and I am informed mean to give us battle there. I have added an 8 inch howitzer on this occasion to Captain Hartley's advanced division, as it will be useful to dislodge them from a Tope in the way, where they are to place some cannon.

I think myself much obliged by your kind wishes for my health and success. Accept of ours for your health.

I have, &c.,

Baragaum, 8th January 1779. WILLIAM COCKBURN.

P.S.—I had not an opportunity of sending you this letter last night. I have now to acquaint you that the army marched to this place this morning. When we came within a mile of the village the enemy began to cannonade our line from some guns they had placed on the left beyond a gully, and although they kept up a very brisk fire upon us while we were so fortunate as to suffer very little from it. I have not yet heard of above two sepoys killed during the whole time they have fired to-day from 6 to 12 o'clock. We fired a good deal also both in advancing and after we came to our ground and drove their whole force before us to the other side of the village. It is said they have 60,000 fighting men and are composed of the troops of Sakhárám Bápu, Nána, Sindia, Holkar and Hari Pant; they have been in sight all day and appear very numerous. Bhimráv Pansia's party came round in our rear as we advanced and attacked our rear guard, but was beat off by it and some of Rághoba's guns. They have burnt this fine village to the ground last night.

Talegaon, 9th January 1779.

Hon'ble Sir,—I did myself the honor of informing you of our arrival at Talegaon on the 9th instant. We halted there the 10th and 11th, and it being determined by the Committee, that the army could not proceed any farther, but was under the necessity of retreating immediately, I accordingly gave out orders for the march at 11 o'clock at night in hopes of leaving our ground at that hour to gain a day's march of the enemy before they could know of this step; but in this I was disappointed, for I found they had intelligence of it before we moved, which must have been conveyed to them by some treacherous persons about Rághoba. About two o'clock a large party of horse first attacked an advanced guard, which had got some distance from the main body. On account of the confusion occasioned by the vast quantity of baggage and the badness of some part of the road they unfortunately took a great deal of our baggage and camp equipage in this attack; however the advanced guard reached this village about day-light with a great deal of the provisions and ammunition.

Our main body was attacked about 4 o'clock in the rear and both flanks, and as we were frequently obliged to halt and fire some guns at them it thwarted our march, and gave them time to bring up cannon, which obliged us to form in the best manner we could to oppose them. It was shortly after day-light when the attack became general, but the weight fell principally on Captain Hartley's division, which I supported with Europeans and sepoys at different times. From the situation of the ground I found it impracticable to join the whole line to Captain Hartley's division as there were large bodies of horse ready to charge us when they found us in such a situation that we could not use our guns. The attack continued till 4 o'clock in the afternoon before we could retire, which was effected at last with much danger. The troops during the whole time behaved with the greatest bravery.

I am truly sorry to convey such very disagreeable news to you. The last time I wrote I had no thought of anything of this kind happening. I now close you a return of the killed, wounded and missing. They have engaged us all this day with small arms from their Arabs, &c., and a very heavy cannonade. Fortunately we have not suffered much, and we obliged the Arabs to give way at last. It is not yet determined when the army marches. I wait the Committee's orders.

I have, &c.,

Baragaum, 13th January 1779. WILLIAM COCKBURN.

Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Troops under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn.

Artillery.

	Lieutenant-Colonel.	Captain.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenants Fireworkers.	Sergeants.	Carporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drummers.	Matrosses.	Additional Drummers.	Lascars.	Total.
Killed	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1	3	4	9
Wounded	..	1	..	..	...	..	..	..	..	4	..	6	11
Missing	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	43	43
Total	..	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	5	3	53	63

Infantry.

	Colonel.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Cadets and Volunteers.	Sargeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total.
Killed	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1	1	1	12	16
Wounded	..	..	..	5	2	2	..	2	3	..	30	44
Missing	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	2
Total	..	..	..	5	3	2	..	3	4	1	44	62

Sepoys.

	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Commandants.	Subhedárs.	Jemádárs.	Sergeants.	Doctors.	Havaldárs.	Náiks.	Suhupers.	Trumpeters.	Drums and Fifes.	Waterman.	Sepoys.	Total.
Killed	..	1	..	..	1	2	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	26	31
Wounded	1	2	.	..	1	1	1	..	11	5	..	..	..	..	74	96
Missing	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	3	6	..	1	..	..	98	110
Total	1	3	..	..	3	4	1	..	15	11	..	1	..	..	198	287

Artillery. { Captain Westphal, wounded.
Lieutenant James Holdstock Makon, killed. }

Infantry. {

Wounded.

Captain Francis McKenny.
„ Charles Howson.
„ John Eames.
„ Arthur Jones.
„ George Gordon.
Lieutenant Alexander Cockburn.

Lieutenant Thomas Bullock.
Ensign Wm. Henry Martin.
„ Cornelius Basman.

Lieutenant Bowles, wounded the 13th instant, not included in the above return. }

Sepoys.

Lieutenant Henry, Day, killed.
Captain James Hartley, Lieutenant Thomas Dawson, } wounded.

Baragaum Camp, 12th January 1779.

Bombay Castle, 14th January 1779.

Thursday, 14th.—At about five o'clock in the afternoon the following note from the officer in command of the post at Bor Ghát was received by Mr. Robert Taylor, the Assistant Secretary to this Committee, who immediately communicated the same to the President:—

"*Note from Lieutenant* Fraser *to Mr.* Taylor.

To

Mr. ROBERT TAYLOR.

Dear Sir,—Our army is all cut to pieces. I have it in my power to retreat, but I scorn it at the risk of my honor. This is all you will ever hear from me.[1]

Dear Sir,

Bor Ghát, 12th[2] January 1779. Yours, &c.,

WILLIAM FRASER."

Bombay Castle, 15th January 1779.

Friday, 15th.—In the course of this and the preceding day several pattamars despatched to the army have returned, some with their ears cut off, the parties through the Gháts being stopt by the enemy.

Saturday, 16th, Sunday, 17th.—In the course of these two days several sepoys came in from the army, whose accounts are rather more favorable; and in the afternoon of Sunday a driver came in who says positively he left the army in good order at Wargaon on the evening of the 13th. The pattamars are still unable to get a passage through the Gháts though encouraged with the promise of very high rewards.

Received the following letter from the Chief and Factors at Thána:—

"Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,—This morning sent few people to the President, who came from the army, and brought intelligence of an engagement with the enemy, and I am sorry to acquaint your Honor and Council that this evening two Grenadier sepoys belonging to the 2nd battalion arrived here from our camp, who say that five days ago about 10 o'clock at night our army having begun to retreat from Talegaon on their way to Wargaon in their divisions were attacked by the enemy about 4 o'clock in the morning, when six companies of sepoys under Captain Hartley broke and were defeated, several of whom were killed; they suppose about 300 fled with their guns to the other divisions and themselves being separated from an army came hither.

In order that your Honor and Council may have the whole of the particulars from these two sepoys, I have sent them with this.

I am, &c.,

JOHN HALSEY.

Thána, 16th January 1779.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received intelligence from a Bráhman that had a servant who left the camp the day before the engagement, who says that at that time it was determined the army should march from Talegaon to Chinsura, and that letters were in camp which brought news of the Bengal brigade being only twenty kos from Poona.

JOHN HALSEY."

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[1] Fraser did retreat and was dismissed for abandoning his post. He afterwards distinguished himself at the siege of Ahmedabad, see page 398.

[2] Supposed should be the 13th.

Bombay Castle, 22nd January 1779.

Friday.—At 9 P.M. Mr. Carnac arrived from the army.

Saturday, 23rd.—This day Colonel Egerton returned from the army.

Monday, 25th.—This day Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn and part of the force arrived from the continent. Received also the following letter from Mr. William Farmer:—

"GENTLEMEN,—You will, no doubt, have been duly informed, long before the receipt of this, that Mr. Charles Stewart and myself were given as hostages for the due performance on your parts of the agreements concluded at Wargaon between the Hon'ble Company and the Peshwa Mádhav Náráyan.

These agreements have been concluded by the intervention of Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia; the latter, who assumed the general direction of all transactions with the English, desired that we would accompany him wherever he went, we are therefore now in his camp, and he treats us with great civility.

I was given to understand that all the necessary expenses both of Mr. Charles Stewart and myself were to be defrayed by the Hon'ble Company, and for this purpose I have received from the Committee appointed to accompany Raghunáthráv to Poona the sum of Rs. 2,500; and I now take the liberty farther to draw upon you in favour of Mr. Thomas Holmes for the sum of Rs. 1,500; being for a mare and its furniture, valued at Rs. 1,000, of which, by being obliged to move with the army of Mahádji Sindia, I stood in absolute need; the remaining sum of Rs. 500 is for sundry necessaries supplied me by Mr. Holmes, of which he will deliver you an account. Having lost great part of my baggage, and the hurry of more important affairs taking up all my attention, till the march of our army from Wargaon, I returned here almost destitute of everything that was requisite both for myself and Mr. Stewart, and the Parvoes, &c., that accompanied me, and therefore had everything to purchase.

Lest my total silence as to transactions here should surprise or offend you, I beg leave to remind you that in the character of an hostage I have no right to the privileges of a Vakil, amongst which is the free passage of letters. That I have no cipher, and should anything disgusting be found in any of my letters, it would infallibly produce ill-treatment to Mr. Stewart and myself.

I have the honour to be, with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
WILLIAM GAMUL FARMER.

Camp of Mahádji Sindia,
23rd January 1779.

P.S.—I yesterday evening saw Mahádji Sindia, and represented to him, that as there was now peace between the Darbár and the Government of Bombay, I requested that he would directly send the necessary orders for all his Chaukis and those of the Darbár to suffer the free passage of our pattamars; he immediately gave those orders, and sent to Nána Fadanavis to do the same. I mentioned this, because I had advice from Poona that there is a packet lying there from Masulipatam, which I have now directed to be forwarded from Poona. I must request, as speedily as possible, a copy in the Maráthi language of the late agreements.

I am, &c.,
W. G. FARMER."

Monday, 1st February.—At a Select Committee, in the President's Chamber, present :

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

JOHN CARNAC. | Colonel CHARLES EGERTON.

DANIEL DRAPER.

Read and approved our proceedings on the 29th ultimo, being our last meeting.

The President proposes to the Committee that a vessel be despatched to Bengal as soon as possible with a full account of the late transactions and copies of all the proceedings.

The President lays before us letters from the Peshwa, Mahádji Sindia, and Tukoji Holkar, and desires our sentiments what answer is to be returned, for which the Agents are very impatient.

Resolved,—That an answer to the following effect be given to these Agents :—

That Messrs. Carnac and Egerton had no authority whatever to form any treaty or engagement binding on the Hon'ble Company; which their principals were given clearly to understand before the paper upon which they ground their present demands were subscribed by those gentlemen; and that we likewise have no authority to take any steps in consequence until we receive the sentiments of the Governor General and Council, to whom we shall immediately despatch a vessel express with a full account of the whole transactions, and wait their determination.

The President is desired, in the delivery of his answer, to make use of such terms as will leave an opening for further negotiation or overtures from Mahádji Sindia, which his letter gives us room to expect he has commissioned his Agent to make.

WILLIAM HORNBY.
DANIEL DRAPER.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,

Governor General, and Council at Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—The preceding is a duplicate of our address dated 13th ultimo.

We shall very shortly despatch an express to Bengal with a full account of the unsuccessful issue of the late expedition, this being transmitted overland to convey to you as quick as possible this disagreeable intelligence.

When our army had advanced to Talegaon, within about 18 miles from Poona, and it was found, contrary to expectation, that none of the Marátha Chiefs ventured to join the standard of Rághoba, it was judged expedient by Messrs. Carnac and Egerton that the army should fall back to the head of the Gháts to secure their supplies of provision, which they could not procure as they advanced, the country being entirely laid waste by the numerous bodies of horse that opposed them.

The army was accordingly put in motion the 11th at night, and in their retreat were very vigorously attacked by the Marátha horse, who carried off some of the carriage and provision, but after a long and warm action were compelled to retire. This engagement having occasioned the army to halt, Rághoba took that opportunity to open a negotiation with Mahádji Sindia, and the commanding officer having given it as his opinion that the army would not stand another attack, and refused the charge of conducting it to Bombay, the Committee found themselves obliged to treat with the Marátha Chiefs for an unmolested passage. They at first only demanded that we should give up the cause and person of Rághoba, which was accommodated without difficulty, as Rághoba had already declared his intention of putting himself under the protection of Mahádji Sindia; they then rose in their demands, and insisted that we should surrender all the acquisitions made since the time of Mádhavráv, and that Colonel God-

dard's detachment should be ordered back to the Bengal Provinces. This the Committee declared in writing in the most plain and positive manner that they had no authority whatever to agree to, and that if they did make such an agreement, the Ministers would be deceived; however, as they persisted in their demands, the Committee after that declaration, having no alternative, did subscribe a paper containing the above conditions and our troops accordingly returned to Bombay.

As we cannot admit that an agreement made in such circumstances, and after such a previous declaration, is of any validity, we shall endeavour to treat with the Maráthás upon another footing, and we have directed Colonel Goddard to march to Surat instead of to Poona, as before ordered.

We request, gentlemen, you will suspend all judgment and determination respecting this unfortunate affair till the whole is fully laid before you, which shall be done as soon as possible, and, in the meantime,

We remain with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen, &c., &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY.

Bombay Castle, February 1779.

Bombay Castle, 30th May 1779.

Received the following letter from the Governor General and Council:—

"GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter, dated the 21st February.

We wish you had not apprehended the person of Gazedy Khán, as it has the appearance at least of an act of violence to him, which no pretext can justify and which may furnish cause for jealousies that at this time you should be particularly careful to avoid; we must therefore earnestly recommend to you instantly to grant him his liberty, peremptorily insisting that he do immediately quit the English dominions, and if you have an opportunity we further recommend that you forward him on his way to Mecca.

We have deemed it necessary to invest Colonel Goddard with full powers as the public Minister of this Government to treat with the Peshwa and the Ministers of the Marátha State for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of Purandhar, provided they will recede from the pretensions which they have acquired by the late engagements of Messrs. Carnac and Egerton; and will agree not to admit any French force to their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any establishment on the Marátha coast; empowering him to conclude a treaty with them on these conditions, the acceptance or refusal of which must determine the alternative of peace or war.

Our first object in this negotiation is to obtain a peace on honorable terms; in the meantime we recommend to you to be prepared either for repelling any hostile attacks of the Maráthás or for any other service which we may hereafter judge necessary, and we do formally forbid you to undertake any offensive measures without explicit and positive orders from us.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servants,

WARREN HASTINGS.
RICHARD BARWELL.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
EDWARD WHELER.
EYRE COOTE.

Fort William, 5th April 1779."

Letter from Colonel THOMAS GODDARD *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCL *concerning the escape of Raghunáthráv.*

GENTLEMEN,—I had the pleasure of transmitting you some days ago the accounts of Raghnnáthráv's escape from the people who had been placed over him by Mahádji Sindia and his safe arrival within Company's authoritiy and protection, since which time he has solicited permission from me to come in together with his family and receive the protection of my camp. This I have judged it proper from political considerations, as far as it attends to their personal security to grant him in the name of the Bengal Government, till I can receive their pleasure respecting this late unexpected event.

From the minutest information I have been able to obtain relative to Raghunáthráv's escape the following concise relation of it appears to be the literal fact :—

> Mahádji Sindia, whose whole conduct to Rághoba since getting him within his power, seems to have manifested a wish of retaining possession of his person for purposes of private advantage, and at the same time keeping upon fair and friendly terms by paying him every external mark of ceremonious respects the better to lull and deceive him into security, had left him all his artillery except two field pieces, and had permitted the force he brought with him from Bombay and all his followers, except some of the principal people, whom he detained with a promise they should be sent after him, to accompany Rághoba on his route to the Narbada. Sindia's Diván, Hari Bowáji, with 4,000 horse was appointed to attend him on his march. Sindia's view in wishing to convey Rághoba to the northward of the Narbada seems to have been this, that by removing him from the neighbourhood of the capital into the more distant provinces, which he himself possessed in jághír, Rághoba would be entirely subject to his own directions and disposal. In this scheme he has, however, been baffled, for Rághoba, during his march, had received various causes of displeasure from the improper behaviour of Hari Bowáji towards him, and on their arrival at Bureve Ghát upon the Narbada where it was intended they should cross, found an opportunity of executing a plan he had no doubt previously formed for his escape, though as the circumstance is related it carried with it some appearance of having been the effect of accident, for as the artillery was leading down to the river, the road passed near Hari Bowáji's tents, who suspecting treachery, ordered his own people to fire, after which the action commenced, and Sindia's horse being soon dispersed and put to the rout, the troops of Rághoba were victorious. Hari Bowáji was wounded in the fight about a mile from the camp, and died seven days after.

I have been thus particular in communicating to you the circumstanees of this event that have come to my knowledge, because exclusive of the importance it may be of to the Company, in a general point of view you cannot but be particularly interested in the fortunate escape of a man who has been so long and so intimately connected with your Government.

I have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient Servant,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp at Surat, June 15th, 1779.

Letter from General GODDARD.

GENTLEMEN,—The ready attention which you have paid to every application of mine for promoting the good of the public service, calls for my most sincere and heartfelt acknowledg-

ments; and I beg to express to you in the most particular manner the warm sense I entertain of the spirited and decisive conduct you have pursued in the reinforcement of troops which you have at present afforded me. Permit me further to declare that I cannot but consider this compliance as the most happy presage of future fortune, and by continuing to receive the same steady and resolute support from your Government, I assure myself that my endeavours to execute whatever plan may now be resolved upon, will be crowned with success.

In my address to you of the 3rd instant I gave my sentiments at large on the present situation of affairs, and the measures I thought most expedient to be followed, on which subject I now beg leave to add a few words. There appears to be no doubt at present remaining of the absolute necessity of the war itself. The point now to be determined is in what manner this war is to be carried on, whether we should act offensively or defensively, whether we should move to distress the enemy and possess ourselves of their resources immediately, or wait inactive to be insulted and attacked by them in our very camp.

Were there any hopes of an accommodation with the Marátha Minister, from the knowledge I have of the sincere desires of the Bengal Government for peace, and the advantages that might attend it, I should be the last to precipitate matters, or recommend the commencement of hostilities on our part, but it is now too late to negotiate, and even this object of peace can only be obtained by our acting with vigour and resolution.

The fair and reasonable proposals made to the Minister, the alternative of peace or war openly and generously left to his option, and his imperiously preferring the latter by rejecting the terms that were offered him, and presuming to impose disgraceful ones upon us, amply justify our conduct in being the first to unsheathe the sword; I should have said, render it a duty we owe to the honor of our insulted country and the interests of the Company, to show our resentments of such behaviour by avenging it upon the earliest occasion. Every consideration also of political benefit unites in commendation of our entering upon immediate action; we shall by possessing ourselves of a tract of country open the sources of present wealth and provide for future supplies, and by these means prosecute the war with anticipated advantages, while our enemies will be intimidated, and those whose inclinations are wavering, or secretly disposed to our interests, will derive courage from the early success and vigour of our measures.

A most material advantage that strikes me from this mode of conduct is regarding the intended connection with Fattesing, for if we attack him while under the impression of his present fear, it will not be difficult to bring him over to our views, either by negotiation or force, or should even the former not succeed, it will be an easier task to accomplish it by the latter at this time, than when joined and supported by the forces of the ministerial party.

The points regarding which I am most solicitous are the mode of treating with Fattesing consistent with the treaty now subsisting between the Hon'ble Company and him, and the line of conduct to be pursued respecting Raghunáthráv. On these two subjects I have already ventured to give you my sentiments, and I have only to repeat that I shall cheerfully and zealously concur and exert myself in successfully accomplishing your views relative to them, and the other objects of the present expedition as far as lies in my power. This declaration I consider as sufficient for me to make and doubt not its being fully satisfactory at this time, in observing upon the former part of the President's minute of the 10th instant regarding the powers that have been given me by the Hon'ble Governor General and Supreme Council and the relation in which I stand to this Government. The sincerity of my present assurances will, I am hopeful, be fully apparent from the consistency of my future conduct with them. and I trust no differences or misconceptions in points that are not strictly essential to the success of the

business in hand will ever arise to interrupt that harmony and good understanding that has hitherto marked the counsels and resolves of this Committee in the measures concerted for the good of the common cause in which we are embarked, and which cannot fail under the same circumstances of being brought to a happy and glorious issue.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Bombay, November 15th, 1779.

Instructions to General Goddard.

To

Brigadier-General GODDARD.

Sir,—The state in which affairs with the Maráthás now stand since the answer returned by the Minister to your proposals for a pacification; your dismission of the Vakil in consequence; and the intermediate declaration made by you to the Darbár in obedience to the instructions from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th September; together with the military preparations which we learn from all quarters are making at Poona, leading us to conclude a war with that State inevitable, we have at several meetings, to which you have been invited, considered with the most serious attention the conduct proper to be observed in our present circumstances, as well as the object to which the efforts of our force may with most advantage be directed, whenever it shall be judged expedient to commence operations; in order that we might assist you with our best advice for the benefit of the common cause on this very interesting occasion.

The powers you hold under the Governor General and Council make it proper to acquaint you that we do not consider the war now impending as a measure of this Government, nor ourselves in any manner as responsible for the success of it.

As soon as you may judge it expedient to commence operations, we recommend to you to proceed to the reduction of the Marátha possessions south of the Tápti, and their parganás of Olpár, Hansoot, Occlaseer, Desbara, Ahmood, Dubhoi and Versavi. The districts above alluded to lying between the Tápti and the Máhi, care should be taken not to molest the Gáikawád Choteas and Collectors; and in the reduction of these places the Chiefs of Surat and Broach will be directed to afford you every assistance you may desire, and to receive charge of them from you when reduced according to their respective situation; that is, the places north of the Tápti, except Olpár and Versavi, will fall under charge of Broach Chiefship; and those south of that river with Olpár and Versavi under charge of Surat.

These places we apprehend will be reduced without much difficulty; and by that time you will be able to discover Fattesing's disposition towards the proposed settlement, and to determine your future operations.

We entirely concur with you in the plan proposed in your letter of the 3rd ultimo to be pursued respecting Rághoba, and avoiding any positive engagement with him for the present. We trust, that seeing the necessity of the system we have adopted, he will be reconciled to it; and considering how deeply the Company is already involved on his account will allow the justice of our securing some means of reimbursement and resource for future supply before we can avowedly assert his pretensions; and more especially when he considers, as you observe, that we shall enter into his war as principals. We also further approve this way of proceeding as we

may expect orders respecting him from the Governor General and Council when they are apprised of the situation of affairs.

A Company's seal is herewith delivered to you and heartily wishing you success.

We remain,
Sir,
Your most obedient honourable Servants,
WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 2nd December 1779.

Instructions to the Commanding Officer of the Bombay Detachment sent to reinforce the Bengal Army.

To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES HARTLEY.

SIR,—Having appointed you to the command of a detachment of the troops of this Presidency, consisting of one hundred artillery, two hundred European infantry and two battalions of sepoys, with which we have resolved to reinforce the army under General Goddard, and the last embarkation now proceeding to Surat, we direct that you likewise take passage on one of the vessels ordered for the accommodation of the forces; and on your joining the army to put yourself and detachment under the orders of General Goddard, to whom you will deliver a return thereof.

Mr. George Green is appointed Commissary of Stores and Provisions, and Mr. William Lewis, Paymaster to the Bombay detachment; and as it is not in our power to furnish money for the expenses of their departments, we have instructed them to make their drafts on General Goddard.

Mr. Samuel Richardson, one of the principal Surgeons of the hospital and Surgeon-Major of the garrison, proceeds in charge of the hospital, Mr. Durham as Surgeon of the Artillery, and Mr. Clughustone as Surgeon of the Infantry. Mr. Toomey will now act as an Assistant Sergeant with Mr. Green now proceeding; and they must all be put under the orders of Mr. Richardson, Surgeon-Major.

The Bombay detachment under your command will be put on the same footing in point of batta as the Bengal troops; but this indulgence is not to be construed into a precedent, or expected, but when acting in conjunction with the forces of that Presidency.

To enable you to discharge the duties of your command with satisfaction, we have thought proper to allow you a staff consisting of an Aid-de-Camp, Secretary, and Brigade-Major, and are,

Sir,
Your loving friends,
WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 2nd December 1779.

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

I crossed the Tápti the 1st instant as I informed you I would, and halted three days on the north side of it to put every thing in proper order. I yesterday put the army again in motion, and have this morning passsed the Kim Nadi. In two days more I expect to reach Sichturut on the banks of the Narbada.

I hope in a few days to be able to inform you more decisively of what may be expected from Fattesing.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp Gujurram on the Kim Nadi,
6th January 1780.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* SELECT COMMITTEE *at Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have the pleasure to inform you of my having crossed the Narbada yesterday at the Ghát of Bowapur. I found it necessary to halt a few days at Sichturut to give time for conducting the four 18-pounders and military stores from Broach, which joined me safe, under escort of a battalion of sepoys I had sent over the river at Sichturut the day of my arrival at this place.

It is with pleasure I can communicate to you the prospect I have reason to believe there now is of adjusting every point to your wish, and for the interest of the Company with Fattesing. I have exerted every endeavour to effect this alliance, because of the important advantages it will immediately secure to the English in the Gujarát, and of the future favourable consequences they must derive from it in the grand contest they are now entering upon with the Marátha Government. The leisure allowed by the inactivity of the Minister, which has, I conceive, been principally occasioned by the disputes betwixt him and Sindia, has proved very convenient to the settlement of the Gujarát province, which I hope may be finally concluded before any considerable body of troops can arrive from the Deccan. For this reason, as well as the effect it must have upon Fattesing in inclining him to take a more speedy and decisive part upon the occasion, the early movement of the army towards Dubhoi and Baroda, becomes a point most necessary and essential to the good of the cause. He has promised to settle everything on my arrival at the former place, from whence I shall be able to address you more fully, as the sincerity of his present professions will then be put to the test, and till that can be done no certain judgment is to be formed of the real designs of a man so famed for treachery and deceit as Fattesing is reported to be.

As you will so soon hear from me again, I shall conclude at present, and have the honor to subscribe myself,

Gentlemen,
Your most obedient Servant,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp at Bowapur Ghát north of the Narbada,
January 16th, 1780.

Letter from General GODDARD *regarding the capture of Dubhoi.*

GENTLEMEN,—In my letter of the 16th instant, I informed you I should march towards Dubhoi the 18th; at which place I arrived yesterday, and having summoned Báláji Raghunáth, the person who held it on the part of the Poona Government with a garrison of about two thousand men, to surrender the place, received a refusal. I immediately made the necessary preparations for besieging it. The place of attack being fixed upon, a battery of three 18-pounders within two hundred yards of the wall was completed by this morning at daybreak, when I found the enemy had evacuated the town, which I have taken possession of

in the name of the Company, and congratulate you upon this accession to your territorial possession in Gujarát. The inhabitants, many of whom remained in the place, seem perfectly well disposed to obey and live under the protection of the English Government; and as the fortifications, though insufficient to resist a regular European attack, might, with a small force, be defended against a considerable body of country troops, the possession of it must confer stability and security upon your territories on this side, and in the event of an accommodation with Fattesing, from its vicinity to Baroda, prove a check and restraint upon his future conduct. I have written to Mr. Gambier, your Chief of Broach, to send proper persons to settle and collect the revenues of the country, and shall afford him every further assistance necessary for this purpose.

I am happy at an opportunity of mentioning to you the satisfaction I received from the skill and assiduity of Major Spaith, the Chief Engineer, in constructing and completing the battery with so much expedition. Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, who acted under him, and showed himself exceedingly alert and active in his duty, received a wound in his thigh from a matchlock, which, however, I am hopeful will not prove any way dangerous.

I have not heard from Fattesing since my last of the 16th instant. I expected the return of his Vakils with every thing finally settled and agreed to the day of my arrival here, or this day at furthest. As they may yet arrive in the course of it, or to-morrow morning, I shall differ saying any more upon the subject of Fattesing till I can write you with an absolute certainty.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head Quarters Camp at Dubhoi,
January 20th, 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard *accompanying copy of a Treaty entered into with* Fattesing *at Baroda in the name of this Government as entered hereafter.*

Gentlemen,—I am this instant returned from an interview with Fattesing Gáikawár, held near the village of Candeela in the district of Dubhoi, at which was signed, sealed and mutually interchanged a treaty of alliance betwixt him and the Hon'ble Company, concluded upon the terms that had been previously proposed according to the grounds contained in your instructions of the 6th December 1779. I have not time to write you so fully upon the subject at present as I could wish as the evening is so far advanced, and must therefore defer it till to-morrow upon the arrival of the army at the Vishvámitri Nadi within four miles of Baroda, when I will also transmit the treaty itself for your approbation.

Permit me to congratulate you upon the success of the negotiation, which has at present secured such an ample accession of country and revenue to the Hon'ble Company; and by a confirmed alliance and amicable settlement of the province of Gujarát with Fattesing opens so large a field of advantage in our future contests with the Marátha Government.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head Quarters Camp at Belápore,
26th January 1780.

Gentlemen,—I had the pleasure of informing you yesterday of the treaty concluded betwixt the Hon'ble Company and Fattesing Gáikawár, and now enclose you a copy of the original treaty, the exact counterpart of which is in the possession of Fattesing, which I hope

will meet with your approbation. By the last article it is provided that two copies of this treaty shall be forwarded by your Government to the Hon'ble Governor General and Council for their confirmation and ratification, which I take the liberty of requesting you will be pleased to do by the earliest opportunity.

I have thought it requisite to retain the original treaty at present with me, as in the course of the campaign occasions may offer to render the immediate producing it useful and necessary to the good of the service; and the authenticated copy I now send will be sufficient fully to answer the present purpose of your and the Bengal Governments.

I have from time to time communicated to you the progress of my negotiation, and the difficulties I met with in the course of it, to bring it to a successful issue, which from a conviction of the real and solid advantages arising to the Company by a connection with Fattesing, I have seriously and assiduously laboured to effect. It is unnecessary to point out to you, who have so exact and perfect a knowledge of the province of Gujarát, the particular advantages of country and revenue acquired and secured to the Company by this treaty whose dominion in Gujarát I conceive now to be fixed upon the most firm and unshaken basis, as the only power besides the English, who can have any legal or just claim to the possession of the country, is equally interested with them to exclude the Marátha Government from all share or participation of it whatever; and although the alliance of Fattesing may not bring any very material accession of military force to the Company, the influence it must have upon the minds of the Marátha leaders renders it a very favorable and fortunate circumstance at the commencement of the present war; and effectually provides many prevailing arguments of right and justice, so necessary to reconcile the sentiments and opinions of men in all changes of government, to the form that may be introduced and established.

In consequence of what you mentioned respecting the necessity you supposed there might be of inserting the name of Sayáji in any engagement formed with Fattesing, I proposed that he should also be mentioned, but was told that since the conclusion of the former treaty betwixt Rághoba and Fattesing through the mediation of the English Company, the sanads of the Rája had been made out in the sole name of Fattesing, and sent him from the Court of Sátára. To avoid however every possibility of a dispute hereafter, I have considered Fattesing, as he certainly now is, the head of the family, and made his engagement with the Hon'ble Company in the name of the whole of the Gáikawárs.

According to the wish you expressed of securing a suitable provision for Govindráv, I hinted your inclination to Fattesing, but I found, if I succeeded in that point, I must have positively insisted upon it, and as in doing so I must have deviated from the orders of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council, wherein they expressly forbid the assuming any mediation betwixt the two brothers, to which you have also desired me to pay particular attention, I rather chose to desist from further solicitation on that subject, by recommending a reconciliation betwixt them, as a circumstance that would be much to his honor and advantage, and would give great satisfaction to the English.

It was with a good deal of reluctance that Fattesing could be brought to consent to the cession of Zinore and strongly pleaded for having the pargana of Dubhoi in exchange given up to him; but knowing the importance of both these places, and particularly the latter to the Company, I tried every argument to induce him to comply; in which I at last succeeded by proving to him the real and advantageous compensation he would reap from the present treaty with the English. This is a point I have endeavoured to persuade him into a firm belief through the whole of the negotiation, well knowing that to secure the faithful and strict adherence of any person to the engagements they may have entered into, it is a material object to con-

vince him they are for his interest. The earnestness expressed by Fattesing to be put in possession of Dubhoi clearly shows that he considers that place in the important point of view it deserves; and is apprehensive of its being in the hands of such formidable neighbours as the English.

I shall shortly write you of the particular plan I mean to follow in effecting what remains to be executed respecting the settlement of the province; and shall take leave at present, by representing to you the necessity there appears at this crisis, of augmenting the number of troops on your establishment, to maintain the flourishing state of the Company's affairs in this quarter, and to defend and protect the Company's acquisitions from any future alarm or depredation of their enemies.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Camp near Baroda on the Vishwámitri Nadi, 27th January 1780.

Treaty between the Hon'ble the English East India Company and Fattesing Gáikawár, Samsher Bahádur, concluded in the Village of Candeela in the Pargana of Dubhoi, January 26th, 1780.

The Ministers of the Marátha State having refused to accept of the reasonable terms of accommodation offered them by Brigadier General Thomas Goddard in the name of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council of Fort William, and by their obstinate perseverance in hostile intentions against the English compelled them to take up arms in defence of their own right and possessions, the Hon'ble President and Select Committee of Bombay with the sanction and approbation of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council of Fort William have appointed and authorized Brigadier General Thomas Goddard to settle and conclude a treaty of lasting peace and alliance betwixt the Hon'ble East India Company on one part, and Fattesing Gáikawár, Samsher Bahádur, for and in the name of all the Gáikawár family on the other; and the following are the articles of convention mutually entered into :—

ARTICLE I.

The English and Fattesing agree to a league of defensive alliance and to protect each other against all foreign enemies whatever.

ARTICLE II.

The Ministers of the Marátha State by repeated violations of treaty as well as their late conduct, having drawn upon themselves the just resentment of the English, having also by undue acts of oppression proved themselves the enemies of Fattesing. For these reasons and because the most firm and sincere friendship has long subsisted betwixt the Hon'ble Company and Fattesing, the contracting parties mutually agree to enter immediately into an offensive league excluding the Government of Poona from all share of country in the Province of Gujarát whatever.

ARTICLE III.

The English agree to support and defend Fattesing in possession of his share of the Gujarát Province, and Fattesing is to assist and support the English in possessing themselves of and maintaining the share now held by the Government of Poona.

ARTICLE IV.

In order to accomplish this service as a firm friendship is now established betwixt the English and Fattesing, the latter agrees to join the English with 3,000 horse accord-

ing to custom, and as many more as he can possibly raise, to act in conjunction with them during the present war whenever they shall call upon him so to do.

Article V.

As the present mode of partition betwixt the Poona Government and Fattesing is attended with great loss and inconvenience from the disputes that must arise from the interference of the officers of each in collecting the revenues of the same places, and that lay interspersed with one another, it is agreed upon that a new settlement of the Province of Gujarát shall take place for the mutual benefit and convenience of both parties, the express object of which will be an absolute and specific partition of the whole territory betwixt the Hon'ble East India Company and Fattesing according to the proportion of the revenues now respectively held by him and the Maráthás.

Article VI.

Ahmedabad and its dependencies, that is to say, the country to the north of the River Máhi now possessed by the Poona Government to be allotted to Fattesing, in lieu of which the English are to be put in possession of the Gáikawár's division of the country south of the Tápti known by the name of Attawisi, and their share of the revenues of Surat.

Article VII.

The English will give such assistance of force as Fattesing may require to conquer and put him in possession of the Poona share of the country to the northward of the Máhi.

Article VIII.

The final partition and settlement of the Gujarát Province being made each party is to have the distinct and sole government and possession of the division allotted him and to hold his share independent of and unconnected with the other except when united for their common defence against a foreign enemy, which they mutually and in the most solemn manner agree to do. And this partition and this settlement mutually agreed to is to be binding upon them and their posterity for ever.

Article IX.

Fattesing having requested that the English supported him in withholding the annual tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poona .Government, it is stipulated that the Hon'ble Company will do so, till a final peace shall be concluded betwixt them aud the Poona Government, in which the interest of Fattesing shall be carefully and equally attended to with their own.

Article X.

In consideration of the advantage that will arise to Fattesing from the above article and as a proof of his sincere regard and friendship for the English, he agrees to cede to them the district af Zinore and the villages situated in the Broach pargana now belonging to him, both which are to remain for ever in the possesion of the Company.

Article XI.

All the countries and places made over to the English in this treaty by Fattesing are to be delivered into their hands and the collections accounted for to them from the day that Fattesing is put in possession of the city of Ahmedabad, and no demand of collection for any past time is to be made in them by Fattesing.

Article XII.

It is agreed that two copies of this treaty be immediately sent to the Hon'ble President and Select Committee of Bombay for their approbation and to be by them transmitted to the Hon'ble Governor General and Council of Fort William, under whose

sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final confirmation and ratification, after which one copy so authenticated is to remain with the Hon'ble President and Select Committee of Bombay, and another with Fattesing.

(A True Translation.)
DAL WATHERSTON,
Persian Translator.

(A True Copy.)
(Signed) THOMAS GODDARD.

This treaty was signed, sealed and delivered to the contracting parties by each other in presence of us who have hereunto signed our names.

(Signed) JOHN COCKERELL, Quarter Master General.
(„) EDWARD HEARD, Adjutant General.

Bombay Castle, 21st February 1780.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.
Daniel Draper.

Read and approved the minutes of our last meetiug.

Read letters this instant received from the Chiefs of Broach and Surat advising of the capture of Ahmedabad by storm on the 15th instant, on which pleasing intelligence a royal salute is ordered to be fired.

The President lays before us the translation of a letter to him from the Naváb Hyder Ally, and a copy of the answer he returned, as entered in the book of country correspondence under this date.

The Committee will observe that the President has proposed sending a gentleman to Hyder, which the present posture of affairs in his opinion makes highly necessary. The war, in which we are now actually engaged with the Maráthás, renders it of the utmost importance to secure the friendship of this Prince during the continuance of it; and if possible to engage him to co-operate with us by an attack on their dominions, which would not only prove a powerful diversion in favour of General Goddard's operations in Gujarát, and by drawing the enemy's attention to a distance enable us to settle ourselves most effectually in our new acquisitions, and to reap the immediate benefit of the revenue of them ; but would likewise open the fairest prospect to an hon'ble and advantageous peace; at the same time by promoting Hyder's views against the Maráthás who have ever been the great object of his jealousy, we might probably detach him from all future connection with the French and unite him to our interest.

For these purposes, it will be necessary to use every means in our power to quiet his apprehensions on the side of the Karnátak; with a view to which the President has thrown out the hint in his letter in reply to that part of Hyder's relative to his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the Government of Madras; and the President is of opinion that the gentleman sent to him from hence ought to be instructed to receive Hyder's representations on this subject, and to assure him of our good offices with the gentlemen of that Presidency as well as with the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council in order to remove all ground of jealousy; and that he be directed to communicate to both those boards such information as he may obtain with regard to Hyder's disposition towards us, and expectations from us in regard to this material object.

The quieting of the present troubles in the Malabár country, and the settlement of it in manner favourable to our commercial interests are points likewise of essential importance to our Hon'ble Master's affairs under this Presidency, and can only be effected by means of Hyder's authority. On these therefore our Resident with him should be particularly instructed as well as to procure the confirmation of our privileges at Onore and in the Kánarese and Sounda countries.

The President proposed to the Committee that Mr. George Horsley be employed in this Commission and that his instructions be prepared with all expedition.

WILLIAM HORNBY.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL, *regarding the capture of Ahmedabad.*

GENTLEMEN,—That no time might be lost in communicating to you the fortunate intelligence of the reduction of Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarát, I despatched a short note to Mr. Gambier, the Chief of Broach, the instant of the troops entering the place, requesting he would immediately transmit an account of it to you, which I hope you will have received. Permit me to congratulate you most sincerely upon an event so honorable to the British arms, and so favourable to the interests of your Government.

On the 10th in the morning, I arrived before the city, and wrote to the Marátha Governor Rágho Pandit Táttia, desiring him to deliver up the place to me; with this demand he affected an intention of complying, but his conduct was entirely the reverse of any such intention, for the troops upon the walls fired upon such of the camp people as approached them, and endeavoured to do all the mischief in their power. In his excuse the Pandit alleged, that the Arab and Sindi Jamádárs who garrisoned the place had large arrears due to them, and would not be induced to give it up, till a sum of money was agreed to be paid them, and that they kept his person in confinement because he was unable to satisfy them. There was, I believe, some foundation for this assertion. These Arabs and Sindis had arrears due them from the Poona Government; they were hired mercenaries, and it was in all probability a matter of indifference to them what power's service they entered into. They would therefore gladly have accepted their arrears, upon condition of being continued in the garrison of the place; but I am convinced they never would have permitted the British troops to be put in possession, or have evacuated it themselves if required to do so, because they had been, from a residence of many years, considered as the legal established militia of the city, and from the success with which they had always heretofore opposed the efforts of the most numerous armies, none of whom could ever conquer the place, as well as the strength of their own garrison, which consisted of at least 6,000 Arab and Sindy foot, besides 2,000 horse, they were inspired with a degree of self confidence and assurance that their arms were invincible, and the city impregnable to our force. Finding therefore all my efforts to obtain possession of the place by any other means ineffectual, I made the necessary preparations for besieging it; and on the 12th at one o'clock P.M. opened the batteries against it, which continued to play till the 13th in the evening, when the breach being practicable I formed an intention of storming next morning; but from motives of humanity and compassion, as the city was extensive and populous, and I well knew the undistinguished slaughter that almost unavoidably attends the fury of entering a city by storm, I deferred the attack one day, in hopes that the enemy might accept the mercy

I had proferred them. In this hope I was however deceived and accordingly this morning gave orders for an assault, which succeeded to my utmost wish. The enemy fled from their works, after having endeavoured without effect to oppose the fierce onset of the Grenadiers, who with their officers distinguished themselves in a most remarkable degree, and I beg leave to recommend their conduct to your notice and approbation, and generally that of the whole army during the siege. Near three hundred of the enemy fell near the breach and about the gateway, besides others who were killed and wounded after entering the place; and what makes the enterprise particularly fortunate, considering the desperate resistance of the enemy, and the difficulties we had to encounter, is the little loss on our side with which it was achieved. This circumstance I consider as a blessing, on which I beg leave to congratulate you, and also on the honor which the British arms have acquired by the moderation and mercy that so strikingly marked their conduct. After getting possession of the place not above two of the inhabitants were wounded, which might have been the effect of accident entirely; and many who were in arms upon submitting and delivering themselves up had their lives spared them.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker received a wound on the 11th, which I have the satisfaction to acquaint you is not by the faculty deemed dangerous. I committed the conduct of the attack to Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, and I am happy at an opportunity of testifying the high sense I have of his merit and gallantry as an officer from the whole of his behaviour on this occasion. While I express my warmest approbation of Major Spaith's skill and assiduity I am concerned at the same time to inform you of his being wounded by a sabre in seven places, which he received in assisting with his people and materials to fill up the ditch for the passage of the Grenadiers; I cannot at present speak with any certainty upon the nature of his case. I am sorry to give you the disagreeable intelligence that Captain Gough has this evening expired of the wounds he received in the storm this morning. Mr. Wright, a volunteer of your establishment, was killed by the accident of the bursting of a shell on the 13th instant. The names of several gentlemen who have received wounds, all of which I have reason to hope are not dangerous, are as follows: Lieutenants Caldwell and Prole of the Engineer, Dr. Stewart, Lieutenant Long of the Artillery, and Lieutenant McIntosh and Crossly of the Infantry, and two volunteers.

I cannot help taking this opportunity of recommending to your favourable notice the conduct of Mr. Fraser, who acted as a volunteer during the siege and accompanied the forlorn hope on the storming party. Let me hope that the proofs of courage he has shown will, at my instance, be an inducement to restore him to your service with his rank. Mr. Clancey, who was some time ago unfortunate enough to lose your service, and has been since admitted on the Bengal Establishment, where he is now an ensign, solicited for an opportunity of wiping away any stain that might have been thrown on his character, which I am happy to assure you he has effectually done by his gallant conduct in mounting the breach with the forlorn hope. Ensign Hearn's behaviour who carried the Grenadier European colours merits particular mention. He followed the forlorn hope with the colours, and having surmounted the breach rushed to the gateway amidst a number of the enemy and planted them in triumph.

The volunteers of your establishment were in the trenches during the whole of the siege, and marched foremost to the storm. Let me hope that you will find it consistent to give them some promotion as a reward for their good behaviour. Sergeant Fridge who led the forlorn hope displayed extraordinary marks of bravery; and as he is well educated and very deserving, I hope I do not intrude too much on your indulgence, by soliciting he may be appointed a cadet.

The troops have taken a number of standards from the enemy in assaulting the breach, which I propose sending to your Government to be hung as trophies of the conquest of Ahmedabad by the British arms either in the church at Bombay or in your armoury as you may think most proper.

The return of the killed and wounded not being ready for this despatch, I shall send it by the next opportunity, when I will address you particularly, at present I am taking measures to protect the city and encourage the inhabitants.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Ahmedabad,
15th February 1780.

Bombay Castle, 25th February 1780.

Received the following letter from Brigadier-General Goddard with a return of the killed and wounded :—

"Gentlemen,—I had the honor to address you the 15th instant, informing you of the reduction of Ahmedabad by the British arms ; and now beg leave to enclose you a return of the killed and wounded from the commencement of the siege till the period of its conclusion.

Since my last I have received authentic and undoubted intelligence that Sindia and Tukoji Holkar had passed the Ghát of Casserbarry, and were encamped the 5th instant at Orrahpore, which is reckoned about 60 kos from Baroda. Sindia had sent off all his heavy artillery to Barhánpur, and with ten or twelve light field pieces and about 15,000 horse was himself advancing towards Gujarát. Should not the intelligence of the fall of Ahmedabad put a stop to his progress, which I hope it may not, I do not doubt being soon able to give you a good account of him ; unless, which is also reported, the Minister is sending another army to his support, I can scarcely think he would re-enter into the Gujarát with so small a force as he has at present with him. It is however pretty evident that the supposed animosity betwixt those Chiefs is less confirmed and violent than what we had reason to believe from former reports ; though at the same time Sindia, it is well known, has not been satisfied by the Minister respecting the demands he made upon him, and will therefore most probably be the readier to act upon his arrival the part he may find most for his own interest. I shall not fail to communicate any new intelligence I may receive, and have the honor to be,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Ahmedabad, 18th February 1780.

"Return of the Killed and Wounded at the Siege and Attack of Ahmedabad, 15th February 1780.

	Killed.	Wounded.
Mogal Regiment of Cavalry ...	1 Rank and File	1 Lieutenant, 3 Rank and File.
Artillery ... European ...	....	2 do.
Artillery ... Native ...	....	1 Lieut.-Colonel, 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Subhedár 29 Rank and File.
Bengal Infantry	1 Jamádár, 9 Rank and File ...	
Bombay Infantry ... Europeans ...	1 Volunteer, 1 Drumer	1 Lieutenant, 3 Volunteers, 1 Secretary, 5 Rank and File.
Bombay Infantry ... Sepoys ...	2 Rank and File.	
Engineers	....	1 Major, 2 Lieutenants.
Lascars	2	3
Bhaldars and Coolis	....	5
Bhistis	....	2
Grand Total ...	17	64

List of the Officers Killed and Wounded.

BENGAL INFANTRY.

Killed.

Mr. Wright, Volunteer.

Wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker.
Captain Gough, since dead.
Lieutenant McIntosh.
Dr. Stewart.

Lieutenant Caldwall, } Engineers.
" Prole, }

BOMBAY.

Major Spaith, Field Engineer.
Lieutenant Long, Artillery.
Crossley, Infantry.
Messrs. Boya Thelly and Tallen, Volunteers.

THOMAS GODDARD,
Brigadier General."

Translate of a letter to FATTESING *written by* MAHÁDJI SINDIA, *received the 23rd February 1780, at Broach.*

After compliments.

The particulars of the marching of the English have been written me by Bálkrishna Anant, and as soon as I knew this news I marched in a great hurry and came into Khándesh, and from thence I am coming by long marches to you. You have to this day managed to stop the English and you must continue to do the same, for there will be no delay in my coming. I

will reach you soon by marching daily in haste. I have written you about this two or three letters and hope you have received them. I am coming with guns. When I come we will consult together and will contrive the punishment of the English. Have no fear but acquaint me with all the news frequently.—Dated the 29th Mohorum, Gentoo style, which answers to our style the 6th February 1780.

Translate of a letter written by MAHÁDJI SINDIA *to* BÁLKRISHNA ANANT, *received the 23rd February 1780, at Broach.*

After compliments.

I have received your letter and observed what you wrote, and therefore by marching daily with my army have come into Khándesh, and still I continue marching daily and soon will come down to you and punish the English. Fattesing, who to this day has managed to stop them, must in the same manner continue to do so by fair speeches and assurances of peace and friendship till my army comes, for there shall be no delay of my coming. I will make very long marches daily and you must tell Fattesing so and write me all the news frequently. —Dated 29th Mohorum, Gentoo style, which answers to our style the 6th February 1780.

Translate of a letter from BALAJI GOVIND *to* BÁLKRISHNA ANANT, *received the 23rd February 1780, at Broach.*

After compliments.

The letters you sent by express pattamars have been received and I have observed what you wrote about the monkeys' force; and as soon as we came to know this at Jámgaon, Shrimant Sindia with his forces marched from Jámgaon the 28th Mohorum and encamped at Dhoolay; and since by long marches the army will come to your countries and you must consider as if it was already come. The love and friendship of the Shrimant Sindia is much upon Fattesing; the particulars of which I cannot write in a letter. Soon as he knew that the monkeys' forces were after him he despatched Bhagiratráv and other Sardárs, with forces to assist him, and hope they have arrived. Now his own army, commanded by himself, is coming. You must tell Fattesing so, and desire him to continue to do as he has done before to stop the monkeys till our forces come against them, which will be very soon. Fattesing has by his patience and courage not yet come under the monkeys as I observe by your writing. This pleases me much; and I have written you five or six letters to come to Khándesh, and am coming on daily. God grant us to meet soon. Shrimant Sindia trusts this time to Fattesing entirely, and hopes the same on his side; about which you must speak to Fattesing. Three letters, by means of Náráyanráv Govind I have sent and strict friendship must go on both sides. The Subhedár and Master of us all is coming to you with strong forces. You must write all the news from your place, for we are coming with large force and many guns to your place. Write particularly how the English go on and what they say about us and how Fattesing goes on. Write often and particularly.—Dated 29th Mohorum, Gentoo style, which answers to our style the 6th February 1780.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—In my last addressed to you from Ahmedabad I informed you of my having sent off the heavy artillery and stores to Cambay, which I have now the pleasure to acquaint you arrived safe. In order to render my motions as perfectly free and unincumbered as possible, I came to the further resolution upon my arrival at Máppu hearing that a body of 6,000 horse had been detached from the main army of Sindia towards the Máhi, to

send off most of the baggage and useless followers of the camp to Cambay, which I had the satisfaction to see most readily and fully complied with by the officers and troops in general. I yesterday arrived on the south bank of the Máhi at Tázilpore, where I have halted this day to refresh the cattle after their fatigue, and to-morrow shall proceed to the banks of the Vishvámitri Nadi so near to Baroda as to keep my communication open with that city. Fattesing with the greatest part of his force accompanies me. By the accounts I have received this morning Sindia and Holkar were themselves encamped yesterday within about two miles of Dubhoi on the road that leads towards Pawnghar, a strong fortress belonging to the former, situated about 16 miles east of Baroda and leading to the Málva Province; but notwithstanding I am arrived so near him it is out of my power at present to give you any certain information of his real views in entering this province farther than what may be drawn from the circumstances of his claim upon the English, the appearance of coming to assert it at the head of an army, and the hostile progress of his troops hitherto in plundering and destroying the country through which they have passed. The body of 6,000 horse belonging to Sindia, which had been sent forward by him towards the Máhi, were yesterday encamped near Chauna, about 5 kos in front, but through fear of our army have moved off during the course of last night.

I shall not fail to advise you soon of my further operation and have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Camp at Tázilpore, 7th March 1780.

Letter from Mr. Boddam to the Governor and Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,—I addressed you under the 7th instant, a duplicate of which I have now the honor to enclose, as also a packet from General Goddard, received last night from Broach.

By a private letter to me from the General, dated at his Camp near Baroda, he advises me of his arrival there the 8th at noon, having sent off all the baggage of the army to Cambay; that Sindia and Holkar's army was encamped near Tecu Tallow, about 7 kos distant from him, but had sent off all their baggage and guns towards Champaner and Pawnghar; and that his intentions were to have attacked them, but that he had received a letter from Mr. Farmer acquainting him that Sindia had sent for him and Mr. Stewart, and acquainted them that he and Holkar wished to be on amicable terms with the English; and as a proof of their sincerity they gave them their liberty in form, and would send Sháháji Appáji with them to his camp in order to open a negotiation with the General, and that Trimbak Bhálleráv should also be despatched to Rághoba. What further might follow the General wrote me he should advise me of; and that Messrs. Farmer and Stewart were expected the next day the 9th instant; that these two Chiefs were so alarmed at the rapid approach of our army, that after sending all their guns and baggage on to Champaner and Pawnghar, they had kept their people mounted all night and that day, the 8th instant, and that had not Farmer's letter arrived just as it did, the General had made a push with the Grenadiers and Europeans of the army to beat up their quarters and give them an alarm that night. As soon as I learn anything further material to advise of, I shall immediately despatch an express boat therewith.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker arrived here in the "Hart" armed boat yesterday from Cambay; and the 18 guns with the heavy stores of the army went into Broach river as they passed it, under convoy of the Naváb.

Enclosed I now transmit copies of the several papers noticed in my last, as sent me by the General, relative to the Attawisee and the Chauth of this town, which latter the Naváb had delivered into our charge in conformity to a letter sent him by Fattesing.

I remain with great respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
R. H. BODDAM.

Surat, 12th March 1780.

To

THE HON'BLE ENGLISH COMPANY.

After compliments.

I, Fattesingráv Gáikawár, Sená Khaskell Samsher Bahádur, present you my compliments; the *Chauth* of the port of Surat is given you, you will therefore take the same into your possession and enjoy it.—Dated the 21st of the month Saffer in the year 1108.

To

THE HON'BLE ENGLISH COMPANY.

After compliments.

I, Fattesing Gáikawár, Sená Kháskell Samsher Bahádur, send you my compliments, that as I have given you the Mahals of Surat Attawisee, excepting Songur and the jurisdiction of Vearah (Variav ?), you will therefore take them into your possession and enjoy the same.—Dated the 22nd of the month Saffer in the year 1108. What need I say more ?

FATTESINGRÁV GÁIKAWÁR, Sená Kháskell Samsher Bahádur, his Parwáná to all the KAMÁVISDÁRS of SURAT ATTAWISEE.

You will put into the possession of the English Company the districts of Surat Attawisee, excepting Songur and the jurisdiction of Vearah, and obey them.—Mágh vadya 7th, 1836, or the 22nd of the month Saffer.

To

ANNAJI A'NANT.

I, Fattesingráv Gáikawár, Sená Kháskell Samsher Bahádur, send you my compliments and that as the districts of Surat Attawisee, except Songur and the jurisdiction of Vearah, have been given to the English Company by me, you will therefore put them into their possession.—Dated the 22nd of the month Saffer, in the year 1108.

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—I wrote you from Tázilpore, acquainting you with my having crossed the Máhi, on the south bank of which I remained encamped to the 7th instant, and on the 8th marched to this place on the Vishwámitri Nadi within two miles of Baroda. I have as yet met with no sort of attempt to molest the followers of the camp from Sindia's troops; nor have they by any act, since quitting the neighbourhood of our pargana, testified a hostile disposition in their master towards the English; on the contrary, he has himself, as far as was in his power, endeavoured to evince his own friendly inclination by releasing voluntarily and unasked Messrs. Farmer and Stewart from their confinement, and dismissing them to my camp, where I have the pleasure to

inform you they arrived safe the evening of yesterday. He at the same time deputed Abáji Shábáji to deliver them over to me, with letters from himself and Holkar, setting forth the proofs he had formerly given of his friendly intentions to the English at Wargaon, he having persisted in the same sentiments towards them till the present period, which was sufficiently manifested in the treatment he had given to Messrs. Farmer and Stewart during their residence in his camp, and particularly in the liberty he had now granted them to return; and that he wished to know whether our inclinations were of a hostile or friendly nature towards the Peshwa and himself, as from our conduct hitherto he had reason to believe the former. In answer to this I told Abájee Shábáji that his master could not be a stranger to the disposition of the English to live in terms of peace and amity with the Peshwa's Government; that to effect this I had made fair and equitable proposals of accommodation to the Minister, which were rejected by him, and that in consequence of that refusal the English had been compelled to enter upon a war, in defence and vindication of their own rights and honor. That their quarrel was with the Minister, to whose obstinate and pernicious counsel the evils that might befall the Marátha State in the course of this war must alone be attributed. That they had no cause of enmity against Sindia whatever, but on the contrary were conscious of the favourable disposition he had always shown to their interests; and if he continued to prove himself their friend, they were ready to testify the sense of his services, and unite in any plan that might be proposed and adopted for their mutual benefit.

After conversing some time, the Vakil told me that his master was equally with us the enemy of Nána Fadanavis; since notwithstanding he was indebted for all his present greatness and security to the powerful aid of Sindia, who had confined both Sakhárám and Moroba, he had acted with the blackest ingratitude, and had leagued with the Bhonsla and Nizám against Sindia. He dwelt much on the power of his own master, and the inferior light in which the Minister ought to be considered, being in fact entirely subject to the control and direction of Sindia. He concluded with declaring, that the inclinations of the English and Sindia were, he found, reciprocally friendly to each other, and hostile towards Nána; and requested I would upon these grounds make such proposals to his master as might be consistent with the views, and conducive to the interests of both parties.

I plainly perceived from the conversation of this man that his drift was to obtain from me the first overtures towards a particular connection with Siudia, either with a view to give his master the superiority in the course of the negotiation, if he was sincere in the friendly wish he then expressed, or if he meant to deceive, to draw such a discovery from me as might be of service to his own designs. I therefore contented myself for the present with observing, in addition to what I have above mentioned, that it would be a circumstance perfectly agreeable to the English if Sindia heartily united with them against the Minister; and that with regard to the future settlement of the Government of Poona, as he must be the best judge how it might be effected in the most eligible and beneficial manner, I wished to receive his sentiments on the subject, to which I should reply with candour and sincerity.

Sensible how important a firm alliance with Sindia would be to the interest of the Company at this juncture; and how decisive with respect to the object of our present operations, as well as on account of the line of conduct the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council recommended me to pursue regarding this Chief, I have at the same time given him every proper encouragement to unite himself with the English, and in general terms held forth to him the honor and advantage he must ultimately derive from so considerable and distinguished a connection. The Vakil has this morning sent off to his master the particulars of what passed; and I expect to receive an explicit answer to-morrow, from which I shall be able to form a

more certain idea of his real views, and what plan must ultimately be resolved upon regarding him. I beg leave to assure you, that I shall not be seduced by the shining advantages this alliance offers, to place any implicit confidence in his professions, but shall act in the negotiation with the utmost circumspection and deliberation, and guard, as far as human prudence and foresight can determine, against every possibility of deceit.

Permit me to request that you will favor me as early as possible with your sentiments on the conduct proper to be pursued regarding this Chief; and in the mean time believe that I shall be guided by an invariable attention to the objects contained in the general plan concerted with you for the successful conclusion of our present contests with the Marátha Empire. I shall not fail to give you the earliest information respecting this business in my power, and have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Camp on the Vishwámitri Nadi, 10th March 1780.

Letters from THOMAS GODDARD *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—Since my letter of the 10th instant, which informed you of the arrival of Messrs. Farmer and Stewart in my camp, and the conversation I had held with Abáji Shábáji who accompanied them on the part of Sindia, I have entertained hopes of being able to communicate to you something decisive with regard to the negotiation set on foot by that Chief; but notwithstanding the expected answers have arrived, I am sorry it is not in my power to satisfy you further on this important point.

The answers from Sindia and Holkar were delivered me last night by the Vakil, and contained only general declarations of their own friendly sentiments, and the satisfaction they had derived from my assurances of the favorable inclinations of the English towards them; requesting further that as the business to be mutually adjusted was of the most important nature, I would send a confidential person to their camp, fully informed of the views of the English, with whom they would come to a final settlement and determination. After the proofs so lately given by Sindia of his wish to preserve the good opinion and friendship of the English, I could not with any propriety have hesitated to show him this mark of my confidence, had it appeared necessary to the success of our negotiation, or even calculated to promote it in any degree; but exclusive of a certain conviction in my own mind to the contrary, I further considered that the deputing a person to him at this time would carry the appearance of being too eager in making overtures, which might be construed in an unfavourable light; and was besides particularly improper from the circumstance of Sindia's having corresponded with me under the seal of the Peshwa, and that since the refusal of the Minister to accede to the terms I had proposed, all proposals for accommodation ought to be first made by their government.

I therefore declined sending persons immediately from myself to Sindia, but in such a manner as to avoid impressing him with a belief that my dissent arose from any motives of distrust, or a want of reliance in his honor, or sincerity; and have given Abáji Shábáji leave to return to his master, empowered to offer every general assurance on the part of the English, of the proper sense they have of his services, and their wish to continue on terms of amity with him, if by his conduct he will give them an opportunity of proving their friendly disposi-

tion and desire to promote his interests in conjunction with their own. Abáji Shábáji set out this day for his master's camp, which is about ten kos distant, with a promise to returning the day after to-morrow; to which period I have thought it necessary to limit him, as Sindia will have sufficient leisure to deliberate fully upon the measures he wishes to propose, and at the same time an excuse for further delays be avoided. I have consented, however much against my inclination, to the delay hitherto practised, from the probability there appears of succeeding in this negotiation, and the certain and decisive advantages a union of interest with Sindia will give us in the present war. Since crossing the Máhi his army has also remained perfectly quiet in the neighbourhood of Pawnghar and the Company's harkárás do not experience the effects of their ravages and depredations. My next will, I flatter myself, give you that certain and positive intelligence I am so desirous of conveying to you.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp near Baroda, 13th March 1780.

Gentlemen,—The expected proposals on the part of Mahádji Sindia have at last been made to me through Abáji Shábáji, who yesterday brought me letters from his master filled only with general expressions of friendship and referring me for particulars to this man. He accordingly, after repeating Sindia's enmity to the Minister of Nana Fadanavis, and his wish to unite with the English in removing him from the administration and setting it upon a plan more consistent with the interests of both parties, made the following proposal: That formerly, when Rághoba was at Talegaon after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into betwixt him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, wherein the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansie, where he should receive an allowance from the Peshwa's revenue of twelve lákhs of rupees per annum; that the sicca should continue to be struck in the name of the young Peshwa Mádhavráv Náráyan, and that Bájiráv, the son of Rághoba, should be appointed his Diván, but that as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia, by which means the sole control and direction of the government would come into his hands. This plan Sindia proposed should now be pursued, that Rághoba should immediately go himself to Jhansie, and young Bájiráv accompany him to Poona in order to fix the administration in the manner above mentioned. This was the amount of what Sindia had authorized Abáji to propose, without any reservation or other clause whatever; and as it appeared plain his only drift was to get Rághoba and his son into his own power, by which means he meant to aggrandize himself in the state without regard to the interests of the English, and perhaps through their means to make his own terms with the Minister, I have thought it proper to dismiss the Vakil with this pointed and positive answer, that the English cannot consistent with their honor, nor ever will agree to put any restraint upon Rághoba, or compel him to leave their dominions, where he has received an asylum, against his own consent; that however they might be inclined to unite in the proposed settlement, they must be perfectly satisfied respecting the safety of young Bájiráv, and every thing must be quietly settled at Poona, before his presence would be expedient, or even necessary there;

and that admitting the English did agree to assist in putting the power of the state into the hands of Sindia, it was necessary that he should also, on his part and in the name of the Peshwa, consent to the performance of certain conditions favourable to their interests, as well in consideration of the important advantages he was to receive through their means, as to compensate for the heavy expense of the wars, which formerly and particularly at this time, they had been involuntarily compelled to wage with the Marátha State. With this answer I this morning dismissed Abáji Shábáji to his master; and as in explaining fully my sentiments to him, and giving him to understand I could not consent to any terms that were of a dishonorable nature, I at the same time used every endeavour to convince him of my sincere inclination towards an accommodation; if his design is really to unite with the English, it will be at once proved by the conduct he adopts upon receiving my answer. One circumstance which tends to establish a belief of his hostile intentions, and which I think proper to mention to you, is that he wrote to Govindráv, the dissatisfied brother of Fattesing, who has long resided with the Lunawara Raja, inviting him to his camp and promising to put him in possession of the Gáikawár share of Gujarát, and I this evening learn that he has actually arrived and been received by Sindia.

I propose halting to-morrow when I shall determine upon the steps it will be necessary to follow and shall immediately inform you.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp near Baroda, March 17th, 1780.

Gentlemen,—In my last letter I informed you of the dismission of Sindia's Vakil and my intention to move towards him. I have accordingly advanced to a place called Pilloull on the banks of the Vishwámitri Nadi and about eight miles to the east of Baroda. On the day of my arrival here I found Sindia had sent his camp equipage, bázár and baggage for security to the neighbourhood of Pawnghur, and himself with the greatest part of his army, unincumbered with any sort of baggage whatever had taken post at the distance of about 12 miles. The remainder of the troops he had dispersed in different bodies round himself, and on the roads leading to my camp, so as to be effectually guarded against every possibility of a surprise which he is much affraid of, and which I have studied all in my power to obtain an opportunity of attempting with any prospect of success, but on account of the disposition above described hitherto to no effect. I am anxious to accomplish this, because from the nature of his army, and the mode of war he practises I neither can approach near enough to attack him suddenly to advantage, nor will he risk the hazard of meeting me openly in the field. If I advance he will certainly retreat; and to think of pursuing him beyond his present encampment would not be the means of bringing on a decisive action, nor could it be attended with any real or solid benefit, proportionate to the inconvenience of exposing the Company's and Fattesing's possessions in the Gujarát to the inroads and depredation of a ravaging enemy, from which they are at present entirely free. I think it necessary to mention to you, that since the dismission of Sindia's Vakil, I have received no sort of message or overture whatever, and that notwithstanding the reports and the general belief of an enmity subsisting betwixt him and the Minister, the agents of the latter reside in his camp, and I am credibly informed letters are

constantly passing betwixt him and the Minister. From all these circumstances I am confirmed in the conjecture which Sindia's late conduct suggested, that the show of his animosity against Nána Fadanavis was an entire pretext to deceive the English, and get the persons of Rághoba and his son into his hands, for purposes merely of his own advantage, and obtaining the accomplishment of his views with the Ministers. I shall write you very shortly, and have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,
THOMAS GADDARD.

Camp near Pilloull, 4 kos from Baroda, 24th May 1780.

P.S.—In consequence of the intention expressed in your former letter of raising two new battalions immediately, I gave orders to Major Fullerton, Commanding the Detachment at Ahmedabad, to entertain some sepoy recruits, of which numbers were offering themselves, and as I have reason to believe that country the best nursery for soldiers on this side of India, I take the liberty of further proposing that you will allow me to authorize Major Fullerton to enlist such number as you may judge requisite to complete the augmentation proposed to take place in your military establishment.

THOMAS GODDARD.

Gentlemen,—My letter of the 24th instant informed you particularly how affairs were situated respecting Sindia, in which state they remained without any alteration till this morning, when it became requisite to move ground on account of a scarcity of water at the former encampment. I accordingly determined upon marching to this place, which was about five miles distant, and upon my approach found a large party of the enemy's horse had occupied the village of Camould, close to which it was necessary to encamp. As I advanced nearer, their numbers continued to increase, till upon obtaining a more distinct view, I perceived their whole army had collected in its neighbourhood, covering a space of at least three miles in extent, on the right, left, and in the rear of the village. I therefore immediately ordered the line to form, and advanced in order of battle to the village, which after firing a few rockets they precipitately abandoned; but as their army showed themselves upon the plain in front disposed to annoy the troops, I thought it necessary for the ease and convenience of the army to disperse them, and accordingly ordered a few discharges from the artillery, which had the desired effect, and they immediately fled with the loss of some men and horses, nor have they since appeared to give any disturbance.

I cannot exactly ascertain their present situation any further than that their guns and baggage are moved to a considerable distance out of reach, and where it would neither be consistent with good policy to follow them, nor could it be attended with any immediate advantage as they would continue to carry them to a still greater distance as I advanced. I shall obtain every necessary information respecting the enemy, after which I shall determine upon the steps proper to be taken and give you instant intelligence.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp at Kunlade, 27th March 1780.

Gentlemen,—In my letter of the 27th ultimo, I communicated to you the circumstances that happened the day of my arrival at this place; since which time nothing of any consequence has occurred till this morning, when finding the enemy would neither venture to come to a fair and decisive action themselves, nor put it in my power to attack them with all the advantage I could have wished, having sent their guns and standing encampment at too great a distance in their rear for me possible to overtake them, I came to the resolution of dislodging their army from the post they then occupied with their horses and arms only about six miles from my camp, and marched myself for that purpose at two o'clock with a part of the army, leaving the remainder at the former ground under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley. The force I took with me consisted of 200 Europeans, 10 Grenadier companies of sepoys, the 4th and 7th battalions of Bengal and the 8th battalion of Bombay Infantry, together with 2 twelve and 10 six pounders of artillery. I also took with me the regiment of Mogal cavalry and Kandáhár horse. These I divided into two lines, giving the command of the rear line to Major Hopkins, which consisted of two battalions of sepoys with the cavalry divided on either flank. Lieutenant-Colonel Bailie and Major Forbes were stationed to the front line.

The situation in which I knew the enemy to be posted, the care they took to prevent being surprized, and the ease and expedition with which they would be able to move off upon the first alarm, gave me no hopes of coming upon them unprepared and surprizing them effectually; but the objects I principally had in view were to induce them to venture an action with only a part of the army opposed to their whole force; to drive them from the post they then occupied; or if they fled without resistance to prove the manifest superiority of our arms in the most striking and honorable manner. I am happy to inform you the event has far exceeded my expectations; I approached much nearer to their camp without being discovered by any of their small out-posts than I could have conceived possible, and a little before daybreak came upon their grand guard consisting of six or seven thousand men and commanded by Piráji Pant and Baghretty Sindia* which I passed through without discharging a shot, determined to reserve my fire till I came to the main body under Mahádji Sindia himself. This being a mile and a half in front, I did not reach till about sunrise, when their whole army was in motion, and the action immediately commenced. Seeing the inferiority of our force, and presuming upon their own numbers, they advanced with much appearance of courage and resolution, but were received by so warm and well directed a fire from our artillery that they were obliged to give way, and in the space of about an hour quitted the field entirely. In order to dislodge a large body of the enemy who were very troublesome to the troops by firing matchlocks and rockets from behind the cover of some bushes on the right flank of the line, I ordered the regiment of cavalry and the Kandáhár horse to advance; which service they performed with equal spirit and success, and having driven them to the plain, gave an excellent opportunity for the artillery to fire upon them as they retreated.

After remaining two hours upon this ground, and the Maráthás not daring to make their appearance again, I ordered the troops to return to camp, which they did without any further molestation from the enemy, or any party of their horse showing themselves in the rear. From this circumstance, and the effect which it was plain our artillery must have had among them, I am persuaded the enemy must have suffered considerably. I cannot at present ascertain it exactly, but the reports of harkárás who come in make the numbers who fell very considerable, besides those who were carried off wounded.

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* Probably either for Bhagvat Sing or Bhagvant Sindia.

We have sustained no loss on our side except among the Kandáhár horse, of whom fifteen were killed and wounded in charging the enemy as before related, which they did very gallantly. One Mogal trooper is wounded, and also one sepoy by a matchlock ball. I shall shortly inform you what effect the action of this day had upon Sindia's operations, and beg leave to conclude at present by expressing to you my satisfaction at the steady, uniform and proper behaviour of Major Hopkins who had charge of the rear line during the whole engagement.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp at Kimloule, 3rd April 1780.

To

Brigadier General GODDARD.

Sir,—Our last letters from you were dated the 3rd and 4th of this month.

We observed with much pleasure the advantage gained over the enemy in the action of the 3rd, but we are impatient to hear from you what effect your success may have had on Sindia's operations, and what plan you propose pursuing, which, as the season grows very late, it is of consequence for us to be informed of as early as possible.

The possession of Bassein, considered in every point of view, is an object of so much importance to the Company, that we cannot help expressing our anxiety at the probability there appears of this season elapsing, and Bassein still unsubdued. The danger of such a fortification so contiguous to our possessions, remaining in the hands of the enemy at this time of an European war, and the advantage and security of the acquisition of it would give to this Presidency, makes us very earnest in our wishes not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accident or circumstances; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention, or bring the campaign to a more honorable and advantageous conclusion.

The President has acquainted us that he wrote you some time ago on this subject; and the rule we have laid down for our conduct will not permit us to withhold our advice on so very material an affair. But should you not intend to move to the southward before the close of the season, a due attention to the safety of this place, which you must be sensible, is now in a very destitute and unprovided situation, with respect to the troops, makes it absolutely and indispensably requisite that the Bombay detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley should be returned into garrison as soon as possible, before the monsoon shuts up the communication by sea, as it would be the height of imprudence to suffer this place to remain with such a slender force for its defence at the season most favourable for a sudden attack, when no relief can be afforded in case of any attempts from the French. If therfore your operations for this season should be confined to Gujarát, the weighty reasons above recited, we doubt not, will convince you of the necessity of immediately complying with our requisition for the return of our detachment—a measure we cannot dispense with, and

shall accordingly depend on your ordering it to Surat to be embarked for Bombay whilst the weather will permit; on which head we shall give the necessary orders to Mr. Boddam.

The number of our Europeans, and the present disposition of them, will not, we think, for the present, admit of our carrying into execution the alterations proposed by you with respect to them, in any manner, that will prove of advantage to the service adequate to the great increase of expense; but we have determined immediately to raise seven additional battalions of sepoys in order to complete our establishment according to your recommendation to fifteen battalions, which will be formed of the strength and model proposed by you, and we shall soon inform you of the particular arrangement we proposed making.

We have appointed Captains West, Waddington, and McCullock, now serving under you, to command three of the new battalions, and hope to hear of Major Fullerton's success in raising recruits at Ahmedabad.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 30th April 1780.

Bombay Castle, May 9th, 1780.

Gentlemen,—Since my letter of the 3rd instant I have not addressed you upon the subject of the operations of the compaign in hopes I should have been able to bring it to some more decided issue than I have yet found means of doing, but all my endeavours to draw Sindia into an action with the whole or part of the army have hitherto proved ineffectual. As far however as circumstances could possibly allow of I have met with every success it was reasonable to expect or desire. The declared superiority of the British arms has been asserted and undeniably proved, and Sindia, expelled from the dominions of the Company in Gujarát and of their ally Fattesing, has been compelled to retire towards Powah Gurr (Pavangad) and restrain himself within the limits of his country. These, you must be sensible, except prevailing upon Sindia to try the decision of a battle, were the only points to which my present military objects could tend. I had no inducement to penetrate into the Málva Province in order to pursue and punish a flying enemy. By doing so, besides that no adequate advantage could possibly be attained, I should expose the troops to unnecessary because unprofitable difficulties and dangers; and the Company's new acquired possessions, as well as the whole of their settlements on this side of India, to the depredations of an Indian, and perhaps the attack of an European, force. Thus circumstanced, I have been necessitated to confine my operations to the watching the motions of Sindia, and to aim at catching an opportunity to avail myself of any advantage these might give me; but in this view I have been a good deal disappointed of success from the extreme precaution he uses, as described in my former letters, and which he has doubled since the surprise of the 3rd instant. After that period I remained encamped at Camloul till the 19th, when I came to the determination of moving to occupy the ground where Sindia's and Holkar's

army lay, hoping by this step, besides the reputation it would lend our arms of having twice driven him from the field, to obtain a more certain information of his real designs, and of the conduct he meant to follow if I advanced towards his country. The event justified the certain belief I had before formed, that he would not on any account hazard a battle, and that he hoped by drawing me from a proper line of policy into a fruitless pursuit of him to find occasion when I might be distressed for want of provision or forage to attack me to more advantage, for he removed his bazár and baggage to a still greater distance, and himself with his army, after discharging a number of rockets upon the troops as they advanced, which fortunately did no execution, except killing one sepoy, retreated to the distance of about 7 miles, where he remained as before with his fighting men only.

I continued on their ground till yesterday, when finding not the smallest probability of coming to an engagement, and having no intention of following Sindia any further to no purpose, I returned with the army to within ten miles of Baroda. The enemy did not venture to appear in any numbers. About three thousand only of their Pindáris showed themselves in the rear and were dispersed by a few shot. During my stay at the last encampment an action happened betwixt two battalions of the Bengal sepoys and the greatest part of Sindia's army, in which himself and Holkar were present. The country for near twenty miles round my camp had been so completely destroyed by the enemy that it was not possible to find any grass for the subsistence of the cattle within that space. Even the leaves of such trees as might have nourished them had been mostly stripped off. It became therefore necessary to send a strong party for the protection of the foragers. This consisted, as I have mentioned above, of two battalions of sepoys with their four 6-pounders, under the command of Captain Campbell. The enemy came down upon them in great numbers about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, venturing so near as to receive the fire of the two grenadier companies, which made them instantly wheel about, and as the grape shot of the artillery played briskly upon them at the same time, a considerable number were killed, and among them fell a very near relation of Tukoji Holkar, who enjoyed his chief confidence and had the principal direction of his affairs. They did not dare to advance so near again, but continued hovering at a distance till about five in the afternoon, when the party having completed their forage halted at a village called Sihoully, where they remained till near midnight, and returned next morning safe to camp. I am exceedingly pleased with the cool and resolute conduct of Captain Campbell on this occasion, and take the liberty of mentioning it to you, as well as the steady and determined bravery of the troops under him. This little action, successfully maintained by so small a force against the greatest part of Sindia's army, himself and Holkar present, must confirm their idea of their inefficiency to contend with our arms, and impress them with a proper sense of their own weakness.

As the season is now so far advanced as to leave little leisure for further military operations, and indeed in this quarter nothing remains to be done except securing the peaceful and unmolested possession of the countries we have acquired and the general tranquillity of the Gujarát Province, I propose taking such measures for the purpose in concert with Fattesing as may be consistent with the interests of the Company and the future prosecution of the war, and shall immediately communicate to you the plan I propose to follow.

Sindia has not yet changed his situation since my march to this place. I am waiting very impatiently for letters from your Committee, the last I received bearing date so far back

as the 26th of February. Enclosed is a duplicate of my address to you of the 16th instant, which permit me to request your early attention. I shall have the honor to write you again soon, and am,

Gentlemen,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Camp near Camloul,
25th April 1780.

Bombay Castle, 28th April 1780.

Received the following letter from the Chief and Factors at Thána enclosing Captain Dawson's report of the passes on the hills in the Belápur District :—

"Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—We have received your letter of the 20th instant, in which you point out Kalyán as an object for our troops, and direct that they be employed against it as soon as possible, unless we judge it impracticable without too much risk to them. To prevent suspicion and as there were little hopes of getting grain in the Antgaon, we immediately recalled Captain Campbell's detachment to Persik, and ordered Captain Dawson, who had been sent with a party to examine the different passes on the hills in the Belápur District (his report of them we have now the honor to enclose), to return, but as there were various reports of the strength of the fort and number of the troops at Kalyán, we despatched a person to get some certain intelligence. He returned last night and brought something of a plan of the place. The fort is upon a hill, mounts 12 or 16 guns which command the town : he observed that they are extremely apprehensive and very much upon their guard. They have sunk some boats in the river near the fort, and people are posted at a good distance to give notice of our approach, so that it seems now too late to surprise them. He is not very clear as to the number of their troops, but heard they had near 1,000 men. The Major being made acquainted with these circumstances gave it as his opinion that the force of 460 men which we can now muster is not sufficient to insure success, but was it joined by the companies of Europeans and sepoys lately taken from this garrison with 8 or 10 artillerymen, it would. We therefore request your Honor and Council will, if to be spared, return them.

We are with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
JOHN HALSEY.
GEORGE PAGE.
LEWIS COCKRAN.

Thána, 27th April 1780."

Received the following letter from Thána :—

"Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—The companies of Europeans and sepoys that were sent from this garrison with Captain Lendrum to Belápure being now returned enables us to carry your wishes with respect to Kalyán into execution : these troops will be joined by the force

mentioned to your Honor and Council in our respects of the 27th ultimo, we could spare; and they will all meet at Persik to-morrow night, and proceed up the river with the same tide to Kalyán, when we expect they will arrive about 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning—a proper time for them to disembark.

We have not been favoured with an answer to our letter of the 27th ultimo, but we still understand this to be your purpose, and shall therefore carry it into execution to-morrow night unless we receive orders from your Honor and Council to the contrary before that time.

We are with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
JOHN HALSEY.
GEORGE PAGE.
LEWIS COCKRAN.

Thána, 8th May 1780."

Bombay Castle, 12th May 1780.

Received the following letter from Thána:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—This is purposely to acquaint you that Lieutenant Little arrived last night from Kalyán with advice that our troops took possession of that place about one o'clock yesterday without any loss; only one sepoy and one lascar slightly wounded.

The town of Kalyán being now in our possession, we shall, as soon as possible, bring down all the grain found there; but as keeping the town requires at least a whole battalion of sepoys, and even then the country round about will be subject to the ravages of the enemy, and so of little or no use, besides the difficulty of keeping open the communication by the river, we submit to your Honor and Council whether it would be eligible to endeavour to make the Bráhmans ransom their houses, of which there are a great number of very excellent ones, threatening otherwise to destroy them and then withdraw our troops for other service.

We are with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
JOHN HALSEY.
GEORGE PAGE.
LEWIS COCKRAN.

Thána, 11th May 1780."

Bombay Castle, 14 May 1780.

Received the following letter from Thána, enclosing copy of one from Captain Campbell to the Chief and Factors and copy of another from Ensign Fyfe to Captain Campbell:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—Enclosed is copy of a letter from Captain Campbell to the Chief, also copy of one from Ensign Fyfe, who is prisoner in the Marátha Camp, to Captain Campbell.

We can plainly hear that they are smartly engaged at Kalyán and have been these two hours past.

It is not in our power to send Captain Campbell any re-inforcement from hence, having but 160 disciplined sepoys in garrison.

The Chief has written to Captain Campbell to acquaint the Marátha Sardár that though we should be exceedingly sorry to follow any example of cruelty, yet should they put their threats into execution with regard to the prisoners the Bráhmans that are in our hands should be every one put to death, not indeed that we would have him do so, but only by way of intimidating them.

He is likewise told, that if he finds he cannot defend the place without too great risque, he must retreat in the best manner he can by the river and bring off the boats if possible, otherwise by the Antgaon, to which place we will send boats for them.

If you could send a small vessel or two they would be of great service either in covering the retreat in case of necessity, or in keeping open the communication with Kalyán. The Prahm cannot be taken from her station, as she has full employment in resisting the attempts daily made by the enemy's armed boats to pass down the river. The large floating battery is ordered as high up the river as she can go with safety, to be of what use she can.

We are, with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
JOHN HALSEY.
GEORGE PAGE.
LEWIS COCKRAN.

Thána, 13th May 1780, half-past 10 o'clock A.M."

"SIR,—Nothing material has happened since I did myself the honor of writing to you. The Maráthás, to the number of about two thousand horse and foot, came round the town, fired a few shot and retired to a small distance, where they still are.

I cannot get any person to give me an account of what batty is in town. There is a great quantity, but every inhabitant having left their houses, it will not be possible to take it in the manner my instructions direct me.

Since I wrote the above I have been favoured with your letter by Captain McNeil and Mr. Hopkins. I shall send the batty with all despatch, as you direct, on the arrival of the boats.

I have this moment received the enclosed letter from Ensign Fyfe, now a prisoner in the Marátha Camp, near this town. A Jamádár of the 2nd battalion (taken prisoner with himself) was sent with it, and is obliged to return. I see he is obliged to write largely, as the Marátha Sardár was to have his letter read.

Will you not think it necessary with me, Sir, that the Prahm will be of service if you order her up here.

I send a principal inhabitant of this place to you, named Ally Saib Chodry, with his family.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
(Signed) RICHARD CAMPBELL.

Kalyán, 12th May 1780, 9 P.M."

"Dear Sir,—I am now a prisoner in the Marátha camp with 7 Europeans, 1 Subhedár, 2 Jamádárs and 15 sepoys; they are now encamped within a very little of Kalyán, and are about 16 or 18,000 fighting men; have 8 guns of our howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write this at their desire to demand that you will immediately deliver up Kalyán and Belápur, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, and to storm both the other places and put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer with an answer. I have pledged my head that you will not hurt the messenger, and so be certain to return an answer soon. My situation is none of the most agreeable. Should be obliged to Mr. Maclean for a few clothes: I have none.

I am, Sir,
(Signed) THOMAS FYFE.

Camp near Kalyán, 12th May 1780.

P.S.—This does not please Mr. Bápuji, the Burrah Sardár; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty that has been taken and also a tribute for the great expense of his army; he also says that General Goddard with the grand army is at present surrounded in Gujarát, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms he will get the grand army relieved, and further threatens us if a refusal is given.

(A True Copy.)
LEWIS COCKRAN,
Secretary.

To Captain Campbell, or the Commanding Officer at Kalyán."

Letter from the Governor and Council to John Halsey, Chief and Factors at Thána.

Gentlemen,—We have received your letters of the 11th and 13th.

We flatter ourselves that Captain Campbell with the force under his command will be able to maintain himself at Kalyán, which we are entirely of opinion is preferable to attempt-

ing a retreat before the enemy—a measure always attended with much danger and which even if successfully accomplished will certainly encourage the enemy to insult us in our own possessions. We hereby expect to hear the event of the attack of the 13th, and in order that you may, if necessary, have it in your power to afford further assistance to the troops at Kalyán, we now send a detachment of about three hundred men with two field pieces, which with one company of sepoys from your garrison are to be put under the command of Major Westphall and held in readiness to support Captain Campbell if occasion should require, of which we conclude you will be able to judge from his advice.

From what information we possess, we can form but little judgment of the state of the communication with Kalyán, or how far it can be effected without annoyance from the enemy, and therefore must rely on you and Major Westphall to take all proper precautions for effecting a junction should the detachment proceed.

We hope Captain Campbell is properly supplied with ammunition. Your indent, received yesterday, will be immediately complied with.

Bombay Castle, 14th May 1780.

We are,

Your loving friends,

WILLIAM HORNBY AND COMMITTEE.

Received the following letter from Thána:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—On receipt of your letter of the 14th we considered whether we should immediately send the reinforcement to Kalyán or wait for advices from Captain Campbell, when we were of opinion it would be most prudent to send them directly, which was therefore done, and we were confirmed of the necessity by the receipt of his next letter. Major Westphall with the whole of the detachment from Bombay got safe to Kalyán yesterday afternoon, but it was utterly out of our power to add a company to it from hence.

We should have written to you before, but that the Chief constantly kept the Hon'ble the President advised of the situation of the force at Kalyán.

The 13th the enemy kept up a constant fire from 8 o'clock till one without doing any other mischief to the detachment than killing one European and wounding a sepoy. They renewed the attack with much more spirit yesterday morning, and continued it till two, when they were again obliged to retire. We had one Jamádár and four sepoys killed. Ensign Brown is wounded in the shoulder, and ten sepoys are also wounded.

We beg leave to observe to your Honor and Council that Captain Campbell seems to us to have repulsed the enemy in their attacks with great courage, and indeed has exerted himself to the utmost during the time he had the command; he writes that the troops are in great spirits and very alert though enduring extraordinary fatigue.

Mr. Christie who came with the detachment has made an indent for Engineer stores and workmen, which we have thought proper to comply with and hope you will approve it.

We have received a letter from the Hon'ble Board ordering Lieutenants George Unthank, John Brown, John Huntridge and James Rattry to the Presidency, but as the two latter

gentlemen are on service at Kalyán, we hope they will excuse their not having been sent. Mr. Unthank proceeds to the Presidency, but Mr. Brown is wounded and cannot.

Thána, 16th May 1780.

We are with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
JOHN HALSEY.
GEORGE PAGE.
LEWIS COCKRAN."

Bombay Castle, 25th May 1780.

The President received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"*Camp on the heights 2 miles to the eastward of the enemy's Camp, May 24th, 1780, 9 A.M.*

HON'BLE SIR,—Yesterday I received a disposition of the troops and every necessary preparation for marching to attack the enemy this morning who, I found from my harkárás, were encamped about 3 miles south-east of Kalyán; in consequence of which I ordered the troops to be under arms at 2 o'clock this morning in hopes of being able to surprise them in their camp by dawn of day, but the oxen that came from Bombay having arrived only last night, and being in number insufficient, as Major Westphall had not been able to get a single draught bullock for his guns at Kalyán, and for want of drivers, not having one, as well as the bullocks being totally unfit for service, so that the guns were obliged to be dragged by sepoys and lascars, it was 4 o'clock before I got clear of the suburbs. After advancing about 500 yards I fell in with the enemy's picquet, who not suspecting our approach were marching towards Kalyán. I immediately ordered the advanced guard to form and unlimbered a six-pounder and let the enemy come within 100 yards before a shot was fired. The 1st and 2nd from the pounder did a good deal of execution, and a plantoon well fired from the advanced guard brought down several men and a few horses. As soon as it was well light I found the enemy's intentions were to get in our rear, notwithstanding which I was determined to push on as fast as I could in hopes of cutting off their guns, as they had brought one down to our left that fired a shot without hurting any of our people; they had also armed the hedges and topes with Arabs and Gárdis, so that I was obliged to detach flanking parties to drive them off (as their shot very much annoyed our line) which had the intended effect; and after fighting their way we came to their encampment about 7 o'clock, which they had left in great precipitation as the principal part of their baggage was there, about a mile from their camp (which was on the south-east bank of a dry nála). I perceived their guns drawing off with about 20 pair of oxen to each, elephants assisting the one they had been firing at us, the axle tree of which was broken. I pushed on as speedily as possibly could, in hopes of getting up with the last, but could not get it, and after pursuing them about two miles from their camp I have drawn up my detachment on a commanding ground, where I intend to refresh my people and wait till evening, when, if I find the enemy entirely gone (which I think they are up Naruck Ghát), very few being now in sight, I will return to Kalyán. I have the pleasure and satisfaction to acquaint you that the officers and men behaved with the greatest spirit and bravery, and nothing prevented my taking every gun they had, but the want of good cattle and drivers, as I could have hemmed them in, so that they could not possibly have got them off. Our guns and small arms

must have done great execution, being well served and fired. As we passed through their camp we picked up one of their drums, some muskets and a great number of catridges. The best account I have been able to get of the enemy's strength is that they have between four and five thousand horse and from one thousand five hundred to two thousand Arabs, Sindians and Gardis, with eight guns.

I am with respect,
Hon'ble Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
JAMES HARTLEY."

Bombay Castle, 9th July 1780.

Received the following letter from the Governor General and Council :—

"GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter under date the 7th March with its enclosures.

We observe what you have urged in your letters to General Goddard of the 9th and 24th February respecting the further settlement and division of the Province of Gujarát, and the great disproportion which the share allotted to the Company bears to that allowed to Fattesing being, as appears by your estimated value of the several districts, no less an amount than the sum of Rs. 16,37,100 yearly revenue. We thank you for the caution which you have been pleased to give in upon this head, and shall conform to it in our final ratification of the treaty.

It does not appear from any part of General Goddard's correspondence with you, or of his advices to us, what specific advantages he proposed to derive to the Company from the exchange which has occasioned this diminution in the original value of their portion of the Province of Gujarát further than that the possession of the fort of the district of Dubhoi might prove from its contiguity to Baroda a check upon Fattesing. To us uninformed as we are of the other circumstances on which the comparative advantages of the district may depend, it seems that exclusively of the difference of revenue, the exchange must rather prove disadvantageous to the Company, as we gain for lands laying remote and rendered in a degree inaccessible to the Maráthás by the interposition of three capital rivers, a district immediately bordering upon theirs and at all times open to their incursions. We have therefore recommended this subject to be again considered by General Goddard ; and we must likewise request you to afford him the aid of your advice upon it, to which we are persuaded he will pay that deference and respect which he has hitherto yielded to it on every occasion, and we have thought proper to direct him either :—

1st.—To require the consent of Fattesing to annul the exchange already made and to give up the possession of the districts which formerly appertained to the Peshwa on the north of the River Máhi and was ceded to him by General Goddard, and to receive back the districts of Zinore and Dubhoi, originally the Gáikawár's share on the south of the Tápti, which was ceded to him in like manner by the General.

Or *2ndly.*—Allowing the exchange to continue, to assign and to deliver over to the Company an additional portion of land yielding a revenue equal to the difference produced by that exchange in the manner prescribed in your letter to General Goddard of the 24th February.

Or *3rdly.*—To enter into a specific engagement for a subsidy payable in ready money equal to that amount.

We have the treaty at present under consideration, and shall apprise you in our next of any further observation which may occur to us and which may be necessary for your information upon it.

The treaty will be ratified and returned to you in duplicate by the Ship "Elizabeth," which will sail in a few days and by the safest route by land.

Our distress for money is such, that we shall be unable to make adequate remittances for the support of your Presidency, and the pay of the large army under command of Brigadier General Goddard. We must therefore desire that every accession of revenue which may immediately arise to the Company from the operations and successes of General Goddard's army be set aside and appropriated exclusively to that expense. For the same reason we must recommend to you not to admit the smallest increase in your expenses in a reliance on a continuance of the large supplies which have been afforded you from hence, as we fear that neither our resources nor the currency of these provinces will in any degree endure a continuance of the vast drains that have been made from it in remittances to your Presidency, to Fort St. George, and to China since the time at which they came into the Company's possession.

We have read with attention and surprise Mr. Henshaw's correspondence with the Viceroy of Goa relative to the seizure of an English ship by the subjects of Portugal of Mangalore. We desire that you will send us affidavits of the several facts mentioned in Mr. Henshaw's letters, a further account of the Viceroy's conduct from the period, of Mr. Henshaw's last application to him, and of every other circumstance which can throw any light upon this extraordinary transaction and the present view of the subject. We think that if you have not obtained complete satisfaction from the Viceroy for the insult offered to the British flag by the seizure of the ship and the confinement of the gunner Warren, you would be authorized in making reprisals.

We shall transmit a copy of Mr. Henshaw's correspondence to Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hughes and request his opinion upon the subject of it, a copy of which we shall desire he will forward to you.

We are,
Gentlemen,

Fort William, 15th May 1780.

WARREN HASTINGS.
PHILIP FRANCIS.
EDWARD WHELER."

Letter from the Governor, *and* Council, *Bombay, to Brigadier General* Goddard.

Sir,—The season for action now approaching, the President has laid before us a statement of the present situation of affairs as relative to the Marátha War, and his sentiments in respect to the operations of the ensuing campaign, with a general plan of measures most suitable to the circumstances in which we now are.

We lose no time iu transmitting to you an abstract of the President's minute on those points which are requisite for your immediate information, and in advising you of the measures which appear to us most expedient to be pursued at this juncture.

The President's statement of our present difficulties is just in every particular, and we entirely concur with him in the necessity of the most vigorous exertions on our part for avert-

ing the further distress we should be exposed to by our inactivity, and for bringing the Marátha War to as speedy a conclusion as possible; nor can we indulge any hope of effecting either of these points or of improving our situation, but by the timely execution of the measures he has proposed, and strictly confining our attention and efforts to the objects already defined and explained to you as the boundaries of our views in regard to the acquisition of territory for this Presidency.

The plan of operations proposed for the ensuing campaign appears calculated with every probability of success to answer these important ends, and to be concerted with all possible attention to our present circumstances and means of execution; and we have accordingly determined to send an army into the Konkan as early as the season will possibly permit, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, to anticipate the enemy in securing possession of the country and passes into the Deccan, whilst the army under your command moves down to the siege of Bassein, when our forces may be employed in covering the siege, or as occasion may require. The advantages of this plan are so obvious, and so clearly explained in the President's minute, that we shall not repeat them here; and shall only observe that we see no other possible method of securing subsistence for the army for which you have acquainted us. You shall entirely depend on us.

It will be essential to the complete execution of the plan for securing the country before it is ravaged and destroyed by the enemy, that the Bengal army should move down by land to the siege of Bassein, and we think more eligible in every other respect than transporting it by sea; not only by the saving of much time and expense; but as it will tend to distract and impress the enemy with an opinion of our strength, exclusive of the argument that may be drawn in support of our opinion from the aversion the Bengal sepoys entertain for the sea, the chance of accidents, and the disgust they may conceive to the service, if embarked contrary to their inclination. What is urged on this head we doubt not will fully convince you that the reduction of Bassein will be performed with infinitely greater advantage, as well as other very important points provided for more effectually if the army is moved down by land rather than in the other mode of transporting it by sea; and we trust that when you have attentively considered the reasons on which our opinion is grounded any further recommendation will be needless to induce you to adopt the measures of marching the army by land to the siege of Bassein.

We cannot point out the exact time for your commencing the siege, as that will depend on the weather, but according to the usual course of the seasons we imagine you will be able to put the army in motion the 1st of October. We however recommend to you to commence your march as soon as you shall judge it practicable, and the rains sufficiently abated to permit the passage of the rivers; whilst, as already mentioned, we shall exert our utmost endeavours to preserve the country in a condition to afford the necessary supplies to the army during the march and the continuance of the campaign in this quarter.

We shall furnish the artillery, stores and ammunition requisite for the siege agreeably to your desire, and lodge them at Dhárávi, where they will be in readiness for service immediately on your arrival, and we shall provide vessels for transporting them to the place where they are to be landed and for keeping your communication open by sea.

We understand there is now a large force in Bassein, said to consist of eight or ten thousand men; and as the enemy must for some time have expected an attack, we conclude they are not unprepared for that event.

You will no doubt see the importance of making an effectual disposition for the protection of Gujarát during your absence to the southward. So principal a part of our resources depending on the receipts from the late acquisitions, to enable you the more sufficiently to provide for their defence, we now send directions to the Chiefs at Surat and Broach to afford you such reinforcements from those garrisons as can be spared, if you should judge such assistance necessary, and make requisition to them on that head.

The Governor General and Council have in a late letter given their sentiments on the exchange of territory made with Fattesing according to the treaty, and recommended other modes of partition, which are particularized in the Governor's minute, as well as the objections that lay against those modes. But circumstanced as matters now are, we are persuaded you will agree with us in opinion, that it will be more expedient for the present to avoid a subject that may give dissatisfaction and raise doubt in Fattesing, and to waive any further discussion of the partition till a more convenient season.

Our distress for money is so very great, that we shall find the utmost difficulty in furnishing the necessary sum even for the slender equipments of the body of forces to be sent into the Konkan—a service on which so much depends; and at a time when our own necessities press so hard upon us, our embarrassment is doubly increased by the intimation we have received from the Governor Ceneral and Council, that their own distress will put it out of their power to make adequate remittances for the support of this Presidency, and the pay of the large army under your command; on which account they desire that every accession of revenue which may arise to the Company from the success of that army may be set aside and appropriated exclusively to that expense. We shall not, however, renounce our reliance on more effectual support from Bengal, when the Governor General and Council have received our late representations, and are informed of the levies made with your advice for the defence of our new possessions, for which it was necessary we should make provision as their defence must in the end devolve upon us; but when they see the vigorous exertions we are making to bring the war to an advantageous crisis, we confidentially hope they will strain their extensive resources to second our endeavours, or at least that they will provide for the payment of the Bengal army, and make this exclusive appropriation unnecessary as it is impossible. In the mean time, the revenue arising from the new acquisitions shall be set apart for the general purposes of the war; and we shall be very ready to afford you out of this or any other resource such sums as we can possibly spare from our own occasions, to assist in defraying the charges of the forces under your command.

We have received your letter of the 8th ultimo.

The information you, before, gave us on the subject of Mr. Vandergroof's correspondence with the Poona Minister has been already transmitted to the Governor General and Council, and will be followed by your letter above mentioned; when, if they should judge it proper to take public notice of his conduct, we shall have sufficient time to make a representation to the Dutch Governor General before an apportunity will offer for Batavia.

We are, &c.,

Bombay Castle, 6th August 1780. WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Thursday, 5th.—Received the following letter from Lieut.-Colonel Hartley :—

"Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—On the 2nd instant I had the honour of acquainting you with my intentions of moving from Kalyán with my reasons for doing so, and have now the satisfaction to inform you that my endeavours have in some degree been crowned with the success I wished.

I marched yesterday morning at 5 a.m. with two 3-pounder field pieces, the European Infantry, and the first battalion of sepoys from Kalyán, having previously directed Major Hopkins, on seeing me pass the Walden (Ulhás) river, to send down from the Machi of Báwa Mullen the right battalion of sepoys to the western point of the hill.

On the junction of the troops at the point of the hill I directed Captain Jameson to advance briskly and take possession of the enemy's guns, supporting him with the troops from Kalyán, who marched to the left in hopes of drawing the enemy between two fires.

On our troops passing the point of the hill they immediately fell in with the enemy, who were likewise in motion, and disputed for above a mile every inch of the ground; but the right battalion advancing upon them with the utmost eagerness and spirit, pursued them to their camp, which they took possession of, and were shortly joined there by the rest of the troops.

The enemy separated and fled in two parties, one of which, I am informed, is gone towards Pait, and the other towards Chauk.

Their numbers, I learn, were about three thousand fighting men, and as they were very near to us in the beginning of the action, have suffered for their temerity. We have taken thirteen prisoners, five of whom are wounded. On our side four sepoys of the right battalion are wounded, one, I fear, mortally.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head Quarters, Village of Kaitpara,
4th October 1780."

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley to President and Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—By my last despatch under the 4th instant I did myself the honor to inform you of my having obliged the enemy to abandon their camp at Kaitpara.

Hearing that the enemy had again collected and encamped about ten miles from Kaitpara on the road to Chauk, I determined to pursue them and oblige them, if possible, to quit the country.

On the 5th, in the morning, I marched to Kurki, where the enemy were encamped. On our approach they fired a few shot and fled to Chauk. I again marched on the 8th, and coming up with them at Chauk, they made a stand at some distance on the opposite bank of the river. I immediately ordered the 1st battalion to pass the river and pursue them, following with the Europeans and the rest of the line. We pursued them for near three miles towards Khálápur, but finding we could not get up with them, except a few stragglers in the rear, and the men being fatigued with a long march, I ordered the troops to halt and encamp.

The enemy fled to Kampoli, where I suppose they will remain until they are reinforced from Poona.

I have cleared the country of the enemy at present; and the inhabitants are now employed in cutting their harvest and gathering it in.

From Chauk I have marched to the eastward of the hills which intersect the Konkan, and have encamped at Koolgaum, a village about 12 miles from Kalyán.

My intentions in taking post here are to cover the country as much as possible, and the more conveniently and speedily to bring my artillery and stores into the field, so as to be able to move in force as soon as ever the season will possibly permit.

I have the honor to enclose your Honor and Council copy of a letter received this day from Major John Hopkins and request your directions thereon.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Koolgaum, 11th October 1780.

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 21st November 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of acquainting you under the 13th instant of my situation, and of the intelligence I had received respecting that of the enemy and on the 17th of enclosing you a return of and state and disposition of the troops under my command.

On the 16th a body of about a thousand men made their appearance and threw several rockets, but were prevented by the advanced posts of the camp from coming near enough with them to do execution, and a few shots from those posts obliged them shortly after to retire. They yesterday brought down their whole force, except their gun, and made several warm attacks on an advanced post to the right which commanded the camp. I accordingly reinforced that post and enabled them to repulse the enemy who, I have great reason to believe, have suffered considerably upon the occasion. We have one jamádár, one havaldár, one náik and twelve sepoys wounded.

The enemy retreated up the Bor Ghát, where the situation of their camp and guns is, I understand, the same as when I had last the honor of addressing you.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the part of the troops which was engaged with the enemy behaved with the greatest spirit.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Man, 19th November 1780."

Bombay Castle, 23rd November 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had this morning intelligence from my harkárás that yesterday Nána Fadanavis and Haripant Fadkia were at Talegaon with ten thousand men, and intended marching a large body down the Rájmáchi Ghát in order to cut off my communication; and this account in this moment is confirmed to me by intelligence of their arrival this evening at Khandála.

I propose moving to-morrow morning a little to the northward of Rájmáchi pass in order, as effectually as possible, to keep my rear open and to collect the different detachments I now have out. I have ordered Captain Carpenter to join the army as soon as possible.

The enemy have not come down the Ghát in any force since I had the honor of addressing you last.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Man, 21st November 1780."

Letter from the GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL *to Lieutenant-Colonel* JAMES HARTLEY.

SIR,—Since our letter of the 11th instant we have received your letters of the 14th, 17th, 19th, and 21st instant.

The President has acquainted us that he has been advised by the Resident at Bellápur that you have ordered the detachment from that garrison now at Panvel to join the army under your command, but as it never was intended that the garrison at Bellápur should be considered as a part of the strength of your force, we cannot allow you to withdraw the detachment under Captain Lendrom, as it will immediately expose the district where they are stationed to the ravages of the enemy.

As we find by your last letter that you have thought it necessary to call in the different detachments now out in order to unite your whole force, we hope, notwithstanding, that you will be able to protect the inhabitants and those employed in gathering in the harvest.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 24th November 1780.

Letter from Colonel HARTLEY *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of addressing you last night acquainting you of my intentions of moving to the northward. I accordingly marched this morning at 6 o'clock, and at noon encamped about 4 miles to the northward of the ground I occupied at Devláli. A few straggling horse appeared in the rear, which was the only part of the enemy I have this day seen.

The officer in command of Kalyán informs me that the enemy's horse are in that neighbourhood, and that a body of a thousand men have marched from Mahuli and burnt Baindi (Bhivandi), Nangoli and Sanola villages on the borders of the Antgaon.

Conformably to your instructions I now consider the reduction of Bassein as the grand and primary object of our military operations, and flatter myself that by having drawn the principal force of the enemy so far to the southward I have contributed in a small degree to facilitate the success of the siege; by drawing near Kalyán where our magazines, both of provisions and

ammunition, are laid up, I think I effectually provide for the danger of the enemy availing themselves of their chief advantage against it, and distressing my detachment in respect to necessary supplies. This or any other disadvantage or difficulty is, as I conceive, what is now to be guarded against; and as long as I am sure of a sufficient supply for my troops and at hand to prevent the enemy from succeeding in any sudden attempt on Kalyán, I flatter myself still to keep them in check; or if they should choose to pass me in order to proceed to the relief of Bassein, I shall be ready to follow them or to take such steps under General Goddard's directions as may seem most necessary for the public service. By this plan of conduct I have little doubt of detaining any force the enemy may bring down the Gháts till Bassein falls, after which, if the enemy keep the field, they will have both General Goddard's army and this detachment on their hands at once.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp of Sawvee,
22nd November 1780.

Bombay Castle, 26th 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of acquainting you under the 22nd instant with my reasons for moving to the northward.

I marched again yesterday morning at 6 o'clock and for above ten miles the enemy made repeated attacks on the rear guard, but without making the smallest impression either on it, the line or the baggage, or once during the whole of that time obliging us to halt; when finding their efforts fruitless they drew off their force, and I marched 6 miles further on without the smallest opposition. We had one havaldár, one náik and twelve sepoys wounded—only three dangerously, the rest very slightly.

I cannot sufficiently commend to you the spirit which manifested itself all through the line during the march, and which has confirmed me in the high opinion I shall always have of the troops.

I am now encamped about two miles to the southward of Badlápur and the different detachments I had out have already joined.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Devláli,
24th November 1780."

Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 5th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard:—

"Gentlemen,—I had the honor to address you the 16th October previous to my leaving Surat, and have from time to time written the Hon'ble President, informing him of the progress of march, the fatigues and hardships suffered by the troops from the extreme badness of the roads and the numerous nálás and rapid rivers in our route, which could not be passed without great difficulty. Besides, as I was compelled to march considerably inland in order to avoid the deep inlets of the sea, which could only be crossed in boats, the route lay through and over hills where the roads were exceedingly narrow and steep, and in some places stopped up with large stones and trees laid across.

The additional distance the circuit occasioned, and the time required to remove these obstructions rendered the march more tedious than I expected, and I did not reach the bridge of Gorwarra that joins the island of Bassein to the continent till the 12th ultimo. The preceding day the army having made a long and laborious march through a deep and narrow defile, where for above half a mile large trees and stones had been laid across, that entirely blocked up the passage and retarded the arrival of part of the troops at their ground till past 9 o'clock at night, I found it would be impossible for the whole to move next day; but as I understood from my harkárás that the bridge was then entire, knowing of what importance it would be to secure it before the enemy should have time to reflect upon the difficulties its destruction would necessarily occasion to us and the delay produced in our operations, I resolved to lose no time in seizing it, and accordingly marched myself in the morning of the 12th with the Grenadiers of the army.

A small guard only of the enemy was posted at it, which fled on our first appearance. On the 13th I marched and occupied the ground, where I am at present encamped near the sea-shore and within little more than two miles of the walls of Bassein, the situation of which has proved exceedingly useful and proper for every purpose of the service and for carrying on with convenience the operations of the siege. The troops from Sálsette crossed and joined me the night of my arrival; and the following day great part of the stores was landed and the remainder followed with every possible expedition. I am happy that I can with the strictest regard to justice declare my satisfaction with the alacrity and spirit shown by the troops since their leaving Surat, and the exertions made in every department since my arrival before this place to land and collect the stores provided for the siege, and I can venture to assure you that the operations have been and shall be prosecuted with all possible vigour.

I ought to apologize for troubling you at present with these particulars, most of which will no doubt have been already laid before you by the Hon'ble President, but having mentioned the subject, I have unintentionally run into a detail of circumstances, which I hope you will excuse.

The time requisite for landing and collecting the stores in the place fixed on for their reception giving me sufficient leisure to inform myself fully of the strength of the place previous to the commencement of the attack, I examined it most minutely and found it both from the natural situation of the ground and the construction of the works, the number of cannon planted on the walls, and the troops composing the garrison, which I have every reason to believe exceeds 8,000 men, much more strong and formidable than even from the description before given me I had been led to conceive. I accordingly determined to carry on my operations with every skilful and regular precaution, which, though it might be the means of protracting the fall

of the place, would not fail of securing its ultimate success, and prevent the disagreeable consequences of sacrificing the lives of the troops by proceeding more precipitately. Perceiving the works of the N.-E. face of the fort to be infinitely inferior to those on the N. side, where I now propose to erect my breaching battery it was my original wish and intention to have attacked it on that quarter, but having an opportunity of minutely examining the ground at the high spring tides, I found it was entirely overflowed, and that it would be impracticable to carry on my approaches on that side without the greatest difficulty and a certain hazard of disappointment. I therefore thought proper to lay aside my first design and to make the grand attack at a place, which though rendered exceedingly strong by art had not the same natural difficulties to oppose my operations.

On the 28th in the morning I had completed a battery of two 18 and four 12-pounders, with a battery for six 13-inch mortars, within 900 yards of the wall. It is impossible to ascertain the damage the enemy have received from the fire of this battery, but I have every reason to hope it has been considerable, as the artillery has been extremely well directed and the shells thrown into the fort have appeared most of them to take place, and do the desired execution. At all events, the effect it has produced has been very favourable to our operations, as it has enabled me to carry on my works under cover of its fire to the spot where I propose to erect the grand battery, which the necessary approaches and parallels being now completed, I intend to begin to-night, and hope soon to have the happiness of informing you of this work being also accomplished.

The enemy have not once ventured to sally from the walls or interrupt the operations otherwise than by a very hot fire of artillery, which, unfortunately, owing to the skill of the Engineer in constructing the works, though served remarkably well, has done us very little mischief. They have thrown some shells and rockets, but without effect. A third battery of four 18-pounders is now nearly completed within 800 yards of the wall, and more to the eastward, which will enfilade the face of the fort where I am carrying on the grand attack and greatly divert the attention of the besieged, as well as destroy the works which flank and command the entrance of the breach.

By advices received from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley I understand that in consequence of a large body of the enemy having descended the Gháts he has thought it advisable to move towards Kalyán with his detachment in order to preserve the communication with that place, where his magazines of provision and ammunition are lodged. I have in consequence of this information sent him such instructions as appeared to me most effectual to defeat the success of the enemy's designs and guard against any attempt they may make to relieve this place. I do not, however, think they will venture to put themselves betwixt the two fires of this army and Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment, which seems to be the situation of all others in which we should wish to bring them; and indeed at all events it will not be possible for them to succeed if they should endeavour to throw succours into Bassein, because the place is so closely invested that they will not be able to approach it; and as I have destroyed two of the bridges upon the creek that forms the island of Bassein and have posted a very strong guard for the defence of the remaining one, I have not the smallest apprehension of their entering the island with any considerable force, or interrupting the operations of the siege in any material degree whatever.

A few horsemen have made their appearance within these two days on the outside of the creek and burnt some of the adjacent villages. My harkárás bring me intelligence that near 1,000 horse are encamped about 14 kos from the bridge and that parties are detached from them to destroy the country,

As I flatter myself it will soon be in my power to congratulate you upon the conquest of Bassein, and do not doubt you will take the earliest opportunity of communicating so pleasing an event to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, I beg leave to acquaint you with my wish of addressing them at the same time and informing them of such further particulars as they may be desirous of knowing. Permit me therefore to request you will give me previous notice of the exact time when the vessel you propose sending will sail, her immediate destination, and the route by which your packet is to be forwarded to Europe, that I may prepare my despatches accordingly.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp before Bassein, December 4th, 1780."

Bombay Castle, 7th December 1780.

Received the following letter from Colonel Hartley:—

"Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—The enemy came down yesterday morning with two guns, from which they cannonaded us for about 4 hours; only two of their shot did any execution. By them we unluckily lost one Sergeant and one matross of the artillery and one sepoy Sergeant and one sepoy. We had also one sepoy wounded by their musketry. Both their horse and foot kept at a great distance during the attack.

I had intelligence the night before last that a party of their horse had marched from Dawmut and encamped about 8 miles to the northward of this on the Bassein road, and am now informed that that party was on the same evening reinforced by Senhor Noronha with three guns and one thousand foot, and that he and Rástia who command have received orders from Nána to proceed with that force towards Bassein. The party which remains encamped at Dawmut with two guns is, I understand, meant to amuse us while the other party proceeds to the northward.

As the enemy's present division of their force may be only a feint to draw me from the strong situation I am encamped in, I shall not quit it till by another march towards Bassein they further confirm the intelligence I have received of their plan of operations. I propose then immediately to follow them.

I have the honor to be, with respect,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Devláli, 5th December 1780."

Bombay Castle, Sunday 10th, 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had the honor of addressing you under the 5th instant, acquainting you with the intelligence I had received of the enemy's intention of throwing succours into Bassein and my resolution in consequence thereof to follow them to the northward. I accordingly marched this morning and am now encamped at Titwala.

As the force, which remains in my rear, and is encamped at Dawmut and Báwa Mullen, may probably make some attempt on Kalyán in hopes of preventing my proceeding further to the northward, and as it is impossible for me to leave in that place a larger garrison than it now consists of, from the number of sick belonging to this army, which at present amount to near

six hundred men, I beg leave to recommend that a reinforcement may be sent and remain there while the service requires the continuance of this army to the northward.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp at Titwála, 6th December 1780."

Bombay Castle, 12th December 1780.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.
Daniel Draper, and Nathaniel Stackhouse.

Read and approved the proceedings of our last meeting on the 10th ultimo.

Read a letter from General Goddard, as entered hereafter, received early this morning by his Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant Charles Brown, containing the agreeable intelligence of the surrender of Bassein, on which happy event a royal salute was immediately fired from the castle. We feel the highest satisfaction on this important conquest, and are impatient to hear the promised particulars from the General, when we shall consider what measures may be necessary to pursue with respect to this acquisition, and in the mean time we shall send our congratulations to the General by the return of his Aide-de-Camp.

The President lays before us the following plan of measures he would propose to be now pursued in consequence of the reduction of Bassein; and the same being deliberately considered, it is entirely approved and must be immediately transmitted to the General with strong recommendation from us immediately to pursue the measures therein proposed, which we flatter ourselves will coincide with his sentiments.

The surrender of Bassein makes it unnecessary to send the large supply of gunpowder requested by General Goddard in his letter of the 10th and which we could but ill afford to spare.

WILLIAM HORNBY,
DANIEL DRAPER,
NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

General Goddard's letter regarding the surrender of Bassein.

Gentlemen,—I have the happiness to congratulate you upon the acquisition of Bassein, which surrendered to the Company's arms this day. I have written this express that no time may be lost in communicating to you so agreeable an event, and shall address you more particularly hereafter. In the meantime I beg leave to refer you to Lieutenant Brown my Aide-de-Camp, whom I have entrusted with this despatch, and who having been present at the siege, will be able to give you information on such points as you may be desirous of immediately knowing.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Bassein, December 11th, 1780.

Bombay Castle, 13th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard:—

"Gentlemen,—I had the happiness of acquainting you yesterday of the surrender of Bassein to the British arms and shall now inform you of such further particulars as you may be desirous of knowing.

During the 9th and 10th the grand battery fired without intermission and a practicable breach was nearly completed, which so much intimidated the garrison that at 10 o'clock yesterday morning they came with a message from the fort offering the surrender. I gave them till sunrise, dismissed the messenger, declaring if the terms I granted were not complied with by that time I would resume hostilities. At 7 in the morning no messenger appearing, I ordered the several batteries to play and kept up an exceeding hot fire both from the guns and mortars for about half an hour, which had the wished for effect, and the messenger came out once more, upon which I ordered the firing to cease about 9 o'clock. Nago Pant, one of the principal Sardárs, with the person who had brought the former messages, and another Brahman formally waited on me from Visáji Pant, the Subha of the place. The principal conditions upon which I agreed to accept the proposed surrender were, that the garrison should march out and lay down their arms in front of the fort, after which they should be permitted to go in safety to whatever place they desired; that they should be allowed to carry away their own private effects, but that all public property should be faithfully delivered up and appropriated to the use of the victors; that it was not my intention to hurt the unarmed inhabitants, and they might either remain in the place or depart with their property unmolested. As a preliminary article I insisted upon their immediately sending out to be punished at my mercy Jacob Johnson, a private man of the Madras Regiment of Europeans, who had deserted during the siege and whilst employed on duty in the trenches. With this final answer I dismissed the emissaries and allowed them till one o'clock, by which time should they not comply, I would hoist a flag in the battery as a signal for the renewal of hostilities. The flag was accordingly hoisted, and very soon after the people from the fort made their appearance from the western side coming out of the water gateway,—first the European, bound and escorted by a small guard, was delivered up, next followed the unarmed inhabitants, all of whom belonged to the towns of Bahádarpur and Pápdi and the adjacent villages, and in the rear of the whole came Visáji Pant and the other Sardárs with the garrison, consisting of about 4,000 men, among whom were about 1,000 Arabs. They laid down their arms and delivered up their standards, about 30 in number, and were immediately escorted by a company of sepoys out of the island. Visáji Pant and the other Sardárs had the choice given them of being sent to Bombay or Surat and continuing under the English protection, but they all preferred going to Mussul (?), where a part of Visáji Pant's family at present reside.

I have not been able exactly to ascertain the number of the enemy killed and wounded during the siege, but from the effects of the shot and shells that appear in every part of the fort, and the number of wounded they carried out with them, as in general the wounds given them must have proved fatal, I believe their loss must have been very considerable.

The circumstance which I consider as most fortunate and which I cannot but most sincerely congratulate you upon, is the achieving the place with so little loss on our side, one officer only having been wounded, and about 12 men killed and wounded during the siege, including 4 Europeans and one Subhedár of sepoys.

I cannot help on this occasion doing justice to the merit of Captain Theobald, the Engineer, who had the constructing and carrying on of the works, to whose able management and skill in his profession must be in a great measure attributed the preservation of the lives of the troops, as well as the successful issue of the siege, during the whole of which he has acquitted himself to my satisfaction, and I hope so as to merit some testimony of your approbation.

The brisk and well directed fire of our guns and the effectual bursting of the shells, which, besides driving the enemy from their works and preventing them from annoying us fortunately destroyed two of their magazines, has proved of most essential consequence to the success of

our operations; and I am happy in an opportunity of declaring my approbation of the conduct and assiduous attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailie, Commandant of Artillery, in the direction of that department, in which he was well supported by Major Mackay and the other officers of the artillery corps.

Upon the whole, though the merits of the infantry and cavalry were not so immediately called forth in their particular line of service, I cannot sufficiently commend the alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the part required of them, being almost constantly employed in the trenches, the proper defence of which, from their extent scarcely admitted of two separate reliefs, and with the assistance they gave in conducting the works kept them almost constantly in duty. It is with particular pleasure I mention the behaviour of the Bengal sepoys who, with the regiment of cavalry, although before never accustomed to be employed on such occasions, offered themselves voluntarily to assist in working at the trenches and did accordingly assist in that service. In short, the behaviour of the troops, both officers and men, during the whole of the siege, in every department, has been so much to their own honor and the success of the service on which they were employed, that I cannot help expressing my warmest approbation of it to you.

I have examined the fortifications of the place very minutely, and find the idea I had formed of its being accessible on the face where I attacked it, to have been perfectly just, it being surrounded on every other side by water or low marshy ground which at spring tides is overflowed. The works here are therefore much weakened. Upon the whole the fort of Bassein, both from its natural situation and the strength of the works where it became necessary to have recourse to art for assistance, is exceedingly formidable, totally impregnable to the efforts of any country power, and cannot fail in your possession to be attended with every favourable consequence to the interests of the Company that has been expected from it, and to secure to us a permanent footing on the continent and possession of the Sarkár, of which it must always give us the command.

I have sent a summons to the Governor of Arnála to evacuate the place, and threatened to put every man in it to death, if he obstinately persists in refusing to submit, and put me to the necessity of sending a force to attack it; which he must be sensible can easily be effected, as from the fort being situated on an island, it will be impossible for the garrison to have any communication whatever with the continent.

I have taken every proper means to encourage the inhabitants who fled upon the commencement of hostilities against Bassein to return and settle in their deserted habitations; and many of them have already made their appearance, though from the destruction within the walls of the fort, as well as of the towns of Bahádarpur and Pápdi, together with most of the adjacent villages, they being at present only a heap of ruins, it will be long before the country can be restored to its former flourishing condition.

In consequence of intelligence brought in this morning by my harkárás that Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley is arrived in the neighbourhood of Vajrábái, and that a body of Maráthás has followed him from the southward, while Senhor Noronha with his detachment is on the road betwixt him and my camp, I shall march this evening with the Grenadiers of the army to intercept that body and facilitate Colonel Hartley's juncture with me.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Bassein, December 12th, 1780.

Bombay Castle, 16th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard and Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley :—

" Gentlemen,—In my letter of the 12th instant I acquainted you with my intention of proceeding that evening with a detachment composed of the Grenadiers of the army, with four 12 and four 6-pounders, the regiment of cavalry and Kandáhar horse to join Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment, who, from the intelligence brought me by my harkárás, had been attacked the preceding day by the whole of the Marátha troops that had descended the Gháts, as well as those including Senhor Noronha's body of infantry who had marched to the relief of Bassein, as the party which was advancing on Colonel Hartley's rear to impede the pursuit of the other, and that the Colonel had that day taken post within 4 or 5 miles of Vajrábái, in the neighbourhood of which the enemy also were encamped.

The idea which suggested itself to me from this information was the possibility that even the safety of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment might be in danger, having received no accounts from himself of a later date than the 9th instant, and that at all events from the severe attacks he had received it was probable he might be in want both of supplies of ammunition and provision, or of assistance in the care of his wounded men, which I also heard were numerous.

I therefore at once determined on the propriety of marching to his relief as a movement that could possibly be attended with no bad consequences, and besides its apparent necessity might ultimately prove of the most real advantage from the terror and alarm with which so sudden a step must impress the minds of the enemy. I was not either without hope of coming upon them unprepared, and by that means giving them a complete overthrow.

On the morning of the 13th I reached Mándavi, where I halted all day, and at 8 o'clock in the evening prosecuted my march to Vajrábái, where I arrived about an hour before daybreak this morning. When the van of the detachment had passed the village I could distinctly perceive the lights of the enemy's camp, and also heard the sound of their trumpets as if they were in motion at the distance of about 3 miles. By the intelligence of my spies I was soon convinced to my great disappointment that they were far beyond my reach, and that all attempts to pursue and overtake them would be ineffectual; for in the afternoon of yesterday, either alarmed by intelligence of the fall of Bassien or apprised of the motion I had made, they had sent off their bázárs, baggage, sick and wounded men towards Máhuli, and had followed with the whole of their force, except a party of horse whom they had kept as a guard at their former encampment, and which was the body I saw in motion upon my arrival at Vajrábái. I therefore halted at that village till sunrise, when I prosecuted my march to join Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, whom I found strongly encamped in a post he had most judiciously chosen, and from whence the enemy must have found it a most difficult, if not impossible task to dislodge him, especially as in the attempts made by them to do so they had been repulsed with equal bravery and conduct on the part of our troops, and had themselves sustained most severe and considerable loss. The intelligence confirmed by the reports of different harkárás gives great room to believe that Rámchandra Ganesh, their principal leader, is killed, and that Senhor Noronha is wounded, whether dangerously or otherwise is uncertain.

The enemy are at present encamped within 5 or 6 miles of the fort of Máhuli, which I conceive to be near 21 miles distant. As the detachment that accompanied me is a good deal fatigued with their late harassing march to this place, I propose halting to-morrow and shall acquaint you with the measures I may find it necessary to take in consequence of the intelligence I shall receive of the enemy's motions and designs. During the march of last night your letter of the 12th instant enclosing the Hon'ble President's minute of the same date was brought me by my Aid-de-Camp Lieutenant Brown, to which I shall take the earliest opportunity of replying particularly hereafter

The messenger I sent to Arnála summoning the garrison to surrender brought me a verbal answer from the Killedár last night with the letter I had written him, importing his resolution of holding out the place to the last extremity, though I had privately declared to him, if he compelled me to use force he must expect no mercy. I have yet taken no steps in consequence of this reply further than requesting Commodore Nesbit to sail with the "Revenge" to the mouth of the Arnála river, which may have the effect of intimidating the garrison when they see fresh measures followed to cut off their escape, and desiring Lieutenant Hartley to have sufficient boats in readiness for the conveyance of such troops and stores as may be requisite to effect this necessary piece of service.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp Near Dugur, 14th December 1780."

Letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley to the President and Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had the honor of informing you last night of an action I had during the whole day with the united force of the enemy, who, to the number of 20,000 men with five guns, attacked me in front and rear. My loss by the returns amounts to sixteen killed and eighty wounded, many of the latter dangerously.

Finding that during yesterday's action two parties I had posted on eminences on each flank of the line were frequently pressed by the enemy's infantry, I ordered the engineer during the night to establish two posts there, to each of which I got up a pounder. The enemy renewed their attack this morning. A thick fog prevented our seeing them till past 9 o'clock. We then discovered a large body of their horse close to the right of the line. Their infantry endeavoured to gain the height on the right flank, but both they and their horse were thrown into such confusion by the gun posted there and the artillery of the right of the line that they instantly retreated; and we saw from the eminence near 2,000 of their horse collected about one person whom they put into a palanquin and carried off. I have great reason to believe one of their principal officers is either killed or dangerously wounded. The party in the rear fired a few shot and then likewise retreated along the Máhuli road; the other body are now encamped about eight miles from this out of the Bassein road and on that to the Násik Ghát. Their guns have to-day done very little execution. We have a havaldár and one sepoy killed and one wounded. I have the happiness to inform you that both the officers and men have behaved with the greatest spirit, and many of the former have much distinguished themselves for their zeal and activity.

I am informed by the villagers who now flock into the camp in great numbers that the enemy were encamped three kos on the other side of Vajrábái; but on hearing of our approach marched to meet us, and judging I suppose they would find us fatigued after a long march, during a great part of which we were engaged with their army in the rear, were thereby urged to make the attack they did on the 10th. They will however, I believe, have but little reason to boast of the different attacks they have made since my leaving Devláli, as I am convinced their losses have been more than proportionably considerable.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Head-quarters Camp near Dugur, 12th December 1780.

Brigadier General Goddard arrived this morning.

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,—I had last the honor of despatching to you, under the 12th, at night, informing you of the retreat of the enemy and the reasons I had to believe they had lost one of their principal officers, and confirmed by the inhabitants, who say that Rámchandra Ganesh, the head Sardár of both their armies, has lost his life and that Noronha is dangerously wounded. * * * * * * * *

I am sorry to inform you that Lieutenant Cowan my Aid-de-Camp and Lieutenant Cooper are both dead of the wounds they received. The loss of the former I cannot help lamenting particularly as a very useful, active, and diligent officer.

I cannot avoid particularly recommending to your notice Lieutenant Pierson whose behaviour at the time he received his wound showed a spirit and zeal for the service deserving of every commendation in my power to bestow on it.

I have the honor to be, with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Camp at Vajrábái,
15th December 1780.

Letter from General Goddard *to the* President *and* Council.

Gentlemen,—I have the happiness to congratulate you on the capture of the fort of Arnála. A practicable breach having been made the measure for storming it had been fixed upon, the plan of assault laid, and the orders given for its being carried into execution this morning. It was however prevented by the Killedár's sending out a message yesterday evening offering to surrender the place. This I assented to receive, but would grant him no other terms than submitting entirely to mercy. After two or three messages, the intervals of which were filled up with a renewal of hostilities from our batteries which I assured them would be the case if they made any delay, the whole of the garrison consisting of about 500 men came over, having left their arms, &c., in the fort, and a party of sepoys crossed and took possession of it an hour before daybreak. I shall on a future opportunity acquaint you with the loss we have sustained, which has been very trifling, and with the number of guns and quantity of military stores found in the place. At present I shall conclude with observing that it is from its natural situation and the goodness as well as the excellent condition of its works, of very considerable strength, and may be defended by a handful of men against any force whatever.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Arnála, 18th January 1781.

Letter from General Goddard *to the* President *and* Council.

Gentlemen,—I had the pleasure of addressing you the 31st ultimo. On the day following I marched to Badlapur, where I halted the 2nd and 3rd instant till the return of the escort from Kalyán, which joined me with the expected supplies during the night of the 2nd, and this morning I marched and encamped at Dawmut, about ten miles distant from the last ground.

Understanding from my harkárás that the enemy had collected all their force at Dawmut, where Hari Pant was himself in person, I conceived it very possible they might intend either to risk an action upon the arrival of the army there, or, what was more probable, that they would avail themselves of some favourable situation of the road through which we were to pass to make an attack upon the line and impede the progress of our march. That I might be fully prepared

to receive them I ordered the advanced guard of the army to be reinforced by the first battalion of Bengal sepoys. Nor was I deceived in my conjecture of their designs; for, after advancing about 7 miles, during which large bodies of the enemy had shown themselves and a great many rockets had been thrown by people concealed in hollows and jungly places, the former of which had been dispersed by our artillery and the latter driven away by the flanking parties, the route led through a narrow, though short, defile, and no sooner had the van of the advanced party appeared beyond it than a sudden fire commenced of small arms from behind a bank which was little more than 100 yards in front. The nature of the ground covered with thick jungle and full of deep hollows, but, above all, the extreme fogginess of the weather which had obstructed our view of the enemy the whole morning, made it impossible to ascertain their numbers; but from the extent of the front from which they fired, it was plain that they were considerable, and large bodies of horse appeared on the banks; besides which they had brought two guns to play upon us, but at the distance of more than a mile, nor did they venture to come any nearer. I immediately formed the advanced guard and pushed forward with it to dislodge the enemy from the post they had occupied, which they immediately abandoned and fled with great precipitation. Our artillery continued to fire upon them as we advanced and must have destroyed a considerable number, as the shot were well directed and fell amongst crowds of them. By the report of some prisoners who fell into our hands, as well as the intelligence brought me by my own harkárás this evening, they have sent off their bázárs and baggage of every kind to Kampoli, where they mean to follow themselves and proceed up the Gháts immediately. Other reports say that Hari Pant himself intends to take this route, but that some of the other Chiefs with a large body of horse are to remain below the Gháts. I have left Captain Carpenter's complete battalion in garrison at Kalyán, which will secure that place from all danger should they adopt this plan. However as I am now within 4 or 5 days' march of Kampoli, I shall soon be able to ascertian their intentions and give you information of them. I shall march to-morrow morning.

Camp at Dawmut,
4th February 1781.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—Since my last letter from Dawmut nothing material occurred to communicate to you till this morning, which puts it in my power to congratulate you on the troops under my command having stormed and taken possession of Bor Ghát. After the ineffectual attempt made on the 4th instant which my last letter particularly described to you, the enemy thought proper to desist from the mode of opposition they had hitherto adopted, and a body of about five or six thousand horse under the command of Báji Pant Anna was detached to harass our rear and to endeavour to pick up any of the straggling bázár bullocks or baggage that might loiter behind out of the defence of our line. Here, however, they were equally unsuccessful. Nothing of any consequence and, indeed, scarce any thing falling into their hands; besides that many of them suffered from our artillery whenever they ventured to come within reach of them.

Yesterday morning the army reached Kampoli, which is at the foot of the Ghát, and finding upon my arrival that the enemy had posted themselves in it, where they had also brought a number of guns and a large body of infantry, consisting by the report of my spies of near 4,000 men, I resolved upon attacking it that very night before they could collect a more numerous force for its defence or improve the works which I could plainly perceive they were constructing; as I had also intelligence that Holkar with his army, consisting of 15,000 horse, besides

Pendháris, and another principal Sardár with 7,000 horse had arrived upon the top of the Ghát, I thought it expedient to order a very strong party upon this service, which consisted of the Poona corps in front followed by two companies of Bombay and Madras European Grenadiers, four companies of Bengal sepoy Grenadiers, the 1st and 7th battalions of Bengal sepoys and the 8th battalion of Madras sepoys. The light 3-pounder pieces of Bombay Artillery carried by lascars preceded the European Grenadiers and two light 6-pounder field pieces marched in the rear of the 7th Bengal and in front of the 8th battalion of Madras sepoys.

The whole party were ready to march off and the van entered the bottom of the pass at midnight. In little more than an hour they reached the first post about half way up the pass, which the enemy after discharging their pieces immediately abandoned. The troops then pushed forward towards the Darwaja or second post, which is deemed the strongest part of the pass, and where the enemy had thrown up a breastwork, from the left of which, as our people advanced, they fired some guns and threw a considerable number of rockets, which, however, as our people were under cover, did no mischief whatever, and in the meantime the Pioneer corps with two companies of Bengal Grenadier sepoys having taken possession of some heights on the right of the road moved upon them towards the Darwaja, which the enemy instantly relinquished, but not without carrying off their guns, which, after a few discharges, they had moved to a hill in front of the Darwaja, and they continued firing from it as the troops formed. Our small field pieces were by this time mounted on the eminence and fired upon the enemy, who soon fled on all sides. The troops having got through the Darwaja and formed, then moved forward to a pagoda which is considered as the summit of the Ghát, and from thence to Khandála, where they are at present strongly encamped upon the ground before occupied by the enemy, who abandoned it on their approach, and from the appearance of their camp as well as the number of horse who were seen moving off, I have reason to suppose Holkar himself must have been there, as the situation of the ground corresponds with the accounts given yesterday by the harkárás, and no further intelligence has yet been brought.

I cannot but congratulate you most sincerely upon the singular good fortune that has attended this enterprise, which has been achieved without the loss of one man killed or wounded; and this I must attribute in a great degree to the cool and steady conduct of Colonel Parker who commanded the morning party and the officers and troops under him, and also to the clear and exact information I received from a plan of the Ghát furnished me by Captain Jackson, which enabled me to form the previous plan of attack in a manner that would expose the troops to the least possible danger. I must also beg leave to mention with particular satisfaction the behaviour of Lieutenant Brown my Aide-de-Camp and Lieutenants Christie and Richardson who accompanied the party up the Gháts, and by their activity and former knowledge of the situation of the ground greatly assisted in the success of several parts of the attack. A few only of the enemy's slain were immediately found, but I have not yet been able to ascertain exactly their number.

Having thus far successfully prosecuted the plan mutually agreed to for carrying on the war with vigour and driving the enemy out of the Konkan, it now remains to determine the measures most proper to be pursued the remainder of the campaign in order to bring the war to an honorable conclusion and effect, as far as lies in our power, the wishes of the Governor General and Council of Bengal on that head. It is necessary here to premise that notwithstanding the expectations they have given, no overture or proposal whatever has yet been made by the Poona Government, and I am myself at present incapable of making any previous advances on my part from a conviction not only of the inconsistency of such an act, but of the ill consequence that might attend it, since I have it not in my power to prescribe any terms whatever, and the

Minister, knowing the conditions on which he can put an immediate end to the war if he pleases should any further proposals be made him by me which could be construed into an anxiety for peace, might be encouraged to persist in hostilities and rather increase than relax in his demands and expectations of advantage. These being my sentiments with respect to any present idea of negotiation, I shall proceed to explain my opinion of the most eligible plan for prosecuting the war. The security of the Konkan and the requisite assertion of the superiority of our arms made it absolutely necessary to take possession of the Ghâts which command it, and which at the same time open to us a passage into the Deccan and their capital at Poona at any time when we may find it expedient to march thither. The apprehension of this while it deters them from detaching any considerable force into the Konkan which might leave the capital exposed, will perhaps be the most probable means of inclining them to think seriously of peace. I am therefore of opinion that our first object ought to be to establish a strong post upon this Ghát, which from its situation as well as its vicinity to Poona, is the most convenient for the purpose, and which, if necessary, may be defended by one battalion of sepoys against any force whatever. The possession of this too, should the Konkan hereafter remain in our hands, will be most useful, as it will prove no less a check upon the Maráthás than a secure barrier to our own territories. The next point we ought to have in view is to collect a magazine of stores and provisions at this place sufficient to supply the army with enough of the latter for six weeks should it be deemed expedient to march forward to Poona, as that quantity would at least be requisite on such an occasion. With respect to this measure I must confess I do not at present see any sufficient or adequate object to authorize it, as I do not think it would be more conducive to the attainment of a peace than the mode I have before suggested. At any rate I am under the necessity of remaining here till I can receive a supply of provisions, which as the nearest and most convenient place I propose furnishing myself with from Bellápur, and have accordingly given directions to the Commissioners of the army to lay in their stock at that place, permit me therefore to request most earnestly as a point most essential to the good of the service and even necessary to the safety and existence of the army that you will give every encouragement to the conveyance of provisions to that place and in other respects give such assistance to the provision of grain for the use of the army as you may find most expedient and the nature of the case absolutely requires. I shall conclude this letter by entreating to be favoured with your sentiments on the several subjects it contains, in which I have fully delivered my opinion and shall impatiently wait to receive yours for my advice and further guidance.

I have, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp Bor Ghát, 9th February 1781.

Letter from the PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL *to General* GODDARD.

SIR,—We received with particular pleasure your letter of the 9th instant and congratulate you most heartily on your having accomplished that important point of getting possession of the Ghâts without any loss and in a manner so honorable to the officers and troops who executed that service.

Our despatch of yesterday will sufficiently explain our sentiments respecting future operations, which nearly correspond with those delivered in your letter before us, and we have only now to assure you that we shall assist you to the utmost of our power in establishing a magazine of provisions at the head of the Ghâts, that you may have it in your power to

prosecute your future operations in such manner as may be judged most expedient. For this purpose we have given your Agent, Mr. David Scott, permission to make exports of grain and provisions from this island.

We entirely concur in your ideas respecting the impolicy and inefficacy of making any overtures towards an accommodation, as the Ministers are in possession of our terms, and the period limited for their determination approaches. The short time they have for deliberation, the advantageous position of the army and vigorous preparations for further measures may produce the crisis we hope for, which we do not think can be accelerated by any further advances on our part.

We are, &c.,
WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 12th February 1781.

Bombay Castle, 7th March 1781.

Received the following letter from General Goddard with the enclosed paper:—

"GENTLEMEN,—Having received early this morning the Minister's expected reply to my letter sent him the 1st instant, I lose no time in communicating it to you; and that you may be enabled to judge more fully of the real disposition and intention of the Marátha Government, I have enclosed an exact translation of his letter to me, together with a copy of mine, to which his is an answer.

His letter I cannot but consider as an absolute refusal of the offers of the Bengal Government, and proves beyond a doubt, what I have all along had reason to suspect, the existence of an alliance and connection with Hyder Alli, which has for its principal object a mutual league against the English nation; and that Hyder is expressly alluded to in that part of the Minister's letter, where he says that, if I am fervent in my desire of friendship, it is requisite that I make a treaty, which shall include the proposals of such persons who are alluded to and connected with the Sarkár.

Having therefore no grounds to expect that the Minister will in the most distant degree be inclined to enter into our present views against Hyder by any further attempt to negotiate on my part, and indeed thoroughly persuaded that no terms could now in policy be proposed to the Marátha Government, that had not the mutual prosecution of the war againat Hyder for its express and sole object, the present expediency and necessity of which could alone justify any further sacrifice on our side, I have determined to consider the Minister's answer, as it is certainly intended by him, decisive with respect to the present negotiation, and to make no new proposals or advances, which would only increase his confident presumption, subject us to the mortification of a second refusal, and, besides, promise no reasonable prospect of success; since if Nána was really desirous of peace, he would have availed himself of the opening now given, and at least have communicated in writing or sent a person to declare what the terms are on which he is ready to conclude a treaty, and in some respect have explained the nature of the proposals he wishes should be included for the benefit of the persons who, he says, are allied and connected with the councils of the Sarkár.

I request to be favoured with your particular sentiments on this occasion, and your opinion of the propriety or good policy of prosecuting any further plan of negotiation under the discouraging circumstances that now present themselves; which, unless some unforeseen event occur, I shall not myself think of attempting till I receive your answer to this letter.

I have under my consideration your letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the future operations of the war, in the conduct of which I shall be generally guided by the opinion you have therein expressed, and which concurs with the sentiments formerly delivered to you by myself.

I shall, however, be glad to receive any further communication of your particular ideas on this important point; and have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Khandála, 5th March 1781.

Draft of a letter from General GODDARD *to* NA'NA FADANAVIS, *March 1st, 1781.*

Notwithstanding you are already fully acquainted with the friendly sentiments of the English, and their earnest desire for peace with the Marátha State, which have been communicated to you, yet, in order to convince you still more of the sincerity of my intentions, and that you may not possibly urge in excuse for neglecting the interests of the Sarkár at this important and dangerous time, your ignorance of the favourable and very friendly disposition of the English towards you, I now enclose the proposals of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal, for concluding a treaty of perpetual alliance with the Marátha State, original of which has been transmitted by them to you through the mediation of Mudáji Bhonsla, the Rája of Berár.

Should the original proposals not have been received by you through Mudáji Bhonsla, I think it proper to declare to you in the name of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal, that I am invested with full power in their name, and in behalf of the Hon'ble Company, to agree to the conditions proposed in the paper I now send you in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

You will perceive from the date of the proposals, that the five months limited will expire in nine days from the date of this letter, that is, on the 9th of March, corresponding to the 13th of Rubila-ul-divil, in the 1195 year of the Hijira.

I, therefore, think it necessary to declare to you, that if before that time you do not agree to the proposals, I am not authorized to grant or treat on these terms afterwards, and they will therefore become then and for everafter, void and of no effect.

If the proposals now made meet with your concurrence, it is necessary that a person be sent from you fully authorized by the Sarkár to negotiate, as with no other can I in future hold correspondence. What more?

(A True Translation.)
D. WATHERSTON,
Persian Translator.

Translation of a letter from NA'NA FADANAVIS *to General* GODDARD, *received 5th March 1781.*

Your agreeable letter having been received I am made acquainted with the contents.

You have written, that Mr. Hastings and the Government of Calcutta sent a treaty to the Minister of Peshwa, through the mediation of Mudáji Bhonsla, which perhaps may not have arrived, and on that account you have sent a copy, from a perusal of which every particular will be made known. You also add that Mr. Hastings and the Government of Calcutta have invested you with full powers to conclude and settle the business of these parts.

Before this, Mudáji Bhonsla wrote the Sarkár that Imad-ul-Dowla and the Chiefs of Calcutta had sent him a treaty, but as it did not meet with his approbation, it would answer no end to send it to the Sarkár; and that therefore he had returned it to Mr. Hastings.

At present the copy of that very treaty which you have sent me, has been read from beginning to end by your friend, and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of the Sarkár. If you are sincere in your desire of friendship, it is therefore incumbent upon you to make a treaty that shall include the proposals of those persons who are alluded to, and connected with the councils of that Sarkár.

It is not my desire that the violence of war should continue to rage on both sides, and the inhabitants be ruined. But betwixt the Government of the Peshwa Pandit Pradhán and the English Company a firm and constant intercourse of friendship long subsisted: on whose part this has been interrupted and destroyed that friend well knows. There is no necessity for me to point it out. What more shall I write?

(A True Translation.)

D. WATHERSTON,
Persian Translator.

Bombay Castle, 27th March 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

Danial Draper, and Nathaniel Stackhouse.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 9th instant.

Read the letters received from General Goddard the 24th instant.

General Goddard's definition of the objects of the war and of our political views on this side of India is exactly the same as has been repeatedly expressed by us in all our proceedings and plans of conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our operations.

We entirely concur with the General and, indeed, the proposition came first from us, as appears by our minutes of the 9th, that a system of defence is now a measure of necessity, and our only difficulty is in the choice of measures for pursuing that system. Various objections occur against keeping a large force at the head of the Gháts during the monsoon; the danger and difficulty of affording them supplies, the vast expense of stores and ammunition, and the danger of leaving so large a part of our force in a situation where perhaps we could not command their services, if there should be a necessity for them at Bombay, or be able to give them assistance if they should be hard pressed. After all, it does not appear that maintaining a post at the head of the Gháts will answer the purpose of keeping the enemy out of the Konkan, for it is evident by the General's letters on the table, that notwithstanding the present situation of the army, a very large body of the enemy is now in the country, by which a large convoy was exposed to imminent danger. If the General could have adopted our proposal of making himself master of Rájmáchi, the possession might have been maintained with a small body of men, and it would have afforded secure lodgment for the troops and stores without the expense attending the proposed scheme of raising works and fortifying a post, building magazines, casements, &c.

Upon the whole we think that if at any time hereafter it may be judged expedient to possess ourselves of the Gháts, they may be again secured or taken possession of with much less loss, difficulty and danger, than would attend maintaining a post there during the rainy season: and it is therefore resolved to recommend to the General to drop this idea, and to employ the army during the remainder of the season in protecting the Konkan, and if possible, to reduce Paeb or some other of the strongholds which might afford convenient and secure stations for part of the troops during the rains; and the securing of which in our hands will protect and encourage the inhabitants in their cultivation the ensuing season.

As it will be impossible for the Marátha horse to act in the Konkan during the rains, we apprehend there can be no danger, and it must accordingly be suggested to the General to canton the army in two or more divisions at the most convenient stations for covering the country, which we judge may be about Panvel, Kalyán or Vajrábái, from which places the troops may with ease be transported to Bombay in case of necessity; or form a junction against the opening of the season without danger from the enemy.

We shall, agreeably to the General's proposal, take immediate measures for returning the Madras detachment; and we are glad to have it in our power to assist that Presidency, though in the present reduced state of our establishment we wish circumstances would admit of our detaining the Europeans. The General must, in consequence, be desired to give immediate orders for returning the Madras detachment to Bombay in readiness to embark.

We also propose, previous to the setting in of the monsoon, to withdraw the Bombay troops into garrison, which will cause a further considerable reduction in the expenses of the army; and we conceive the Bengal detachment will be fully sufficient to secure the country and strong enough to resist any attempts that can possibly be made by the enemy at that season of the year.

We must now, with whatever reluctance, put in execution our former resolution of abandoning Tellicherry, which as already fully explained in our proceedings, it is absolutely out of our power to maintain any longer, since we have no longer any hopes of bringing the Marátha war to a conclusion. When the Madras detachment arrives from the army, which, as the season is late, the General must be desired to expedite, we shall consult with Colonel Brown about the plan to be observed in withdrawing the garrison, and the expediency of landing his forces in order to make an effort to dislodge the enemy, which we apprehend will be necessary before the place can be evacuated; and will also enable us to do it with less loss of credit and risk to the inhabitants.

Ordered,—That the Commander of the Royal Admiral be directed to get his ship in immediate readiness for sea, to assist in transporting the Madras detachment to Tellicherry and Anjengo.

Read the letter from Admiral Hughes, entered under the 19th instant.

Resolved,—That our resolution of this day respecting the return of the Madras detachment and the withdrawing of Tellicherry be communicated to the Admiral, and a request made to him to order one or more of his ships to assist on these services. Whatever ships he may think proper to order, may take on board the marines he left for the defence of Tellicherry.

The seamen will be returned on the arrival of the "Revenge," now daily expected, or, if the "Bombay Grab" should not have sent up her proportion, the ships the Admiral may send to Tellicherry may receive them there; and an apology must be made to the Admiral for their detention, which was neither foreseen nor ordered by us.

Adjourned.

W. HORNBY.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* PRESIDENT *and* COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—I have been favoured with your letter of the 28th ultimo, original and duplicate of which have arrived safe. I cannot help sincerely regretting the accident which happened to my letter of the 12th ultimo, because it has been the means of keeping me so long uninformed of your sentiments relative to the plan I had suggested of maintaining the top of the Bor Ghát; and though I must entirely concur with you in the superior expediency of the measures you have recommended, I am myself at this time unable to carry them into immediate execution from the particular state of the circumstances which I shall proceed to explain to you.

Upon the 28th of March an escort proceeded to Panvel to bring a supply of provisions to the army, which, as it consisted of three battalions of sepoys, the regiment of horse and the

Kandahar cavalry with ten pieces of ordnance, I considered sufficiently strong to oppose any force of the enemy then in the Konkan, and though some loss of cattle has happened through unlucky accidents which could not be foreseen or expected on the march to Panvel, I am confident the detachment would have been able to conduct the convoy in safety to camp notwithstanding every effort of Parashurám Bháu's force to obstruct and oppose their progress.

In this firm belief the detachment marched, and at the same time I was impressed with the idea that the Maráthás would not venture to detach any further considerable reinforcements into the Konkan. Contrary, however, to my expectation Holkar has himself descended the Gháts with the whole of his force, and as this addition of strength to the enemy renders the return of the escort if not impracticable at least too dangerous to be attempted without a reinforcement, I find myself necessitated to apply to you on this emergency and to request that you will immediately order a detachment from your Presidency to join Colonel Brown and proceed with him to camp, after which I propose instantly to relinquish the post on Bor Ghát, and as every previous preparation will be made for that purpose, I shall be able to put the whole army in motion, when the reinforcement you send may be returned to Bombay and the Madras troops proceed to your Presidency to be in readiness for embarking.

I beg to observe to you that no danger can possibly arise or inconvenience at all adequate to the pressing necessity of the service be occasioned by detaching a force at present from Bombay which cannot be absent above ten or twelve days, as there is no possibility of the enemy attempting anything on this side, and the presence of the fleet will provide perfect security from the sea.

I did intend upon the first intelligence of Holkar's design to have marched a detachment from this place to join the escort, but upon mature reflection and a full investigation of circumstances I find such a measure at this time impracticable. The difficulties which occur are these: The superiority of the enemy's force would too much endanger the safety of any detachment that could be at present spared; because if a body of men able to resist the efforts of their united strength were to move, a sufficient force could not be left to maintain this post, and though I were inclined to relinquish it immediately, which, I must confess, from the appearance of necessity it would carry, the discouragement it must give our own troops, and the proportionate spirits it would infuse into the enemy, do not think would be a proper or political step at this time. It would still be impossible to put the army in motion from the want of cattle to convey the stores and provisions now with me, and in particular the draught bullocks sent with the escort to Panvel to bring up the heavy artillery I had before applied for to your Government. If to these difficulties be further added the number of sick and wounded, it will be found an absolute impossibility to put the whole in motion until the return of the escort; and I assure myself that when, together with the several circumstances already mentioned, you also consider the weak and reduced state of the several corps of the army, a return of which accompanied the escort to Panvel, you will concur with me in the extreme danger and impropriety of detaching a part.

Having thus explained everything that the necessity of the circumstances prompted, and suggested the only plan that occurs to me as proper and practicable for the good of the service, I trust, gentlemen, that you will concur with me in the expediency of its being immediately and effectually adopted; and I beg to acquaint you that I must rely entirely upon your exertions on this occasion. It is impossible for me to point out what reinforcement is requisite which, after considering the necessity of the case, your own wisdom and judgment will best determine; but as its absence from Bombay can only be for a few days, I trust you will see the expediency of sending as many Europeans, sepoys and marines as can possibly be spared from the common duties of the garrison; and that no delay may be occasioned in victualling them, they may be supplied from the Company's stock of provisions immediately upon joining the escort.

I have acquainted the officer in command of the escort with my present application to you, and directed him not to prosecute his march until joined by the reinforcements you may send, of which I have desired him to give me immediate notice, and also of the time he proposes to march, that I may be in readiness to co-operate with and facilitate his junction should circumstances render any movement on my part absolutely necessary.

Let me request to receive your immediate answer to this letter, for which I shall be exceedingly anxious; the parts of your letter which relate to the disposition of the troops I shall take an opportunity of replying to, hereafter. At present permit me generally to observe that no effort, excepting that of open force to which from its situation it is totally inaccessible, has been neglected by me to succeed in attempt upon Rájmachi, nor have I been inattentive to the object of securing the other strong fortress in the Konkan by every secret means in my power, and to which I shall bend my future endeavours.

I have the honor to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters, Khandála, 4th April 1781.

P.S.—That you may clearly see the necessity of despatch on this occasion I think it necessary to mention that the stock of provisions at present with me will not last more than twelve days.

Bombay Castle, 8th April 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

W. Daniel Draper, and Nathaniel Stackhouse, indisposed.

Read and approved the minutes of our last meeting of the 27th ultimo.

Read the letter received last night from General Goddard.

In the critical situation to which we find the army is reduced, we cannot hesitate a moment in exerting every possible effort to extricate them, and it is therefore resolved immediately to send over to Panvel, to join Colonel Brown, as strong a detachment as could possibly be formed from this garrison, which by a sketch now made from the returns we find will amount to about 800 effective men, of which 80 will be European rank and file. This is a force nearly equal to two of the battalions now in the field, and is the utmost we can collect, as we have already, considering the vicinity of the army and the presence of the fleet, sent almost the whole of our troops into the field.

By the orders already given this detachment will proceed over to Panvel this night, of which immediate notice must be given to Colonel Brown and General Goddard, and the latter must be acquainted, that as we have entirely unfurnished the garrison, and the fleet will soon leave us, we must insist on his returning this detachment before the departure of the fleet; and he must also be desired to expedite the march of the Madras detachment that they may arrive in time to embark on the squadron.

Read the letter received from the Admiral the 5th instant.

The situation of the inhabitants at Tellicherry fills us with the most deep concern, and we shall not fail to take every step in our power for their preservation when we frame our instructions for the withdrawing of the place.

We are sorry for the disappointment in not returning the men lent to the "Bombay Grab", but their detention at Tellicherry was not foreseen or ordered by us.

W. HORNBY, and COMMITTEE.

Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to General Goddard.

Sir,—I have received your letters of the 18th and 28th December last.

I most heartily rejoice at the success which has attended your operations against Bassein and on the consequent fall of that important fortress. After begging that you will yourself accept of my sincere congratulations on the additional honor which you have acquired by this event, which is doubtless a severe blow to the interests of the Marátha State, I request that you will in my name express the highest sense I entertain of the bravery and good conduct of the officers and men under your command, and this I must entreat you to do not only by mentioning every officer and corps which you deem deserving of marks of my approbation, but that you will do it in such signal terms as will convince them of the entire satisfaction I received from the favourable accounts transmitted me of their valor and steady attachment to our interests. I shall also cheerfully acquiesce in any marks of distinction which you may think proper to confer on the Bengal troops, who, it must be allowed, highly merit every indulgence and favour in our power to grant them.

Having thus discharged the debt which I hold on every account due from me to yourself and the troops under your command, I shall beg your attention to what I have more immediately to offer on the subject of your letters of the 18th and 20th December.

When I wrote you in the terms I did, the most expressive I could dictate of the distressed situation of affairs here, wherein I enumerated the various difficulties I had to combat against, the smallness of my force, and the impossibility of attacking the enemy in the strongholds he was possessed of unless a diversion was created in his country to oblige him to divide the very formidable force he had in the Karnátak; I say, when I stated these circumstances, and added to them my firm opinion that nothing but our united efforts speedily exerted could possibly retrieve the misfortunes which had fallen upon our interests on this coast and the consequent ruin which threatened the whole of the English possessions in India, I did not mean to enhance any credit which might arise from my honest exertions in the cause of my country and my employers, but that you might be the better convinced of the real necessity there was for seeking an accommodation with the Maráthás on any terms rather than, by prosecuting a destructive war, delay should have happened in pursuing such measures as promised the accomplishment of the grand national object—giving an effectual check to the increasing power and influence of Hyder Alli Khán. I will not argue how far my orders as Commander-in-Chief ought to have weighed with you on the occasion; but I must say that when together with them I stated the imminent danger which I conceived to impend the British interests in India, and under the express authority delegated to me over the Bengal troops under your command pointed out the mode whereby that danger might be averted, I experienced a very heavy disappointment at your not having at least aimed at a cessation of hostilities with the Maráthás, for which the resolutions of the Governor General and Council, as well as the spirit of the proposed treaty itself, gave a clear latitude. With the authority you possess over the Bengal troops independent of the Bombay administration, and furnished with a just account of the situation of affairs of the most serious importance, and which stood in need of such speedy support, I am confident that had you made it, as it deserved, the first object in your deliberations with the Bombay Council, that they would have seen the propriety of countenancing it; and that had they and you in consequence been solicitous about it in your communications with the Minister at Poona, I have every reason to think, from the situation which the affairs of the Marátha State were then in, might easily have been effected. I will not be certain that no endeavours have been exerted to that end; but as you make no mention of anything to that effect in your letters, I

am justified in drawing the conclusion I have done, and in adding that I conceive my powers as Commander-in-Chief in India have not been treated with that attention which in a time of warfare they are entitled to, and more particularly at a juncture and on an occasion like the present, which called for their exercise and interposition. I wish nevertheless to rest the judgment to be formed of my own conduct, and the conduct of the other parties, who have had either an executive or deliberative share in the management of public affairs upon our own evident necessities, which, it must be confessed, were too alarming to justify any measures which could delay the much wanted cure for all our distresses—a Marátha peace. Although I ever consider the policy of warring against the Marátha State a most ruinous one to the interests both of the Company and the English nation; still on the eve of your late success, if we had no other power to combat against, I might have subscribed to the plan you advise me, as laid down for the operations of your campaign, as the most likely to procure us honorable terms of accommodation; but engaged as we are in a scene of contention, I may say with every power of any consideration in India, all steps, the event of which could not be clearly ascertained as an unfailing remedy must be exceptionable. By prosecuting the war our difficulties must be increased, and the prospect of obtaining peace become daily more distant. Our resources, anticipated by the current demands of our military establishment to which they are unequal, and burdened with a heavy debt, cannot long support the present system. I must therefore impose it upon you as a duty you owe your King, your country and your employers, to leave no means which may depend upon you, untried to effect a peace with the Maráthás, and which may enable you speedily to carry into execution my orders for entering and creating a powerful diversion in Hyder Alli's country on the Malabár side, without which I have already told you that it is impossible for me, with the very small army I command, to drive him from the Karnátak, possessing as he does a numerous and formidable force, and with every man of any consideration in this country in his interest, nay absolutely at this moment in his camp with considerable bodies of men.

In the operation of my yet infant campaign I have already put more to risk than can be reconciled with a proper regard to the public interest. I shall not attempt, occupied as my time and attention necessarily are in watching the motions of the enemy, who is strongly posted a few miles distant from this place, to state the grounds upon which the above opinion is founded, but just relate for your information the effects which my movements have produced: the retaking Carangoly in a manner which does honor to the bravery and resolution of the officer and men employed on that service, the raising the sieges of Permacoil(?), Vellore and Wandivash, and now keeping the enemy in check from attempting any thing effectual against these and other garrisons. I cannot, however, prevent his ravaging the country all around and obstructing all supplies from coming to my camp. What I now obtain is by sea. I ought also to have mentioned the distressing the French fleet in the Pondichery roads by destroying all the boats by the assistance of which they drew refreshments from the shore. They are now happily departed, being in number seven ships of the line and three frigates. Had they not gone when they did, my distresses for provisions, which were then great, might have increased to a degree that would have terminated in the most melancholy and fatal manner to this army. I thank God, however, that as the sea is now open to us these alarms are certainly subsided. Ill-equipped as the French squadron were for making resistance, it is much to be regretted that our fleet should have been absent from this coast, as I am confident they must have proved an easy conquest to them.

I trust that the intended relief for Major Cotgrave has been sent to Tellichery, as the bad effects which have been produced in his detachment by the frequent breach of promise to the sepoys of returning to this coast are both serious and alarming. On the strength of your informa-

tion that Major Cotgrave would certainly be relieved from Bombay, I have sent him orders to lose no time in joining me by the southern route or with the Admiral.

I shall conclude this letter with observing that as your letters contain assurances of your desire to co-operate with and to assist my measures, I will rely on your leaving no endeavours unexerted to accomplish the important objects above pointed out.

I am, &c.,
EYRE COOTE.

Camp New Town, 1st March 1781.

P.S.—I think it necessary to inform you I have received information that Hyder Álli Khán is using every means in his power to defeat our views of peace with the Maráthás, and has even carried his intrigues so far as to authorize Raghunáthráv to employ his credit in the expenditure of whatever sums he may find necessary to that end.

(A True Copy).
G. TYLER.

Letter from the Governor General *and* Council *to the* Governor *and* Council, *Bombay.*

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,—In our letter of the 9th October, which we have the pleasure to forward to you in transcript, we acknowledged our receipt of the letter which you had written to us under date the 17th August; we have since received those of the 11th and 23rd September.

We have read with attention your President's minute transmitted to us with your letter and highly approve of the sentiments therein delivered on a plan of operations for the ensuing campaign. It seems to us to be the best that could be adopted at the time when it was written; but since that period events have taken place which could not have been foreseen or provided for; the interests of the Company require that the operations of their troops should be directed against another enemy, and that their system of policy should of course be changed. It has now become necessary that the whole force which we were able to collect and to spare from the immediate defence of our Presidencies should be employed in curbing and, if possible, oversetting the increased power of our ambitious enemy in the Karnátak; and we hope that the orders which General Goddard had received from Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, with whom it was left by us to send him such as he should deem expedient, will have followed by the immediate direction of his arms towards the territories of Hyder Alli Khán.

We wish at present to leave in suspense an ultimate resolution on that part of your letter wherein you communicate to us your observations on the desire we had expressed that the receipts from the acquisitions in Gujarát should be exclusively appropriated to the payment of General Goddard's army. Our abilities to continue supplies to it and to your Presidency is not increased since we made the requisition, but, on the contrary, considerably lessened, for we have been obliged to augment our military strength to supply the place of the detachments made from the force composing it; and the prosecution of the war in the Karnátak depends solely on remittances from our treasury.

We have sent to your Presidency on the ship "Duke of Portland" the sum of five lákhs of rupees, which we hope will prove to you a seasonable supply, and we authorize you to draw on us for what further sums as you may want at a reasonable exchange; but the exchange of the bills procured here payable at your Presidency is so extravagantly high, and the risk of conveyance of treasure to the other side of India so great, that we cannot promise you supplies in any other manner.

We have perused the translations which you have sent us of the intercepted papers from the Dutch Chief at Surat and the Marátha Vakils; but we deem them as unimportant, as defective in proof, and would recommend that the complaint be permitted to rest to a future day.

We are not of opinion that the information contained in Mr. Henshaw's letter enclosed in yours to us of the 23rd September is of sufficient importance to require our serious attention; so far otherwise are we inclined to believe that the Portuguese are inclined to be hostile to the Company, that we have lately determined to make overtures to them for an union with us in distressing Hyder Alli by sending a body of force into his country.

The insults which have been offered to the Portuguse by this common enemy, the friendship and alliance which has long subsisted between their nation and ours, and independently of this last consideration the interest which they have in common with us in curbing an increase of power in that ambitious Chief have prevailed with us in making them the overtures abovementioned; and we have deputed on this service Mr. James Peter Aurial, who has been instructed to advise you regularly of such part of his proceedings as may be necessary for your information.

We have, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
EDWARD WHELER.

Fort William,
7th January 1780.

Letter from General GODDARD *to the* GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge your letter of the 8th instant, and while I express my thanks for the ready and effectual aid you sent at my requisition to Colonel Brown, I feel at the same time the most sincere satisfaction in acquainting you with his safe arrival in camp yesterday at noon, and congratulate you upon the success he met with in conducting the escort to the army without any loss notwithstanding the repeated and powerful efforts of the enemy who attacked him every day during his march and in particular on the second day betwixt Burwa and Chauk, when the greatest part of their force at present below the Gháts, amounting to at least 20,000 men, among which some bodies of foot were mingled, showed themselves in front and rear, but more especially in the latter, and continued to molest and harass the detachment from before sunrise till about half-past two, when the troops arrived at their ground of encampment near two miles on this side of Chauk.

The military skill and conduct of Colonel Brown in protecting and preserving his convoy during so long and incessant an attack, and the order and perseverence of the officers and men under his command in bravely defeating the repeated and vigorous attacks of a numerous army, are circumstances that reflect the highest honor upon them, and in this point of view I beg leave to recommend their behaviour to your particular notice and approbation.

There is reason to believe the Maráthás must have suffered very considerably, though, as the detachment continued moving on, it was impossible to ascertain their loss with any certainty. The harkárás confirm this belief by accounts, however, which are too exaggerated to deserve entire credit, but yet prove the reality of the opinion I have been led to form of their suffering very severely. The total of our loss during the three days' march from Panvel to camp amounts to eighteen killed and eighty-eight wounded, including five officers wounded, *viz.*, Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall of the Bombay, Ensign Gibbings of the Madras and Ensign Richardson of the Bengal establishment.

I am sorry to acquaint you that Lieutenant Tindall has since died of his wounds. By the intelligence of harkárás who came in from the enemy's camp this evening, Holkar has moved to the foot of the Eussore Ghát, on the top of which he has left his artillery and bázárs. Parashurám is still encamped beyond Dehoily, and as neither of them are encumbered with guns or heavy baggage (for they have not ventured to bring down any of the former into the Konkan), it will be easy for them to move up the Gháts with the whole or a part of their force without

my being able to intercept or prevent them. I hope to obtain certain information of their designs very soon and shall take my measures accordingly. In the meantime I am using every possible expedition to relinquish the post upon Bor Ghát, which on account of the number of stores of every kind collected at Khandála and the want of cattle I found it impossible to evacuate until the arrival of the escort, and shall put the army in motion towards Panvel as early as circumstances will admit conveniently or consistent with the nature of the service.

I shall not fail to give you previous intimation of the time of my intended march from Kampoli, and have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Khandála, 15th April 1781.

Bombay Castle, 19th April 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.
W. DANIEL DRAPER, and NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 8th instant, being our last meeting.

Read the letter received yesterday from the Governor General and Council and the one received this morning from General Goddard.

We cannot but sincerely regret that the letter from Bengal, which is of such infinite consequence to our deliberations, was not sooner received; and that transcripts were not forwarded by different conveyances, instead of giving us no other chance for its receipt than the safe arrival of a country grab ship which has already been some weeks on the coast and left Goa so long ago as the * * *; and we are now so much straitened for time by the near approach of the monsoon and the fleet being on the point of sailing, that it is hardly possible to retrieve the consequence of this omission; however after mature deliberation on the change of circumstances occasioned by the supplies of rice which we understand are provided for this presidency; and our wants for money being in some measure relieved by the consignment of specie expected on the "Duke of Portland"; and the permission we have received to make drafts on the Governor General and Council; as well as the importance of preserving the settlement of Tellicherry and the disgrace and bad consequences of abandoning it at this juncture, it is resolved to take measures with all possible expedition for sending a relief to that garrison; and for that purpose to draw immediately from the Konkan two batteries of sepoys and a detachment of artillery and to state our resolutions to the Admiral and request he will prolong his stay here for a few days in order to transport this force to Tellicherry; which being so important a service and as there will be now the less necessity for his remaining there any considerable time we flatter ourselves he will readily consent to.

A copy of General Goddard's last letter must be sent to the Admiral, who will observe therefrom that though we cannot fix any precise day for the arrival of the troops, yet we may hope as it has been so long upon the road that they may arrive very shortly, and he must be acquainted that we will expedite their embarkation as much as possible, and that boats were sent over last night to Panvel to transport them to Bombay.

It has not escaped our observation that it is possible the French fleet may appear on this coast the ensuing season; and that in such case they may make themselves masters of Tellicherry if they should join the present enemy before it; that we think the preservation of this fortress

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* Illegible.

of so much consequence to the Company in the present situation of affairs that it is our duty so long as we have the means in our hands to make every possible effort to preserve it; and not to run the hazard of such a contingency; trusting that the Admiral will do the utmost in his power to protect all the Company's settlements, it is accordingly resolved to recommend to him to bring round the squadron to some part of this coast on the shifting of the monsoon and to take his station there till the season will admit of his returning to the coast of Koromandel; by which measure the Company's settlements on both coasts will be in perfect security from the attempts of an European enemy.

Resolved, also, that a boat be immediately despatched to Tellicherry advising of our intention to send this relief; and provided the Factors should not already have complied with the request of the Resident and Factors at Anjengo, they must at the same time be directed to send the "Royal Charlotte" country ship thither to receive a cargo of pepper, from whence she must return to this place.

A letter must be immediately sent off to General Goddard to advise him of this resolution and to repeat our requisition for the Bombay troops being sent over by the boats now waiting at Panvel.

Letter from the Governor *and* Council *to Brigadier General* Goddard.

Sir,—We have just received your letter of the 15th instant.

Though we trust this letter will find you far advanced on your march from the Gháts, we despatch express to acquaint you that we have, in consequence of advices from the Governor General and Council, come to a resolution to maintain the settlement at Tellicherry, and we have in consequence made application to the Admiral to postpone his departure for a few days in order to give time for a sufficient number of troops being sent from the Konkan to form a proper garrison for that fortress, and to be conveyed thither by the squadron.

We have therefore to desire that you will, upon receipt hereof, take measures for sending over with all possible expedition the whole of the detachment with which we reinforced Colonel Brown, both Europeans and sepoys, and all the officers and men under your command belonging to the 10th and 11th battalions of sepoys which are destined for Tellicherry. We have further to request that you will instantly relieve from the Bombay troops under your command the detachments from those two battalions now on duty at Persik, Bellápur and Karanja.

As the season is far advanced and the squadron remains here but a very few days, we recommend and trust that you will use all possible despatch in complying with this requisition.

The necessary orders have been sent to Bellápur, Persik and Karanja, and the President will immediately send you advice of the numbers necessary for the relief of those garrisons.

We have received with much pleasure the testimony you gave of the gallant conduct of Colonel Brown and the troops under his command, and are,

Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
WILLIAM HORNBY and COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle,
19th April 1781.

Letter from General Goddard *to the* President *and* Council.

Gentlemen,—I wrote you the 19th instant and acquainted you with my intention of putting the army in motion the day following. I accordingly marched from Kampoli and encamped the 20th at Kolhápur without meeting with any molestation from the enemy till the troops approached their ground, when a considerable party appeared in the rear, but after a few shot from our artillery retreated to a distance.

By the intelligence my harkárás brought me during the course of the day I learnt that Hari Pant with the force he formerly commanded in the Konkan had descended the Bor Ghát soon after my quitting Kampoli and has also brought down with him some light field pieces and a numerous body of infantry. In consequence of this information I conceived it was the enemy's object to attack and harass me as much as possible on the march and to attempt to carry off the baggage, &c.; and as the road through which we were to pass afforded them many opportunities for executing such a project with advantage, I took every precaution that circumstances could possibly allow of, to disappoint and defeat its success.

I accordingly marched at daybreak yesterday, and having sent all the baggage with a part of the army securely through a narrow pass that was close to the rear of our encampment and through which the road lay, prepared to follow with the rear division, when the enemy began an attack by the discharge of artillery and rockets, and a very smart firing of musketry, which they continued to do incessantly from very early in the morning till past 10 o'clock, when the troops reached their ground of encampment at Chauk.

Their principal efforts were directed against our rear; though from the nature of the country through which we passed and the thick jungles, deep hollows and broken ground which effectually covered them from our sight, they frequently found means to annoy the line on the flanks as it advanced; and could retire in safety as our parties moved out to dislodge them from their lurking places.

The first shot fired from the enemy from their field pieces unfortunately struck one of our 6 lbs. tumbrils, which instantly blew up. It luckily did us very little damage, wounded only one lascar and two bullock drivers, nor did it occasion any confusion or disorder in the line; but it is probable the enemy were encouraged by this accident to give us more trouble and annoyance than they would otherwise have ventured to do.

Their guns remained at a considerable distance in the rear, where their horse also keep aloof in large bodies, generally out of the reach of our shot, so that almost the whole of the action on their side was carried on by their infantry, which is evident from the small number of our killed in proportion to those who were wounded. Their foot, though above four thousand, did not attack in any regular manner or show themselves in large bodies, but were dispersed in small parties in the gullies and hollow ways which intersected the whole of the country and proved exceedingly favourable to their mode of attack; as behind these they lay concealed and took cool and certain aim by which means many men were picked off and a number of officers suffered; however unwilling to delay my march in any shape, the first object of which was to arrive at Panvel as soon as possible, or to expose the troops unnecessarily to the danger of the enemy's concealed attacks, I however found it requisite sometimes to form a part of the line and advance against them where they appeared to have collected in greatest numbers, when they always fled, and by these movements a confidence was given to our own troops and they were taught thoroughly to despise the dastardly efforts of so mean and cowardly a foe. The enemy had seven pieces of artillery in the field, two of which belonged to Holkar. A very brisk and constant fire was kept upon our side, both of artillery and musketry, and notwithstanding the disadvantages under which we had to labor in opposing an enemy that kept themselves so much under cover, could make choice of their ground, and only showed themselves when they pleased, I am convinced they must have suffered very considerably. The reports of different harkárás make their loss amount to 200 killed and about twice that number wounded. Our own loss, including European officers, was twenty-eight killed and 267 wounded, above 200 of which belonged to the Bengal troops. I shall send you a particular return of the whole upon my arrival at Panvel. Permit me in the meantime to testify my warmest sense of the courage and good conduct of the officers and men under my command who displayed on this occasion

all that firmness and cool resolution which is no less the effect of discipline than a zealous attachment to the cause in which they are engaged and a determined intention of despising every difficulty and danger to promote its success.

I should be guilty of the highest injustice to their merits and services did I not take this opportunity of recommending them to your notice in the strongest terms of which I am capable, and expressing my sincere wish that they may be honored by marks of your favour and approbation.

I have found it necessary to halt at Chauk this day in order to provide conveyance for the wounded men who were with a great deal of difficulty brought up to the ground yesterday. All the officers' palanquins and a great number of horse belonging to the Mogal Regiment of cavalry being made use of for that purpose. I propose marching to-morrow and, if possible, pushing on to Panvel, though as the greatest part of the road betwixt this place and Burwa is very unfavorable from its being full of jungles and broken ground, I cannot promise with certainty that I shall be able to accomplish it.

I was this morning favoured with your letter of the 19th instant and shall immediately upon my arrival at Panvel comply with your requisition to relieve the garrisons of Bellápur and Persik, and shall send over the reinforcements from your Presidency, together with all the officers and men under my command belonging to the 10th and 11th battalions of sepoys, in order that they may be embarked for Tellicherry on His Majesty's squadron. That no delay may arise in conveying them to Bombay I hope to find the boats in readiness upon my arrival at Panvel which I suggested might be sent there in my letter of the 19th.

The enemy having now in consequence of our having relinquished the Gháts brought down all their force into the Konkan it will be necessary to form some plan of securing the country from their ravages in the most effectual manner possible; and for this purpose, after arriving at Panvel, should the lateness of the season not force them to retire, which, however, I think it is most probable will be the case, I shall consider upon the steps that appear to me most necessary to be taken, and acquaint you with the result.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Camp at Chauk,
22nd April 1781.

Bombay Castle, 25th April 1781.

Early this morning we learnt that the army arrived at Panvel the 23rd in the afternoon. Received the following letter from Brigadier General Goddard enclosing two returns of the killed and wounded of the army the 21st and 23rd instant:—

"Gentlemen,—I had the pleasure of addressing you the 22nd instant from Chauk and acquainting you with my intention of marching towards Panvel the following day. As I knew the road from Chauk to Burwa, more than half way to this place, lay through a country full of thick jungles, broken ground and narow defiles, where the enemy would possess every advantage they could wish of concealing themselves and annoying our troops, I thought it expedient to send off all the heavy stores, baggage and every incumbrance, at 2 o'clock in the morning under the care of a strong escort and remained myself with the main body till daybreak. The success fully answered my expectations. The baggage, &c., moved off undiscovered by the enemy, who had not an opportunity during the whole of the march of attacking or giving them any disturbance whatever.

A little after sunrise the enemy made their appearance, at first in small parties, throwing rockets and discharging their musketry upon our rear, from the numerous thickets and hollows that favoured their approach. Their numbers continued to increase; and soon after their whole force, which I am confident from the full view I had of them at different times yesterday, the names of their leaders, and the repeated intelligence of my harkárás, would not be less than 50,000, of which there may be 6,000 infantry, showed themselves lining the tops of the hills on the right and left, and behind every bank or bush where there was a possibility of concealing themselves. Their horse kept behind their guns, and generally at too great a distance for our artillery to reach them, though sometimes considerable bodies came near enough to receive the fire of our guns, which were exceedingly well served and must have done very great execution.

Their most serious and determined attack was made when we came near Burwa, with their whole force, horse and foot; at which time the rear being very hardly pressed, I took possession of an eminence with the 6th battalion of Bengal and 13th of Bombay infantry, which effectually commanded the spot where the enemy had posted themselves, and drove them off, after they had sustained very considerable loss from the guns of these battalions.

The whole of the army reached Burwa, about 10 o'clock; when finding the enemy showed no inclination to advance, but on the contrary were retreating, seemingly tired of the warm reception they had met with and despairing of success in their attempts to make any impression upon our line, I thought it most expedient, notwithstanding the fatigue the troops had sustained, as the whole of the baggage, was secure in our front, to push on to Panvel, and accordingly having halted some time to refresh the people, prosecuted my march and arrived at Panvel about an hour before sunset.

It is with the greatest concern I have to acquaint you with the loss of Colonel Parker, who commanded in the rear, where exerting himself with that courage and military ardour that always distinguished him on every occasion of active service, he received a mortal wound in his belly, of which he expired on the march a few hours after.

Enclosed is a return of the killed and wounded in the action of yesterday; and I also take this opportunity of sending you a particular list of our loss upon the 21st instant.

The reinforcements for your Presidency will embark this day at noon; at which time also the relief for the garrisons of Bellápur and Persik will proceed.

I shall also send off with all possible expedition the five companies belonging to Captain Carpenter's battalion to strengthen the garrison at Kalyán, with one company of the 4th battalion of Bombay sepoys.

I expect you to receive particular accounts by my harkárás of the situation of the enemy and of their designs. By intelligence brought in early this morning, I learn that their main body is encamped at Chowke, and that they have a body of about 5,000 horse posted at Burwah. I shall do myself the pleasure of communicating any further information as soon at it arrives.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Panvel, 24th April 1781.

Return of the killed and wounded of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Goddard on the 1st April 1781.

First Regiment of Cavalry	... ...	... 1 Trooper wounded.
Artillery ...	Bengal ...	... 1 Lieutenant, 1 Matross, and 1 Gulendaz wounded.
	Madras ...	... 1 Lieutenant killed, 1 Lieutenant Sergeant, and 1 Matross wounded.
	Bombay ...	... None.
Bengal Sepoy Infantry.	1st Battalion	... 2 Subhedárs, 2 Náiks, 7 Sepoys, and 1 Lascar killed; 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 3 Jumbledárs, 1 Dummer, 13 Havaldárs, 7 Náiks, 70 Sepoys, and 3 Lascars wounded.
	5th do.	... 1 Náik wounded.
	6th do.	... 3 Havaldárs, 2 Náiks, and 7 Sepoys killed; 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 2 Surgeons, 3 Subhedárs, 5 Jumbledárs, 1 Drummer, 8 Havaldárs, 4 Náiks, 2 Trumpeters, 63 Sepoys, and 2 Watermen wounded.
	7th do.	... 1 Sepoy wounded.
	Grenadiers of the 2nd and 4th Bengal Battalions.	1 Jumbledár, 1 Havaldár, and 7 Sepoys wounded.
Bombay Sepoy Infantry.	2nd Battalion	... 1 Sepoy wounded.
	4th	... 4 do do.
	8th	... 2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, 1 Gunner, 5 Haváldárs, 5 Náiks, and 23 Sepoys wounded.
	Captain Samber's Battalion	...1 Commandant, 1 Náik, and 4 Sepoys wounded.
Pioneer Corps ...	... ...	... 1 Náik and 2 Sepoys wounded.

	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Battalion.	Ensign and Sepoys.	Sergeants.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Commandants.	Subhedárs.	Jumbledárs.	Drummers.	Havaldárs.	Náiks.	Trumpeters.	Gulendaz.	Sepoys.	Lascars.	Total.
Total killed ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	3	4	...	...	16	1	28
Total wounded .	7	1	3	4	1	2	1	5	10	2	27	19	2	1	176	5	266

Names of the Officers killed and wounded.

Killed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Gibson, Madras Artillery, and Mr. Penny, Surgeon, do.

Wounded.

Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.
Do. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.
Do. Duncan, Madras Infantry.
Do. Hall, Do. Taylor, Do. More, Do. Coleridge, Do. Smith, — Bengal Infantry.
Do. Taylor, Do. Mills, Do. Reynolds, — Bombay do.
Mr. Flemming, Surgeon General.

THOMAS GODDARD,
Brigadier General.

Letter from the GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL *to Sir* EYRE COOTE, *K.B., Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in India.*

SIR,—We have been favoured with your letter of the 2nd March.

In our letter of the 15th of February, by the "Indus", we fully explained our motives for recommending to General Goddard a vigorous prosecution of the war against the Maráthás; which we thought the most probable and rational method of bringing them to terms, neither had we in that case any room for deliberation, our line of conduct being distinctly marked out by the Governor General and Council, who, after acquainting us, that they had offered terms to the Marátha Government, directed us, on receipt of a certain requisition and notification from the Peshwa, immediately to suspend all hostilities and military operations; but in the mean time, and until the receipt of such requisition and notification, they earnestly recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war, so far as our troops were engaged in it, and acquainted us that a similar order had been sent to General Goddard.

We are convinced of the necessity, and sincerely desirous of bringing the Marátha War to a conclusion; but it is not because we are desirous of peace; or that peace is necessary to our affairs, that will prove arguments with the enemy for consenting to an accommodation; and until that happens, it would be as impracticable and as unsafe for us to employ the army against the possessions of Hyder Alli, as it would be for you to make a diversion in our favour against the Maráthás. In this situation we have done the utmost in our power for the common cause. We have reduced the war on our part as nearly as possible to a mere system of defence; and determined to send back all the Madras troops serving on this coast, in order to make the army under command more respectable and formidable, and thereby to distress Hyder to the utmost degree that lay within our power.

It is not to be doubted but that the Maráthás and Hyder are bound by mutual engagements, which we may conclude they will abide by so long as they may find it for their interest or safety. Provision must, therefore, be made to resist the attempts of both these powers until one or other can be detached from their engagements, or be effectually depressed; and it now appears to us that we can only expect this crisis from the event of your operations against Hyder, which we have sanguine hopes will be attended with the most decisive success, and that Hyder himself will be inclined to peace now he finds himself disappointed in his hopes of assistance from the French. We then might hope to bring the Maráthás to terms, which it has appeared the offers from Bengal have not been able to effect; though as we have already mentioned in our letter, dated the 6th of March, General Goddard, in consequence of our recommendation, sent a copy of the articles directly from himself to the Minister, who had affected ignorance of their contents.

We have enclosed a copy of the answer the General received from the Minister, wherein he evidently alludes to, and acknowledges engagements with Hyder Alli, and in direct terms refuses to accede to the offers.

We have further, with the assistance of supplies from Bengal, made provision for the defence of Tellicherry, and now send down a complete relief for the detachment under Major Cotgrave, which will be transported to the coast by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Hughes and other ships we have appointed for that service. We expect to send round Colonel Brown's detachments by the "Ponsborne", "Contractor" and "Duke of Portland."

We have advices, which we believe very authentic, of Hyder having sustained a very material loss by the blowing up of his magazine and powder works at Bednur, on the 2nd or 3rd of last month.

Your packet was duly forwarded to General Goddard, who, we conclude, will give you the requisite information of his operations by this opportunity.

We beg leave to repeat our wishes for your success, and have the honor to be, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 26th April 1781.

Letter from the GOVERNOR *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay, to Brigadier General* GODDARD.

SIR,—We have received your letters of the 19th, 22nd and 24th instant.

The large drafts made from our force for Tellicherry make it absolutely necessary that the Bombay troops now serving with the army under your command should be immediately returned into garrison, as the fleet is on the point of departure and we have hardly a sentinel to post at our gates. The season is now so late that we imagine you can have little further occasion for their services in the field, but at any rate as our garrison is totally destitute of men, even for the most common and indispensable duties, we must desire that the whole of the Bombay detachment be forthwith sent over on the boats that will be provided for that purpose.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 26th April 1781.

Bombay Castle, 5th May 1781.

Received the following letter from Brigadier General Goddard:—

GENTLEMEN,—I am favoured with your letter of yesterday's date acknowledging the receipt of mine of the 30th April and 1st instant and enclosing a copy of the letter from the Hon'ble Governor General and Council, dated the 7th January. Mr. Bayard has also arrived with the treasure which you delivered to him.

In consequence of the small number of boats sent for the transportation of the troops to Bombay the 8th battalion of sepoys only could be embarked yesterday for the Presidency, and this day fifteen boats, and three small ones, having arrived, I have thought it most expedient to make use of these in transporting the sick and wounded of the Bombay detachment (for which purpose they are barely sufficient) to the Presidency. They will proceed this evening under the care of Mr. Spink, who is to deliver them over to the Surgeons of the Bombay Hospital, and as from the number of sick and wounded men now in camp, his assistance is very much wanted with the army, I shall be glad of your permitting him to return to it as soon as you possibly can.

The remainder of your detachment shall be embarked as soon as boats arrive to transport them, which I take the liberty of requesting may be done with the earliest opportunity, and also sufficient to convey the sick and stores to Kalyán, in order that the troops who now suffer great inconvenience from the violent heat of the weather, and especially the sick and wounded, may be commodiously lodged, and have time to shelter themselves from the inclemency of the season before the rains commence.

The greatest part of the enemy's force having retired beyond the Gháts and the remainder being now on their march, I propose setting out for Bombay early to-morrow morning and shall leave the neccessary instructions with Colonel Brown, the officer commanding in camp.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters at Panvel, May 4th, 1781.

Bombay Castle, 3rd September 1781.

Received from General Goddard copy of a letter written to him by the Governor General and Council :—

"SIR,—We have to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated the 24th March, received within these few days, in which you acquaint us that you had agreed with the President and Select Committee of Bombay in the propriety and expediency of confining your operations entirely to a plan of defence, and explain to us the motives that have operated with you in forming this determination.

Although our sentiments of the expediency of the measure at the time when it was agreed on, continue as they were expressed on the 10th ultimo, when we transmitted to you a copy of our letter to the President and Select Committee of Bombay in reply to theirs, in which they gave us information of it, yet the change of circumstances which has taken place by your retreat from the Gháts to Panvel has now made it absolutely necessary. Although we have not yet had any information from yourself of this movement, we received such advice of it as we deem authentic. This has totally changed the aspect of affairs, and as we cannot pretend even to conjecture what may be the state of them when this reaches you, we cannot under such uncertainty venture to restrict you by any instructions. But we feel not the smallest anxiety in placing the public welfare on this occasion in the unrestrained exercise of your zeal and abilities, a confidence in which we are justified by our experience of the spirit and judgment exerted in all your operations. We receive pleasure in the account which you relate to us of the success of the detachment under Captain Mackay; and desire that you will present our thanks to him for his spirited and skilful conduct, as well as to the officers and troops serving under him for their behaviour on this occasion.

We are, &c.,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.
(,,) EDWARD WHELER.

(A True Copy)
T. GODDARD.

Fort William, 14th June 1781."

Bombay Castle, 24th November 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

W. DANIEL DRAPER. | THOMAS GODDARD, Brigadier General.

JOHN HALSEY.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 6th instant, being our last meeting.

General Goddard begs to communicate to the President and Committee the purport of advices he has received from Colonel Muir, commanding the Bengal detachment to the northward of Málwa, dated the 23rd October, which inform him of the Colonel's having concluded a separate treaty with Mahádji Sindia on the 13th of the said month, and of his being then, in consequence of engagements made with that Chief, on his march back to the Doole, a province of the Vizir's on the north side of the river Jamna.

The only aricles in the treaty which can affect our views and operations in this quarter, or which bear any relation to the general interests of the war with the Marátha State, are the 2nd and 3rd, by the former of which it is stipulated that "Colonel Muir with his army shall march into the country of the Vizier Assuph-ul-Dowla, and Sindia with his troops into his own within eight days after the conclusion of the treaty;" and by the latter article "Sindia agrees to endeavour on his part to negotiate a treaty of peace betwixt Hyder Alli and the English, and betwixt the Peshwa and the English, and if his endeavours fail of success, the English are then to be at liberty to act as they think proper. Sindia will neither oppose nor give assistance to any person whatever."

In order to make the Committee more fully acquainted with the views and interests of the Bengal Government in authorizing Colonel Muir to conclude this separate treaty with Mahádji Sindia, the General further lays before them a letter received from the Hon'ble Governor General, as entered hereafter, by which it is evident that he had derived from Sindia's alliance the expectation of laying the grounds of future peace and reconciliation with the Marátha State.

How far the terms of the agreement made by Colonel Muir may be calculated to answer this expectation is a point that deserves our most serious attention and consideration.

It is plain, however, that no express condition is made corresponding with that supposed in Mr. Hastings's letter to be intended by Sindia's proposition to him "of mediating a peace betwixt the English and Marátha State and requiring that a certain time may be allowed him for that purpose in which the result is to be awaited." Since, if Colonel Muir has agreed to Sindia's proposition of becoming mediator, he has done it in such general and indefinite terms as not even to imply that a truce shall take place betwixt us and the Peshwa during the time required for settling a final peace, or, indeed, to restrict us in our military operations in any degree. The sense in which Colonel Muir understood the nature of the agreement regarding this point is evident from the following extract of his letter to me and confirms the opinion I have given:—

"Herewith you will receive a letter from Mr. Hastings; in my next letter I will be more full and explicit. At present I am far from well, which I beg you will admit in excuse for the brevity of this. I shall now only add that I promised Sindia I would recommend a cessation of arms should take place as soon as possible between you and the Peshwa at Poona in order to give an opportunity for proposals for a general peace between our Government and them. Respecting this important point I will not presume to intrude my advice, as by the enclosed papers you have a full view of the Governor General's sentiments and wishes, and the terms he is willing to grant and accept. To them and to your own judgment I beg leave to refer you."

Since, therefore, no part of the treaty ties up our hands from acting in any manner we may find expedient, or forms any political engagement to restrain our conduct, and influence our counsels, we must be guided in the present choice of measures by the actual state of circumstances and the advantages which they offer; endeavouring at the same time to desire such benefit and use from Colonel Muir's treaty with Sindia as may be found practicable, and to make it (if possible) the foundation and leading step to a general peace and permanent alliance with the Peshwa and Marátha State.

The General will not take up more of the Committee's time at present. The subject is of the utmost importance and merits the most serious and attentive deliberation. It will not be, therefore, improper to postpone forming any decisive opinion or resolution regarding it till a future meeting, at which time he hopes to receive the Committee's full and explicit sentiments for his instruction and guidance. It is requisite generally to observe that the return of Colonel

Muir's detachment has totally overturned the basis on which the plan of operations formerly recommended to the consideration of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council was founded; and that since we are disappointed in our expectation of the means of effectually carrying on the war, we ought most earnestly to study how far the transactions with Sindia may be made to contribute to the attainment which we know to be so much the object of the wishes of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council.

The General also delivers in a copy at length of the treaty concluded with Mahádji Sindia, which is ordered to be entered on our records.

The General then acquaints us that he wishes to receive the sentiments and instructions of the Committee how far our measures and his conduct are liable to be affected by the treaty with Sindia, and what particular steps are necessary to be taken in consequence; but as this point requires more consideration, it is resolved to postpone our determination, and in the mean time the necessary papers must be sent round for the perusal of the members.

Read the advices received since our last meeting from Bassein, Thána and Bellápur.

Permission is given to repair the magazine at Bassein and to complete the works in the fort at Thána mentioned in the Engineer's letter; but the expense must not exceed the estimated sum.

A Surgeon has been already ordered to Tárápore.

It was not our intention by the power we gave to General Goddard over the troops in the Konkan to make any alteration in the internal management of the different settlements or to affect the relative powers of the Resident and Commanding Officer. The General will take what part of the troops from each station he may require to join the army under his command; and the remainder left for garrison will continue on the same footing as before.

Read a letter, as entered hereafter, from the Warehouse-keeper, by which we find we shall be at liberty to dispose of the copper whenever an opportunity may offer.

W. HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Translation of an Agreement betwixt Colonel Muir on the part of the English Company and Mahádji Sindia for himself, to this effect:

That Mr. Hastings, Governor General of Bengal, &c., having been fully empowered by the Governor General and Council has authorized the above-mentioned Colonel Muir to negotiate a treaty betwixt the Company and the Mahárája, promising to agree to and confirm whatever engagements may be entered into by him in behalf of the Company. In consequence thereof the Mahárája and the Colonel mutually desirous of peace with each other have concluded a treaty of peace upon the following conditions:—

1st.—There shall be peace and friendship firmly established betwixt the parties and they shall always remain steadfast in their engagements.

2nd.—Within eight days from the final conclusion of the treaty, that is, after its being signed and sealed by both the contracting parties, the two armies are to march at the same time, Colonel Muir with his forces into the country of the Vazir Assuph-ul-Dowla and Mahárája with his troops into his own country.

3rd.—If it should be approved of, the Mahárája agrees to endeavour on his part to negotiate a peace betwixt Hyder Alli and the English and betwixt the Peshwa and the English. If a peace should be concluded it is better, if not, the English will be then at

liberty to act as they think proper. The Mahárája will neither oppose nor give assistance to any power whatever.

4th.—All the country belonging to Sindia on this side of the Jamna which has been conquered by the English the Colonel agrees to restore; and the Mahárája promises on his part to give no molestation to Rána Chittersing in the possession of the country, together with the fortress of Gwalior now held by him, so long as he shall conduct himself properly, nor to Mahipat Rámsing in the possession of the country at present in his hands.

5th.—The Mahárája having received Rámchandra Rája of Chanderi from the Colonel agrees to replace him in his kingdom and to make no demands whatever from him; and all his country (excepting such part of it as has been long in the possession of the Peshwa) after having expelled Rája Dher his Diván who ungratefully rebelled against his master, is to be given back to him.

This agreement was signed and sealed by Colonel Muir on the part of Hon'ble Company and Mahárája Sindia for himself for the 13th day of October 1781, corresponding to the 24th of the month Showal and the 1195th year of the Hijira.

(A True Translation,)

D. WATHERSTONE,
Persian Translator.

Letter from the Governor General *to* General Goddard, *Commanding the Forces of the Bengal Establishment at Bombay.*

Sir,—Mahádji Sindia having made overtures on terms nearly comformable to my wishes, I have sent instructions and full powers to Colonel Muir to settle and conclude with him a separate treaty of peace.

In the propositions, which have been received from Sindia, he offers his mediation for a peace with the Peshwa and requires that a certain time be allowed him for that purpose, in which the result is to be awaited, by which I understand a cessation of arms. I have authorized Colonel Muir to agree to this proposition; and in case it should be settled, that a truce shall take place between us and the Peshwa during the time required for settling a final peace.

I have directed Colonel Muir to transmit a copy of this article of his treaty to you. I have also desired him to communicate to you any other articles of the treaty which may affect your operations; and I direct that you be regulated by them and adhere strictly to the terms of Colonel Muir's agreement.

I think it necessary to inform you that I have directed Colonel Muir to provide that in case a treaty should already have taken place betwixt you and the Peshwa, the treaty now in agitation betwixt him and Sindia must become void so far as they may differ.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

(A True Copy)
R. DUNKLEY, Secretary.

Chunar, 11th September 1781.

Bombay Castle, Monday, 26th November 1781.

Received per pattamars *viâ* Massulipatam duplicate of a letter from the Right Hon'ble Lord Macartney, Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes and Mr. John McPherson, with a copy enclosed of a letter addressed by them to the Peshwa:—

"GENTLEMEN,—We have the honor to acquaint you that a few days since John McPherson, Esq., one of the Supreme Council of Bengal, arrived here from England and communicated to us the orders and instructions of the Court of Directors contained in their general letter, together with the concurrent system and intentions of the administration relative to the war in which we are engaged with the Marátha State.

Being thus fully possessed of the lines of our duty from the first authority, we have, without a moment's delay, taken the proper steps towards concluding a firm friendship and lasting peace with the Government of Poona. And for the perfect accomplishment of so desirable an object, we expect that you will give not only your most hearty concurrence but every possible assistance and co-operation. These, gentlemen, we are authorized and empowered to demand; and, from particular consideration for you, we think it necessary to add that should the least difficulty or delay arise from you in the prosecution of this measure, you alone must stand responsible for any failure to the public or ill consequence to yourselves.

It is our meaning that all hostilities should cease on the part of the Government of Bombay in the same manner as hostilities cease on the part of the Maráthás.

A copy of what we have written to them is enclosed in this letter, which will be forwarded to you through their channel. You will as soon as possible receive instructions from Bengal of a similar nature, for Mr. McPherson sails this evening.

We have the honor to be,
With great truth and regard,
Gentlemen,

MACARTNEY.
EYRE COOTE.
JOHN McPHERSON,
For SIR EDWARD HUGHES,
signed by the above."

Copy of the letter to the PESHWA *above referred to.*

Mr. Hastings, the Governor General for the affairs of the English in India, has, no doubt, informed you of the wishes of the Company to establish a peace between them and your Government. The steps which he is pursuing to settle this desirable business cannot fail of being attended with success when supported by the orders just arrived, not only from the Company but from the King of Great Britain, our just and most illustrious sovereign.

These orders, issued at a time when the news had arrived in England of conquests by General Goddard, and when Vakils had brought letters to the King and to the Company from Raghunáthráv with great offers, speak most forcibly the justice, the wisdom and the unalterable determination of the Company, of the King, and of the whole English nation to adhere to the maxims they had long since adopted and declared in their instructions to their servants of remaining satisfied with their possessions in this part of the world without aiming at new conquest, but living in peace and amity with all the powers in India.

Such has been the indignation felt at the infraction of those wise and pacific maxims; and notwithstanding the accounts of successes gained by the English arms and before any knowledge of the invasion of the Karnátak, so peremptory have the late orders been for an immediate obedience to the former instructions, that we, Sir Eyre Coote, Commander-in-Chief of the King's and Company's Forces all over India, Sir Edward Hughes, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Fleet, Lord Macartney, Governor of the Coast of Coromandel and one of His Majesty's Privy Council and representative of the Crown on divers occasions in Europe and America, and John McPherson, Esq., Member of the Supreme Council of Bengal, appointed under the authority of Parliament and just arrived in this country from England, charged expressly with the said orders, write to you this joint letter with a view to carry them into execution. And we have further requested the Naváb Walla Jah Bahádur, the ancient friend of our nation, to write to you his information.

The orders are to settle immediately a peace and establish a treaty of friendship with your Government, which will be ratified by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and which cannot be altered or infringed by any Sardárs or servants of the Company.

As a proof of our respect for, and obedience to these orders, and in the fullest confidence of a suitable return on your part, we do not hesitate to send at once to General Goddard and to the Presidency of Bombay the Company's commands to cease immediately all hostitities against you, not doubting but that you will at the same time direct hostilities to cease against us.

We request that you will be pleased to write without delay to the Governor General and Council the particular stipulations of the treaty of peace and everlasting friendship which you may desire to have established between us under the authority of the King, the Parliament and the Company.

And as we know already in general what your wishes are, and as we are ordered and empowered to bring this affair to a happy conclusion, we hereby pledge to you in the most solemn manner our respective honors, not only upon our own parts but upon the part of the Governor General and Council, and in behalf of the Company and the King our master and the British nation, that every just satisfaction shall be given to you in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

After these assurances you have before you the alternative of peace or war. The evil and fatal consequences of war, if you should be bent upon it, will hereafter rest upon you. If you join with us in preferring peace, you will at the same time enjoy all the advantages which our friendship will be willing and able to afford you. May God grant you to make a just and proper choice.

MACARTNEY.
Fort St. George, September 11th, 1781. EYRE COOTE.
EDWARD HUGHES.
JOHN McPHERSON.

Bombay Castle, 29th November 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.
W. Daniel Draper. | Thomas Goddard, Brigadier General.
John Halsey.

Read and approved our proceedings at our last meeting the 24th instant.

Read the duplicate letter from Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes and Mr. McPherson, received the 26th instant, with the enclosed letter addressed to the Peshwa.

The President also lays before us a letter without date, time, or place from Dawji, who, we understand, is the Naváb of Arcot's Vakil at the Poona Darbár, received at the same time with the letters above-mentioned and entered hereafter.

General Goddard then lays before us the following minute:—

"In addition to the papers laid before the Committee at the last meeting for their perusal and consideration, I beg leave to communicate some further particulars which have since occurred, and which merit the most serious attention, as they will be of the greatest use in assisting our deliberations upon the choice of measures proper to be adopted at this time for the good of the public service.

I have a letter from Sir Eyre Coote, dated Fort St. George, 11th September, accompanying copy of one of the same date from Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes and John McPherson, Esq., to the Select Committee of Bombay.

As the Committee's letter has been received, I will only mention the purport of the letter addressed to myself, which is enjoining the strictest obedience and conformity on my part to the letter and spirit of the following paragraph of the Committee's letter:

'It is our meaning that all hostilities do immediately cease on the part of the Government of Bombay in the same manner as hostilities cease on the part of the Maráthás.'

The other circumstance I beg to communicate the Committee is, a letter I have just received from Mudáji Bhonsla, the Raja of Berár, the purport of which, after enumerating the friendship and connection subsisting betwixt himself and the English, the particulars of his correspondence with Mr. Hastings on the subject of the Marátha War, and his own repeated and earnest endeavours to bring it to a termination, relates the circumstance mentioned in the Hon'ble Governor General and Council's letter to me of the 11th June, of his intention to send Diwádhar Pandit, his Diván, to the Court of Poona in prosecution of the same desirable object. He then communicates the death of his Diván, which unfortunately put a stop to the plan of negotiation proposed to take place through his means, and concludes with earnestly recommending a peace betwixt the English and Marátha State, and promising to exert himself in the same manner as formerly to effect it as soon as he shall receive an answer to his letter, which he requests may be sent him without delay.

Having maturely considered the three points now under the consideration of the Committee, *viz.*, the treaty made with Sindia by Colonel Muir, the letters from Fort St. George to the Committee and myself, and the advices from the Rajá of Berár, I think it my duty to point out such measures as appear to me most proper to be adopted at this critical juncture, in order to improve these circumstances to the public benefit and the attainment of a peace with the Marátha State, which is so earnestly wished for by the Company, and has been so strongly recommended by the Supreme Council of Bengal, and pursued with equal warmth by this Government and myself as the first and most important object of all our views and counsels.

Permit me to call to the Committee's attention the present state of the Marátha War which it has been found necessary on account of the present distress for want of money to confine on our part to a defensive system. The return of Colonel Muir's detachment to the Vazir's territories had besides cut off one principal and necessary resource for enabling us to enter upon a plan of offensive measures with vigour and effect; and from the avowed wish of the Bengal Government for peace and the steps declared taken to accomplish it, and in so striking and public a manner by the four gentlemen whose letter to the Committee is now under consideration, every inconvenience which might be supposed

possible to attend the discovery of an anxious desire for peace on our part, has already happened; and we have even cause to apprehend that if the Hon'ble Governor General and Council were actually possessed of the means to supply us to the extent requisite to enable us to enter upon an offensive plan of operations (the contrary of which we know to be the case) the line of policy at present adopted by them would be a bar to the full attainment of our views from that quarter.

I therefore beg to acquaint the Committee that I propose with their advice and concurrence to write a letter to the Marátha Minister 'expressing the general wish of the English nation of the Company at Home and of their servants in India, to bring the present war to a termination and enter into a firm and lasting alliance with the Peshwa and Marátha State upon terms of honor and advantage to both parties. To acquaint him that by advices from Colonel Muir I am informed of the treaty which has taken place between that Sardár and Sindia, one of the principal officers belonging to the Peshwa's Government, and of the peace and tranquillity to which the northern possessions of the Marátha Empire are by that means restored; to congratulate him upon that circumstance; and to observe also that as Colonel Muir, in pursuance of a promise made by him to Mahádji Sindia, has recommended a cessation of hostilities until the terms of a treaty can be finally adjusted; that I have done so and am willing to continue in the same conduct, provided the Minister is serious and sincere in his endeavours to negotiate a treaty. To represent to him further the friendship subsisting betwixt the Government of Bengal and Rája of Berár, who is so closely and particularly connected with the Marátha Government; and to express a hope that through his mediation and good offices (should it be desired by the parties) the terms of an alliance may be easily and finally settled to the honor and satisfaction of both. I further propose to acquaint the Minister, that I had received full powers and instructions from the Hon'ble Governor General and Council to conclude a peace with the Maráthás in the name of the Company, and request that if the present proposal meets with Náná's full and hearty concurrence, he will immediately inform me that I may send a confidential person to Poona to communicate further particulars. After which should the preliminaries mutually proposed be acceded to, I shall myself repair to Poona finally to adjust every point of negotiation and to conclude and ratify the treaty betwixt the English and Marátha State. I shall conclude by desiring that if he consents to receiving a confidential person from me passports may be immediately sent for his safe conduct, and by observing that it is also necessary to prevent disputes and misunderstandings that he send instant orders to the officers of the Peshwa to cease all further hostilities, and that immediately on receiving accounts of his having done so, similar orders will be issued to the officers of the English Government.'

This, gentlemen, is the plan I would recommend to be immediately pursued, and in the interval that must elapse before an answer can arrive, as the defensive line of conduct to which we are necessarily restricted makes us no losers by any delay, I propose to prepare such directions for the person I shall depute, founded upon the instructions of the Bengal Government of the 11th June, as may enable him to explain our views and intentions clearly and particularly, and obtain a speedy and decisive answer from the Minister, in which I request the advice of assistance of the Committee.

If it should be objected that the orders of the Supreme Council do not require me to commence a negotiation with the Minister until overtures shall have been previously received from him, I think it necessary to observe that the change of circumstances since

that period as stated in the former part of this minute, not only authorizes a deviation from the strict letter of their instructions, but with the latitude of action they have been pleased to give, make it a measure in my opinion of necessary and unavoidable policy.

Should it be adduced as a further argument against my proposal, that the advices from Madras to the Committee received in duplicate, mention their having enclosed a copy of their letter to the Government of Poona which would be forwarded by them, and that therefore we ought to wait the arrival of the expressed despatch from the Minister in order to have a perfect knowledge of his intentions, and whether he intends to agree to the cessation of hostilities proposed, I beg to give it as my opinion that this circumstance ought to be a powerful inducement for making an immediate overture on our part for the following reasons:

First, because we shall bring the Marátha Government to a decided explanation of their intentions, and deprive them of the means of hereafter making use of the authority we know to be in their hands to our disadvantage;

Secondly, because by this striking proof of our friendly disposition we contribute in the most effectual manner and co-operate all in our power with the wishes of the Bengal Government to the attainment of a firm friendship and lasting alliance with the Marátha State; and

Thirdly, because I am myself fully persuaded it will be the means of accelerating the conclusion of a peace; and upon terms the most honorable and advantageous to the Company's interests, which in the present general state of affairs can be reasonably expected."

It is then considered what conduct to pursue on the present crisis. When after due attention to the treaty with Mahádji Sindia, the overtures made by Lord Macartney and others to the Poona Government, the advices from the Rája of Berár communicated by General Goddard, the tenor of the latest instructions from the Governor General in Council and the Hon'ble the Committee of Secrecy and the general situation of affairs.

Resolved,—That it is incumbent on us not to omit any measure that may satisfy the Poona Darbár of the disposition of this Government for peace and facilitate the accomplishment of that desirable object; and though we have yet had no intimation from Poona or requisition respecting a cessation of hostilities notwithstanding the letter from Lord Macartney and others being dated so long ago as the 11th September, must have been long ago received, yet as we trust it will be agreeable to the Governor General and Council as being consonant to Colonel Muir's promise to Mahádji Sindia on conclusion of the treaty with him, and to the general tenor of the late instructions from them and the Hon'ble Company, and can also have no bad effect after the many advances lately made from different quarters, it is agreed to convey in the General's writing a letter to the Minister in the terms expressed in his minute; and if he accepts the offered cessation, the necessary orders will be immediately issued, and in the meantime our army will remain as at present in their cantonments.

We hope before an answer can be received from Poona the promised instructions will arrive from the Governor General, till when it appears unnecessary to enter into any discussion or to take any resolutions respecting the terms to be required or offered, which must entirely depend on the tenor of those instructions.

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

To

The Right Hon'ble GEORGE LORD MACARTNEY, K.B.,
Sir EYRE COOTE, K.B.,
Sir EDWÁRD HUGHES, K.B., and
JOHN McPHERSON, Esquire.

My Lord and Gentlemen,—We had the honor to receive the duplicate of your letter, dated the 10th September, with the copy of that addressed to the Peshwa.

We are not apprised, gentlemen, of what particular or special powers you may be collectively invested with, but from regard to the high stations you hold, we declare to you without reserve that an honorable and permanent peace with the Maráthás is the first object of our wishes, and that we shall not omit any effort on our part to secure the accomplishment of a point so essential to the welfare of the Company.

There has not been any renewal of hostilities on our part since the monsoon, nor have the Maráthás, as we learn, yet sent an army into the field; so that in fact a virtual cessation of arms has existed, though no overtures have been made by the enemy for concluding one in form. From the date of your letter we judged it must have reached Poona long ago; however that the Ministers might be satisfied of the sincere desire of this Government for peace, we concurred in General Goddard's addressing himself directly to the Minister with the strongest assurances of the general wish of the English nation, the Company and their servants in India, to enter into a firm and lasting alliance with the Marátha State, acquainting them of his being invested with full powers from the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council to conclude a peace, offering to send a person to Poona to settle preliminaries and afterwards to proceed himself finally to adjust the treaty, and desiring that orders might be immediately sent to the officers of the Peshwa to cease all further hostilities, when similar orders should be issued to the officers of the English Government.

In the meantime our army will remain as at present in their cantonments, and we hope before an answer arrives from Poona to receive full instructions for our conduct from the Hon'ble Governor General in Council as mentioned in your letter.

General Coote's late success against Hyder Alli affords us the highest satisfaction and the most pleasing subject of congratulation to your Lordship, &c.

We have the honor to be,
My Lord and Gentlemen,
WILLIAM HORNBY, and COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 13th December 1781.

Bombay Castle, 17th January 1782.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor.

W. Daniel Draper. | Thomas Goddard, Brigadier General.

John Halsey.

The General acquaints the Committee that he has requested this meeting to lay before them a letter he has received from the Minister at Poona in reply to the one he wrote him with their concurrence on the 29th of November last; and he likewise acquaints the Committee that he has received the passport mentioned in the Minister's letter, in consequence of which he now delivers the letter from the Minister:—

Translation of a letter from BALÁJIRÁV NÁNA FADANAVIS, *to Brigadier General* GODDARD, *without date, despatched from Poona, the 25th December 1871*

After compliments he proceeds.

Your letter, the source of delight, has been received in a favourable hour, and has made me happy. Induced by friendship and regard you have communicated the following particulars:—

That it is the wish of the Governor General and Council, Bengal, and of the English Sardárs to form a league of peace and amity and to conclude a firm and lasting alliance between the Peshwa Pandit Pradhán and the English nation.

That you have first received a letter from Colonel Muir informing you of his having promised Mahádji Sindia Ráv to recommend a cessation of hostilities to you, until the terms of treaty can be finally settled. You add that you are invested with full powers and instructions from Mr. Hastings and the gentlemen of the Supreme Council of Bengal, and that you hope a proper answer will arrive on the subject of peace. In order that the flames of war and dissension may be allayed by the waters of concord and reconciliation that after receiving my answer you will send a confidential person to me. Upon his arrival, should matters appear favourable and the preliminaries mutually proposed be likely to be agreed to, you will yourself repair to Poona and conclude and finally ratify a treaty. On this account you further desire that passports with the seal and signature of the Peshwa may be sent back with my answer for the safe conduct of the person you mean to depute.

In reply to the above I inform you that the contents of your letter replete with friendship has been explained to me word for word, and has filled with joy my heart, which is the emblem of regard. Before this time a letter arrived from Mahádji Sindia to me, informing me of Colonel Muir's having entered into a negotiation with him, the purport of which was that Sindia should exert himself in bringing about a peace with the Peshwa Pandit Pradhán and the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán; but your letter makes no mention of this circumstance. I therefore write to acquaint you that the sincere regard and friendship subsisting betwixt the Shrimant Pradhán and the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán is more conspicuous and shining than the splendour of the sun. Therefore if it is the wish of that friend, whose heart is the residence of regard, to settle the terms of a firm and lasting alliance, it is expedient and advisable that you send a confidential person, and after a meeting has taken place with him we shall mutually confer upon business; a passport from the Sarkár Pandit Pradhán is now sent for his safe conduct. What more?

(A True Translation.)
W. WATHERSTON.

Letter from WARREN HASTINGS *to the* GOVERNOR, *and* COUNCIL, *Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—In consquence of the accompanying letter addressed to you by the Council of Fort William, informing you that I have been invested by this Government with all its powers to negotiate with the neighbouring states, and specially to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with the Marátha Government, and requiring you to consider any directions and orders upon that subject as the full legal and united voice of the Board, and desiring you likewise to consider whomsoever I should delegate as a Plenipotentiary and Ambassador to settle the conditions of a peace and treaty of friendship with the Government of Poona or any branch of the Marátha State as vested with the full powers of this Government, I now inform you that a treaty of peace being concluded with Mahádji Sindia, who has offered to be the mediator between our Government and that of Poona, I have made choice of Mr. David Anderson to be the Minister Plenipotentiary for the Company to negotiate and conclude a final peace and treaty of alliance with the Marátha Government.

To accelarate Mr. Anderson's negotiation, and to evince the sincerity of our overtures, it will be expedient to refrain from all offensive hostilities against the Maráthás; and I must, therefore, in virtue of the authority conferred on me by the Board, formally and peremptorily require and enjoin you to confine your military operations to the defence of our own possessions until I shall be informed by the result of Mr. Anderson's deputation, or until that gentleman shall acquaint you that his proposals have been rejected.

If the army, or any part of it, shall have commenced offensive operations against the Marátha State, you are immediately to put a stop to them, and to recall any troops that may have marched on such design.

I shall send similar requisition to General Goddard.

I have, &c.,
W. HASTINGS.

Benares, 4th November 1781.

Letter from Captain WATHERSTON *to Brigadier General* GODDARD, *Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

SIR,—I have been favoured with your letter of the 6th instant, enclosing copy of the proceedings of the Select Committee in consequence of my letter of the 31st ultimo, to the resolutions expressed wherein you direct me to conform, and obtain the Minister's permission to return to Bombay. It is with no small concern and disappointment that I am to inform you of the ill success which my endeavours to effect this point have met with, and of the necessity I am under, notwithstanding your positive directions for my return, of consenting to a temporary stay; in doing which I trust I shall be firmly believed when I affirm that I make a sacrifice of my own inclinations to motives that have the public good alone for their basis; for although I can hitherto see no cause to destroy the belief of the Minister's solicitude to detain me proceeding principally from view of directing advantage to himself, I am also very sensible that after the reasons he now assigns for delaying my departure, I should be wanting in zeal for the Company's interests, and risk your censure and disapprobation, if I peremptorily insisted upon a dismission, until those reasons were communicated to you, and an opportunity given you for forming a particular judgment of them, and transmitting me such further instructions as you shall then deem necessary.

Your letter of the 6th reached me the morning of the 10th instant; but as I was prevented by circumstances from having an interview with the Minister till last night, although intermediate messages had passed between us very unfavourable to my hopes of getting away, I thought it best to try what effect a personal conference might produce before I ventured to address you decisively on the occasion. Haripant Fadkia was, as usual, present at this meeting.

I acquainted the Minister with the orders I had received from you to return to Bombay, and fully explained the reasons which had induced you to consider such a step as absolutely necessary, both in obedience to Mr. Hastings' instructions, and because by the appointment of Mr. Anderson all powers to treat with the Marátha Government were vested in him, and I must remain here without public commission or power to negotiate whatever.

It is needless to take up your time with repeating the several arguments I used to prove the inutility as well as the impropriety of my stay, and of course to enforce the expediency of my departure. Suffice it is to say that I neglected nothing, which I thought could have any weight with the Minister either in reason or as connected with his own interests, to obtain his consent.

He acknowledged himself sensible of the justice of what I advanced. He observed that there could be no more convincing proof of a person's total want of power than his own declaration; that therefore he did not wish to detain me, with any prospect of my being hereafter employed to negotiate, what I had myself assured him was impossible; and that his sole view in it was to facilitate the future settlement of an alliance betwixt the English and Marátha State by making me the confidential channel for conveying his secret sentiments and intentions to you and Mr. Hastings. He said the circumstances appeared to him in the following light; that I had arrived at the Peshwá's court, and had produced full powers in your name from Mr. Hastings and the Government of Bengal to conclude a treaty, and that in consequence he had entered into a frank and unreserved communication of his most secret thoughts and objects of negotiation with the English; that in strict propriety he might expect to receive an answer from Mr. Hastings to those proposals through me or expressly referring him to some other person for satisfaction regarding them, before I ought to propose going away; but that he waived every right of requisition which this circumstance afforded him, and that all he requested and expected was, that I should remain till advices might arrive from Mahádji Sindia. Subsequent to his entering upon business with Mr. Anderson, he added that from what Mahádji Sindia had already written, and from what you had desired me to communicate, he had no doubt of Mr. Anderson's possessing full powers and coming with an intention to conclude an alliance with the Peshwa Ráo Pandit Pradhán, but that there were many particulars that he wished to be apprised of before he could come to a determination upon certain important points, and that these could not be known till Mahádji Sindia and Mr. Anderson had conferred together, and the result had been transmitted to him. He concluded by observing that in all subjects of negotiation there were some of so particularly nice and secret a nature as not to admit of being committed to writing, and that it was solely with a view of personally communicating to me his sentiments upon these, as soon as the result of Mr. Anderson's negotiation with Mahádji Sindia should be received, that he solicited me to remain in order that I might make them known to you and Mr. Hastings.

I observed to the Minister, that as he had not explained himself so fully when I first informed him of Mr. Anderson's deputation as he had now done, I should represent to you the reasons assigned by him for wishing me to stay; and I was well assured your friendship for him and determination of doing everything that was proper and calculated to effect an alliance betwixt the English and Marátha States would lead you to comply with any request he might reasonably make. I however requested he would fix some certain period for my taking leave as, after the directions I had already received to come away with his permission, you would naturally expect to be satisfied respecting the length of time he has to detain me. In reply to this he told me that he had received advices from Mahádji Sindia of a public meeting with Mr. Anderson, and that as the subjects of business would be entered upon immediately after a sufficient time were allowed for their being fully discussed, he could not expect the arrival of the despatches he alluded to sooner than in twenty or twenty-five days, and that at the expiration of that period he would certainly give me leave to go away, and this he requested I would mention to you. The above, Sir, is the substance of what passed at the conference of last night with the Minister, which I beg leave to submit to your consideration,; and I hope you will approve of my conduct on the occasion, and the acquiescence I have been obliged to give to his request urged with such warmth and show of sincerity, and supported by arguments which, if not altogether conclusive and satisfactory, carried however the specious appearance of reason as well as real intention on his part, and besides from the influence they might probably have upon Mr. Anderson's further negotiation seemed in my opinion deserving of the most particular and cautious attention.

I some time ago addressed Mr. Hastings acquainting him with the desire formerly expressed by the Minister of detaining me at Poona till advices should be received from Mahádji Sindia subsequent to Mr. Anderson's arrival and entering upon business with him; and at the same time suggested to him the difficulty I was sensible I should meet with in obtaining his permission to depart previous to the receipt of those advices. In consequence of what has since passed, I shall take the earliest opportunity of again addressing him, and communicate the result of my late interview. The Minister informed me of his having received a letter from Mudáji Bhonsla intimating the arrival of Mr. Chapman at Nágpur, and that he was possessed of full powers from Bengal Government to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Marátha State. But the questions which he put to me respecting this gentleman and Mr. Anderson and their respective stations in the Company's service, I judged necessary to regulate my answer in such a manner to convince him that the business of negotiation was more perticularly, if not exclusively, entrusted to the management of the latter, a declaration which, Mr. Hastings' letter to you seemed to render necessary; and that if he sincerely and seriously desired an accommodation, his calling Mr. Anderson immediately to Poona would tend most speedily to effect its attainment. This, however, he affimed was a step he could not take until the expected advices from Sindia were received. In the course of conversation he asked me if I had received any late accounts from the Karnátak, and informed me that by his advices, dated six days ago, Hyder's army was encamped at Cuddalore, and Sir Eyre Coote about twenty-one kos distant betwixt that place and Madras. From the manner in which he questioned me and the circumstance of Hyder's Ambassador having been with him that and the preceding evening, I am led to suspect that some particular intelligence has been received, and if so, I think their silence regarding it is a proof of its not being favourable to the interests of their ally; this, however, is only a conjecture, and I shall endeavour to inform myself as soon as possible if it is founded upon any reality. I shall conclude this letter by informing you that the Peshwa and Court will set out this day to a holy place, about sixteen kos distant and not far from Purandhar, to perform a vow made last year by the Minister in case of the young Peshwa's recovery from the small-pox, which he has taken the present opportunity of doing. I do not expect their return there seven or eight days.

I have, &c.,
D. WATHERSTON.

Poona, 15th February 1782.

Letter from Captain WATHERSTON *to Brigadier General* GODDARD.

SIR,—My last address was dated the 15th instant and related to you the particulars of what had passed at my interview with the Minister the preceding evening. The young Peshwa and Hari Pant Fadkia returned here the 20th instant, but the Minister himself is not expected till the day after to-morrow. He did not, it seems, accompany them, but went to Minowli, a place about thirty kos distant in the neighbourhood of Sátára, to excute a matrimonial plan which, report says, he has changed his mind and laid aside.

Since Hari Pant's return all public business, however, has been carried on by him in the same manner as if the Minister were present himself; and the several officers of State as well as Vakils from foreign courts regularly attend his Darbár, and receive the necessary orders and replies to their remonstrances or representations as usual. Within these eight days repeated expresses have arrived from Hyder, and yesterday his Vakils delivered despatches to Hari Pant, the purport of which was strenuously exhorting this Government not to come to any terms of agreement with the English, and holding out most flattering prospects of success to his own affairs by assurances of being soon joined by a large body of French troops. He further promised

to send an army very shortly to assist the Maráthás against us, together with a large sum of money. I cannot, after the most deligent enquiry, learn that accounts have yet been received of any action of consequence having happened since the commencement of operations this campaign in the Karnátak. It is plain from circumstances and, indeed, I am so informed from good authority, that the attention of this Court is turned towards that event, as the rule which will influence and solely direct the conduct necessary to be observed in negotiating with us hereafter, and it is therefore to be apprehended that decisive accounts from that quarter rather than despatches from Sindia are requisite to produce a disposition in the Minister to perform the promise he had made of permitting me to leave Poona at the period he has limited for the arrival of the letter. The probability of this idea has induced me to listen with more credit to a piece of information I received this very evening from a person whose situation and connexion with a Pandit in the Minister's confidence gives him an opportunity of discovering his secret intentions. He says that the present alliance of this Court with Hyder is one of necessity, not choice; that however it is impossible to break it immediately, and that the Minister will be guided by events, and watch the proper opportunity of doing it; that in the meantime he will avoid coming to any final agreement with the English, and that it is his present plan to detain me here by every possible pretence until the arrival of Nizám Alli at Poona, who is expected in two months to be present at the celebration of the Peshwa's nuptials, for which preparations are now making. This intelligence further adds that it is the intention of the Minister to consult with Nizám Alli upon the measures then proper to be pursued; and if he consents, to form a confederacy with the English and Mudáji Bhonsla, and fall with their united force upon the dominions of Hyder. In the above intelligence the circumstance of the intended wedding I know to be true. The visit of Nizám Alli is by no means very improbable, and if a measure is absolutely fixed upon it must shortly be made public. The secret object of it corresponds with the political sentiments by which I have from the beginning supposed this Court to be influenced; and the plan proposed relative to myself is very reconcilable to their past conduct, and the narrow selfish policy which governs them; on which if they can hinge an idea of the smallest possible advantage to be hereafter derived from it, all other considerations of honor and propriety will easily be made to give way. My departure is now a point formally agreed upon, and I do not see any shadow of reason the Minister can assign for detaining me after the limited period shall expire. I am sure he will be able to give none of sufficient force to compel my consent, and I see no public motive that need operate with me to render a further sacrifice to his inclinations necessary, since a communication will, by that time, have been fully established with Mr. Anderson, and it will be in his power only to avail himself of the favourable opportunities that may occur for negotiating with his Court, either separately or conjunctively with any other. I impatiently wait for your answer to my letter of the 15th instant, which will, I hope, approve and authorize the stay in this place, which I have consented to; and although I have suggested above the difficulties I expect to meet with in getting away at the time appointed, I beg I may not be understood as conveying an idea that my further continuance can possibly be proper or necessary, which I am determined after what has passed, unless I receive your orders to the contrary, not to consent upon any consideration whatever.

I shall conclude this letter by mentioning that a small body of infantry moved from hence yesterday towards Bor Ghát, intended to act against the Chief of Rájápur, whose name is, I believe, Kakoot Khán, and who is now making considerable disturbances to the southward.

I have, &c.,
D. WATHERSTON.

Poona, 24th February 1782.

Letter from Captain WATHERSTON *to Brigadier General* GODDARD, *Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge your favour of the 2nd instant enclosing a letter to the Minister, which I delivered to him; and I have the satisfaction to communicate to you his compliance with the request it contains of allowing me to return to Bombay. At a visit which I paid him yesterday to renew and urge my application for leave to go away, he expressed himself in terms the most friendly and satisfactory, pointing out the disappointment which the hopes he had been led to entertain from my arrival must suffer, but at the same time acknowledging the force of the reasons you had given him for my departure, in consequence of which and on account of the limited time being now expired, he found himself unwillingly compelled to consent to my going away. He desired me, however, to assure you in the strongest terms of his sincere inclination to remain in friendship and alliance with the English; and added, that he confided in my good offices and just representations of his sentiments to impress Mr. Hastings and you with a proper knowledge of them, and to preserve a disposition in your mind equally favourable and friendly towards him. He observed that no actual treaty was yet concluded; he considered a friendship as mutually agreed to and established from the time of my arrival; and ended by informing me of the receipt of advices from Mahádji Sindia, which though not so minute and particular as he expected, were however generally expressive of the satisfaction he received from Mr. Anderson's negotiation, and favourable to the early completion of his wishes in a treaty of peace and lasting alliance between the Peshwa and the English. I need not trouble you here with a further detail of what passed, as I hope so soon to have the pleasure of communicating it in person. Monday, the 11th, is fixed for the day of taking leave, and I propose setting out the day after, and proceeding by the way of Bellápur.

It is with the sincerest satisfaction I promise myself the pleasure of presenting to you Captain Banks of the Madras Establishment, and a young gentleman his companion, Mr. Shaw, who have been prisoners since December 1779, and experienced all the rigours and distress which want and severe treatment could inflict during so tedious and painful a period. I have often, since my arrival, solicited the Minister in their behalf, and as often received vague and evasive answers, which though not absolute refusals, gave however very little encouragement to hope for success. At the late interview when my departure was fixed upon, I took the opportunity that circumstance offered of enforcing all my former arguments, and further pointing out to him how pleasing a proof he would enable me to give you of his regard and friendship by this act of generosity and particular attention to your wishes, and that I should not fail to represent to you in the favourable colors it derived. My endeavour had fortunately their desired effect; he yielded (as he said) to considerations entirely personal, and granted to my particular request what he had already refused to repeated and very strong applications from a variety of other quarters.

I shall conclude this letter by communicating a piece of intelligence which I have just received of the arrival of two letters last night from Hyder Alli informing the Minister of his having remitted seven lákhs of rupees to this Court. The Banker at Poona, through whose house the business is carried on, has not received himself the letter of advice; but Hyder's Vakils verbally communicated the circumstance to him, and told him he might expect it daily; that the money was ready in Hyder's camp and would be sent off immediately. It is through the channel of this man that I have received my intelligence, which further adds that Hyder is to complete the sum to ten lákhs, and has promised to remit the remaining three very shortly.

I have, &c.,
D. WATHERSTON.

Poona, March 9th, 1782.

The Governor General's instructions to David Anderson.

Sir,—Having already delegated to you by a former commission the full powers and authority vested in me by the Governor General and Council for the purpose of negotiating and finally concluding a treaty of peace and alliance between the Company and the Marátha State, and reposing the firmest reliance on your abilities and integrity, I recommend to your attentive consideration and observance the following instructions for the easier and more effectual attainment of the great object of your deputation and other purposes dependent upon and connected with it:—

The peace lately concluded between our Government and Mahádji Sindia opens a fair prospect for the success of your mission by the offer which that Chief has made to interpose his friendly offices at Poona for an equitable accommodation. The great credit and influence which Sindia possesses in the Marátha State leaves no room for apprehension that his endeavours would prove ineffectual if he exerts them sincerely and heartily; it is therefore with a view to dispose him more strongly to our interest that I desire you to repair to him, to give him the strongest assurances of my personal esteem and friendship, and of my desire to cultivate and improve the connection which has lately been formed between us; the most effectual means of accomplishing these purposes would be a formal interview between Sindia and myself; and I desire that you will endeavour to draw from him his sentiments concerning it, and advise it if you find him disposed to it, but do not abruptly or formally demand it, should he be equally inclined to meet me. You may propose Allahabad or Cawnpore as the rendezvous; but if neither of these places should suit his convenience, I will go to Etáwáh or other place on the banks of Jamna that you may know my time will admit of.

If Sindia should either decline an interview altogether, or not afford you a proper encouragement to recommend, it must then rest entirely with you to effect my views, which are as follows:—

First obtain through the mediation of Sindia and in concert with his Agents, if he shall think proper to depute one for the purpose, a treaty of peace and alliance offensive and defensive with the Peshwa against all common enemies, but especially against Hyder Alli Khán, or of peace simply on the conditions of restoring all that we have acquired during the war, except Ahmedabad, and the territory conquered for Fattesing Gáikawár.

We cannot totally abandon the interest of Raghunáthráv; and endeavour to obtain for him an adequate provision on the conditions prescribed in General Goddard's instructions.

You may consent to yield what is ours, what we can in honor grant, but we will never suffer our treaties to be infringed nor our faith to be violated. You will of course be attentive to any engagements subsisting between us and other powers in settling the terms of peace and alliance with the Maráthás. I except from this precaution the Rána of Gohad, who has been guilty of the most flagrant breach of faith towards us in every instance, and after a most faithful and scrupulous performance of every stipulation in his favour by us, and after we have saved him and his country from certain destruction. Leave him to settle his own affairs with the Maráthás. Colonel Muir will give you complete intelligence concerning the Rána's conduct, and from this you will judge whether he is worthy of being any longer considered as our ally.

Reserve Bassein if you can, even though it should be with the concession of restoring all the lands obtained by the treaty with Colonel Upton, except Sálsette

and ceded islands and the ceded moiety of Broach; but do not insist on the reservation of Bassein to the hindrance of a peace. We want nothing from the Maráthás but their alliance against Hyder Ali Khán, and that we dispense with as the effect of a positive engagement in which they cannot perhaps in decency agree, although they may be desirous of availing themselves of any pretext which may lead to it without a direct breach of the public faith; be careful that your engagements do not contain anything hostile to the Government of Berár or hurtful to our connection with it.

Include Fattesing Gáikawár in the peace according to the treaty concluded with him, of which you have a copy.

Obtain the exclusion of the French and all other European nations from the alliance, and from the ports and dominions of the Maráthás. It must be a principal object of your attention to prevail upon the Marátha Government to invade the dominions of Hyder Alli Khán. They will not enter into public engagements for that purpose, as they are at present in alliance with him; but pretexts will not be wanting when they shall perceive the facility of making conquests from him. Endeavour to interest Scindia in all these views with the administration of Poona, and to engage him separately, or with Tukoji Holkar into close connections with our Government by the prospects of mutual advantage. I leave a large latitude in this instruction to your discretion. You know my views, which are for present peace and security. Pursue and agree to whatever may promote these views, reject and shun whatever may obstruct them, and especially such as may draw us into a new scene of hostilities.

Wait upon Colonel Muir in his camp at Etáwáh before you proceed to Sindia; and obtain from him every information and advice which can be useful in your negotiation with that Chief.

Since your departure, Rája Mudáji Bhonsla has requested, that a gentleman in my confidence might attend him as the Agent of our Government at this Court, and I have given this commission to Mr. Chapman. I send you a copy of his instructions. You will furnish him with such communications and orders from time to time as you may judge will tend to promote the success of your negotiations.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

(A True Copy)
W. BRUER,
Assistant Secretary.

Benares, 4th November 1781.

Bombay Castle, 11th April 1782.

Received the following letter from Mr. David Anderson :—

"Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,—I did myself the honor of addressing you in duplicate under date 27th ultimo.

Although the progress of my negotiation has been more slow than I had reason to imagine from the cordial disposition which I informed you Sindia had shown to promote a peace, yet I have the pleasure to inform you that matters continue still in a very favourable train. The point on which the negotiation chiefly hinges at present is our treaty with Fattesing Gáikawár.

Sindia has proposed that we should agree to the restitution of the Peshwa's share of Ahmedabad; and on condition of my acceding to this point he has declared himself ready to settle with me immediately the terms of a treaty, which he would pledge his word, should be ratified by the other members of the Marátha State. I have informed him that my instructions from the Hon'ble Board on this head are positi ve; and being sensible that they are founded on a strict principle of natural faith and honor, I have assured him that there is not the smallest prospect of their being retracted. Though I believe Sindia is convinced from this declaration that success is not to be expected in this point, yet, having been positively instructed to procure this stipulation, he cannot, he declares, conclude the terms of a treaty without it. He has written on the subject to Poona; and though a considerable delay from this circumstance must necessarily take place, yet I do not I magine that it will in the end prove an obstacle to the treaty.

It is with the utmost satisfaction I inform you that I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Sindia in the undertaking. On the contrary, I believe him, both from inclination and a sense of interest, to be very cordially desirous of promoting a peace between the English and the Marátha State; but there is reason to believe that his instructions from Thána have not extended further than simply to discuss and adjust the terms of a treaty with me without bringing them a final settlement. It is not indeed likely that Nána Fadanavis, whilst he keeps a channel of negotiation open immediately under himself at Poona, would give up to Sindia the powers of a final settlement. I lament this unfortunate circumstance of a double negotiation having been opened by us nearly at the same time, as one great cause of all the delays I have hitherto experienced, and I wait with the utmost anxiety to hear of General Goddard's having recalled Captain Watherston from Poona, in compliance with the orders of the Hon'ble Board of the 9th February; until then I have no hopes of bringing the negotiation to a favourable issue, as Nána, though he might not choose to conclude a treaty with the concurrence of Mahádji Sindia, will not probably however be desirous of relinquishing the negotiation with General Goddard, whilst by keeping both channels open he may flatter himself with expectations of having it more in his power to effect a compliance with his own terms. When I consider the anxiety of the Maráthás themselves for a peace, so strongly instanced in their present cessation from hostilities, and the very equitable terms I have been empowered to make to them, I cannot otherwise account for their conduct from any consideration either of reason or policy.

I beg leave to repeat to you my assurances that I shall pay the utmost deference to your advice on every occasion and avail myself of the full latitude of my instructions in complying with such requisitions as you may think it necessary to make to me.

I am, &c.,
D. ANDERSON.

Sindia's Camp, Nunke Kray,
12 kos from Gwalior, 23rd March 1782."

Letter from the Governor General *to Captain* D. Watherston *at Poona.*

Sir,—I have received your letter under date the 15th of January informing me of your arrival at Poona and of the reception which you have met with from the Minister. It gives me great pleasure to learn that your meeting with him has in the profession which he has made afforded so fair a prospect of an early accomplishment of our views for settling the differences subsisting

between the Company and the Marátha State; and I trust that your subsequent conference with him have been attended with increasing proofs of a sincere desire on his part to effect this desirable purpose. I write that, informed as you undoubtedly will have been long ere this of the appointment of Mr. Anderson by a special commission from Bengal as our Minister to the Court of Poona to conclude a treaty with the Marátha State through the mediation and with the assistance of Mahádji Sindia, you may have communicated to him what has passed between the Minister and you on this important subject; but if in consequence of the powers delegated to you by Brigadier General Goddard you shall have been convinced that this was not necessary, I must express my desire that you do so immediately on receipt of this letter. The Governor General and Council having charged Mr. Anderson with the special commission which I have mentioned, and having given him full and particular instructions for his guidance in the execution of it, it might be fatal to the object of that commission were separate negotiations to be carried on by any other person; the Board have therefore directed Bragadier General Goddard to withdraw from that in which he had employed his Agents at the Peshwa's Court. But as your abrupt departure from that Court might give rise to a belief in the mind of the Minister unfavourable to the sincerity of our wishes, which are strongly and earnestly for peace, I request that you do not leave it but continue there until Mr. Anderson's arrival, notwithstanding any orders which you may have received from Brigadier General Goddard, grounded on our late directions, which as they regard your stay at Poona will be particularly explained to him by a letter from the Board.

I am sensible that great delicacy of conduct is required, and that much will depend on your good management and address to prevent any impression being had to the prejudice of our views from the stop put to your further negotiations at the Court of Poona; but I trust to your abilities and your zeal for the interest of the Company for obviating it, and I rely also on the latter for such communications to Mr. Anderson as your observations of the temper, object and those circumstances of the Poona Government may suggest and be useful to the success of the commission with which he is charged.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

(A True Copy)
C. REAY,
Sub-Secretary.

Fort William, 25th February 1782.

Translate of a letter from NA'NA FADANAVIS *to General* GODDARD.

I was made happy with the receipt of your letter, and inform you of the contents. I have had several meetings with Mr. Watherston, whom you deputed to me, since his arrival at Poona; and he has repeatedly in conversation together made known your regard and friendship, which has given me the greatest satisfaction and pleasure. Mr. Watherston is exceedingly wise, discerning, and of great experience in affairs. He has now obtained permission to leave this place

and will proceed towards you. He will fully state every particular, and from his information, your heart, the mirror of friendship, will learn every circumstance. I hope that you will continue to favour me with repeated letters fraught with sincere regard. Acquainting me with your health. What more?

(A True Translation)
(Signed) THOMAS GODDARD.

General Goddard delivered in copy of a letter he this day received from the Minister at Poona:—

" *Translate of a letter from* Na'na Fadanavis *to General* Goddard.

After compliments.

I have received your letter and the contents have been particularly explained to me. You write that the rainy season is now approaching, and as the weather of the Konkan is very unwholesome for animals and horses, you have thought it proper to order a part of your troops to march and canton at Surat, which you mentioned for my information. My friend, at present friendship is not established between the Peshwa and English Sardárs. In case of friendship not existing, where is the necessity or advantage of communicating these circumstances to me? What more shall I write?"

Letter from David Anderson *to the* President *and* Council.

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,—I had the honor to address you in duplicate under date the 23rd March.

I have now the honor to inform you that I have at last settled with Mahádji Sindia the terms of an accommodation between the English and Marátha Governments, and we both addressed our respective principals for their approbation. As soon as I receive answer to the despatches which I have sent to the Hon'ble Governor General and Council, I shall do myself the honor of addressing you more fully.

Mahádji Sindia having received intelligence of the late skirmishes between the Company's troops and Ganeshpant misrepresented in such manner as to make him apprehensive of our intention of renewing hostilities, I have communicated to him such purticulars relative to that affair as have come to my knowledge from private correspondence. I have the pleasure to inform you that Sindia appears fully satisfied with the assurances which I have given him, and he has promised that the most peremptory orders shall be issued to all the Marátha troops to abstain from giving us any future cause of complaint. It is possible, however, that without any imputation on the sincerity of the Marátha Government these orders may not be strictly obeyed as it is not always in the power of the Chiefs to restrain the irregularities of their predatory and undisciplined bands.

I am, &c.,
D. ANDERSON.

Sindia's Camp,
Sálbai, 22nd May 1782.

Gentlemen,—Having this day received from Mr. David Anderson a copy of the treaty of general peace concluded by me on the part of this Government with Mahádji Sindia on the part of all the Marátha powers, we now transmit you copy of the same for your information; and enjoin you in the most solemn and peremptory manner to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent any act either in your Government or in any person under your authority which may have the smallest tendency to the infringement of it.

Having by the fifth article made this Government responsible for the conduct of all persons acting under the Company's authority for the observation of the treaty, we think it incumbent only by that obligation to declare that we are determined not only to maintain the several conditions of the treaty inviolate on our part, but are firmly resolved to bind all the Company's dependencies to the same sacred observance of it by the fullest exercise of the controlling powers lodged in us for that purpose by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and by appeals to their authority if ever those powers should be found insufficient for the preservation of the peace, which we have at length so happily obtained, and for the national faith solemnly pledged for that purpose.

We have, &c.,
W. HASTINGS,
E. WHELER,
J. McPHERSON.

Fort William, 3rd June 1782.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH THE MARA'THA'S, 1782.

Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance between the Hon'ble the English East India Company and the Peshwa Mádhavráv Pandit Pradhán, settled by Mr. David Anderson, on the part of the Hon'ble Company, in virtue of the powers delegated to him for that purpose by the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council, appointed by the King and Parliament of Great Britain to direct and control all political affairs of the Hon'ble English East India Company in India; and by Maháraja Soubahdar Mádhavráv Sindia, as Plenipotentiary on the part of the Peshwa Mádhavráv Pandit Pradhán, Balláji Pandit, Nána Fadanavis, and the whole of the Chiefs of the Marátha nation, agreeably to the following articles, which shall be ever binding on their heirs and successors, and the conditions of them to be invariably observed by both parties.

Article I.

It is stipulated and agreed to between the Hon'ble the English East India Company and the Peshwa, through the mediation of Mádhavráv Sindia, that all countries, places, cities, and forts, including Bassein, &c., which have been taken from the Peshwa during the war that has arisen since the treaty settled by Colonel Upton, and have come into the possession of the English, shall be delivered up to the Peshwa; the territories, ports, cities, &c., to be restored, shall be delivered in within the space of two months from the period when this treaty shall become complete (as hereinafter described), to such persons as the Peshwa, or his Minister Nána Fadanavis shall appoint.

Article II.

It is agreed between the English Company and the Peshwa, that Sálsette and three other islands, *viz.*, Elephanta, Karanja, and Hog, which are included in the treaty of Colonel Upton,

shall continue for ever in possession of the English. If any other islands have been taken in the course of the present war, they shall be delivered up to the Peshwa.

Article III.

Whereas it was stipulated in the fourth article of the treaty of Colonel Upton, "that the Peshwa and all the Chiefs of the Marátha State do agree to give the English Company, for ever, all right and title to the city of Broach, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Mogals or otherwise, without retaining any claim of chauth, or any other claims whatsoever, so that the English Company shall possess it without participation or claim of any kind;" this article is accordingly continued in full force and effect.

Article IV.

The Peshwa having formerly, in the treaty of Colonel Upton, agreed, by way of friendship, to give up to the English a country of three lákhs of rupees, near Broach, the English do now, at the request of Mádhavráv Sindia, consent to relinquish their claim to the said country in favour of the Peshwa.

Article V.

The country which Sayáji and Fattesing Gáikawár gave to the English, and which is mentioned in the seventh article of the treaty of Colonel Upton, being therein left in a state of suspense, the English, with a view to obviate all future disputes, now agree that it shall be restored; and it is hereby settled that if the said country be a part of the established territory of the Gáikawár, it shall be restored to the Gáikawár; and if it shall be a part of the Peshwá's territories, it shall be restored to the Peshwa.

Article VI.

The English engage that, having allowed Raghunáthráv a period of four months from the time when this treaty shall become complete to fix on a place of residence, they will not, after the expiration of the said period, afford him any support, protection, or assistance, nor supply him with money for his expenses: and the Peshwa on his part engages, that if Raghunáthráv will voluntarily and of his own accord repair to Maháràja Mádhavráv Sindia, and quietly reside with him, the sum of Rs. 25,000 per month shall be paid him for his maintenance, and no injury whatever shall be offered to him by the Peshwa, or any of his people.

Article VII.

The Hon'ble English East India Company and the Peshwa being desirous that their respective allies shall be included in this peace, it is hereby mutually stipulated, that each party shall make peace with the allies of the other, in the manner hereinafter specified.

Article VIII.

The territory which has long been the established jághír of Sayáji Gáikawár and Fattesing Gáikawár, that is to say, whatever territory Fattesing Gáikawár possessed at the commencement of the present war, shall hereafter for ever remain on the usual footing in his possession; and the said Fattesing shall, from the date of this treaty being complete, pay for the future to the Peshwa the tribute as usual previous to the present war, and shall perform such services, and be subject to such obedience, as have long been established and customary. No claim shall be made on the said Fattesing by the Peshwa for the period that is past.

Article IX.

The Peshwa engages, that whereas the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán having concluded a treaty with him, hath disturbed and taken possession of territories belonging to the English and their allies, he shall be made to relinquish them; and they shall be restored to the Company and the Naváb Mahamed Alli Khán. All prisoners that have been taken on either side during the war shall be released, and Hyder Alli Khán shall be made to relinquish all such territories belonging to the English Company and their allies, as he may have taken possession of since the ninth of Ramzán in the year 1181, being the date of his treaty with the Peshwa; and the said territories shall be delivered over to the English and the Naváb Mahamed Alli Khán within six months after this treaty being complete; and the English, in such case, agree that so long as Hyder Alli Khán shall afterwards abstain from hostilities against them, and their allies, and so long as he shall continue in friendship with the Peshwa, they will in no respect act hostilely towards him.

Article X.

The Peshwa engages, on his own behalf as well as on behalf of his allies, the Naváb Nizám Alli Khán, Rághoji Bhonsla, Syna Sáheb Soubah, and the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán, that they shall, in every respect, maintain peace towards the English and their allies, the Naváb Asoph-ul-Dowlah Bahádur, and the Naváb Mahamed Alli Khán Bahádur, and shall in no respect whatever give them any disturbance. The English engage on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of their allies, the Naváb Asoph-ul-Dowlah, and the Naváb Mahamed Alli Khán, that they shall in every respect maintain peace towards the Peshwa and his allies, the Naváb Nizám Alli Khán and Rághoji Bhonsla, Syna Sáheb: and the English further engage on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of their allies, that they will maintain peace also towards the Naváb Hyder Alli Khán, under the conditions specified in the 9th Article of this treaty.

Article XI.

The Hon'ble East India Company and the Peshwa mutually agree that the vessels of each shall afford no disturbance to the navigation of the vessels of the other: and the vessels of each shall be allowed access to the ports of the other, where they shall meet with no molestation, and the fullest protection shall be reciprocally afforded.

Article XII.

The Peshwa and Chiefs of the Marátha State hereby agree that the English shall enjoy the privilege of trade, as formerly, in the Marátha territories, and shall meet with no kind of interruption; and, in the same manner, the Hon'ble East India Company agree that the subjects of the Peshwa shall be allowed the privilege of trade, without interruption, in the territories of the English.

Article XIII.

The Peshwa hereby engages that he will not suffer any factories of other European nations to be established in his territories, or those of the chiefs dependant on him, excepting only such as are already established by the Portuguese; and he will hold no intercourse of friendship with any other European nations: and the English on their part agree that they will not afford assistance to any nation of Deccan or Hindustán at enmity with the Peshwa.

Article XIV.

The English and the Peshwa mutually agree that neither will afford any kind of assistance to the enemies of the other.

ARTICLE XV.

The Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Fort William engage that they will not permit any of the Chiefs, dependants, or subjects of the English, the gentlemen of Bombay, Surat, or Madras, to act contrary at any place to the terms of this treaty. In the same manner, the Peshwa Mádhavráv Pandit Pradhán engages that none of the Chiefs or subjects of the Marátha State shall act contrary to them.

ARTICLE XVI.

The Hon'ble East India Company, and the Peshwa Mádhavráv Pandit Pradhán, having the fullest confidence in Mahárája Soubahdar Mádhavráv Sindia Bahádur, they have both requested the said Mahárája to be the mutual guarantee for the perpetual and invariable adherence of both parties to the conditions of this treaty; and the said Mádhavráv Sindia, from a regard to the welfare of both States, hath accordingly taken upon himself the mutual guarantee. If either of the parties shall deviate from the conditions of this treaty, the said Mahárája will join the other party, and will, to the utmost of his power, endeavour to bring the aggressor to a proper understanding.

ARTICLE XVII.

It is hereby agreed that whatever territories, forts, or cities, in Gujarát were granted by Raghunáthráv to the English, previous to the treaty of Colonel Upton, and have come into their possession, the restitution of which was stipulated in the seventh Article of the said treaty shall be restored, agreeably to the terms of the said article.

This treaty consisting of 17 articles, is settled at Sálbai, in the Camp of Mahárája Soubahdar Mádhavráv Sindia, on the 4th of the month Jemmadul Saany, in the year 1197 of the Hygera, corresponding with the 17th of March 1782 of the Christian era, by the said Mahárája and Mr. David Anderson: a copy hereof shall be sent by each of the above-named persons to their respective principals at Fort William and Poona, and when both copies being returned, the one under the seal of the Hon'ble East India Company and signature of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Fort William, shall be delivered to Mahárája Mádhavráv Sindia Bahádur, and the other under the seal of the Peshwa Mádhavráv Pandit Pradhán, and the signature of Bálláji Pandit, Nána Fadanavis, shall be delivered to Mr. David Anderson, this treaty shall be deemed complete and ratified, and the articles herein contained, shall become binding on both the contracting parties.

(Written in the Maráthi character by RAGUBHA'U DIVA'N.) "In all seventeen Articles, on the fourth of Jemmad-ul-Akher, or fifth of Jesht Adhik, in the Shuklapaksh, in the year 1182."

(Subscribed in the Maráthi character by MAHA'DJI SINDIA.) "Agreed to what is above written in Persian."

(Signed) DAVID ANDERSON.

Witnesses :—

(Signed) JAMES ANDERSON,
(„) W. BLAINE.

(A True Translation.)
(Signed) JAMES ANDERSON.
Assistant to the Embassy.

Ratified at Fort William, the 6th of June 1782.

(The Company's Seal.)

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.
(„) EDWARD WHELER.
(„) JOHN McPHERSON.

(Signed) J. P. AURIOL,
Secretary.

The following was added at the time of the ratification at Poona and the final exchange at Gwálior:—

This treaty, consisting of seventeen articles, was ratified on the fifteenth of the month of Mohrummum-ul-Hirram, in the year 1196 of the Hygera, and shall be invariably and perpetually binding on both the contracting parties.

(Subscribed in the handwriting of NA'NA FADANAVIS.) "Done by me, BA'LA'JI JANA'RDHAN, on the 15th of Mohurum, in the year 1183," 20th December 1782.

On the 21st of Rubbi-ul-Awul, in the year 1197 of the Hygera, the above-written treaty, under the seals of the Peshwa and the signature of Báláji Pandit Fadanavis, was delivered near Gwálior, to Mr. David Anderson, and a counterpart of the same, under the seal of the Company, and the signatures of the Governor General and Council of Fort William, was in like manner delivered to Maháraja Mahádji Sindia Bahádur, by which exchange the said treaty is become complete, and from this date shall be binding on each of the contracting parties.

(Subscribed in the handwriting of MAHA'DJI SINDIA.) "21st of Rubbi-ul-Awul."

(A True Translation.)
(Signed) CHARLES WILKINS.

The counterpart subscribed by Mr. ANDERSON, 24th February 1783.

N. B.—The small seal of the Peshwa affixed to the joinings of the different sheets.

INDEX.

PAGE.

A.

Ahmadabad, capture of (1780) ... 397—399
Arras, battle of (1775) ... ... 226—229
Articles of Agreement between the Peshwa Mádhavráv Náráyan and the English East India Company 372

B.

Baragaum, battle of 381-382
Bassein, siege and surrender of...427, 428, 429, 430
Britto, Sebastião deAzavedor, Governor of Daman, letter from 325

C.

Camera, Joze Pedro de, Captain General of Goa, letter from 324-325
Campbell, Captain ... ... 412—415
Carnac, John ...340, 344, 352, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 369, 371
Circular from Raghunáthráv Bájiráv to Sardárs, Jághírdárs, and subjects of the Marátha Empire... 349-350
Cockburn, Lieutenant-Colonel ... 379, 380, 381
Coote, Sir Eyre, letter from... 445

D.

Deputation of Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to Poona 269
Diary and proceedings of John Carnac, Colonel Charles Egerton and Thomas Mostyn, a Committee appointed to accompany Rághoba to Poona... ... ... 338—379
Dubhoi, capture of 391-392

E.

Egerton, Charles, Colonel ... ... 333—338
Escape of Rághoba from Sindia's custody, General Goddard's account thereof ... 387

F.

Farmer, William Gamul, letters from ... 340, 341
Fattesing Gáikawár, treaty with ... 392—396
French intrigues ... ... 290—300, 331-332

G.

Goddard, Thomas, Brigadier-General, letters from...343, 345, 387, 388, 389, 391, 399, 400, 402, 403, 405, 406, 407, 408—413, 432, 433—438, 449, 452, 453, 456, 457, 477

PAGE.

H.

Haider Alli, letter from 308
Hartley, James, Lieutenant-Colonel ...378, 423, 424, 425, 426, 434, 436
Hastings, Warren, Governor-General, letters from ...233, 235, 242, 246, 270—276, 285, 299, 308, 309, 314, 317, 328, 386, 420, 448, 457, 468, 474, 476, 478

I.

Instructions (President and Council's) to Colonel Keating...215; to Colonel Egerton...349—350; to General Goddard... 389; to Lieutenant-Colonel James Hartley. 390

K.

Kalyán, capture of ... ... 413—415
Keating, Lieutenant-Colonel, instructions to ...215—217; letters from...217—230, 281, 282, 283
King of England, Rághobá's letter to the... 282

M.

Macartney, the Right Hon'ble Lord... 461—462
Mádhavráv, Peshwa, letter from ... 286-287
Mahádji Sindia 400-401
Minute by Brigadier-General Gordon on Rághobá's affairs 285
Minutes of the consultation held by the Poona Committee at Wargaum on the 15th January 1779 ... ... 377—379
Mostyn, Thomas, letters from ... 305, 312, 321
Mudáji Bhonsla 355

N.

Nána Fadanavis, letter from 441

P.

Purandhar, Treaty of (1775) ... 277—280

R.

Rághoba—defeated by the ministerial forces... 211; his negotiations with the Bombay Government, who conclude an offensive treaty with him...211—215; troops sent to his assistance under Colonel Keating... 215; Rághoba forms a junction with the English forces at Darra...220; engagement with the ministerial army at Arras... 226—229; the Bengal Government disapprove of the action of the Bombay Government...237—239; Colonel Upton sent by the Bengal Government to enter into a

PAGE.

treaty with the Poona Ministers...269-270; the conclusion of the Treaty of Purandhar.. 276—280; the Ministers agree to pay Rághoba three lákhs of rupees annually on his disbanding his army...*Ibid*; Rághoba declines to accede to the terms stipulated... 281; his letter to the King of England... 282-283; his coming to Bombay objected to by the Poona Ministers...285-286; Sakhárám Bápu and other Ministers make overtures to Bombay Government to bring Rághoba to Poona...300; the Bengal Government authorizes the Bombay Government to take Rághoba to Poona...309-310; the Bombay Government makes a fresh treaty with him for carrying him to Poona...333—338; instructions to Colonel Egerton to accompany Rághoba with a body of forces and establish him in the office of Peshwa...333; he follows the army but tarries on the road...339; his circular to the subjects of the Marátha State...349-350; the English Army with Rághoba proceeds to Khandála and thence to the Mondhurna plains...351—357; they are opposed by the ministerial forces...358—364; the ministerial party demands the surrender of Rághoba...368; he voluntarily delivers himself to Mahádji Sindia...369; his escape from the hands of Mahádji Sindia 387

PAGE.

Return of the killed and wounded in the battle fought at Baragaum on the 12th January 1779 between the Maráthás and the English 382

Return of the killed and wounded in the capture of Ahmadabad (1780) 400

S.

Sakhárám Bápu, Peshwá's Minister, letter from... 246

Sálbái, Treaty of 478

St. Lubin 323, 334, 327

T.

Taylor, William, his letter to the Governor General recapitulating important events of the Marátha Empire from its foundation to the year 1775. ... ... 248—268

Treaties; treaty with Rághoba (1775)...212—215; Treaty of Purandhar (1776)...277—280; second treaty with Rághoba (1778)... 334; treaty with Fattesing Gáikawár (1780)...394; treaty of Sálbái (1782) ... 478

U.

Upton, Lieutenant-Colonel... 273, 276, 277, 280, 283, 284, 286

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